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*Cum permissu superiorum.*

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## WAS ANSELM A REALIST? THE *MONOLOGIUM*<sup>1</sup>

In his book *The Logic of St. Anselm*,<sup>2</sup> D. P. Henry calls into question the traditional view that Anselm is a realist. Henry gives three, not obviously equivalent explanations of what a "crude" or "primitive" realist is. According to the first (pp. 96, 98), the realist thinks that general terms such as 'man' have meaning in the same way that proper names do: by standing for or referring to some entity. But where proper names stand for or refer to particular entities, general terms stand for or refer to universal entities—which the realist takes to be *mind-independent*. According to the second (pp. 99–107), a realist is someone who believes universal entities or classes are or exist in the same sense that Socrates and Plato are or exist. As a third criterion of the realist position (p. 107), Henry suggests the claim that universal entities are connumerable with particular entities. Henry argues that in *De Grammatico* Anselm was trying, despite the hinderance of ordinary Latin, to distinguish two senses of 'is' or 'exists': a "ground-level" 'is' in which particulars like Socrates and Plato are said to exist; and a "higher level" 'is' in which universal substances are said to exist. Using this distinction, Henry tries to explain away apparent evidence in *Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi* that Anselm was a realist.

It is not my purpose in this paper to dispute what Henry says about Anselm's views in *De Grammatico*, or for that matter in *Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi*. But, in my opinion, Henry gives the evidence in the *Monologium* short shrift. Recognizing that "a better case for Anselm's realism might be based on the proof of the existence of God given in the *Monologium*," Henry says that "such a case is inconclusive" because "other writers who cannot be described as 'realists' in the full sense have been prepared to use such a proof in

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to my husband, Robert Merrihew Adams, for helpful comments on this paper. The translations are my own.

<sup>2</sup> *The Logic of Saint Anselm*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1967. Page references are to that work.

their natural theology" (p. 99). But after elaborating the distinction between the ground-level and higher level 'is', Henry never returns to the text of the *Monologium* to see whether the distinctions fits what Anselm says there. In what follows, I shall do just that and argue that Anselm cannot have had this distinction in mind when he wrote the *Monologium*.

## I

Before examining the *Monologium* itself, we need to have before us a more detailed account of the distinction Henry attributes to Anselm between the ground-level '...is...' and what Henry labels '...is\*...'. In his books and articles, Henry draws on Leśniewski's Ontology and spells out his points in terms of the formal language of that system. For our purposes, however, it will suffice to consider the more nearly "Englished" versions of his analyses.

To begin with, lower case letters such as 'a' and 'b' range over proper and concrete common nouns ('Socrates', 'Plato', 'man', 'animal') and concrete adjectives used as substantives ('album', 'bonum', etc. which would often be translated into English as 'white thing', 'good thing'). The the ground-level '...is...' takes such names and name-like expressions as completions.

(.1) <sup>3</sup> *a* is *b*.

is a statement involving the groud-level '...is...' that is true if either 'a' and 'b' name the same individual and only that individual (e.g., 'Cicero is Tully') or 'a' names one of the things named by 'b' (e.g., 'Socrates is a man').

Weak Identity is defined as follows.

(.3) For all *a* and *b*, *a* is weakly identical with *b*, if and only if for all *c*, *c* is *a* if and only if *c* is *b*.

That is, *a* and *b* are weakly identical, if the extension of '*a*' is identical with the extension of '*b*'.

Greek letter such as 'Φ' and 'Ψ' range over predicate or predicate expressions, according to Henry. In two places (p. 102 and p. 103) he says predicate expressions are "verbs or verb-like expressions which require one name-completion in order to form a sentence." But the the sentences in Anselm which he interprets as involving the higher-level '...is\*...' of which predicate expressions are the legiti-

<sup>3</sup> To avoid confusion, I will use Henry's numbering for these analyses.

mate competitions, seldom are explicitly of this form. Rather predicate expressions seem to include abstract nouns like 'humanity' and 'literacy' as well as concrete common nouns and adjectives (capitalized and italicized like '*Man*' and '*White*') where it is clear that they are doing duty for the corresponding abstract noun. Henry then defines the higher-level '...is\*' as follows.

- (.4) For all  $\Phi$  and  $\Psi$ ,  $\Phi$  is\*  $\Psi$ , if and only if for some  $a$ ,  $\Phi$  of  $a$  and  $\Psi$  of  $a$ , and for all  $b$ ,  $\Phi$  of  $b$  if and only if  $a$  is weakly identical with  $b$ .

To say  $\Phi$  is\*  $\Psi$ , is to say that there is (ground level) at least one thing named by ' $a$ ' such that it satisfies  $\Phi$  and  $\Psi$ , and all the things that satisfy  $\Phi$  satisfy  $\Psi$ . For example, the statement 'Honesty is\* a virtue' means that there is (ground-level) at least one thing that satisfies Honesty (i.e., has honesty or is honest) and that satisfies Virtue (i.e., has virtue or is virtuous). Henry emphasizes that '...is\*' is a "completely unproblematic but higher type of '...is...'" (p. 103) — unproblematic in the sense that to say  $\Phi$  is\*  $\Psi$  does not posit any universal entities  $\Phi$  and  $\Psi$  on the ground level.

Finally, Henry contrasts 'There exists (ground-level) exactly one  $a$ ' which is analysed as

- (.5) For all  $a$ , there exists exactly one  $a$ , if and only if for some  $b$ ,  $a$  is  $b$ .

with 'There exists\* exactly one  $\Phi$ ' which is analysed as

- (.6) For all  $\Phi$ , there exists\* exactly one  $\Phi$ , if and only if for some  $\Psi$ ,  $\Phi$  is\*  $\Psi$ .

Referring to (.4), we see that to say that there exists\* exactly one Honesty, is to say that there is some predicate expression ' $\Psi$ ' and some name-like expression ' $a$ ', such that there is (ground level) at least one thing named by ' $a$ ' that satisfies Honesty and satisfies  $\Psi$ , and all the things that satisfy Honesty satisfy  $\Psi$ . Since  $\Psi$  is unspecified, this comes to little more than saying that at least one thing that exists on the ground-level is (ground-level) honest. Thus, to say that there exists\* exactly one Honesty, obviously does not posit any universal entity Honesty on the ground-level either.

Henry notes (p. 101) Anselm's distinction of what is signified by 'white' *per se* and what is signified by 'white' *per aliud* and identifies the former with the meaning (evidently, the sense) and the latter with the reference. What is signified by 'white' *per se* is the same for each standard use of the term 'white', but the intended reference,

what is signified *per aliud*, is not. Presumably, too, it is only what is signified *per aliud* that is on the ground-level. What is signified *per se* is\*.

## II

In the *Monologium*, c.i, Anselm argues that there is a being that is supremely good. In c.ii, he indicates that the same form of argument shows that there is a being that is supremely great. In c.iii, he uses a slightly more complicated version of the same argument to show that there is a nature that exists *per se* and is that through which all things exist. Since the issue we are interested in will be the same for each argument, let us concentrate on the argument in c.i. It may be set out as follows.

1. All the things that are said to be something *F* in such a way that by mutual comparison they are said to be *F* more or less or equally, are said to be it through something *F*-ness which is not one thing in one case and another in another.
2. We learn by our senses and reasoning faculty that there are diverse and innumerable goods which if compared would prove equally or unequally good.
3. Therefore, there is some one thing through which all goods are good. (1,2)
4. The thing through which all *F*'s are *F* is a great *F*.
5. Therefore, the thing through which all *F*'s are *F* is *F* *per se*. (4, analytic)
6. Therefore, the thing through which all goods are good is Good *per se*. (3, substitution in 5)
7. It is better to be *F* *per se* than to be *F* *per aliud*.
8. Therefore, there is something Good *per se*, which is supremely good.

Suppose we try to interpret this argument on the assumption that Anselm did distinguish between ground-level '...is...' and '...is\*...' in the *Monologium* and so avoided realism (in the second sense) even in his earliest work. To do so, we shall have to construe the first three steps as follows.

- I'. All the things that are said to be (ground-level) *F* in greater, lesser, or equal degree, are said to be (ground-level) *F* through something which is\* the same in diverse things.

- 2'. We learn by our senses and reasoning faculty that there are (ground-level) diverse and innumerable goods which if compared would prove equally or unequally good.
- 3'. Therefore, there is\* some one thing through which all goods are (ground-level) good.

(1') can be construed as a material mode version of the claim that in every standard use of the term 'good', no matter what the intended reference is, the sense is the same. (3') asserts that the one significatum that is common to all these standard uses of the term 'good' is\*. But what does this assertion

There is\* exactly one Goodness.

come to? To see, we must first apply Henry's (.6) to get

For some  $\Psi$ , Goodness is\*  $\Psi$ .

But applying (.4) we get

For some  $\Psi$ , for some  $a$  Goodness of  $a$  and  $\Psi$  of  $a$  and for all  $b$ ,  
Goodness of  $b$  if and only if  $a$  is weakly identical with  $b$ .

This asserts that there is at least one individual on the ground level that satisfies Goodness and  $\Psi$  and that all the individuals that satisfy Goodness satisfy  $\Psi$ . As we saw above, this comes to little more than saying that at least one individual that exists on the ground level has goodness or is good – which is no more than what is asserted by (2'). (3') certainly does not assert the existence on the ground level of some universal entity Goodness.

The interpretation of (4) is problematic, if we understand ' $F$ ' to range over name-like expressions capable of completing the ground-level '...is...' For suppose we understand the 'is' to be the ground-level 'is'. The ' $F$ -ness is a great  $F$ ' is not a well-formed formula. For ' $F$ -ness' is not a legitimate completion of the ground-level '...is...'. On the other hand, if we understand it to be '...is\*...' it is still not a well-formed formula, since ' $F$ ' so understood, is not a legitimate completion of the schema '...is\*...'. The only way to render (4) as a well-formed formula is to ignore the qualification 'great' and take ' $F$ ' in (4) to range over concrete common nouns or adjectives *taken as equivalent to their corresponding abstract nouns*. That is, we must understand ' $F$ ' as equivalent to ' $F$ -ness'. Then (4) becomes

(4')  $F$ -ness is\*  $F$ -ness.

Applying (.4) to (4') we get

For some  $a$ ,  $F$ -ness of  $a$  and  $F$ -ness of  $a$ , and for all  $b$ ,  $F$ -ness of  $b$  if and only if  $a$  is weakly identical with  $b$ .

The latter says only that at least one individual on the ground-level satisfies *F*-ness — that is, has *F*-ness or is *F*.

(5) becomes

(5') The thing through which all *F*'s are (ground-level) *F*, is\* *F per se*.

That is, that through which all *F*'s are *F* is what is signified *per se* by the term '*F*'. Thus,

(6') The thing through which all goods are (ground-level) good, is\* Good *per se*.

So far as I can see, this interpretation wrecks the rest of the argument. For applying this distinction to the argument, (7) asserts that what is *F per se* — i.e., the sense of the term '*F*' — is better than that which is *F per aliud* — i.e., the reference of the term '*F*'. The latter claim does not make sense, since what is *F per se* is not good at the same level as what is *F per aliud* and thus cannot be compared in this way with what is *F per aliud*. If Anselm had been systematically distinguishing ground-level '...is...' from '...is\*' in the *Monologium*, he would not have advanced (6)–(8) as sound.

The main difficulty in trying to apply Henry's distinction to this argument, however, centers around (3'). Did Anselm really take himself to be proving that there is\* some one thing through which all goods are good?

At first glance, Anselm's discussion in *Monologium*, c.xxvii, suggests that he did. Anselm has identified things whose existence he has proved in cc.i,ii, and iii, with each other and with the supreme nature. In c.xxvii, Anselm says that the supreme nature is neither a secondary substance since it is not a universal that is shared by many individuals, nor a primary substance since it is not an individual that has a universal essence in common with others. The latter denial that the supreme nature is a primary substance might be taken as a denial that the supreme nature is on the ground level. But by the same reasoning, one could take the denial that the supreme nature is a secondary substance as a denial that the supreme nature is\*. So this passage does not really give evidence that Anselm wanted to establish that that through which all good things are good, is\*. <sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> It is not clear that this passage can be reconciled with the rest of what Anselm says. If, as Anselm says, the Ideas by virtue of which changing things have the natures and properties they have, exist in and are identical with the mind of the supreme nature, it would seem that in some sense the supreme na-

Further, when we examine what else Anselm says about the supreme nature in the *Monologium*, it is clear that he did not intend to be proving in step (3) that the Goodness through which all things are good is\*. To begin with, in cc.iv-viii, Anselm argues that the supreme nature created all things other than itself out of nothing, where the supreme nature is that whose existence is proved when the existence of Goodness is proved in c.i. But, as we have seen above, if (3) is understood as (3'), it asserts merely that at least one good thing exists on the ground level — which is no more than is asserted by (2'). It says nothing about anything that could be the cause of the existence of all those good things mentioned by (2'), let alone about anything that could create them out of nothing. Further, in c.xv, where Anselm is trying to establish what the essential properties of the supreme nature are, he makes it perfectly plain that he thinks the supreme nature could exist even if nothing else existed.

Thus, this expression — that the supreme nature is the highest of all things or that it is greater than all the things that have been made by it, or any other similarly relative expression — which can be said of it, does not designate its natural essence. For if none of those things in relation to which it is said to be highest or greater, ever existed, it would be understood to be neither highest nor greater. Nevertheless, it would not therefore be less good and it would in no way suffer detriment to its essential greatness.

This clearly implies that Anselm thinks he has proved in cc.i,ii, and iii, the existence of something that would exist even if none of the things mentioned in (2') existed, and would be both good and great. But (3') does not assert the existence of anything not already mentioned in (2'), let alone the existence of something that would exist and be good and great even if nothing else existed. And in fact, if Anselm had not thought that the supreme nature would exist even if nothing else existed, he would not have been willing to conclude in c.lxxix that the supreme nature is worthy of worship and ought to be called "God."

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ture is a universal essence shared by many. The contrast between the two senses of 'substance' here is Aristotle's, however. And it may be that Anselm has in mind the "Aristotelian" secondary substances that are in sensibles but not separable from them. Anselm would emphatically deny that the supreme nature *inheres* in many. Instead, he seems to understand the Platonic relation of participation between changing things and Ideas, not in terms of inherence of the Idea in the changing things, but in terms of imperfect resemblance.

Moreover, in cc.xv–xvi, Anselm argues that the supreme nature is all those things it is universally, better to be than not to be — viz., living, wise, powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, immutable, and incorruptible — *per se*. If (3') says that what is the supreme nature is\*, then we must understand the statements in cc.xv–xvi to assert that the supreme nature *is\** living, wise, powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, immutable, and incorruptible *per se*. What would such a statement mean? Since '*F per se*' is equivalent to '*F-ness*', let us substitute 'Life' for 'living *per se*', 'Wisdom' for 'wise *per se*', 'Powerfulness' for 'powerful *per se*'. Since the supreme nature is identified with the Goodness proved in c.i, let us ask what the statement 'Goodness *is\** Life, Wisdom, and Powerfulness' means. Applying (.4), we get

For some *a*, Goodness of *a* and Life of *a* and Wisdom of *a* and Powerfulness of *a*, and for all *b*, Goodness of *b* if and only if *a* is weakly identical with *b*.

But this means that there is on the ground level at least one good thing that is also living, wise, and powerful, and that all the good things are (ground level) living, wise, and powerful. But Anselm would have regarded the second half of this statement as false. The discussion in c.xv makes it clear that he thinks non-living things are good. For he says that to be gold is better than to be lead. Gold could not be *better* than lead if it were not *good* in some degree. Since only living things can be wise, it is obvious that Anselm would not say that all good things are wise either. Similarly, if a gold ring is good, it is obvious that a thing does not have to be powerful in order to be good, on Anselm's view. Thus, it seems entirely unreasonable to take Anselm as saying in cc.xv–xvi that the supreme nature *is\** living, wise, powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, immutable, and incorruptible *per se*.<sup>5</sup>

The most natural way to understand the argument in *Monologium*, c. i, is to understand it as offered by someone who does not draw the distinction Henry suggests but who would say that there

<sup>5</sup> Surprisingly, this is one of the passages of the *Monologium* that Henry focuses on in demonstrating Anselm's logical subtlety as opposed to the *alleged* simple-minded approach of Ockham who "unceasingly strives to make technical language pointless." (p. 26) In sections 2.22–2.24, Henry fixes on a passage in *Summa Logicae* I.7 where Ockham says that he will tolerate imprecise talk of Socrates *having* his humanity (whereas, for Ockham, strictly speaking Socrates

is a single sense of 'is' in which it is true to say both that Socrates and Plato are and are good and that Goodness is and is good. If we interpret all the occurrences of 'is' univocally, (1) is readily recognizable as the premiss cited in *Parmenides* 132A1–B2 as a reason for believing in the existence of Platonic Ideas. Step (4) is the familiar Self–Predication assumption. The inference of (5) from (4) is the familiar Self–Predication assumption. The inference of (5) from (4) is understood this way: If *F*–ness is that through which *all* things are *F* and is itself one of the *F*'s, then it must be *F* through *F*–ness, too — i.e., it must be *F per se*. It is evident that *F*–ness is regarded as connumerable with *F*'s in this reasoning. The rationale behind (7) can be understood in terms of the claim that what is causally independent is better than what is causally dependent (whether material, efficient, formal, or final causes are at stake).

It seems, then, that we can make the best sense of Anselm's argument in the *Monologium*, c.i (and thus of the arguments in cc.ii and iii), if we suppose that he did not distinguish ground-level '...is...' from '...is\*...' in that work and that he did regard what is *F per se* as connumerable with particular entities we observe by the senses and reason — that is, if we suppose that he was a realist in the second and third of Henry's senses. Even so Anselm would not be a realist in the first sense mentioned by Henry, according to which a realist says that universals are mind–independent. For Anselm does not wish to conclude that the Platonic Ideas exist mind–independently. If he did, the arguments in cc.i and ii would not serve his ultimate purpose, which is to prove the existence of God. Instead, Anselm assumes that no Idea could exist independently of a mind. Given this assumption, proof of the existence of Goodness *per se* and Greatness *per se*, provide premisses for inferring the existence of a mind whose Ideas they are. And, in cc. ix–xii, xxix–xxxvi, Anselm argues that all the Ideas exist in the mind of the supreme nature and, since this nature is simple, are identical with it.

Of course, nothing I have said touches Henry's case that Anselm was not a realist by the time he wrote *De Grammatico* and *Epistola*

*is* his humanity) in the same way that Anselm in *Monologium* c. 16 proposes to tolerate talk of God's *having* justice (whereas strictly God *is* justice). Ockham is surely misinterpreting if he thinks Anselm would go along with his own view that strictly speaking Socrates is his humanity. But equally, my arguments show that Henry is mistaken if he thinks that in this passage Anselm has the distinction between ground-level "...is..." and "...is\*..." in mind.

*De Incarnatione Verbi.* The *Monologium* was Anselm's first work. Henry might point out that in the Preface to the *Proslogion* Anselm confides that

After I edited, at the request of certain brothers, a little work [the *Monologium*], as an example of meditation of the grounds of faith... I began to ask myself if perhaps one argument could be found which would require for its proof nothing other than itself alone, and which alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists, and that there is a supreme good that lacks nothing and on which all things depend for their existence and well being...

The outcome of this inquiry of Anselm's was, of course, the argument in *Proslogion*, c. 2. Henry might point out that once Anselm had developed this argument, he had no more need to rely on the more cumbersome arguments of the *Monologium* for proving the existence of God. It is true, as recent discussion has pointed out,<sup>6</sup> that the argument in *Proslogion*, c. 2, does not require the realism of the *Monologium* for its soundness. On the other hand, Anselm continues in the *Proslogion* (e.g., cc. xv and xviii) to predicate abstract nouns such as 'Wisdom' and 'Life' of 'God'. And it would make no more sense to render those statements as the claim that God is\* Wisdom and Life, than it did to interpret the statements of *Monologium*, c. xv-xvi, that way. Whether Anselm was a realist when he wrote the *Proslogion*, and if so, what sort of realist he was, is a topic for further investigation.

University of Michigan

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<sup>6</sup> In a paper by Robert Merrihew Adams, "The Logical Structure of Anselm's Arguments," in the *Philosophical Review*, January, 1971.

## WALTER BURLEIGH'S TREATISE *DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS* AND ITS INFLUENCE ON WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

The interplay of William of Ockham and Walter Burleigh on the subject of supposition has been noted in a number of earlier studies. Konstanty Michalski spoke of Ockham and Burleigh fighting one another over this question. According to Michalski Burleigh's late treatment of supposition in the *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior* provides us with Walter's attack on Ockham's notion of simple supposition. The battle is not, however, one-sided according to Michalski, for Burleigh informs us that in his youth he wrote a treatise on supposition; and it is this earlier treatise which Ockham attacked in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.<sup>1</sup>

Leon Baudry evaluated Michalski's presentation of this Burleigh-Ockham interplay and found it wanting. First of all, Baudry argued, the evidence which Michalski offers to support his claim that Ockham, in his *Sentences*, attacks Burleigh is only the copyist's, or perhaps just an editor's, note in the margin of the 1508 edition. Secondly, Michalski's view is lop-sided since it deals only with the oppositions between Ockham's and Burleigh's teachings, never with any similarities. Furthermore, Michalski has failed to establish the chronology of the various works in order to show the nature of the interplay between the two authors. Baudry concluded that we have to begin all over again and, if we wish to do so, we had better take a close look at the texts themselves if we wish to see the real interplay between the two authors.<sup>2</sup>

Philotheus Boehner, in his little book entitled *Medieval Logic*, likewise studied the connection between Ockham and Burleigh on

<sup>1</sup> K. Michalski, "Les courants critiques et sceptiques dans la philosophie du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle" in *Bulletin de l'Académie polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres*, (1927), 237.

<sup>2</sup> L. Baudry, "Les rapports de Guillaume d'Occam et de Walter Burleigh" in *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, IX (1934), 172-173.

the question of supposition.<sup>3</sup> His approach is demonstrably related to the texts of the two authors, focusing on Ockham's *Summa logicae* and Burleigh's *De puritate*. Thereby Boehner overcame the first of Baudry's objections to Michalski. Secondly, he showed not only Burleigh's opposition to Ockham on the question of simple supposition but also indicated some positive influence of Ockham on Burleigh. Boehner's *Medieval Logic*, however, travels only in one direction: Ockham's influence on Burleigh. Though he noted in his edition of the *De puritate* that Burleigh had written an earlier work *De suppositionibus*, with large parts in common with the *De puritate*, Boehner never pursued an investigation concerning Burleigh's influence on Ockham.<sup>4</sup>

In the present article we will edit and study Burleigh's earlier treatise on supposition. Certainly it is the work of Burleigh. This is witnessed by the *explicits* of both manuscripts which contain it.<sup>5</sup> Also, as Boehner indicated, it has large parts in common with the *De puritate*. Furthermore, Burleigh in the *De puritate* speaks of an earlier treatise with its manifold divisions of supposition, and the *De suppositionibus* lives up to that description. It is most probably a very early work of Walter Burleigh. As both Boehner and Weisheipl indicated, unlike the *De puritate* it shows no sign of attacking Ockham at all.<sup>6</sup> Also in the *De puritate* Burleigh himself speaks of an earlier treatise on supposition as "written in my youth."<sup>7</sup> Finally, in the manuscripts it is located beside works written in 1301 and 1302, shortly after Burleigh became a Master in the Arts Faculty. We conclude therefore that it is certainly the work of Burleigh and most probably was written about 1302.

<sup>3</sup> P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic* (Manchester, 1952), 36-51.

<sup>4</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*, ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), XIII.

<sup>5</sup> London, British Museum, Royal 12 F XIX, f. 133<sup>va</sup>: "...Et ideo valet quia arguitur a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum. Explicant suppositiones datae a M. W. de Bourl'." Cambridge, Gonville et Caius 434/434, f. 19<sup>ra</sup>: "Et non, quia arguitur a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum. Explicant suppositiones datae a Magistro Waltero de Burley."

<sup>6</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate...*, XIII-XIV; J. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians" in *Mediaeval Studies*, XXX (1968), 179.

<sup>7</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate...*, 2: "Plurimas divisiones suppositionis in iuventute mea memini me scripsisse..."

If we are to appreciate the significance of this early 14th century tract *De suppositionibus* then it is important to see the setting in which it was written. We do not, thereby intend to rewrite the history of supposition,<sup>8</sup> but to recreate the atmosphere surrounding the tract *De suppositionibus* of Burleigh so we can appreciate his personal statement for its originality, its consistency with tradition, and its influence upon Ockham. In undertaking this study we do not intend to treat every aspect of his supposition theory. We simply wish to indicate some of the main points of development in his work and the influence of these points on Ockham.

In order to recreate the intellectual atmosphere surrounding Burleigh's early treatise we will examine six texts provided by De Rijk<sup>9</sup> for the period between 1130 and 1220: *Tractatus Anagnani*, *Introductiones Parisienses*, *Logica "Ut dicit,"* *Logica "Cum sit nostra,"* *Dialectica Monacensis*, and *Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum*, and four of the main authors of logical treatises later in the 13th century: William of Sherwood's *Introductiones in logicam*,<sup>10</sup> Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales*,<sup>11</sup> Roger (or Robert) Bacon's

<sup>8</sup> For the history of supposition, besides the information provided by the general logic histories of Prantl, Bochenski, and the Kneales, the following specific works are worth consulting: E. Arnold, "Zur Geschichte der Suppositionstheorie, die Wurzeln des modernen Subjektivismus" in *Symposion: Jahrbuch für Philosophie*, 3 (1952), 1-134; P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic* (Manchester, 1952); Idem, "Ockham's Theory of Truth" in *Franciscan Studies*, 5 (1945), 138-161; Idem, "Ockham's Theory of Signification" in *Franciscan Studies*, 6 (1946), 143-170; Idem, "Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the Notion of Truth" in *Franciscan Studies*, 18 (1958), 240-289; L. M. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum (II-1)*: *The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition* (Assen, 1967); D. P. Henry, « The Early History of Suppositio » in *Franciscan Studies*, 23 (1963), 205-212; Idem, *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford, 1967); N. Kretzmann, *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic* (Minneapolis, 1966); E. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York, 1935); J. P. Mullaly, *The Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain* (Notre Dame, 1945); A. R. Perreiah, « Approaches to Supposition-Theory » in *The New Scholasticism*, XLV (1971), 381-408; J. Swiniarski, *Theories of Supposition in Medieval Logic: Their Origin and their Development from Abelard to Ockham* (unpublished doctoral dissertation from the State University of New York at Buffalo, 1970).

<sup>9</sup> L. M. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum (II-2): The Origin And Early Development of the Theory of Supposition, Texts and Indices* (Assen, 1967).

<sup>10</sup> M. Grabmann, "Die *Introductiones in logicam* des Wilhelm von Shyreswood (nach 1267)" in *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse*, 10 (München, 1937).

<sup>11</sup> Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, ed. I. M. Bochenski (Rome, 1947).

*Summulae dialectices*,<sup>12</sup> and Lambert of Auxerre's *Summulae logicales*.<sup>13</sup>

A more thorough study of the development of supposition up to the time of Burleigh would demand an examination of its treatment among the theologians, especially in their commentaries on Distinction IV of Book I of the *Sentences*.<sup>14</sup> There would also be need to study Peter of Spain's (as well as the other later logicians mentioned) sources, since Peter certainly depends on others.<sup>15</sup> The works of Albert the Great and Giles of Rome also would have to be studied, since later logicians indicated them as instruments in the development of supposition.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the logical commentaries on works like Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales* also would have to be studied, for they too make their contribution to the history of supposition.<sup>17</sup> While such a thorough study would be interesting and profitable it is beyond our present task. From the examination of the ten works indicated above we can get enough of a general picture to appreciate the atmosphere into which Burleigh's treatise was born.

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<sup>12</sup> Roger Bacon, *Summa Grammatica Magistri Rogeri Bacon necnon Summulae Dialectices Magistri Rogeri Bacon* (ed. Robert Steele), Fasc. XV of *Opera hactenus inedita* (Oxford, 1940), 193–539.

<sup>13</sup> Lambert of Auxerre, *Summulae logicales* in cod. Erfurt, *Stadtbibliothek, Amploniana O. 66*. When necessary I have used cod. Padova, *Bibl. Univ. 647* to correct the text of the Erfurt manuscript.

<sup>14</sup> E.g., see St. Bonaventure, *Commentarium in I Sent.*, d. IV, art. 1, q. 1 (ed. Quaracchi), I, 97–99.

<sup>15</sup> M. L. De Rijk in the two-volume work we have already mentioned has supplied us with a great deal of material to see Peter's reliance on earlier authors. Our study will only focus on six of the works he has made available, and even then only in a limited way.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Johannes Müntzinger's *De suppositionibus* (he taught at Ulm from 1384–1387 according to M. Grabmann, "Handschriftliche For schungen und Funde zu den philosophischen Schriften des Petrus Hispanus, des spateren Papstes Johannes XXI" in *Sitzungsberichte der Baye rischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse*, 9 (München, 1936).

<sup>17</sup> Robertus Anglicus (Kilwardby?), *Commentarium in Petrum Hispanum* (Incipit: "Fons et origo omnium scientiarum...") cod. Vat. lat. 3049, supplies us with some useful historical observations at the same time that it gives us Robert's commentary on Peter's *Summulae logicales*. See below, note 25.

## A. THE DEFINITION OF SUPPOSITION

In his early work Walter provides us with a very clear statement of the nature of supposition:

Two points worth noting in this statement are: (1) the unsuitable definition ("Substantiva rei designatio"), and (2) the approved definition ("Proprietas extremi secundum quod unum extremum ordinatur ad aliud in propositione").

Viso quod pars extremi non supponit dicendum est de suppositionibus, et sciendum quod quilibet terminus et quodcumque potest esse extremum in propositione sive sit adiectivum sive substantivum sive complexum sive incomplexum. Omne tale potest supponere, ex quo patet quod haec definitio suppositionis non est conveniens: "Substantiva rei designatio," quia suppositio non magis debetur substantivo quam alii. Et ideo dicendum quod suppositio est proprietas extremi secundum quod unum extremum ordinatur ad aliud in propositione, et sic suppositio non debetur extremo extra propositionem sed solum in propositione.<sup>18</sup>

(1) When we examine the ten treatises indicated above we find that the unsuitable definition is the most common one before Burleigh. It is found in the *Introductiones Parisienses*, *Logica "Ut dicit," Logica "Cum sit nostra," Dialectica Monacensis*, *Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum*, and in the works of William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, and Roger Bacon.<sup>19</sup> Lambert of Auxerre will be a notable exception, attacking, as does Burley, the limited character of this

<sup>18</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De suppositionibus, infra*, n. 2.01.

<sup>19</sup> The *Tractatus Anagnini* has no clear definition.

*Introductiones Parisienses*: "Suppositio est quedam proprietas que inest dictioni *ex eo quod substantiva sive existenter significat*, ut [dictio] substantiva." (De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (II-2), 371).

*Logica "Ut dicit"*: "Et est suppositio substantiva rei designatio, hoc est quedam proprietas termini substantivi." (De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (II-2), 408).

*Logica "Cum sit nostra"*: "Et est suppositio substantiva rei designatio, id est significatio termini substantivi." (De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (II-2): 446).

*Dialectica Monacensis*: "Supponere siquidem est substantive [rem] significare et per se et sine dependentia tali que est in principali significatione." (De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (II-2), 606).

*Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum*: "Suppositio igitur est significatio rei sub forma substantiali perficiente cam prout sub ipsa cognitata est res ut perfectum et per se ens, non ad aliud dicta per modum accidentis, sed ad quod dicatur aliud." (De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (II-2), 712).

*William of Sherwood*: "Secundum autem quod sunt in habitu dicitur sup-

unsuitable definition.<sup>20</sup> What is occurring in the works of Lambert and Walter Burleigh is a certain unification of the manifold treatises surrounding supposition. In Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales*, for example, the tracts which are later incorporated into the single treatise on supposition are: *De suppositionibus*, *De relativis*, *De ampliationibus*, *De appellationibus*, *De restrictionibus*, and *De distributionibus*.<sup>21</sup> In Lambert and Burleigh we see in the rejection of the common definition an attempt to pull into one treatment both the *suppositio* and *copulatio* of earlier authors.<sup>22</sup> Supposition in this

*positio significatio alicuius ut subsistentis.*" (Grabmann, "Die *Introductiones in logicam*...", 74).

Peter of Spain, "Suppositio autem est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo." (Bochenski, *Summulae logicales*, 68).

Roger Bacon: "...Alio modo dicitur 'supposicio' substantiva rei designatio... De secundo modo ad praesens est intencio..." (Steele, *Sumulæ dialectices*, 268).

<sup>20</sup> Lambert of Auxerre: "Sciendum enim quod suppositio dicitur quatuor modis: uno modo dicitur suppositio substantiva rei designatio vel significatio. Secundo modo dicitur suppositio acceptio alicuius propositionis tamquam pro vera et probata sicut frequenter sumitur in disputationibus. Tertio modo dicitur suppositio ordinatio partium orationis in situ eius de quo alterum dicitur, sicut dicitur esse suppositio in nomine respectu verbi; nomen enim supponit verbo et de nomine verbum dicitur, et huic suppositioni respondet apposito et potest dici apposito ordinatio partium orationis in situ eius de altero dicitur. Quarto modo dicitur suppositio acceptio termini pro se sive pro re sua vel pro aliquibus supponentibus contentis sub re sua. Isto quarto modo est intentio hic de suppositione... Sciendum vero quod suppositio de qua hic intenditur dicitur duobus modis: communiter et proprie... Dividitur autem suppositio communiter dicta in suppositionem proprie dictam et copulationem. Communiter enim loquendo supponunt termini substantivi et adiectivi, sed proprie loquendo suppositio convenit terminis substantivis, copulatio vero adiectivis..." (cod. Erfurt, *Stadtbib. Amploniana* O. 66, f. 47<sup>rb-va</sup>).

<sup>21</sup> Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales* (ed. I. M. Bochenski), tr. 6, 8-12, pp. 57-64, 92-130. There is a certain kind of unity to these disparate treatises in the mind of Peter of Spain. For example, in tr. 9, *De ampliationibus*, he considers *ampliatio* and *restrictio* as divisions of personal supposition: "Item, personalis suppositionis alia est divisio, nam alia restricta, alia ampliata. Et ideo restrictio et ampliatio habent fieri circa personalem suppositionem" (ed. Bochenski, 100). He keeps them, however, as separate treatises. Burleigh is bringing greater unity, not simply by putting all these tracts into one tract. He could have done that without bringing a greater internal unity. By broadening his definition of supposition, by excluding natural supposition, by expanding his divisions into proper and improper and absolute and relative he more explicitly ties things together in a better internal fashion.

<sup>22</sup> In the 12th century texts *copulatio* is defined in opposition to *suppositio*. *Suppositio* is, taken in a proper sense, limited to substantive designation, whereas

broader sense of the term is the property of both substantive and adjectival terms as well as subject and predicate terms. The same unification, as Boehner indicated, will be found in Ockham's *Summa logicae*.<sup>23</sup>

(2) The second noteworthy point is the approved definition. Supposition is the property of a term *in a proposition*. This definition likewise is not the common one available in the 12th and 13th century texts we are considering, though it might be *implied* in the 12th century texts. Here Burleigh parts with Lambert who does not specify that supposition is the property of terms when used in a proposition. Walter here rather leans toward Roger Bacon who declares that "Suppositio non est proprietas nisi termini *actualiter ordinati in oracione et non extra*."<sup>24</sup> Ockham will follow Bacon and Burleigh in this matter and will accept thereby the important corollary — the demise of *natural* supposition.<sup>25</sup>

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*copulatio* is limited to adjectival designation. (See De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum...*, (II-1), 578-579). Among the 13th century authors Peter of Spain employs *suppositio* in its proper instead of broader common meaning (including *copulatio*). He uses *copulatio*, as did the 12th century logicians, for adjectival designation: *Copulatio est acceptio termini adiectivi pro aliquo*" (ed. Bochenski, 58). William of Sherwood also uses *copulatio* as opposed to *suppositio*: "Ex hiis patet, quod significatio non est in omni parte seu dictione orationis, *suppositio* autem *in nomine substantivo* tantum vel pronomine vel dictione substantive. Hec enim significant rem ut subsistentem et ordinabilem in alio. *Copulatio autem in omnibus adiectivis et participiis et verbis*" (ed. Grabmann, 74). Roger Bacon also treats *copulatio* as opposed to *suppositio*: "Et enim *copulatio* rei significatae per unam dictionem ad aliam adiectio vel adiacens inclinatio. Sic non est de substantivis nominibus, nec aliis partibus orationis aliis a *praedictis*" (ed. Steele, 289).

<sup>23</sup> P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, 37.

<sup>24</sup> Roger Bacon, *Summulae dialectices* (ed. Steele), 268.

<sup>25</sup> J. Mullaly (The *Summulae logicales...*, xlvi) and P. Boehner (*Medieval Logic*, 33-34) were at odds in their interpretation of natural supposition in the *Summulae logicales* of Peter of Spain. For Mullaly natural supposition is a property of a term considered by itself (outside of its function in a proposition). For Boehner it is a property of a term in a proposition but with the concrete occurrence in the proposition left unspecified or undetermined.

What we have noticed in studying Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, Roger Bacon, Lambert of Auxerre, Walter Burleigh and William of Ockham is that natural supposition disappears as the authors specify that supposition is the property of a term *in a proposition*. In the Commentary of Robertus Anglicus on Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales* we have found a report on a dispute concerning natural supposition. First, in his commentary, Robert explains natural and accidental supposition in the following way: "Notandum primo quod ter-

## B. THE DIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION

1. *Proper and Improper Supposition.* As we have just seen, the division of supposition into natural and accidental disappeared in Bacon, Burleigh and Ockham. Burleigh's first division of supposition will be into proper and improper. Among the ten treatises of the 12th and 13th centuries improper supposition gets very little systematic treatment.<sup>26</sup> According to Gerard Odon improper supposition has its basis in the *Etymologia* of Isidore of Seville.<sup>27</sup> It is found in the De Rijk texts studied only in the *Logica* "Ut dicit."<sup>28</sup> Among

*minus extra orationem positus habet naturalem suppositionem et tunc supponit pro omnibus qui sunt, et qui fuerunt et qui erunt, ut homo per se sumptus. Terminus vero in oratione positus habet accidentalem suppositionem et tunc supponit pro praesentibus, ut homo currit, aut pro futuris, ut homo erit, aut pro praeteritis, ut homo fuit.*" (cod. Vat. lat. 3049, f. 45<sup>rab</sup>). For Robert, then, natural supposition is the property of a term outside a proposition.

Secondly, he tells us that Frater Rogerius Bacon (ms. Frater Rogerius Daco) argues against the existence of natural supposition: "Ad aliud argumentum quod vult Frater Rogerius Daco per demonstrationem per quam ipse dicebat suppositionem naturalem non esse, idem est deceptus, quia suppositio non est tantum sub aliquo positio, immo pro alio positio. Et sic sumitur hic etc." (f. 45<sup>va</sup>).

This opposition of Bacon to natural supposition is very consistent with the definition given by Roger (Robert?) Bacon in the *Summulae dialectices*: "Suppositio non est proprietas nisi termini *actualiter* ordinati in oratione." (ed. Steele, 268). I have not, however, found in the *Summulae dialectices* or the *Compendium Studii Theologiae* any specific arguments against natural supposition.

In any case in Burleigh and Ockham natural supposition has disappeared and in the *Logica* attributed to Richard Campsall (ed. E. A. Synan in *Nine Medieval Thinkers*, 198) the author declares that to speak of natural supposition is to speak improperly: "Primo sequitur ex hoc quod ille modus loquendi quo communiter dicitur quod terminus extra propositionem habet suppositionem naturalem est *improprius et metaphoricus...*"

<sup>26</sup> It is not treated in the *Tractatus Anagnini*, *Introductiones Parisienses*, *Logica* "Cum sit nostra," *Dialectica Monacensis* or *Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum*. Neither is it found in Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales*, William of Sherwood's *Introductiones in logicam* or Lambert of Auxerre's *Summulae logicales*.

<sup>27</sup> Gerard Odon, *De suppositionibus*, cod. Paris., Bibl. nat. lat. 6441, f. 139<sup>rab</sup>: *Suppositio autem aliquando fit <per> proprium terminum, aliquando enim per alienum, ut in quibusdam figuratis locutionibus de quibus ponit Isidorus quatuor genera, ut terminus alicuius supponitur loco proprii, scilicet in locutione metaphorica et metonymica et antonomastica et synedochica...*" Isidorus, *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX*, lib. I, c. 37, n. 13 (synecdoche), n. 8 (metonymia), n. 11 (antonomasia) (ed W. M. Lindsay), Oxford, 1911.

<sup>28</sup> *Logica* "Ut dicit" (ed. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* (II-2), 447-448).

the later four 13th century authors it is found only in Roger Bacon, where it is treated very summarily.<sup>29</sup> Burleigh's tract *De suppositionibus* comes much closer to the *Logica "Ut dicit"* than to Bacon, who is missing one of the divisions, that of *synedochica*.<sup>30</sup> Ockham, in the *Summa logicae*, appears to summarize the position presented by Burleigh, using the same definitions given both by Walter and the *Logica "Ut dicit."*<sup>31</sup>

2. *Absolute and Relative Supposition.* Proper supposition, according to Burleigh, is divided first of all into absolute and relative. Walter has thus incorporated the separate treatise, *De relativis*, of other logicians into his *De suppositionibus*, once again bringing greater unity to the previously disparate treatises or treatments.<sup>32</sup> It is also worth noting that it is the treatment of the supposition of relatives which clearly shows Ockham's positive dependence on this work of Burleigh. William accepts and copies almost verbatim the whole of Walter's presentation of relative supposition.<sup>33</sup> Ockham definitely depends on Burleigh here and the link is not one of opposition but acceptance.

3. *Material and Formal Supposition.* In the earlier treatises on supposition very little attention is paid to material supposition. Among the later authors William of Sherwood does treat it, but not in detail, and Roger Bacon and Lambert of Auxerre cloak it as one type under the broad title of simple supposition.<sup>34</sup> Burleigh's definition of material supposition will become more precise in his later

<sup>29</sup> Roger Bacon, *Sumulæ dialectices* (Ed. Steele), 287–288.

<sup>30</sup> Roger Bacon, *Ibidem*.

<sup>31</sup> See above, notes 28 and 29.

<sup>32</sup> This is accomplished in Burleigh's *De suppositionibus* by making the primary division of proper suppositions: absolute and relative (*infra*, n. 2.1).

<sup>33</sup> Compare Burleigh, *De suppositionibus*, *infra*, nn. 2.5–2.67 with Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 76 (ed. Boehner), 210–213.

<sup>34</sup> William of Sherwood: "Est igitur suppositio quedam materialis, quedam formalis. Et dicitur materialis, quando ipsa dictio supponit vel pro ipsa voce absoluta vel pro ipsa dictione composita ex voce et significazione, ut si dicamus: homo est disillabum, homo est nomen." (Grabmann, *Introductiones in logicam*, 75).

Roger Bacon: (material is part of simple supposition): "Simplex suppositio est quando terminus stat pro significato vel *pro voce*, quae sunt simplicia, ut 'homo est dignissima creatura creaturarum,' 'homo est species,' 'homo est nomen,' 'homo est vox...'" (Steele, *Sumulæ dialectices*, 269).

Lambert of Auxerre: "Simplex suppositio est illa secundum quam tenetur

work, *De puritate*. He has all the ingredients in the early work and gives examples to make sure his definition is not misunderstood. In the *De puritate*, however, he has blended the ingredients in such a way that the new definition excludes the ambiguity of his earlier attempt.<sup>35</sup>

4. *Simple and Personal Supposition*. We come here to the crux of Ockham's criticism of earlier supposition theory. Burleigh, in the *De puritate*, will note that Ockham's definition of simple supposition goes against the *antiquiores*.<sup>36</sup> In his later work Walter sees his own position as the traditional one. He does not change the position he held in his earlier treatise, but despite Ockham's critique Walter holds tenaciously to the position of his youth and the tradition he inherited.<sup>37</sup>

Burleigh, and the tradition he represents, considers supposition to be simple when it supposits for its significate. For example, in the proposition "Homo est dignissima creatura creaturarum," 'homo' has simple supposition since it stands not for Socrates or Plato or any particular man, but for its significate, i.e., for something common, the species.<sup>38</sup> Ockham, whose theory of supposition parallels his

terminus *pro se* vel *pro re sua* non *habito respectu ad supposita sub se contenta*" (cod. Erfurt, *Stadtbibl. Amploniana*, O. 66, f. 48<sup>ra</sup>).

Neither Peter of Spain nor the authors between 1130-1220 treat it, though some instances of material supposition can be found as early as in the works of the eleventh century grammarians. (See L. M. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum...*, (II-1), 597, 589.

<sup>35</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De suppositionibus, infra*, n. 2.2 and *De puritate...*, 2, 3-4.

<sup>36</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate...*, 7: "Aliqui tamen reprehendunt illud dictum, scilicet quod suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro significato; dicunt enim reprehendendo antiquiores, quod illud est falsum et impossibile."

<sup>37</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate...*, 9: "Ideo dico, sicut dicere consuevi, quod quando terminus communis vel terminus concretus singularis vel singulare aggregatum supponit pro eo quod significat, quod tunc habet suppositionem simplicem."

<sup>38</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate...*, 7: "Sed sine dubio, illud est valde irrationaliter dictum, nam in ista: 'Homo est species,' secundum quod est vera, iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro suo significato. Quod probo sic: Nam certum est, quod secundum Philosophum in *Praedicamentis*, quod 'homo' est nomen secundae substantiae, ergo iste terminus 'homo' significat secundum substantiam et non significat secundam substantiam quae est genus, ergo significat speciem..."

theory of universals, rejects any *common reality* existing between individuals and interprets earlier theories of simple supposition as holding a *common reality* corresponding to our common concepts. Ockham redefines simple supposition declaring that the supposition of a term is simple when the term suppositis “*pro intentione animae*”, which properly speaking is not the significate of the term because a supposing term signifies true things, not mental intentions.<sup>39</sup> For Ockham when the supposing term stands for its significate (a true thing) then you have personal supposition, since the only true things are individuals.<sup>40</sup>

Burleigh, in the *De puritate*, sees Ockham's position as a novelty is disagreement with the traditional logicians, with Aristotle, with Priscian and with himself. He maintains his “realist” stance and points out the very irrational character of William's position.<sup>41</sup>

### C. THE RELATION BETWEEN BURLEIGH'S TWO TREATMENTS OF SUPPOSITION

Walter, in the first chapter of the *De puritate*, declares :

Plurimas divisiones suppositionis in iuventute mea memini me scripsisse, sed in praesenti opusculo nolo tot membra ponere quia ad praesens propositum sufficiunt pauciora.<sup>42</sup>

His declaration is deceiving in two ways. First, one would expect less divisions and complexity in the *De puritate*. In fact there is more complexity and the divisions are not reduced in any effective sense.

<sup>39</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 64 (ed. Boehler), 178 : “...Quia suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae proprie non est significatum termini, quia terminus talis significat veras res et non intentiones animae.” Also *Summa logicae*, I, c. 66 (ed. Boehler), 184-185 : “Ideo dicendum est, sicut prius, quod suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae est communis per praedicationem pluribus, aliquando autem est propria uni. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil est a parte rei, quin sit simpliciter singulare.

Unde error istorum omnium, qui credebant aliquid esse in re praeter singularē, et quod humanitas, quae est distincta a singularibus est aliquid in individuis et de essentia eorum, induxit eos in istos errores et multos alios logicales.”

<sup>40</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 64 (ed. Boehler), 177 : “Suppositio personalis universaliter est illa, quando terminus supponit pro significato...”

<sup>41</sup> See *supra*, note 38.

<sup>42</sup> Walter Burleigh, *De puritate...*, 2.

Indeed, there are more subdivisions in some areas. Secondly, Walter gives the impression that he is remembering something he has not at hand. When you see the two texts you see that there are many parts in common, some even verbatim.<sup>43</sup> He must have had a copy of the *De suppositionibus* in front of him when he wrote the *De puritate*.

They are, however, two different works. The *De suppositionibus*, as we mentioned, shows no sign of Ockham in its construction. The *De puritate* very definitely is written against Ockham, answering the *Summa logicae* on many points. The *De puritate* treatise on supposition is a restatement of Burleigh's *De suppositionibus* in light of Ockham's *Summa logicae* critique of the "realist" position.

<sup>43</sup> The correspondents between the *De suppositionibus* and the *De puritate* can be lined up as follows:

<i>De supp.</i>	<i>De puritate</i>
1.1	pp. 1-2
1.2; 1.21; 1.22	p. 47
2.01	p. 2
2.1	p. 2
2.2	p. 2
2.3	pp. 3, 11, 12, 13-14
2.31	pp. 13, 14-15
2.32	pp. 11-12
2.4	pp. 3, 19-20
2.41	p. 20
2.411	pp. 22, 23
2.412	pp. 21-22
2.413	pp. 23-24
2.414	pp. 22-23
2.42	p. 25
2.421	p. 25
2.422	p. 26
2.423	p. 27
2.424	p. 26
2.425	p. 26
2.5; 2.6	p. 28
2.61	p. 28
2.611	pp. 28-29
2.612	p. 29
2.613	p. 29
2.614	p. 29
2.615	p. 30
2.62	p. 30
2.620	p. 30

**D. THE RELATION OF OCKHAM'S *SUMMA LOGICAE*  
TO BURLEIGH'S *DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS***

In his treatment of supposition William of Ockham has not limited himself to the positions of earlier logicians. If we look at his commentary on Distinction IV of Book I of the *Sentences*, where he examines supposition in statements about the triune God, we find that he opposes the positions of St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent.<sup>44</sup>

In searching for the sources of Ockham's treatise on supposition in the *Summa logicae* we must keep open the possibility of contributions from many directions and not be led too quickly by the marginal notes of the Avignon and Cambridge, Gonville and Caius, manuscripts pointing to Walter Burleigh.<sup>45</sup> Ockham definitely knew the *De suppositionibus* of Burleigh. A comparison of Burleigh's treatment of the supposition of relatives with that of Ockham shows that William practically copied the whole section from Burleigh.<sup>46</sup> This is the only place where we find exact correspondence. Also Ockham seems to summarize Burleigh's presentation of improper supposition. Of course there are places where Ockham opposes positions which are held by Burleigh in the *De suppositionibus*. Yet, Burleigh there is presenting the traditional positions, so Ockham is

<i>De supp.</i>	<i>De puritate</i>
2.621	pp. 30-31
2.63	p. 31
2.64	pp. 31-32
2.66	p. 32
2.67	p. 33
2.7 ; 2.71 ; 2.72 ; 2.73	p. 46
3.1 ; 3.3.	pp. 20-21
3.2 ; 3.4	pp. 19-20
3.5	p. 4
4.3	pp. 5-6
6.1 ; 6.2 ; 6. 3	p. 49
6.41 ; 6.42	pp. 49-50
8.1	pp. 39-40

<sup>44</sup> William of Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.*, d. IV, q. 1 (ed. Lugdun.) CD. See St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae*, Ia pars, q. 39, art. 3 and Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 54, a. 3 (II, ff. 81 Y-82 Z).

<sup>45</sup> See the variant readings for these notations in Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, cc. 63 and 64 (ed. Boehner), 177 and 179.

<sup>46</sup> See above, note 33.

not simply opposing Burleigh but positions which are "in the air," the generally accepted positions.

Ockham's attack on simple supposition is explicitly presented as an attack on the common position: "Ex hoc patet falsitas opinionis *communiter dicentium*, quod suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato."<sup>47</sup> Ockham is attacking Burleigh's position but not only Burleigh's position. Also Ockham is opposing Burley when he says: "Opinio *dicentium*, quod in ista: 'Homo est dignissima creaturarum' subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem, est simpliciter falsa,"<sup>48</sup> but again he is opposing others as well as Burleigh.<sup>49</sup> It is clear then that Burleigh's *De suppositionibus*, while a source for Ockham's treatment of supposition in his *Summa logicae*, is not necessarily Ockham's only source, even on those points where Ockham clearly opposes Burleigh's position.

Furthermore, Ockham seems to have other authors in mind on certain points. When he declares, for example:

Est autem sciendum, quod non dicitur suppositio personalis, quia supponit pro persona, nec simplex quia supponit pro simplici, nec materialis, quia supponit pro materia, sed propter causas dictas."<sup>50</sup>

it seems quite likely that he has Roger Bacon in mind.<sup>51</sup>

Also when he argues:

Ex quo sequitur, quod falsum est, quod aliqui ignorantes dicunt, quod concretum a parte praedicati supponit pro forma, videlicet quod in ista: 'Sortes est albus,' li 'albus' supponit pro albedine; nam haec est simpliciter falsa: 'Albedo est alba,' qualitercumque termini supponant. Ideo numquam concretum tale supponit pro forma tali significata per suum abstractum (secundum viam Aristotelis).<sup>52</sup>

it seems that he *primarily* has in mind Henry of Ghent, whom he attacked on this point in his *Commentary on the Sentences*.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>47</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 64 (ed. Boehner), 178.

<sup>48</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 66 (ed. Boehner), 182.

<sup>49</sup> See William of Sherwood, *Introductiones in logicam* (ed. Grabmann), 77. Also see Roger Bacon, *Sumulæ dialectices* (ed. Steele), 269.

<sup>50</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 64 (ed. Boehner), 179.

<sup>51</sup> Roger Bacon, *Sumulæ dialectices* (ed. Steele), 271: "Secundo modo est quando terminus communis stat pro suo significato, quare non dicetur personalis simpliciter nec proprie, sed simplex, suscipiens denominacionem a forma simplici pro qua supponit, sicut personalis a persona pro qua supponit."

<sup>52</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, c. 63 (ed. Boehner), 176.

<sup>53</sup> William of Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.*, d. IV, q. 1 (ed. Lugdun.) D.

In short, Burleigh's *De suppositionibus* is one of the sources for Ockham's *Summa logicae*, at times supplying him with material he adopts, at times sharing with the works of others the role of opposition. Also it is one of the sources which Ockham opposes in his *Commentary on the Sentences* when he attacks the traditional definition of simple supposition.<sup>54</sup> Michalski was right about the interplay of Ockham and Burleigh on the question of supposition even though he didn't have the evidence capable of supporting his claim.

Michalski and Prantl have left modern students with the impression that the logical writings of Burleigh are quite sterile.<sup>55</sup> Boehner tried to overcome this exaggerated and severe judgment.<sup>56</sup> Shapiro and his associates with their editions of short questions of Burleigh have also attempted to bring Walter's value into a truer focus.<sup>57</sup> In our edition of his *De suppositionibus* we hope to supply scholars with more material for study. We have touched some general points of the treatise, but there is yet room for a full study of the work or a thorough comparative study of supposition in the

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He could also have in mind Burley as well, if we follow the interpretation of Desmond P. Henry in "Ockham, *Suppositio*, and Modern Logic" in *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, V (1964), 290–292.

<sup>54</sup> William of Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.*, d. IV, q. 1 (ed. Lugdun.) EF.

<sup>55</sup> C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (Leipzig, 1867), III, 297–306. K. Michalski, "La Physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle" in *Bulletin de l'Académie polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres*, (1927), 95–102.

<sup>56</sup> P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, 44–50.

<sup>57</sup> H. Shapiro and M. J. Kitely, "Walter Burley's *De relativis*" in *Franciscan Studies*, 22 (1962), 155–171; H. Shapiro, "Walter Burley's *De ente*" in *Manuscripta*, 7 (1963), 103–108; H. Shapiro, "De primo et ultimo instanti de Walter Burley" in *Estudios Franciscanos*, 64 (1963), 425–441; H. Shapiro and C. Shapiro, "De quantitatibus des Walter Burleigh" in *Franciskanische Studien*, 45 (1963), 256–260; H. Shapiro, "Walter Burley's 'De Deo, natura et arte'" in *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 15 (1963), 86–90; H. Shapiro and C. Shapiro, "De primo et ultimo instanti des Walter Burley" in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 47 (1965), 157–173; H. Shapiro and F. Scott, "Walter Burley's text *De diffinitione*" in *Mediaeval Studies* 27 (1965), 337–340; H. Shapiro and F. Scott, "Walter Burley's *De potentia activa et passiva*" in *Modern Schoolman*, 43 (1965–1966), 179–182; Walter Burley: *De sensibus* (ed. H. Shapiro and F. Scott), *Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Instituts der Universität München*, 13 (München, 1966); H. Shapiro and F. Scott, "Walter Burley's *De toto et parte*" in *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, XXXIII (1966), 299–303; Walter Burley, *De formis* (ed. F. Scott), *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 4 (München, 1970).

*De suppositionibus* and the *De puritate*. Our appreciation of the *De suppositionibus* is such that we see it as a work marked by a certain originality in the way in which it has unified the previously disparate treatises. On certain points, furthermore, (e.g., the definition of supposition ; improper supposition ; material supposition) Burleigh expresses himself either more clearly or more elaborately than the ten other works we considered. The main thrust, despite a certain originality, is traditional. Burleigh follows the main idea of earlier supposition theory with its "realist" conception of universals.<sup>58</sup> From our study, then, Burleigh appears as a relatively original author who is basically traditional and an important source for the study of Ockham.

In the preparation of our text-edition we have used the two known manuscripts : London, *British Museum, Royal 12 F XIX*, ff. 130<sup>ra</sup>-133<sup>va</sup> and Cambridge, *Gonville and Caius 434/434*, ff. 13<sup>ra</sup>-19<sup>ra</sup>, employing the former, which carries a slightly better text, as our basic document. Both manuscripts have already been adequately described in their respective catalogues.<sup>59</sup> Neither manuscript in itself supplies us with a good text. Each has major omissions and some poor readings. Together, however, they give an adequate text. Because of the many similarities between the *De suppositionibus* and the *De puritate* the latter also aided us in choosing the preferred variant. The symbols employed are :

R – London, *British Museum, Royal 12 F XIX*

C – Cambridge, *Gonville and Caius 434/434*.

<sup>58</sup> P. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, 48.

<sup>59</sup> G. F. Warner and J. P. Gilson, *Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collection of the British Museum* (London, 1921) II, 66-68. M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the library of Gonville and Caius College* (Cambridge, 1908), II, 504.

⟨De suppositionibus secundum Gualterum Burlaeum⟩

(1.1) Eorum quae dicuntur quaedam dicuntur cum complexione et quaedam dicuntur sine complexione. Ea quae dicuntur<sup>1</sup> sine complexione sunt ut 'homo,' 'animal'; et ea quae dicuntur cum complexione sunt ut "Homo currit," "Animal currit."<sup>2</sup> Ex quo patet quod incomplexum est pars complexi. Et quia<sup>3</sup> ad cognitionem totius multum valet cognitio partis, ideo in hoc tractatu est dicendum<sup>4</sup> de incomplexis et de proprietatibus incomplexorum, ut de suppositione et<sup>5</sup> appellatione, quoniam cognitio istorum multum valet ad cognitionem propositionis, et per consequens ad cognitionem syllogismi. Et sumitur incomplexum in proposito<sup>6</sup> non solum pro dictione simplici, sicut<sup>7</sup> est iste terminus 'homo' vel iste terminus<sup>8</sup> 'animal,' sed accipitur incomplexum in proposito<sup>9</sup> pro quolibet quod potest esse extreum in propositione sive sit extreum<sup>10</sup> compositum ex adiectivo et substantivo sive sit compositum mediante copulatione<sup>11</sup> vel mediante disiunctione.<sup>12</sup>

(1.2) De suppositionibus et appellationibus, quae sunt proprietates terminorum in propositionibus, est intentio breviter pertractare, sed antequam dicamus<sup>13</sup> de suppositionibus videamus qui termini supponunt et qui<sup>14</sup> non supponunt. Et sciendum quod pars extremi non habet suppositionem sed toti extremo debetur suppositio, et ideo propter habitudinem inter partes extremorum non oportet consequiam valere. Per<sup>15</sup> hoc patet quod haec consequentia non valet: "Tu es currens ad hospitium, igitur tu es exsistens ad hospitium," quia etsi<sup>16</sup> 'currens' sit inferius ad 'exsistens,' tamen hoc extreum<sup>17</sup> 'currens ad hospitium' non<sup>18</sup> est inferius ad hoc

<sup>1</sup> dicuntur *om.* C

<sup>2</sup> et ea... currit *om.* C

<sup>3</sup> Et quia/ideo C

<sup>4</sup> est dicendum *inv.* C

<sup>5</sup> et *om.* C

<sup>6</sup> in proposito *mg.* C

<sup>7</sup> sicut *corr. (mg.)* in cuiusmodi C

<sup>8</sup> iste terminus *om.* C

<sup>9</sup> accipitur... proposito *om.* C

<sup>10</sup> extreum *mg.* C

<sup>11</sup> copulatione/disiunctione C

<sup>12</sup> disiunctione/copulatione C

<sup>13</sup> dicamus/dicatur R

<sup>14</sup> supponunt<sup>1</sup>... qui *om.* R

<sup>15</sup> Per *mg.* C

<sup>16</sup> etsi/quamvis C

<sup>17</sup> tamen... non/non tamen... hospitium *inv.* C

<sup>18</sup> extreum/tu es *add.* C

extremum<sup>19</sup> 'exsistens ad hospitium.' Non tamen dico quod numquam consequentia valet ubi est habitudo inter partes extremorum, sed dico quod propter habitudinem inter partes extremorum non est concludendum<sup>20</sup> consequentiam valere. Ista enim<sup>21</sup> est consequentia bona: "Tu es videns hominem, igitur tu es videns animal" ubi est habitudo inter partes; sed<sup>22</sup> propter hoc<sup>23</sup> non tenet consequentia, sed solum propter<sup>24</sup> habitudinem inter extrema et quia 'videns hominem' est inferius ad 'videns animal.' Per<sup>25</sup> hoc patet quod talis consequentia non valet: <sup>26</sup> "Tu es res bona, et omnis res bona est clericus bonus vel non clericus <bonus>, igitur tu es clericus bonus vel non es clericus bonus."<sup>28</sup> Etsi sequantur: "Tu es res, igitur tu es clericus vel non clericus,"<sup>29</sup> non tamen sequitur: "Tu es res bona, igitur tu es clericus bonus vel non es clericus bonus,"<sup>30</sup> quia "Tu es res bona" non est inferius ad illam "Tu es clericus bonus vel non bonus."<sup>31</sup> Et hoc patet,<sup>32</sup> quia sic dicto: "Tu es res bona" hoc quod dico<sup>33</sup> 'res,' quia est pars extremi,<sup>35</sup> non habet suppositionem. Similiter haec consequentia non valet: "Tu es discipulus Sortis, et eius<sup>36</sup> discipulus est homo, igitur tu es homo Sortis." Nec<sup>37</sup> valet: "Tu es aliquid Sortis, et non es nisi clericus, igitur tu es clericus Sortis"<sup>38</sup> quia posito quod tu es magister Sortis,<sup>38</sup> antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum. Et<sup>39</sup> deficit haec consequentia,<sup>40</sup> quia sic dicto: "Tu es aliquid Sortis," iste terminus 'aliquid' eo quod est pars extremi, non habet suppositionem. Propter hoc etiam non se-

<sup>19</sup> extremum/tu es C

<sup>20</sup> est concludendum/oportet C

<sup>21</sup> enim om. C

<sup>22</sup> sed om. C

<sup>23</sup> hoc/tamen add. C

<sup>24</sup> propter om. C

<sup>25</sup> Per/Propter C

<sup>26</sup> talis consequentia... valet/tales consequentiae... valent C

<sup>27</sup> bona om. C

<sup>28</sup> es clericus om. C

<sup>29</sup> vel... clericus om. C

<sup>30</sup> non tamen... bonus mg. C

<sup>31</sup> quia... bonus om. R

<sup>32</sup> patet om. C

<sup>33</sup> dico om. C

<sup>34</sup> quia om. C

<sup>35</sup> extremi/et add. C

<sup>36</sup> eius/omnis C

<sup>37</sup> Nec/Et similiter non C

<sup>38</sup> Sortis/tunc add. C

<sup>39</sup> Et om. C

<sup>40</sup> haec consequentia inv. C

quitur: "Tu es aliquid Sortis, igitur tu es clericus Sortis vel non es<sup>41</sup> clericus Sortis."<sup>42</sup>

(1.21) Sed dubium est de extremis compositis<sup>43</sup> mediante copulatione vel disiunctione, an in talibus pars extremi habeat suppositionem. Si concedatur<sup>44</sup> quod sic, haec<sup>45</sup> esset<sup>46</sup> vera: "Tres homines et non plures quam tres homines sunt hic<sup>47</sup> intus," quia sequeretur tres homines et duo homines<sup>48</sup> sunt hic intus,<sup>49</sup> igitur tres homines<sup>50</sup> et non<sup>51</sup> plures quam tres sunt hic intus cum duo homines non sunt plures quam tres. Similiter esset concedendum quod<sup>52</sup> ista: "Omnis homo est animal habeat<sup>53</sup> tria singularia vera<sup>54</sup> et non plura," quia sequeretur<sup>55</sup> habet tria singularia vera, et ista<sup>56</sup> non sunt<sup>57</sup> plura, demonstratis duobus, igitur habet tria singularia vera<sup>58</sup> et non plura. Similiter oporteret<sup>59</sup> concedere quod "Sortes et Plato sunt non-Sortes et non-Plato," quia sequitur "Sortes et Plato sunt Sortes et Plato, igitur Sortes et Plato sunt non-Sortes et non-Plato,"<sup>60</sup> quia Plato est inferius ad non-Sortem et Sortes est inferius ad non-Platonem. Sic esset haec<sup>61</sup> concedenda: <sup>62</sup> "Aliqui non-homines sunt homo<sup>63</sup> et non-homo<sup>64</sup>" vel ad minus<sup>65</sup> quod "Aliqua<sup>66</sup>

<sup>41</sup> es om. C

<sup>42</sup> Sortis om. C

<sup>43</sup> compositis/compositionis C

<sup>44</sup> concedatur/conceditur C

<sup>45</sup> haec/tunc add. C

<sup>46</sup> esset/ est C

<sup>47</sup> et... hic/sunt hic et non plures quam tres homines inv. C

<sup>48</sup> homines om. C

<sup>49</sup> quia... intus mg. C

<sup>50</sup> homines/sunt add. C

<sup>51</sup> non om. C

<sup>52</sup> quod/quia C

<sup>53</sup> habeat/haberet C

<sup>54</sup> vera om. R

<sup>55</sup> sequeretur/sequitur C

<sup>56</sup> ista om. C

<sup>57</sup> sunt om. C

<sup>58</sup> vera om. C

<sup>59</sup> oporteret/oportet C

<sup>60</sup> quia... non Plato om. (hom.) R

<sup>61</sup> haec om. C

<sup>62</sup> concedenda/concedendum quod C

<sup>63</sup> homo/homines C

<sup>64</sup> non-homo/non-homines C

<sup>65</sup> minus/ita add. C

<sup>66</sup> Aliqua om. C

sunt homo et<sup>67</sup> non-homo<sup>68</sup>,<sup>69</sup> ex qua sequitur: "Aliqua<sup>69</sup> sunt homo<sup>70</sup> et non sunt homo."<sup>71</sup>

(1.22) Dicendum<sup>72</sup> quod nulla pars extremi compositi in isto extremo composito habet aliquam suppositionem, tamen in quibusdam tenet consequentia ab inferiori ad superius. Sed hoc non est propter ordinationem inter partes<sup>73</sup> extermorum sed solum<sup>74</sup> propter ordinationem inter extrema. Per hoc patet responsio ad argumenta.<sup>75</sup>

(2.01) Viso quod pars extremi non supponit dicendum est de suppositionibus, et sciendum quod quilibet terminus et quodcumque<sup>76</sup> potest esse extermum in propositione sive sit adiectivum sive substantivum<sup>77</sup> sive complexum sive incomplexum. Omne tale potest supponere, ex quo patet quod haec<sup>78</sup> definitio suppositionis non est conveniens: "Substantiva<sup>79</sup> rei designatio," quia suppositio non magis debetur substantivo<sup>80</sup> quam alii.<sup>81</sup> Et<sup>82</sup> ideo dicendum<sup>83</sup> quod suppositio est proprietas extremi secundum quod unum extermum ordinatur ad aliud in propositione,<sup>84</sup> et sic suppositio non debetur extero extra propositionem sed solum in propositione.

(2.1) Suppositio dividitur, quia quaedam est *propria* et quaedam *in propria*, et haec est divisio prima suppositionum.<sup>85</sup> Terminus supponit proprie quando supponit pro aliquo pro quo permittitur supponere de virtute sermonis. Sed terminus supponit improprie quando supponit pro aliquo ex transumptione vel ex usu loquendi. Sed primo est dicendum de suppositione propria, et primo in<sup>86</sup> absolutis, deinde in<sup>87</sup> respectivis.

<sup>67</sup> homo et *om.* C

<sup>68</sup> non-homo/non-homines C

<sup>69</sup> Aliqua/igitur aliqui C

<sup>70</sup> homo/homines C

<sup>71</sup> homo/homines C

<sup>72</sup> Dicendum/Dico C

<sup>73</sup> inter partes/in parte R

<sup>74</sup> solum *om.* C

<sup>75</sup> argumenta/illa C

<sup>76</sup> quodcumque/aliquod *add.* C

<sup>77</sup> substantibum/sustentivum C

<sup>78</sup> haec *om.* C

<sup>79</sup> substantiva/sustentiva C

<sup>80</sup> substantivo/sustentivo C

<sup>81</sup> alii/adiectivo (*mg.*) C

<sup>82</sup> Et *om.* C

<sup>83</sup> dicendum/dicitur C

<sup>84</sup> in propositione *mg.* C

<sup>85</sup> suppositionum/Unde *add.* C

<sup>86</sup> in/de C

<sup>87</sup> in *om.* C

(2.2) Suppositio propria dividitur :<sup>88</sup> quaedam est formalis et quaedam materialis. Suppositio materialis est quando terminus supponit pro voce. Et talis est triplex, quia<sup>89</sup> aut supponit pro voce tantum, et sic supponit hic "Homo est dissyllabum"; aut pro voce cum<sup>90</sup> respectu ad<sup>91</sup> significatum,<sup>92</sup> et sic supponit hic "Homo est nomen," quoniam<sup>93</sup> non sola vox est nomen sed aggregatum ex voce<sup>94</sup> et<sup>95</sup> respectu ad significatum; aut supponit pro voce cum<sup>96</sup> respectu ad consignificatum,<sup>97</sup> et sic supponit hic "Homo est singularis numeri," "Catonis est genitivi casus." Intelligendum<sup>98</sup> tamen quod non semper supponit terminus materialiter quando supponit pro voce, quia si sic, tunc<sup>99</sup> sic dicto: "Omnis vox est vox" subiectum supponeret materialiter, quia subiectum distribuitur sive<sup>1</sup> supponit<sup>2</sup> pro hac voce 'vox.' Similiter sic dicto: "Omne nomen est pars orationis,"<sup>3</sup> subiectum supponeret materialiter, quia subiectum supponit pro quolibet nomine et ita pro hoc nomine 'nomen.' Unde in aliquibus res significata per vocem est superius quam ipsa vox significans, et tunc quando talis terminus<sup>4</sup> supponit personaliter<sup>5</sup> supponit pro voce; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod supponit materialiter nisi supponeret pro se ipsa tantum vel tantum pro se ipsa cum<sup>6</sup> respectu ad significatum vel<sup>7</sup> ad consignificatum.

(2.3) Suppositio formalis est quando terminus supponit pro significato suo vel pro<sup>8</sup> supposito, et dividitur suppositio formalis quia quaedam est simplex et quaedam personalis. Et dividitur suppositio simplex, quia aliquando terminus supponit pro significato absoluto et aliquando<sup>9</sup> pro significato comparato ad suppo-

<sup>88</sup> dividitur/nam add. C

<sup>89</sup> quia om. C

<sup>90</sup> cum/et R

<sup>91</sup> ad/aut R

<sup>92</sup> significatum/significata C

<sup>93</sup> quoniam/quia C

<sup>94</sup> ex voce om. R

<sup>95</sup> et/cum C

<sup>96</sup> cum/et R

<sup>97</sup> consignificatum/significatum C

<sup>98</sup> Intelligendum/Et notandum C

<sup>99</sup> si... tunc C

<sup>1</sup> distribuitur sive om. C

<sup>2</sup> supponit/supponat R

<sup>3</sup> orationis/hic add. C

<sup>4</sup> terminus/vox R

<sup>5</sup> personaliter/particulariter R

<sup>6</sup> cum om. R

<sup>7</sup> vel om. C

<sup>8</sup> pro/suo add. C

<sup>9</sup> et aliquando/aut C

sita. Et sic<sup>10</sup> suppositio simplex<sup>11</sup> est duplex: quaedam est<sup>12</sup> a b-soluta et quaedam comparata: suppositio absoluta<sup>13</sup> ut hic "Homo est dignissima creaturarum creatura," et<sup>14</sup> suppositio comparata ut hic "Homo est species." Quoniam<sup>15</sup> universale habet duas condiciones: una eius condicio<sup>16</sup> est esse in multis, et alia<sup>17</sup> dici de multis. Secundum quod universale habet esse in multis debetur sibi<sup>18</sup> suppositio absoluta, et secundum quod dicitur de multis debetur sibi<sup>19</sup> suppositio simplex et<sup>20</sup> comparata. Unde secundum aliam<sup>20</sup> suppositionem est haec vera: "Homo est species," et secundum aliam est haec vera: "Homo est dignissima creaturarum creatura," alioquin foret haec vera: "Dignissima creaturarum creatura est species."

(2.31) Sciendum quod secundum<sup>22</sup> suppositionem simplicem et<sup>23</sup> absolutam verificatur ista: "Bos tibi promittitur." Posito quod aliquis promittat tibi bovem sic dicendo: "Tibi promitto bovem,"<sup>24</sup> haec tunc est vera: "Bos tibi promittitur," et tamen nec iste bos nec ille sed res<sup>25</sup> significata per bovem, et illud<sup>26</sup> potest<sup>27</sup> redi reddendo quocumque suppositum indifferenter. Unde qui dat tibi<sup>28</sup> bovem dat tibi rem significatam per istum terminum 'bos,' nec potest aliter hoc commune tibi redi quam in suo supposito. Similiter secundum hanc suppositionem est haec vera: "Iste privatur visu," demonstrato caeco, quia nec<sup>29</sup> visu meo nec visu tuo privatur. Et causa est<sup>30</sup> quia non est natus habere visum meum nec<sup>31</sup> tuum; est tamen natus habere rem significatam per istum terminum 'visus,' et ideo caecus

<sup>10</sup> sic *om.* R

<sup>11</sup> simplex *om.* R

<sup>12</sup> est *om.* C

<sup>13</sup> absoluta/est *add.* C

<sup>14</sup> et *om.* C

<sup>15</sup> Quoniam/Unde C

<sup>16</sup> eius condicio *om.* C

<sup>17</sup> alia/est *add.* C

<sup>18</sup> sibi/ei R

<sup>19</sup> suppositio... sibi *om.* (*hom.*) R

<sup>20</sup> et *om.* C

<sup>21</sup> aliam/aliquam R

<sup>22</sup> secundum mg. C

<sup>23</sup> et *om.* C

<sup>24</sup> sic... bovem *om.* C

<sup>25</sup> res/natura R

<sup>26</sup> illud/ideo C

<sup>27</sup> potest/tibi *add.* C

<sup>28</sup> tibi *om.* R

<sup>29</sup> quia nec/nec tamen C

<sup>30</sup> privatur... est *om.* C

<sup>31</sup> nec/visum *add.* C

privatur hoc communi<sup>32</sup> 'visus' sed nec privatur<sup>33</sup> isto visu nec isto.

(2.32) Sciendum<sup>34</sup> quod terminus generalis habens sub se species et individua potest habere suppositionem simplicem comparatam duplicem, quia potest habere suppositionem generalem vel speciale m. Quando<sup>35</sup> habet generalem, tunc supponit pro significato absolute, ita quod non pro aliquo supposito. Et secundum hanc suppositionem est haec vera: "Substantia est genus generalissimum." Sed quando habet suppositionem simplicem<sup>36</sup> speciale m tunc supponit pro speciebus ita quod non pro individuis, et sic est haec vera: "Substantia est substantia secunda." Unde haec est vera: "Prima<sup>37</sup> substantia est substantia secunda" secundum quod subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem specialem.

(2.4) Suppositio personalis<sup>38</sup> dividitur, quia quaedam est communis et quaedam discreta. Suppositio communis est ubi terminus communis supponit pro aliquo supposito uno secundum numerum. Suppositio discreta est ubi terminus discretus supponit. Et sciendum quod terminorum discretorum quidam est<sup>40</sup> simplex et quidam<sup>41</sup> compositus. Voco enim<sup>42</sup> terminum simplicem non quia vox est simplex sed quia habet significatum simplex. In termino<sup>43</sup> discreto simplici non differunt suppositio simplex et suppositio personalis, sed terminus talis<sup>44</sup> supponens simpliciter et<sup>45</sup> personaliter totaliter pro eodem supponit. Verumtamen terminus discretus compositus pro alio<sup>46</sup> supponit quando supponit simpliciter et quando personaliter, quia quando supponit personaliter tunc supponit pro singulari simplici, sed quando supponit simpliciter supponit pro suo significato. Verbi gratia, posito quod Sortes sit albus et currat, haec est vera: "Sortes aibus currit" secundum quod subiectum supponit personaliter, et<sup>47</sup> tunc iste terminus 'Sortes albus'<sup>48</sup> supponit pro

<sup>32</sup> communi/scilicet add. C

<sup>33</sup> privatur om. C

<sup>34</sup> Sciendum/Ideo sciendum est C

<sup>35</sup> Quando/Sed quando C

<sup>36</sup> simplicem/et add. R

<sup>37</sup> Prima om. C

<sup>38</sup> personalis/simplex R

<sup>39</sup> terminorum discretorum/terminus discretus R

<sup>40</sup> est/terminus add. C

<sup>41</sup> quidam/est terminus add. C

<sup>42</sup> Voco enim/Et voco C

<sup>43</sup> termino/enim add. C

<sup>44</sup> talis om. C

<sup>45</sup> et/suppositum add. R

<sup>46</sup> alio/aliquo R

<sup>47</sup> et/quia C

<sup>48</sup> albus/totum add. C

Sorte, et sic singulare compositum supponit<sup>49</sup> pro singulari simplici. Unde ista: “Sortes albus currit” est vera, quia Sortes currit. Et secundum eandem suppositionem est haec vera: “Sortes albus de necessitate est Sortes.” Sed quando talis terminus supponit simpliciter, tunc supponit pro suo significato, et sic est haec vera: “Sortes albus est ens per accidens,” quia res significata per istum terminum ‘Sortes albus’ est ens per accidens.

(2.4I) *Suppositio communis* dividitur, quia quaedam est *confusa* et quaedam *determinata*. *Suppositio*<sup>50</sup> determinata est quando terminus *communis* supponit *distributiva* pro *suppositis* ut hic “Aliquis homo currit.” Unde per *suppositionem determinatam* et per *suppositionem distributivam*<sup>51</sup> idem intelligo. *Suppositio confusa* dividitur, quia quaedam est *suppositio*<sup>52</sup> *confusa* et *confusa tantum* et quaedam *confusa* et *distributiva*. Terminus supponit *confusa tantum* quando supponit pro pluribus, ita quod infertur ex quolibet istorum, et<sup>53</sup> ad nullum istorum contingit descendere copulative vel disiunctive. Isto modo supponit ‘animal’ in ista: “Omnis homo est animal,” quia infertur ex *suppositis*; sequitur enim “Omnis homo est hoc animal, igitur omnis homo est animal,” sed non sequitur “Omnis homo est animal, igitur omnis homo est hoc animal”; nec etiam<sup>54</sup> sequitur “Omnis homo est animal, igitur omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud.”<sup>55</sup>

(2.4II) Sciendum quod syncategorema importans multitudinem habet virtutem confundendi terminum mediate sequentem *confusa tantum*. Et secundum<sup>56</sup> hoc patet quod tales sunt verae: “Bis commedisti panem,” “Ter commedisti illud<sup>57</sup> quod non ter commedisti.” Nec ex hac<sup>58</sup> sequitur: “Igitur ter commedisti hoc<sup>59</sup> quod non ter commedisti vel ter commedisti illud quod non ter commedisti.” Sed ista est vera: “Ter commedisti illud quod non ter commedisti,” quia semel commedisti illud quod non ter commedisti, et alias commedisti illud quod non ter commedisti, et tertio commedisti illud quod non ter commedisti.<sup>60</sup> Quod autem hoc sit verum patet, quia aliter haec foret falsa: “Bis cucurristi,” quia sequitur: “Bis cucurristi, igitur

<sup>49</sup> supponit/suppositum R

<sup>50</sup> *Suppositio om.* C

<sup>51</sup> *distributivam/disjunctivam* C

<sup>52</sup> *suppositio om.* C

<sup>53</sup> et *om.* R

<sup>54</sup> etiam/tamen R

<sup>55</sup> quia infertur... illud *om.* C

<sup>56</sup> secundum/propter C

<sup>57</sup> illud/panem id R

<sup>58</sup> hac/hoc C

<sup>59</sup> Igitur... hoc *om.* C

<sup>60</sup> commedisti...commedisti *om.* C

bis cucurristi cursum." Nisi igitur <sup>61</sup> hoc adverbium 'bis' haberet virtutem confundendi terminum sequentem, <sup>62</sup> sequitur: <sup>63</sup> "Bis cucurristi cursum, igitur bis cucurristi istum cursum vel illum," quod tamen <sup>64</sup> non est verum. Et <sup>65</sup> per hoc patet quod haec sit <sup>66</sup> vera: "Omne caput habet quod <sup>67</sup> non omne caput habet," quia primum supponit confuse tantum, et veritas huius <sup>68</sup> patet, quia quaelibet singularis est vera.

(2.412) Intelligendum <sup>69</sup> est quod quando <sup>70</sup> syncategorema importans multitudinem est pars extremi tunc non habet virtutem confundendi terminum communem mediate sequentem confuse tantum. Verbi gratia, sic dicto: "Videns omnem hominem est animal," in ista non stat 'animal' confuse tantum, et hoc quia li 'homo' est pars extremi. Quod autem li <sup>71</sup> 'animal' non stet <sup>72</sup> confuse tantum patet, <sup>73</sup> quia sequitur: "Videns omnem hominem est animal, igitur videns omnem hominem est hoc animal vel illud," <sup>74</sup> et sic de aliis. Quod sequatur patet, <sup>75</sup> nam sequitur: "Videns omnem hominem est animal, igitur animal est videns omnem hominem," et ulterius: <sup>76</sup> "Igitur hoc animal est videns omnem hominem vel illud animal est videns omnem hominem" et sic de singulis.

(2.413) Praeterea, <sup>77</sup> patet quod haec <sup>78</sup> consequentia non valet: "Quandocumque aliqua species fuit, <sup>79</sup> tunc aliquod eius suppositum fuit, igitur quandocumque aliqua species fuit, tunc hoc <sup>80</sup> eius suppositum fuit vel illud." <sup>81</sup> Sed haec est vera: "Semper ista <sup>82</sup> species

<sup>61</sup> igitur *om.* C

<sup>62</sup> terminum sequentem *om.* C

<sup>63</sup> sequitur/sequeretur tu C

<sup>64</sup> tamen *om.* C

<sup>65</sup> Et *om.* C

<sup>66</sup> sit/est C

<sup>67</sup> quod/qui R

<sup>68</sup> huius/cuius C

<sup>69</sup> Intelligendum/Unde intelligendum C

<sup>70</sup> quando *om.* C

<sup>71</sup> quod... li/quia aliter hic C

<sup>72</sup> stet/stat C

<sup>73</sup> patet *om.* C

<sup>74</sup> illud/animal *add.* C

<sup>75</sup> Quod... patet *om.* C

<sup>76</sup> ulterius/ultra C

<sup>77</sup> Praeterea/Per praedicta C

<sup>78</sup> haec *om.* C

<sup>79</sup> fuit *om.* R

<sup>80</sup> hoc *om.* C

<sup>81</sup> illud/eius suppositum fuit C; Nec valet quandocumque haec species homo fuit, tunc aliquod eius suppositum fuit vel illud *add.* R

<sup>82</sup> ista/haec C

‘homo’ fuit, igitur<sup>83</sup> semper aliquod suppositum hominis fuit.” Et quaelibet istarum est falsa: “Semper hoc suppositum hominis fuit et semper<sup>84</sup> illud suppositum hominis fuit” et sic de aliis,<sup>85</sup> quia per<sup>86</sup> illi ‘semper’ importatur<sup>87</sup> multitudo, ratione<sup>88</sup> cuius terminus<sup>89</sup> mediate sequens confunditur confuse tantum. Per hoc etiam<sup>90</sup> patet quod si<sup>91</sup> in quolibet instanti huius diei aliquis homo sit<sup>92</sup> hic intus sic ita quod unus homo sit hic intus tota die<sup>93</sup> sed successive<sup>94</sup> diversi et diversi ita quod nunc unus et iam aliis,<sup>95</sup> haec est vera: “Tota die aliquis homo est hic intus,” et haec est falsa: “Aliquis homo tota die est hic intus.”

(2.414) Sciendum<sup>96</sup> quod si syncategorema importans multitudinem habeat<sup>97</sup> virtutem confundendi terminum<sup>98</sup> in eadem categorica, tamen syncategorema<sup>99</sup> importans multitudinem positum in una categorica non habet virtutem confundendi terminum positum in alia categorica. Sic dicto: “Omnis homo est animal et aliquis homo<sup>1</sup> est iste,”<sup>2</sup> iste terminus ‘homo’ positus in secunda<sup>3</sup> categorica non confunditur a signo praecedente, et ideo haec tota est falsa<sup>4</sup> pro secunda parte. Similiter nec signum universale negativum positum<sup>5</sup> in una categorica habet virtutem<sup>6</sup> confundendi terminum positum in alia categorica. Unde sic dicto: “Nullus homo est asinus et aliquod animal currit,” iste terminus ‘animal’ positus in secunda<sup>7</sup> categorica habet suppositionem determinatam.

<sup>83</sup> igitur/et hoc similiter C

<sup>84</sup> et semper/vel C

<sup>85</sup> aliis/et hoc C

<sup>86</sup> per/si hoc R

<sup>87</sup> importatur/importetur R

<sup>88</sup> ratione/respectu C

<sup>89</sup> terminus *om.* C

<sup>90</sup> etiam *om.* C

<sup>91</sup> si *om.* C

<sup>92</sup> sit/est C

<sup>93</sup> sic... die *om.* R

<sup>94</sup> sed successive/successive tamen C

<sup>95</sup> alias/tunc *add.* C

<sup>96</sup> Sciendum/Unde sciendum C

<sup>97</sup> habeat/habet C

<sup>98</sup> terminum/mediate sequentem *add.* C

<sup>99</sup> syncategorema/categorema R

<sup>1</sup> homo *om.* R

<sup>2</sup> iste/homo *add.* C

<sup>3</sup> secunda/prima R

<sup>4</sup> est falsa/non valet C

<sup>5</sup> positum *om.* C

<sup>6</sup> virtutem *om.* C

<sup>7</sup> secunda/alia C

(2.42) *Suppositio*<sup>8</sup> confusa et distributiva dividitur, quia quae-dam est *mobilis* et quae-dam *immobilis*. *Mobilis*, quando terminus *communis*<sup>9</sup> habet *suppositionem*<sup>10</sup> et *virtutem distributionis* et<sup>11</sup> contingit descendere ad illud<sup>12</sup> *suppositum*. *Immobilis*, quando terminus *communis*<sup>13</sup> supponit pro *suppositis* et non contingit descendere ad ista<sup>14</sup> *supposita*, et isto modo supponit iste terminus 'homo' in ista: <sup>15</sup> "Omnis homo praeter Sortem currit," quia iste terminus 'homo' distribuitur et non contingit descendere ad *suppositum*; non enim sequitur "Omnis homo praeter Sortem currit, igitur Plato praeter Sortem currit." Unde sciendum quod quando sub termino habente *supposita* non contingit descendere ad *supposita*, nec etiam<sup>16</sup> terminus habens *supposita* infertur ex *suppositis*, tunc iste terminus supponit<sup>17</sup> *distributive immobiliter*, ut patet in exemplo prius posito, vel hic: <sup>18</sup> "Nullus homo praeter aliquem istorum est animal," demonstratis omnibus hominibus. In ista iste terminus 'animal' supponit *confuse* et *distributive immobiliter*, quia nec<sup>19</sup> infertur ex *suppositis* nec infert *supposita*. Non infert *supposita*, quia non sequitur "Nullus homo praeter aliquem istorum est animal, igitur nullus homo praeter aliquem istorum est asinus," nec<sup>20</sup> sequitur: "Nullus homo praeter aliquem istorum est asinus, igitur nullus homo praeter aliquem istorum est animal," quia si sic, sequeretur: <sup>21</sup> "Nullum animal praeter aliquem istorum est homo, igitur nullum animal praeter aliquem istorum est substantia," ubi tamen antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.

(2.421) Circa *suppositionem confusam* et *distributivam mobilem* sciendum quod<sup>22</sup> non semper supponit terminus<sup>23</sup> *confuse* et *distributive immobiliter* quando contingit descendere ad *supposita*<sup>24</sup> nisi hoc sit ratione *distributionis*, quoniam<sup>25</sup> sequitur: "Aliqua propo-

<sup>8</sup> *Suppositio/Similiter suppositio* C

<sup>9</sup> *communis/distributus* R

<sup>10</sup> *suppositionem/determinatam distributam* C

<sup>11</sup> et *om.* C

<sup>12</sup> *illud/aliquod eius* C

<sup>13</sup> *communis/distributus* R

<sup>14</sup> *ista/sua* C

<sup>15</sup> *ista/hac propositione* C

<sup>16</sup> *etiam/est* R

<sup>17</sup> *supponit/confuse et add.* C

<sup>18</sup> vel *hic/et etiam* C

<sup>19</sup> *nec/non* C

<sup>20</sup> *nec/etiam add.* C

<sup>21</sup> *sequeretur/sequitur* C

<sup>22</sup> *quod/terminus add.* C

<sup>23</sup> *terminus om.* C.

<sup>24</sup> *supposita/suppositum* C

<sup>25</sup> *quoniam/quia* C

sitio est vera, igitur haec propositio est vera," demonstrata ista: "Aliqua propositio est vera." Similiter sequitur: "Aliqua propositio est vera," demonstrata<sup>26</sup> hac: "Aliquid est verum" et sic de quolibet sequenti<sup>27</sup> ad hanc: "Aliqua propositio est vera," et tamen subiectum huius: "Aliqua propositio est vera" non supponit confuse et distributive, quia iste<sup>28</sup> descensus non fit propter distributionem sed ex<sup>29</sup> necessitate rei. Unde numquam est suppositio confusa et distributiva nisi hoc sit ratione distributionis.

(2.422) Unde suppositio confusa et distributiva mobilis est quando ratione distributionis contingit descendere ad aliquod suppositum, et importatur distributio per signum universale affirmativum et etiam per syncategoremata et per alia inclientia negationem exercitam. Unde hoc verbum 'differt' habet virtutem confundendi terminum confuse et distributive.<sup>31</sup>

(2.423) Sed dubium est de termino supponente<sup>32</sup> confuse et distributive mobiliter,<sup>33</sup> utrum contingat descendere ad quodlibet<sup>34</sup> suppositum huius termini. Et<sup>35</sup> videtur quod non, quia demonstratis Sorte et Platone, haec est vera: "Utrumque istorum,<sup>36</sup> si est Sortes, differt a Platone" accipiendo<sup>37</sup> istam ut est de condicionato subiecto. Et hoc subiectum vere dicitur<sup>38</sup> de quolibet istorum,<sup>39</sup> quia quodlibet est alterum istorum, si est Sortes. Et tamen non contingit descendere ad quodlibet,<sup>40</sup> quia tunc sequeretur: "Utrumque istorum, si est Sortes, differt a<sup>41</sup> Platone, igitur quodlibet differt a Platone." Similiter sequitur: "Uterque<sup>42</sup> istorum, si est Sortes, differt ab albo,<sup>43</sup> igitur quilibet<sup>44</sup> differt ab<sup>45</sup> albo," quia quilibet est alterum istorum, si est<sup>46</sup> Sortes."

<sup>26</sup> ista... demonstrata *om.* (*hom.*) C

<sup>27</sup> sequenti/sequentia C

<sup>28</sup> iste *om.* C

<sup>29</sup> ex *om.* C

<sup>30</sup> ad/aliquid *add.* C

<sup>31</sup> distributive/mobiliter *add.* C

<sup>32</sup> si... supponente/quando terminus communis supponit C

<sup>33</sup> utrum/si R

<sup>34</sup> quodlibet/aliquid R

<sup>35</sup> Et *om.* C

<sup>36</sup> Utrumque istorum *om.* C, est *add.* R

<sup>37</sup> Accipiendo/accidit R

<sup>38</sup> vere dicitur/videtur R

<sup>39</sup> quolibet/istorum *add.* C.

<sup>40</sup> quodlibet/suppositum *add.* C

<sup>41</sup> differt ab/demonstratis C

<sup>42</sup> Uterque/Utrumque R

<sup>43</sup> albo/alio C

<sup>44</sup> quilibet/quidlibet C

<sup>45</sup> albo/alio C

<sup>46</sup> si est/sicut R

(2.424) Dicendum quod hoc totum: 'Alterum istorum, si est Sortes' non potest distribui per hoc signum 'uterque,' nec est aliquis<sup>47</sup> terminus distribuibilis per hoc signum 'uterque' nisi habeat duo supposita tantum et adhuc non, quia uterque terminus habens duo supposita tantum <non> potest distribui per hoc signum 'uterque'<sup>48</sup> nisi in suo distribuibili demonstratur<sup>49</sup> ista supposita, ut hic: "Utrumque<sup>50</sup> istorum currit," demonstratis Sorte et Platone. Unde ista: "Utrumque istorum, si est Sortes etc." non est<sup>51</sup> intelligendum nisi solummodo distribuatur hoc quod dico 'ens istorum.'

(2.425) Sciendum quod signum universale affirmativum confundit terminum immediate sequentem confuse et distributive, et confundit terminum mediate sequentem confuse tantum. Sed signum universale negativum habet virtutem confundendi tam terminum mediate<sup>52</sup> sequentem quam terminum sibi<sup>53</sup> immediate<sup>54</sup> sequentem confuse et distributive. Unde sic dicto: "Nullus homo est animal," tam 'homo' quam 'animal' supponit confuse et distributive. Sed intelligendum<sup>55</sup> quod haec regula est intelligenda quando signum universale negativum refertur ad compositionem formalem. Sed quando negat compositionem materialem tantum<sup>56</sup> non habet virtutem confundendi extrema compositionis formalis, ut sic dicto: "Nullum hominem currere est verum," accepta ista in sensu composito non confunditur iste terminus 'verum.' Non enim sequitur: "Nullum hominem currere est verum,<sup>57</sup> igitur nullum hominem currere est hoc verum<sup>58</sup> 'Deus est,'" quia antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile.

(2.5) Viso qualiter termini absolute supponunt in suppositione propria,<sup>59</sup> videndum est quomodo relativa supponunt.<sup>60</sup> Et sciendum quod relativum uno modo dicitur illud cuius esse<sup>61</sup> est ad aliud se habere. Et alio modo relativum est antelatae rei recordativum. De

<sup>47</sup> aliquis *om.* C

<sup>48</sup> nisi habeat... uterque *om. (hom.)* C

<sup>49</sup> demonstrantur/denique R

<sup>50</sup> Utrumque/Uterque C

<sup>51</sup> est/sit C

<sup>52</sup> mediate/immediate C

<sup>53</sup> sibi *om.* C

<sup>54</sup> immediate/mediate C

<sup>55</sup> intelligendum/intelligitur C

<sup>56</sup> materialem tantum *om.* C

<sup>57</sup> accepta ista... verum *om. (hom.)* C

<sup>58</sup> verum/demonstrata hac *add.* C.

<sup>59</sup> in... propria *om.* C

<sup>60</sup> quomodo... supponunt/de relativis C

<sup>61</sup> esse *om.* C

relativo primo modo<sup>62</sup> dicto<sup>63</sup> non intendimus ad praesens,<sup>64</sup> sed de relativo secundo modo dicto. Unde *Priscianus* in *Minori volumine* dicit quod relatio est antelatae rei recordatio,<sup>66</sup> ut "Sortes currit et iste disputat" hoc relativum 'iste' facit recordationem de Sorte quae est res antelata.

(2.6) *Taliū*<sup>67</sup> relativorum quaedam sunt relativa substantiae, ut 'iste', 'illud', 'aliud', et quaedam sunt relativa accidentium,<sup>68</sup> ut 'talis',<sup>69</sup> 'quantus.' Relativorum substantiae quaedam sunt relativa identitatis, ut 'iste', 'idem' et quaedam diversitatis, ut 'reliquus', 'alius.' Relativum identitatis est illud<sup>70</sup> quod supponit pro eodem<sup>71</sup> pro quo suum antecedens verificatur, et relativum diversitatis supponit pro alio<sup>72</sup> quam pro quo suum antecedens verificatur.<sup>73</sup> Relativorum identitatis quaedam sunt reciproca, ut ista 'sui',<sup>74</sup> 'se', 'a se,' cum suis possessivis ut<sup>75</sup> 'suus', 'sua' etc.<sup>76</sup>

(2.61) Circa relativa<sup>77</sup> substantiae et primo circa relativum<sup>78</sup> identitatis sciendum quod<sup>79</sup> relativum<sup>80</sup> non reciprocum supponit pro eodem pro quo suum antecedens,<sup>81</sup> ut si<sup>82</sup> suum antecedens<sup>83</sup> supponat pro suppositis<sup>84</sup> relativum supponet pro suppositis suis, et si antecedens relativi supponat pro<sup>85</sup> significato vel pro voce rela-

<sup>62</sup> modo *om.* R

<sup>63</sup> dicto *om.* C

<sup>64</sup> ad praesens *om.* R

<sup>65</sup> *Minori/maiori* C

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *Priscianus*, *Instit. grammatis.*, XVII, cap. 9, n. 56 (ed. Krehl, II 38); verba signata habentur apud Petrum Hispanum, *Summulae Logicales*, tr. VIII (ed. I. M. Bochenski n. 8.01), p. 92).

<sup>67</sup> *Taliū/Terminus talis C*

<sup>68</sup> ut iste... accidentium/et quaedam substantiae ut ille, idem, alius et similia et quaedam sunt relativa accidentium C

<sup>69</sup> talis/tantus *add.* C

<sup>70</sup> illud *om.* C

<sup>71</sup> eodem/quo et suum antecedens sive pro eodem *rep.* C

<sup>72</sup> alio/aliquo R

<sup>73</sup> verificatur *om.* C

<sup>74</sup> sui/suum R

<sup>75</sup> ut *om.* R

<sup>76</sup> etc./suum R

<sup>77</sup> relativa/illa C

<sup>78</sup> relativum/relativa C

<sup>79</sup> sciendum quod/per C

<sup>80</sup> relativum/identitatis *add.* C

<sup>81</sup> antecedens/verificatur C

<sup>82</sup> si *om.* C

<sup>83</sup> antecedens/relativum C

<sup>84</sup> suppositis/et aliquando C

<sup>85</sup> suppositis suis... pro *om.* C

tivum identitatis supponet pro eodem. Verbi gratia, sic dicto: "Homo currit et iste disputat," quia iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro suppositis, ideo relativum in secunda<sup>86</sup> parte supponit pro suppositis.<sup>87</sup> Similiter sic dicto: "Homo est species et iste praedicatur de pluribus," quia 'homo' qui est antecedens<sup>88</sup> supponit pro suo significato,<sup>89</sup> ideo relativum in secunda parte supponit pro eodem.

(2.611) Intelligendum tamen quod si relativum supponat pro eodem pro quo suum antecedens supponit, tamen non semper habet relativum eandem suppositionem quam suum antecedens, ut patet sic dicto: "Animal<sup>90</sup> est trisyllabum et illud non<sup>91</sup> est dissyllabum," li<sup>92</sup> 'animal' in prima<sup>93</sup> parte supponit materialiter sed li 'illud' in secunda parte non supponit materialiter, quia tunc supponeret pro hac voce 'illud,' et tunc<sup>94</sup> esset haec vera: "Animal est trisyllabum et illud est<sup>95</sup> dissyllabum." Et<sup>96</sup> est concedendum quod relativum identitatis semper supponit pro eodem pro quo suum antecedens, tamen non semper habet eandem suppositionem<sup>97</sup> quam suum antecedens.

(2.612) Sciendum etiam<sup>98</sup> quod non semper licet<sup>99</sup> ponere antecedens loco relativi, quia non est idem dicere: "Homo currit et iste disputat"<sup>1</sup> et dicere: "Homo currit et homo disputat," quia ad veritatem huius "Homo currit et iste disputat" requiritur quod ille idem homo qui currit disputet,<sup>2</sup> sed ad veritatem huius "Homo currit et homo disputat," sufficit quod unus homo currat et alias disputet.<sup>3</sup> Sed ista<sup>4</sup> regula: "Licitum<sup>5</sup> est ponere antecedens loco relativi" est intelligenda quando<sup>6</sup> antecedens est singulare et non

<sup>86</sup> secunda/prima C

<sup>87</sup> suppositis/simpliciter add. C

<sup>88</sup> quia bona... antecedens/sed animal C

<sup>89</sup> significato/in prima parte add. C

<sup>90</sup> supponit pro... Animal om. C

<sup>91</sup> non om. C

<sup>92</sup> li/nec C

<sup>93</sup> prima/secunda C

<sup>94</sup> tunc om. C

<sup>95</sup> est om. C

<sup>96</sup> Et/ideo add. C

<sup>97</sup> habet... suppositionem om. C

<sup>98</sup> etiam/est C

<sup>99</sup> licet/habet C

<sup>1</sup> Homo... disputat om. C

<sup>2</sup> disputet/disputat C

<sup>3</sup> sed ad... disputet om. (hom.) C

<sup>4</sup> Sed ista/Secunda C

<sup>5</sup> Licitum om. C

<sup>6</sup> intelligenda quando/intelligendum quod C

est commune<sup>7</sup> ad supposita, quia non refert dicere “Sortes currit et iste disputat” et “Sortes currit et Sortes disputat.”<sup>8</sup>

(2.613) Sciendum quod relativum identitatis non reciprocum numquam<sup>9</sup> refert aliquid positum in eadem categorica. Nihil enim<sup>10</sup> est dictu: “Omnis homo est iste” nisi<sup>11</sup> li ‘iste’ teneatur demonstrative,<sup>12</sup> quia li ‘iste’ non potest referre<sup>13</sup> hominem positum in eadem categorica. Sed relativum identitatis positum in una categorica potest referre terminum positum in alia categorica. Ad hoc<sup>14</sup> quod illae categoricae sint verae in quibus ponuntur relativum et antecedens relativi oportet<sup>15</sup> quod istae propositiones verificantur<sup>16</sup> pro eodem supposito. Ad hoc enim<sup>17</sup> quod istae sint<sup>18</sup> verae “‘Homo currit’ et ‘Iste disputat’” oportet quod ista “Homo currit verificetur pro aliquo supposito hominis et quod secunda pars verificetur pro eodem supposito. Ex isto sequitur quod relativum identitatis non infertur<sup>19</sup> ex supposito nisi simul cum hoc<sup>20</sup> suum antecedens inferatur ex supposito. Unde non sequitur: “Homo <currit> et homo disputat, igitur homo currit et iste disputat,” vel non sequitur: <sup>21</sup> “Sortes currit et Sortes disputat, igitur homo currit et iste disputat.”

(2.614) Sciendum quod nec negatio nec distributio habet virtutem confundendi relativum identitatis, sed relativum identitatis semper supponit pro eodem pro quo supponit et<sup>22</sup> suum antecedens et eodem modo. Unde posito quod Sortes currat et Plato non,<sup>23</sup> haec est vera: “Aliquis homo currit et Plato non est iste.” Nec ex hac sequitur: “Igitur<sup>24</sup> aliquis homo currit et Plato non est Plato,” nam etsi negatio praecedat hoc relativum ‘iste,’ tamen<sup>25</sup> non confundit ipsum, si li ‘iste’ supponat<sup>26</sup> particulariter sicut suum ante-

<sup>7</sup> commune/communis C

<sup>8</sup> disputat/etc. add. C

<sup>9</sup> numquam/non C

<sup>10</sup> enim om. R

<sup>11</sup> nisi om. C

<sup>12</sup> demonstrative/demonstratione C

<sup>13</sup> potest referre/refert C

<sup>14</sup> Ad hoc enim/Et oportet C

<sup>15</sup> oportet om. C

<sup>16</sup> istae... verificantur/verificetur C

<sup>17</sup> enim om. C

<sup>18</sup> sint/sunt C

<sup>19</sup> infertur/refertur C

<sup>20</sup> hoc/quod add. C

<sup>21</sup> Homo <currit>... sequitur om (hom.) R

<sup>22</sup> et om. C

<sup>23</sup> non/nam add. C

<sup>24</sup> Igitur/quod R

<sup>25</sup> tamen/cum C

<sup>26</sup> supponat/supponit C

cedens, non obstante quod negatio praecedat. Ex hoc patet quod secundae<sup>27</sup> partes istarum copulativarum sunt verae : “Aliquis homo est risibilis, et Sortes est iste” et<sup>28</sup> “Aliquis homo est risibilis, et Sortes non est iste.” Nec contradicunt secundae partes istarum copulativarum, nec in talibus potest dari contradictorium<sup>29</sup> propositionis in qua ponitur relativum nisi respectu contradictorii<sup>30</sup> istius propositionis in qua ponitur antecedens relativi.

(2.615) Dubitatur hic :<sup>31</sup> Si relativum identitatis haberet<sup>32</sup> eandem suppositionem quam suum antecedens, haec esset<sup>33</sup> vera : “Omnis homo est animal et omne risibile est illud,” quia in secunda parte li ‘illud’ supponeret confuse tantum et sic per secundam partem non<sup>34</sup> denotatur aliquod animal inesse omni risibili : Dicendum quod ista est falsa : “Omnis homo est animal et omne risibile est illud,” non obstante quod relativum in secunda parte supponat confuse tantum, quia ad hanc sequitur ista :<sup>35</sup> “Sortes est animal et omne risibile est illud,” quae est falsa. Sciendum quod relativum identitatis non reciprocum relatum ad terminum<sup>36</sup> communem stantem confuse et distributive habet virtutem confundendi terminum mediate adiunctum confuse tantum. Sic enim dicto : “Omnis homo est animal et aliquis homo est illud,”<sup>37</sup> iste terminus ‘Aliquis homo’ in secunda parte confunditur confuse tantum.

(2.62) Circa suppositionem relativi reciproci sciendum quod relativum reciprocum potest indifferenter referre terminum positum in eadem categorica et terminum positum in alia categorica. Et per hoc differt relativum identitatis reciprocum a relativo identitatis non reciproco.

(2.620) Veruntamen<sup>38</sup> relativum reciprocum referens terminum in alia categorica aliquando est extreum per se, et tunc supponit pro eodem pro quo suum antecedens. Et de relativo sic supponente sunt eaedam regulae quae sunt de relativo identitatis non reciproco. Sed quando relativum reciprocum referens in alia categorica<sup>39</sup> non

<sup>27</sup> secundae/duae C

<sup>28</sup> et/igitur C

<sup>29</sup> dari contradictio/dare contradictionem C

<sup>30</sup> contradictorii om. C

<sup>31</sup> Dubitatur hic/Dubitetur C

<sup>32</sup> haberet/habet R

<sup>33</sup> esset/est C

<sup>34</sup> non om. C

<sup>35</sup> ista om. C

<sup>36</sup> retentum... terminum om. C

<sup>37</sup> aliquis... illud/iste est aliquis R

<sup>38</sup> Veruntamen/Sed quodlibet C

<sup>39</sup> Aliquando est... categorica om (hom.) C

est extremum sed pars extremi,<sup>40</sup> tunc non oportet illud extremum supponere pro isto<sup>41</sup> pro quo et suum<sup>42</sup> antecedens.<sup>43</sup> Verbi gratia, sic dicto: "Homo disputat et suus asinus currit" li 'suus<sup>44</sup> asinus' in secunda parte non supponit pro isto pro quo iste terminus 'homo' supponit in prima<sup>45</sup> parte.

(2.621) Sciendum quod relativum reciprocum referens terminum in eadem categorica habet eandem suppositionem quam suum antecedens. Sed supra<sup>46</sup> suppositionem quam habet suum antecedens addit relativum singillationem ita quod si suum antecedens supponat confuse et distributively, relativum habet suppositionem confusam et distributivam singillatam, et si unum antecedens supponat particulariter, relativum supponit particulariter singillatim.<sup>47</sup> Verbi gratia,<sup>48</sup> "Omnis homo videt se," li 'se' supponit confuse et distributively singillatim, etsi<sup>49</sup> improprie supponat,<sup>50</sup> quia pars extremi non supponit propriamente.

(2.63) Et est suppositio confusa et distributiva singillata suppositio media<sup>51</sup> inter suppositionem confusam tantum et suppositionem confusam et<sup>52</sup> distributivam absolute dictam. Convenit enim cum suppositione<sup>53</sup> confusa et distributiva absolute dicta in hoc quod terminus supponens confuse et distributively singillatim supponit confuse et distributively<sup>54</sup> pro suppositis actualiter et differt a suppositione confusa et distributiva absoluta, quia sub termino supponente<sup>55</sup> confuse et distributively absolute<sup>56</sup> contingit descendere absolute ad quodlibet pro quo fit distributio. Sed sub termino supponente confuse et distributively singillatim non contingit descendere<sup>57</sup> ad quodlibet suppositum absolute, sed ad quodlibet suppositum contingit descendere respectu sui ipsius. Et ideo dicitur suppositio singillata

<sup>40</sup> extremi/et add. CR

<sup>41</sup> isto/eodem C

<sup>42</sup> et suum om. C

<sup>43</sup> antecedens/relativum add. C

<sup>44</sup> suus om. C

<sup>45</sup> prima/secunda C

<sup>46</sup> supra om. C

<sup>47</sup> singillatim om. C

<sup>48</sup> Verbi gratia/sic dicto C

<sup>49</sup> etsi/sic C

<sup>50</sup> supponat/supponit C

<sup>51</sup> media/mediata C

<sup>52</sup> suppositionem... et om. C

<sup>53</sup> suppositione om. C

<sup>54</sup> confuse... distributively om. R

<sup>55</sup> supponente/absoluto C

<sup>56</sup> absolute om. C

<sup>57</sup> descendere om. C

quae<sup>58</sup> reddit singula singulis. Non enim sequitur: "Omnis homo videt Sortem," sed bene sequitur: "Omnis homo videt se, igitur Sortes<sup>59</sup> videt se." Cum suppositione confusa tantum convenit in<sup>60</sup> hoc quod sub termino supponente<sup>61</sup> singillatim non contingit descendere absolute<sup>62</sup> ad suum<sup>63</sup> suppositum, quia non sequitur: "Omnis homo videt se, igitur omnis homo videt Sortem"; similiter nec<sup>64</sup> contingit descendere sub termino supponente confuse tantum. Et differt a suppositione confusa tantum, quia terminus supponens confuse tantum potest inferri ex supposito; sequitur enim: "Omnis homo est hoc<sup>65</sup> animal, igitur omnis homo est animal";<sup>66</sup> sed<sup>67</sup> terminus supponens confuse et distributive singillatim non infertur<sup>68</sup> ex supposito;<sup>69</sup> non enim sequitur: "Omnis homo videt Sortem, igitur omnis homo videt se."

(2.64) Circa unum praedictum dubitatur,<sup>70</sup> quia videtur quod relativum identitatis non reciprocum non possit<sup>71</sup> referre aliquid<sup>72</sup> positum in eadem categorica, sicut patet per hoc:<sup>73</sup> "Omnis homo habens asinum videt istum": Dicendum quod relativum identitatis non reciprocum non potest referre aliquod extreum istius propositionis in qua ponitur relativum; potest tamen referre partem extremiti. Sic igitur<sup>74</sup> in proposito: Sic enim dicendo:<sup>75</sup> "Iste<sup>76</sup> homo habens asinum videt istum," hoc<sup>77</sup> relativum 'istum' refert asinum et sic refert partem extremiti. Et sciendum quod relativum tale capit suppositionem ab antecedente,<sup>78</sup> ideo ad dandum contradictionem in relativis oportet antecedentia relativorum in contradictoriis habere op-

<sup>58</sup> suppositio... quae/singillatim quia C

<sup>59</sup> Sortes/omnis homo C

<sup>60</sup> convenit in/contingit descendere quia C

<sup>61</sup> supponente/praecedenti C

<sup>62</sup> absolute/aliquid add. C

<sup>63</sup> suum om. R

<sup>64</sup> similiter nec/Sed non C

<sup>65</sup> hoc om. C

<sup>66</sup> omnis homo... animal/animal est C

<sup>67</sup> sed/et C

<sup>68</sup> infertur/infert C

<sup>69</sup> supposito/singillatim C

<sup>70</sup> dubitatur/dubitetur C

<sup>71</sup> non possit/potest C

<sup>72</sup> aliquid/aliquod C

<sup>73</sup> per hoc/hic C

<sup>74</sup> Sic igitur/Sicut accidit C

<sup>75</sup> dicendo/dicto C

<sup>76</sup> iste/omnis C

<sup>77</sup> hoc/li C

<sup>78</sup> antecedente/apposita C

positas<sup>79</sup> suppositiones.<sup>80</sup> Per hoc patet quod ista non contradicunt: "Omnis homo habens asinum videt<sup>81</sup> istum," "Aliquis homo habens asinum non videt istum," quia posito quod quilibet homo<sup>82</sup> habeat duos asinos. unum quem videt et<sup>83</sup> alium quem non videt, tunc istae sunt simul verae: "Omnis homo habens asinum videt istum," et "Aliquis homo habens asinum non videt istum."<sup>84</sup> Similiter, posito quod quilibet<sup>85</sup> habens filium habeat duos filios et diligat unum et odiat<sup>86</sup> alium, istae sunt simul verae: "Omnis homo habens filium diligit illum," et "Aliquis homo<sup>87</sup> habens filium non diligit istum," quia sequitur: "Aliquis homo habens filium odit istum, igitur aliquis homo habens filium non diligit istum."<sup>88</sup> Causa quare tales non contradicunt est quia in contradictoriis termini habent<sup>89</sup> oppositos modos supponendi. Unde cum<sup>90</sup> antecedens relativum in ista: "Aliquis homo habens filium non diligit istum" supponit particulariter,<sup>91</sup> et reliquum supponit particulariter,<sup>92</sup> sicut est<sup>93</sup> dicere quod pars extremi supponit.<sup>94</sup> Per praedicta<sup>95</sup> patet quod haec consequentia non valet: "Omnis<sup>96</sup> homo habens asinum<sup>97</sup> videt istum, igitur aliquis homo habens asinum non videt istum, igitur aliquis homo habens asinum non<sup>98</sup> est homo habens asinum."

(2.65) Sciendum quod in relativis non est haec regula generalis: quod "Quidquid<sup>99</sup> sequitur ad consequens sequitur ad antecedens," quia haec consequentia est bona: "Si<sup>1</sup> aliqua propositio est vera, aliqua propositio est falsa," et sequitur: "Aliqua propositio est falsa,

<sup>79</sup> oppositas/contrarias C

<sup>80</sup> aliter relativa... suppositiones *om. (hom.)* C

<sup>81</sup> videt/est videns R

<sup>82</sup> homo *om.* R

<sup>83</sup> et *om.* R

<sup>84</sup> non... istum/etc. C

<sup>85</sup> quilibet *om.* C

<sup>86</sup> odiat/odit R

<sup>87</sup> homo *om.* R

<sup>88</sup> habens... istum/etc. C

<sup>89</sup> habent/debent C

<sup>90</sup> unde cum/utrum tamen C

<sup>91</sup> particulariter/personaliter C

<sup>92</sup> supponit particulariter *om.* C

<sup>93</sup> sicut est/tunc similiter C

<sup>94</sup> supponit *om.* C

<sup>95</sup> Per praedicta/Proprie dictam C

<sup>96</sup> Omnis/aliquis R

<sup>97</sup> asinum/non *add.* R

<sup>98</sup> videt istum... non *om. (hom.)* C

<sup>99</sup> Quidquid *om.* R

<sup>1</sup> Si *om.* C

igitur eius<sup>2</sup> contradictoria est vera." Non tamen sequitur quod haec consequentia sit<sup>3</sup> bona : "Si aliqua propositio est<sup>4</sup> vera, sua contradictoria est vera," et ratio huius<sup>5</sup> est, quia in consequente huius : "Si aliqua propositio est falsa,<sup>6</sup> sua contradictoria est vera," iste terminus 'sua<sup>7</sup> contradictoria' supponit pro contradictorio falsi, et in ista "Si aliqua propositio est vera, sua contradictoria est vera" ly 'sua contradictoria<sup>8</sup>' supponit pro contradictorio veri. Et ideo non est idem consequens in ipsis : "Si aliqua propositio est falsa, sua contradictoria est vera," et "Si aliqua propositio sit vera, sua contradictoria erit vera." Si tamen in ipsis essent idem consequens, tunc sicut<sup>9</sup> una consequentia valet ita et alia consequentia valeret.<sup>10</sup>

(2.66) Circa relativum diversitatis sciendum est<sup>11</sup> quod<sup>12</sup> relativum diversitatis non dicitur quia supponit pro alio quam pro quo suum antecedens supponit sed quia propositio in qua ponitur relativum diversitatis<sup>13</sup> non verificatur pro eodem pro quo propositio in qua ponitur antecedens relativum. Verbi gratia,<sup>14</sup> sic dicto : "Alterum istorum est verum, et reliquum istorum<sup>15</sup> est verum," demonstratis duobus contradictorie oppositis,<sup>16</sup> li 'reliquum' est relativum diversitatis et supponit pro altero istorum, et hoc quod dico 'alterum istorum' supponit<sup>17</sup> indifferenter pro utroque istorum, et ideo alterum et reliquum<sup>18</sup> pro eodem supponunt. Veruntamen istae propositiones : "Alterum istorum est verum," et "Reliquum istorum est verum"<sup>19</sup> non possunt simul verificari pro eodem. Unde quia ista : "Alterum istorum est verum" non verificatur nisi pro isto qui est alterum<sup>20</sup> istorum quod<sup>21</sup> est verum, unde<sup>22</sup> si ista : "Reliquum

<sup>2</sup> eius/sua C

<sup>3</sup> sit/est C

<sup>4</sup> sit/est C

<sup>5</sup> ratio huius/non R

<sup>6</sup> falsa/igitur add. C

<sup>7</sup> sua om. R

<sup>8</sup> contradictoria<sup>ans</sup> om. R

<sup>9</sup> sicut/si C

<sup>10</sup> consequentia valeret om. C

<sup>11</sup> est om. R

<sup>12</sup> quod/tale add. C

<sup>13</sup> diversitatis non... diversitatis om. C

<sup>14</sup> Verbi gratia/quia C

<sup>15</sup> istorum om. C

<sup>16</sup> oppositis om. C

<sup>17</sup> supponit om. R

<sup>18</sup> reliquum/non add. R

<sup>19</sup> Reliquum... verum om. C

<sup>20</sup> qui... alterum/de numero R

<sup>21</sup> quod om. C

<sup>22</sup> unde/ideo C

istorum est verum" vera<sup>23</sup> foret, sequitur<sup>24</sup> quod esset vera pro falso. Per hoc patet quod secunda pars huius copulativa est impossibilis: "Alterum istorum est verum, et reliquum istorum est verum,"<sup>25</sup> non obstante quod subiectum secundae partis supponat pro consequenti. Quia tamen<sup>26</sup> ad veritatem secundae partis requiritur quod praedicatum insit subiecto pro parte secunda,<sup>27</sup> ideo haec est impossibilis, sicut ista est impossibilis:<sup>28</sup> "Falsum contingens est verum," non obstante quod subiectum huius<sup>29</sup> supponat<sup>30</sup> pro aliquo quod posset<sup>31</sup> esse verum.

(2.67) Circa relativum accidentium<sup>32</sup> sciendum quod relativum accidentis identitatis non infert suum antecedens pro eodem numero, cum impossibile sit idem accidens inesse diversis<sup>33</sup> numero, sed refert<sup>34</sup> suum antecedens pro aliquo cui convenit eadem qualitas<sup>35</sup> specie. Verbi gratia,<sup>36</sup> sic<sup>37</sup> dicto: "Sortes est albus, et talis<sup>38</sup> est Plato," li<sup>39</sup> "talism<sup>40</sup>" est relativum identitatis et refert album non pro eodem numero sed refert album pro aliquo cui convenit albedo quae est eadem species cum albedine quae est<sup>41</sup> in Sorte. Unde intellectus huius: "Sortes est albus, et talis est Plato" est iste:<sup>42</sup> "Sortes est albus, et habens albedinem est Plato. Et haec<sup>43</sup> est differentia inter relativum identitatis substantiae et relativum identitatis accidentium,<sup>44</sup> quia relativum identitatis substantiae refert pro eodem numero, quia ad veritatem huius: "Homo<sup>45</sup> currit, et iste disputat" requiritur quod homo currat et quod idem iste disputet. Sed relati-

<sup>23</sup> vera *om.* R

<sup>24</sup> sequitur/oportet C

<sup>25</sup> et reliquum... verum *om.* C

<sup>26</sup> tamen *om.* C

<sup>27</sup> pro... secunda/propter falsa C

<sup>28</sup> est impossibilis *om.* C

<sup>29</sup> huius *om.* C

<sup>30</sup> supponat/supponit C

<sup>31</sup> posset/potest C

<sup>32</sup> relativum accidentium/relativa accidentis C

<sup>33</sup> diversis/diverso R

<sup>34</sup> refert/infert C

<sup>35</sup> qualitas/qualitatis C

<sup>36</sup> Verbi gratia *om.* C

<sup>37</sup> sic/enim add. C

<sup>38</sup> talis/tale C

<sup>39</sup> li/quia C

<sup>40</sup> talis/tale R

<sup>41</sup> quae est *om.* C

<sup>42</sup> iste *om.* C

<sup>43</sup> haec/in hoc R

<sup>44</sup> relativum... accidentium/accidentis C

<sup>45</sup> Homo/Sortes C

vum identitatis accidentium non refert pro eodem<sup>46</sup> numero, ut patet in exemplo priori; et etiam<sup>47</sup> hic: "Sortes est bicubitus et tantus est Plato." Non enim per istam denotatur quod Sortes et Plato habeant eandem quantitatem<sup>48</sup> numero sed quod<sup>49</sup> habeant eandem quantitatem<sup>50</sup> specie.

(2.7) Dicto<sup>51</sup> de suppositione propria dicendum est de suppositione in propria, et sciendum quod suppositio impropria est quandocumque<sup>52</sup> terminus supponit pro aliquo pro quo non permititur supponere de virtute sermonis, vel etiam quando non<sup>53</sup> supponit praecise<sup>54</sup> pro aliquo pro quo de virtute sermonis non supponit praecise. Per hoc<sup>55</sup> patet quod omnes istae suppositiones<sup>56</sup> sunt impropriae, scilicet suppositio<sup>57</sup> antonomastica, suppositio<sup>58</sup> synedochica, suppositio<sup>59</sup> metonymica.

(2.71) Suppositio antonomastica est quando terminus communis supponit praecise pro isto cui maxime convenit nomen, ut sic dicto: "Apostolus dicit hoc." Per hoc praecise intelligitur quod Paulus dicit hoc. Et<sup>60</sup> iste terminus 'Apostolus' de virtute sermonis non magis supponit pro Paulo<sup>61</sup> quam pro Andrea,<sup>62</sup> quia aliter si Paulus dicceret aliquid, esset haec vera: "Igitur<sup>63</sup> omnis apostolus dicit illud," quia<sup>64</sup> apostolus non<sup>65</sup> supponit nisi<sup>66</sup> pro Paulo.<sup>67</sup>

(2.72) Suppositio<sup>68</sup> synedochica est quando pars supponit pro toto, ut "Prora est in mari." Hic 'prora' supponit pro navi, sed hoc est improprie.

<sup>46</sup> homo currat... eodem/ille idem C

<sup>47</sup> etiam/hic C

<sup>48</sup> quantitatem/suppositionem quantitatis C

<sup>49</sup> quod om. C

<sup>50</sup> quantitatem om. C

<sup>51</sup> Dicto/Dictum est C

<sup>52</sup> quandocumque/quando C

<sup>53</sup> non om. C

<sup>54</sup> praecise/per se C

<sup>55</sup> supponit... hoc/fuit per se, ex quo C

<sup>56</sup> suppositiones/propositiones R

<sup>57</sup> suppositio om. C

<sup>58</sup> suppositio om. C

<sup>59</sup> suppositio om. C

<sup>60</sup> Et/quia C

<sup>61</sup> Paulo/uno C

<sup>62</sup> Andrea/alio C

<sup>63</sup> si Paulus... Igitur/esse verum si Paulus dicit aliquid quod C

<sup>64</sup> quia/tamen G

<sup>65</sup> non/solum C

<sup>66</sup> nisi om. C

<sup>67</sup> Paulo/isto R

<sup>68</sup> Suppositio om. C

(2.73) *Suppositio*<sup>69</sup> metonymica est quando continens supponit pro contento, ut “Bibe ciphum.” Hic supponit<sup>70</sup> ly ‘ciphus’ pro contento in cipho, sed<sup>71</sup> hoc est improprie. Similiter, sic dicto: “Anglia pugnat,” subiectum supponit pro gente Angliae, sed hoc est improprie. Similiter, quando terminus<sup>72</sup> supponit pro aliquo<sup>73</sup> ad quod significatum transmittitur, est suppositio impropria, ut hic: “Aqua est currens” ly ‘currens. supponit pro aqua, sed<sup>74</sup> hoc est improprie.

(3.1) Circa suppositionem propriam<sup>75</sup> dubitatur: cuiusmodi suppositio est hic: <sup>76</sup> “Piper venditur hic et Romae.”

(3.2) Similiter dubitatur: cuiusmodi suppositio est hic: “Herba crescit hic et in horto meo.”<sup>77</sup>

(3.3) Et dicendum<sup>78</sup> quod sic dicto: <sup>79</sup> “Piper venditur hic et Romae,” subiectum supponit personaliter, et ideo haec est falsa ut est de copulato praedicato, quia nullum piper venditur hic et Romae;<sup>80</sup> tamen ut est copulativa est vera, quia haec est vera: “Piper venditur hic et piper venditur Romae, quia in una parte copulativa potest supponere pro uno pipere et in alia pro alio pipere.<sup>81</sup>

(3.4) Ad aliud dicendum quod sic dicto: “Haec herba crescit hic etc.,” hic<sup>82</sup> est suppositio discreta, et<sup>83</sup> ideo quacumque herba demonstrata, haec est falsa: “Haec herba crescit hic et alibi” vel “hic et in horto meo,”<sup>84</sup> quia<sup>85</sup> herba crescens hic est eiusdem specie cum herba crescente in horto meo.”

(3.5) Adhuc dubitatur<sup>86</sup> cuiusmodi suppositio est hic: “De Sorte vere affirmatur animal.” Aut supponit ‘Sortes’<sup>87</sup> materialiter,

<sup>69</sup> *Suppositio* *om.* C

<sup>70</sup> *Hic supponit* *om.* C

<sup>71</sup> *sed/et* C

<sup>72</sup> *terminus* *om.* C

<sup>73</sup> *pro aliquo* *om.* C

<sup>74</sup> *sed/et* C

<sup>75</sup> *propria/impropria* R

<sup>76</sup> *est hic/sit* haec C

<sup>77</sup> *Haec duo dubia et responsiones eorum invertit* C

<sup>78</sup> *dicendum videndum* R

<sup>79</sup> *sic dicto* *om.* C

<sup>80</sup> *subiectum supponit...* Romae *om. (hom.)* C

<sup>81</sup> *pipere* *om.* C

<sup>82</sup> *hic/haec* R

<sup>83</sup> *et om.* R

<sup>84</sup> *vel...* *meo* *om.* C

<sup>85</sup> *quia/tamen* C

<sup>86</sup> *Adhuc dubitatur* *om.* C

<sup>87</sup> *Sortes* *om.* C

et tunc denotatur quod de hoc materiali 'Sortes'<sup>88</sup> vere affirmatur animal, et sic esset haec vera: "Hoc materiale 'Sortes'<sup>89</sup> est animal." Aut supponit pro significato, et tunc denotatur quod de significato Sortis vere affirmatur animal, et sic significatum Sortis esset subiectum<sup>90</sup> propositionis: Dicendum quod hic est suppositio materialis. Sed<sup>91</sup> intellige quod terminus supponens materialiter non semper supponit pro ista<sup>92</sup> eadem voce, sed una vox supponens materialiter aliquando supponit pro alia voce, ut obliquus pro recto.<sup>93</sup> Et ideo ad veritatem huius: <sup>94</sup> "De Sorte vere affirmatur animal"<sup>95</sup> requiritur quod haec sit vera: "Sortes est animal" et non haec: <sup>96</sup> "De<sup>97</sup> Sorte est animal." Similiter aliquando rectum supponit pro obliquo ut hic: "Iste vocatur Guillelmus" et denotatur quod iste vocatur Guillelmus. Non denotatur quod iste vocatur haec vox 'Guillelmus' sed quod vocatur hac voce.<sup>98</sup> Sciendum est etiam quod<sup>99</sup> sicut est in suppositione materiali sic et in aliis<sup>1</sup>: terminus habens suppositionem supponit pro se ipso habente aliam suppositionem, ut hic: "Homo praedicatur de pluribus," habet suppositionem simplicem et supponit<sup>2</sup> pro se ipso habente suppositionem personalem; et ideo<sup>3</sup> ad veritatem huius "Homo praedicatur de pluribus" non requiritur quod 'homo' supponat simpliciter quando praedicatur de suis suppositis, sed debet<sup>4</sup> supponere personaliter, et hoc quia<sup>5</sup> subiectum huius "Homo praedicatur de pluribus" supponit simpliciter<sup>6</sup> pro se ipso supponente personaliter.

(4.1) Intelligendum est quod ad veritatem propositionis affirmativa non sufficit quod praedicatum insit ei quod supponit sed sufficit et requiritur quod illud pro quo supponit praedicatum insit

<sup>88</sup> Sortes *om.* C

<sup>89</sup> Hoc... Sortes/vox C

<sup>90</sup> subiectum/suppositum C

<sup>91</sup> Sed *om.* C

<sup>92</sup> ista *om.* C

<sup>93</sup> ut... recto/animal in proposito pro recto vel pro obliquo ut sic dicto 'De Sorte etc.' hoc obliquum supponens materialiter supponit pro recto C

<sup>94</sup> huius *om.* C

<sup>95</sup> affirmatur animal/etc. C

<sup>96</sup> haec *om.* C

<sup>97</sup> De *om.* R

<sup>98</sup> et denotatur... vox/non dicitur haec vox Guillelmus sed hac voce C

<sup>99</sup> Sciendum... quod/et C

<sup>1</sup> et in aliis/est in aliis et C

<sup>2</sup> habet suppositionem simplicem et supponit/subiectum supponit simpliciter R

<sup>3</sup> ideo/non R

<sup>4</sup> debet/dicitur C

<sup>5</sup> quia/quando C

<sup>6</sup> simpliciter/et supponit *add.* C

illi pro quo supponit subiectum. Per hoc patet quod haec est <sup>7</sup> falsa : "Aliquis homo est terminus communis," non obstante quod hic subicitur unus terminus communis et praedicatum inest cuilibet termino communi. Et sic <sup>8</sup> praedicatum inest subiecto huius, quia cum <sup>9</sup> subiectum huius supponit pro suppositis et praedicatum non inest alicui supposito subiecti, ideo haec est falsa : et ideo veritas propositionis affirmativa est magis iudicanda penes inhaerentiam istorum <sup>10</sup> pro quibus extrema supponunt quam penes inhaerentiam extreborum ad invicem. Per hoc patet quod propositio affirmativa <sup>11</sup> potest esse falsa in qua praedicatur superius de suo inferiori. Ista enim <sup>12</sup> est falsa : "Aliquis homo est terminus communis," et tamen hic praedicatur superius de suo inferiori, nec hoc sufficit. Immo <sup>13</sup> ad hoc <sup>14</sup> quod propositio affirmativa sit vera in qua praedicatur superius de inferiori, oportet quod illud pro quo supponit praedicatum insit illi pro quo supponit subiectum.

(4.11) Contra illud arguitur sic, <sup>15</sup> probando quod omnis propositio <sup>16</sup> affirmativa sit vera <sup>17</sup> in qua praedicatur superius de inferiori, quia si non, sua <sup>18</sup> opposita foret vera et sic <sup>19</sup> propositio esset <sup>20</sup> vera in qua superius negatur ab inferiori ; sed "ad negationem superiorum sequitur negatio inferiorum" ; <sup>21</sup> igitur si propositio esset <sup>22</sup> vera in qua superius negatur ab inferiori, sequitur quod propositio esset vera in qua idem negatur a se :

(4.12) Ad illud dicendum <sup>23</sup> quod ista propositio est vera <sup>24</sup> "ad negationem superiorum <sup>25</sup> sequitur negatio inferiorum," accepto 'inferiorum' <sup>26</sup> sub ista acceptione sub qua superius verificatur de infe-

<sup>7</sup> est/sit R

<sup>8</sup> sic/solum C

<sup>9</sup> cum/tamen C

<sup>10</sup> istorum/sed C

<sup>11</sup> affirmativa *om.* C

<sup>12</sup> Ista enim/tamen C

<sup>13</sup> Immo/numero C

<sup>14</sup> ad hoc *om.* R

<sup>15</sup> sic *om.* C

<sup>16</sup> propositio *om.* C

<sup>17</sup> vera *om.* C

<sup>18</sup> sua *om.* R

<sup>19</sup> et sic/aliqua C, et si R

<sup>20</sup> esset/est C

<sup>21</sup> negatio inferiorum/inferius C

<sup>22</sup> esset/est C

<sup>23</sup> dicendum/dicitur R

<sup>24</sup> est vera *om.* R

<sup>25</sup> superiorum/superioris etc. C

<sup>26</sup> sequitur... inferiorum/Sed dicendum quod sic intelligitur incipiendo C

riori et non aliter. Unde bene sequitur : “ ‘Nullus homo’ est terminus communis, igitur nullus ‘homo’ est homo.” Antecedens est verum, igitur consequens, quia ‘nullus’ cum sit determinans,<sup>27</sup> facit hominem<sup>28</sup> in praedicato supponere materialiter, quia<sup>29</sup> hoc quod dico ‘terminus communis’ non verificatur de homine nisi secundum quod stat<sup>30</sup> materialiter. Et concedo quod aliqua propositio est vera in qua aliquid acceptum sub una acceptione negatur a se ipso sub alia acceptione accepto.<sup>31</sup>

(4.13) Contra: ista propositio<sup>32</sup> est vera: “Homo est terminus<sup>33</sup> communis”; sed non est vera secundum quod ‘homo’ accipitur<sup>34</sup> materialiter, quia ut ‘homo’<sup>35</sup> accipitur materialiter est propositio singularis, et per consequens subiecto sic supposito non inest hoc praedicatum<sup>36</sup> ‘terminus communis’ quia<sup>37</sup> nullus terminus communis est singularis nec e converso.

(4.14) Dicendum quod haec est vera: “Homo est terminus communis” secundum quod subiectum supponit materialiter non obstante quod hoc subiectum supponens<sup>38</sup> materialiter non dicatur de pluribus, tamen hoc subiectum supponens materialiter<sup>39</sup> supponit pro se ipso supponente personaliter, et<sup>40</sup> ideo haec est vera.

(4.15) Veruntamen<sup>41</sup> non subicitur terminus singularis. Tamen si<sup>42</sup> subiciatur terminus<sup>43</sup> singularis, dummodo supponeret pro termino singulari, adhuc posset esse vera, quia sufficit quod praedicatum in sit<sup>44</sup> ei pro quo subiectum supponit. Unde ista est vera: “Iste terminus communis est terminus communis,” demonstrato aliquo termino<sup>45</sup> communi, et tamen hic subicitur terminus singularis. Quia

<sup>27</sup> Antecedens... determinans/a volendo a R

<sup>28</sup> faciat hominem/facere homo C

<sup>29</sup> quia/et R

<sup>30</sup> secundum quod stat/supponente homo R

<sup>31</sup> accepto/accepta R

<sup>32</sup> propositio om. R

<sup>33</sup> terminus om. C

<sup>34</sup> accipitur/supponit R

<sup>35</sup> homo om. C

<sup>36</sup> subiecto sic... praedicatum/subiectum sic sumptum non est C

<sup>37</sup> quia/et R

<sup>38</sup> supponens om. C

<sup>39</sup> materialiter om. C

<sup>40</sup> et om. C

<sup>41</sup> Verumtamen/Tamen C

<sup>42</sup> si/etsi R

<sup>43</sup> terminus om. C

<sup>44</sup> in sit/in est C

<sup>45</sup> termino om. C

tamen<sup>46</sup> terminus singularis<sup>47</sup> supponit pro termino communi, ideo haec est vera.

(4.2) Per praedicta patet quod haec sit vera :<sup>48</sup> “Canis est aequivocum,” sumpto subiecto<sup>49</sup> materialiter, et<sup>50</sup> sic subiectum accipitur pro re univoci,<sup>51</sup> et tamen<sup>52</sup> subiectum acceptum pro re univoci<sup>53</sup> supponit pro se ipso accepto aequivoce,<sup>54</sup> ideo haec est vera.

(4.3) Similiter, haec est vera :<sup>55</sup> “Albus est adiectivum” secundum quod accipitur pro re substantivi, et quia ‘albus’<sup>56</sup> accipitur<sup>57</sup> pro re substantivi,<sup>58</sup> ideo<sup>59</sup> supponit pro se ipso accepto adiective.

(5.1) Circa praedicta oportet videre a quibus termini possunt confundi, ut videlicet<sup>60</sup> quae<sup>61</sup> possunt mobilitare terminum et quae<sup>62</sup> immobilitare. Talia enim sunt syncategoremata importantia multitudinem vel negationem.

(5.2) Una<sup>63</sup> regula est quod quando duo officialia includuntur in aliqua una dictione ad nihil refertur unum ad quod non reliquum, ut patet in hac dictione ‘nullus.’ Includitur negatio et distributio et ad nihil refertur unum ad quod non reliquum, ut patet sic dicto : “Nullus<sup>64</sup> homo est animal,” tam negatio quam distributio refertur ad totum subsequens, tam ad subiectum quam ad praedicatum.

(5.21) Et per hanc regulam<sup>65</sup> solvitur hoc sophisma : “Nullum caput habens est omne<sup>66</sup> caput habens.” Probatur sic : “Hoc caput

<sup>46</sup> tamen *om.* G

<sup>47</sup> singularis/subiectus R

<sup>48</sup> quod vera *om.* C

<sup>49</sup> sumpto subiecto/quia subiectum supponit C

<sup>50</sup> et *om.* C

<sup>51</sup> univoci (*gen.*)/unius vocis C

<sup>52</sup> et tamen/quia tunc C

<sup>53</sup> pro re univoci/per rem univocam C

<sup>54</sup> accepto aequivoce/accipit aequivocum C

<sup>55</sup> Similiter... vera *om.* C

<sup>56</sup> albus/sic C

<sup>57</sup> accipitur/acceptus R

<sup>58</sup> pro... substantivi *om.* C; per rationem substantivi R

<sup>59</sup> ideo *om.* R

<sup>60</sup> ut videlicet/et C

<sup>61</sup> quae/qui R

<sup>62</sup> quae *om.* R

<sup>63</sup> Una/*Et* C

<sup>64</sup> Includitur negatio... Nullus *om.* (*hom.*) C

<sup>65</sup> hanc regulam/hoc C

<sup>66</sup> omne/aliquid C

non<sup>67</sup> habens est aliquod caput habens"<sup>68</sup> et "Illud caput non habens est aliquod caput habens,"<sup>69</sup> et sic de singulis; igitur sophisma verum.

(5.22) Improbatur sic: sua contraria est vera, videlicet haec: "Omne caput habens" etc., igitur<sup>70</sup> haec est<sup>71</sup> vera: "Nullum caput habens" etc., quia tam negatio quam distributio fit respectu compositionis formalis et non respectu huius participii 'habens,' aliter haec non esset universalis et negativa. Et hoc<sup>73</sup> debet sic induci: "Hoc caput habens non est aliquod caput habens"<sup>74</sup> vel sic: "Non hoc caput habens est aliquod caput habens," ita quod negatio referatur ad compositionem formalem.<sup>75</sup> Sic est quaelibet singularis falsa.

(5.3) Sciendum quod quaedam syncategoremata<sup>76</sup> habent virtutem mobilitandi immobilitatum et etiam<sup>77</sup> immobilitandi mobilitatum, ut patet de hac<sup>78</sup> negatione 'non,' quoniam haec negatio 'non'<sup>79</sup> potest mobilitare immobilitatum et immobilitare mobilitatum. Verbi gratia,<sup>80</sup> sic dicto: "Homo currit," iste terminus 'homo' supponit immobiliter et paeponatur negatio sic: "Non homo currit," et tunc stat homo mobiliter et sic mobilitat immobilitatum.<sup>81</sup>

(5.4) Similiter, sic dicto: "Omnis homo currit," 'homo' stat mobiliter; et paeponatur negatio et stat immobiliter, ut hic:<sup>82</sup> "Non omnis<sup>83</sup> homo currit," et sic immobilitat mobilitatum.

(5.5) Unde ponitur una regula: Quidquid potest mobilitare immobilitatum potest immobilitare mobilitatum et e converso.

(5.51) Sed ista regula non est generalis, quia etsi omne potens mobilitare immobilitatum posset<sup>84</sup> immobilitare mobilitatum,

<sup>67</sup> non *om.* C

<sup>68</sup> est... habens/etc. C

<sup>69</sup> caput non... habens *om.* C

<sup>70</sup> sua contraria... igitur/si sophisma illud est verum, tunc C

<sup>71</sup> est/foret C

<sup>72</sup> Nullum... etc./Omne caput habens non est caput habens C

<sup>73</sup> aliter haec... hoc *om.* C

<sup>74</sup> aliquod... habens/etc. C

<sup>75</sup> formalem/principalem R

<sup>76</sup> syncategoremata/in ista R

<sup>77</sup> etiam *om.* C

<sup>78</sup> hac *om.* C

<sup>79</sup> quoniam... non/quia C

<sup>80</sup> Verbi gratia *om.* C

<sup>81</sup> mobilitat immobilitatum/immobilitat mobilitatum C

<sup>82</sup> hic *om.* R

<sup>83</sup> omnis *om.* C

<sup>84</sup> posset/possit C

tamen non omne potens immobilitare mobilitatum<sup>85</sup> potest mobilitare immobilitatum, sicut<sup>86</sup> patet de nota contingentiae quae<sup>87</sup> potest immobilitare mobilitatum non tamen potest mobilitare immobilitatum, quoniam sic dicto: "Contingit nullum *b* esse *a*," iste terminus '*a*' stat immobiliter virtute notae contingentiae, et tamen sic dicto: "Contingit omne *b* esse *a*" non stat '*a*' mobiliter virtute notae contingentiae.<sup>88</sup> Unde maioris virtutis est mobilitare quam immobilitare, et quod potest in<sup>89</sup> maius potest in<sup>90</sup> minus et non e converso,<sup>91</sup> ideo quod potest mobilitare potest immobilitare, non tamen omne quod potest immobilitare potest mobilitare.<sup>92</sup>

(6.1) Similiter, una regula est quod<sup>93</sup> terminus communis supponens respectu<sup>94</sup> verbi de praesenti non ampliativi supponit pro praesentibus solum.

(6.2) Alia regula est quod<sup>95</sup> terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praeterito potest supponere pro praesentibus et pro praeteritis.

(6.3) Tertia regula est quod<sup>96</sup> terminus communis<sup>97</sup> supponens respectu verbi de futuro potest supponere<sup>98</sup> pro praesentibus et pro futuris.

(6.4) Intelligendum est quod ista regula: <sup>99</sup> "Terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praesenti supponit pro praesentibus tantum"<sup>1</sup> debet sic intelligi: non intelligendo per supposita praesentia ista supposita<sup>2</sup> de quibus subiectum dicitur per verbum de praesenti, ita quod iste sit intellectus: Terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praesenti non ampliativi supponit pro istis suppositis de quibus dicitur<sup>3</sup> verbum de praesenti.

<sup>85</sup> mobilitatum/non *add.* C

<sup>86</sup> sicut/sed C

<sup>87</sup> quae/quia C

<sup>88</sup> et tamen... contingentia *om.* (*hom.*) R

<sup>89</sup> in *om.* C

<sup>90</sup> in *om.* C

<sup>91</sup> converso/et *add.* C

<sup>92</sup> omne... mobilitare/e converso C

<sup>93</sup> quod/quando C

<sup>94</sup> respectu *om.* C

<sup>95</sup> quod/quando C

<sup>96</sup> quod/quando C

<sup>97</sup> communis *om.* R

<sup>98</sup> potest supponere/supponit R

<sup>99</sup> regula/quando *add.* C

<sup>1</sup> tantum/tamen C

<sup>2</sup> supposita/praesentia C

<sup>3</sup> dicitur/per *add.* C

(6.42) Similiter in aliis duabus regulis : per supposita praeterita debemus intelligere <sup>4</sup> ista supposita de quibus <sup>5</sup> subiectum dicitur per verbum de praeterito, et per supposita futura debemus intelligere supposita de quibus <sup>6</sup> subiectum dicitur per verbum de futuro.

(6.51) Quoniam <sup>7</sup> si terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praesenti non ampliatiivi solum supponeret pro his quae existunt, haec esset <sup>8</sup> falsa : "Lapis vel Cesar est Cesar," quia praedicatum non inest alicui supposito subiecti quod <sup>9</sup> exsistit.

(6.52) Similiter, demonstratis Cesare et Cesare exsidente, haec esset <sup>10</sup> vera : "Nullus istorum est Cesar," quia subiectum non supponeret nisi pro Cesare. <sup>11</sup> Verumtamen <sup>12</sup> aliquis terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praesenti supponit solum pro suppositis quae existunt et hoc <sup>13</sup> si talis terminus non habeat nisi supposita exsistentia, sicut patet in istis: <sup>14</sup> "Omne album <sup>15</sup> est," "Omnis <sup>16</sup> homo est." Si tu dicas 'homo' habet supposita praeterita et similiter 'album,' quia sic dicto : "Album fuit" potest supponere pro eo quod fuit album et non supponit nisi pro suo supposito: *Dicendum* quod terminus communis supponens respectu verbi de praeterito non solum supponit pro his quae sunt supposita subiecti <sup>17</sup> sed pro his quae fuerunt supposita subiecti, et <sup>18</sup> ideo etsi <sup>19</sup> in ista : "Album fuit" possit solum supponere pro eo quod fuit album ex isto <sup>20</sup> non sequitur quod illud sit suppositum subiecti sed sufficit quod fuit suppositum subiecti. <sup>21</sup>

(7.1) Sciendum quod quando terminus singularis compositus ex adiectivo et substantivo supponit respectu verbi de praeterito vel de futuro talis oratio est multiplex, eo quod inter adiectivum et

<sup>4</sup> debemus intelligere *om.* R

<sup>5</sup> quibus/quo R

<sup>6</sup> quibus/quo R

<sup>7</sup> Quoniam/Quia C

<sup>8</sup> esset/est C

<sup>9</sup> quod/quia C

<sup>10</sup> esset/est C

<sup>11</sup> nisi pro Cesare *om.* C

<sup>12</sup> Verumtamen/tamen C

<sup>13</sup> hoc *om.* R

<sup>14</sup> in istis *om.* C

<sup>15</sup> album/verum R

<sup>16</sup> Omnis/communis C

<sup>17</sup> subiecti/sic C

<sup>18</sup> et *om.* R

<sup>19</sup> etsi/si C

<sup>20</sup> isto/quo C

<sup>21</sup> subiecti *om.* R

substantivum posset esse implicatio per verbum de praesenti vel per verbum<sup>22</sup> de praeterito, et hoc si<sup>23</sup> supponat respectu verbi de praeterito. Sed si supponat respectu verbi de futuro inter adiectivum et substantivum posset esse implicatio mediante verbo de praesenti vel mediante verbo de futuro. Verbi gratia, sic dicto: "Sortes albus fuit," haec est multiplex, eo quod inter Sortem et album potest esse implicatio per verbum de praesenti vel per verbum<sup>24</sup> de praeterito. Primo modo est iste sensus: "Sortes qui est albus, fuit." Secundo modo est iste sensus: "Sortes qui fuit, albus fuit."<sup>25</sup> Et sic est<sup>26</sup> de tali termino<sup>27</sup> supponente respectu verbi de futuro. Per hoc patet quod si Sortes primo<sup>28</sup> fuit<sup>29</sup> niger et in hoc instanti primo<sup>30</sup> sit albus, haec est vera: Sortes albus fuit, scilicet<sup>31</sup> quod inter Sortem et album cadit implicatio per verbum de praesenti, quia<sup>32</sup> non denotatur nisi quod Sortes cui inest albedo prius fuit Sortes; et in eodem sensu est haec vera: "Sortes albus fuit," scilicet<sup>33</sup> antequam Sortes<sup>34</sup> fuit albus.

(7.2) Per hoc patet solutio talium<sup>35</sup>: "Sortes est Sortes exsistens in hoc instanti, et Sortes exsistens in hoc instanti<sup>36</sup> numquam postea erit, igitur Sortes est aliquis vel<sup>37</sup> aliquid quod<sup>38</sup> numquam postea erit" vel sic: <sup>39</sup> "Sortes exsistens in hoc instanti et exsistens in hoc instanti numquam postea erit, quia hoc instans numquam postea erit, igitur Sortes est aliquid quod<sup>40</sup> numquam postea erit." Dicendum quod haec est falsa: "Sortes exsistens in hoc instanti numquam postea erit,"<sup>41</sup> secundum quod inter Sortem et hoc quod dico 'exsistens in hoc instanti' cadit implicatio per verbum de praes-

<sup>22</sup> per verbum *om.* R

<sup>23</sup> si *om.* C

<sup>24</sup> per verbum *om.* R

<sup>25</sup> fuit *om.* R

<sup>26</sup> est *om.* R

<sup>27</sup> termino *om.* R

<sup>28</sup> primo/prius C

<sup>29</sup> fuit/fuerit R

<sup>30</sup> primo/prius C

<sup>31</sup> scilicet/dico secundum C

<sup>32</sup> quia/quod C

<sup>33</sup> scilicet *om.* C

<sup>34</sup> antequam Sortes/quando Sortes non C

<sup>35</sup> talium/huius tantum R

<sup>36</sup> et Sortes... instanti *om.* C

<sup>37</sup> vel/et C

<sup>38</sup> aliquid quod *om.* C

<sup>39</sup> sic *om.* C

<sup>40</sup> quod/et C

<sup>41</sup> erit *om.* C

senti, quia<sup>42</sup> Sortes qui exsistens est<sup>43</sup> in hoc instanti postea erit etsi hoc<sup>44</sup> instans non postea erit. Similiter<sup>45</sup> haec<sup>46</sup> consequentia non valet: "Sortes est exsistens in hoc instanti et illud quod est exsistens in hoc instanti<sup>47</sup> numquam postea erit, igitur Sortes est aliquid quod<sup>48</sup> numquam postea erit," sicut<sup>49</sup> non valet: "Sortes est animal et animal est asinus, igitur Sortes est aliquid quod est asinus." Bene tamen sequitur: Sortes est exsistens in hoc instanti, et nullum<sup>50</sup> exsistens in hoc instanti postea erit, igitur Sortes numquam postea erit," sed minor<sup>51</sup> est falsa.<sup>52</sup>

(8.1) Intelligendum est quod quando arguitur a termino supponente<sup>53</sup> confuse tantum ad terminum supponentem determinate, et hoc respectu eiusdem multitudinis vel respectu eiusdem signi,<sup>54</sup> est fallacia figurae dictionis, ut hic: "Omnis homo est animal, igitur animal est omnis homo." Similiter hic: "Ab utroque istorum enunciatum est verum, igitur enunciatum ab utroque istorum est verum." Posito enim quod Sortes dicat Deum esse et Plato hominem esse animal et quod uterque dicat istam: "Homo est asinus," tunc est haec vera: "Ab utroque istorum enunciatum est verum," et haec est falsa: "Enunciatum ab utroque istorum est verum."

(8.2) Similiter quando arguitur<sup>55</sup> ab aliquo termino supponente plures<sup>56</sup> particulariter respectu alicuius<sup>57</sup> multitudinis ad eundem terminum supponentem <unum> particulariter respectu totius multitudinis,<sup>58</sup> tunc est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia arguitur a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum, ut hic: "Animal est iste homo" et "Animal est <iste> homo" et<sup>59</sup> sic de singulis, "Igitur animal est omnis homo." Per hoc patet responsio ad unum argumentum per quod probatur quod tres homines sunt<sup>60</sup> centum ho-

<sup>42</sup> quia/quod C

<sup>43</sup> est del. C

<sup>44</sup> hoc om. R

<sup>45</sup> Similiter om. R

<sup>46</sup> haec om. C

<sup>47</sup> sic... instanti/et existens in hoc instanti add. C, om. R

<sup>48</sup> quod/et C

<sup>49</sup> sicut/sed C

<sup>50</sup> nullum/nihil C

<sup>51</sup> minor/haec C

<sup>52</sup> falsa/Nullum existens in hoc instanti postea erit add. C

<sup>53</sup> supponente/stante R

<sup>54</sup> signi/tunc add. C

<sup>55</sup> arguitur om. R

<sup>56</sup> plures om. C

<sup>57</sup> alicuius/totius R

<sup>58</sup> ad eundem... multitudinis om. (hom.) R

<sup>59</sup> Animal... et om. R

<sup>60</sup> sunt/sint C

mines, quia haec est vera: "Centum homines<sup>61</sup> et duo homines<sup>62</sup> sunt quilibet homo<sup>63</sup> et duo homines," quia si Sortes <et> duo homines sunt quilibet homo et duo homines,<sup>64</sup> et<sup>65</sup> Plato et duo homines sunt quilibet homo et duo homines, igitur<sup>66</sup> tres homines sunt omnes<sup>67</sup> homines. Quod haec sit vera:<sup>68</sup> "Sortes et duo homines sunt quilibet homo et duo homines" probatur sic: quia<sup>69</sup> Sortes et duo homines sunt Plato et duo homines, similiter Sortes et duo homines sunt Cicero et duo homines, et sic de singulis, igitur Sortes<sup>70</sup> et duo homines sunt quilibet<sup>71</sup> homo et duo homines. **Dicendum** quod haec consequentia non valet: "Sortes et duo homines sunt Plato et duo homines et sic de singulis,<sup>72</sup> igitur Sortes et duo homines sunt quilibet homo et duo homines," quia in praemissis iste terminus 'duo homines' stat<sup>73</sup> particulariter respectu partium multitudinis, et in conclusione stat idem terminus universaliter respectu totius multitudinis, et ideo non valet,<sup>74</sup> quia arguitur a pluribus determinatis ad unum determinatum.

Explicitum suppositiones datae a Magistro W. de Bourle.

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<sup>61</sup> Centum homines/omnis homo C

<sup>62</sup> homines *om.* R

<sup>63</sup> homo *om.* R

<sup>64</sup> quia si... homines *om.* (*hom.*) C

<sup>65</sup> et/similiter C

<sup>66</sup> igitur/ex qua sequitur quod C

<sup>67</sup> omnes/tres C

<sup>68</sup> vera/quod *add.* C

<sup>69</sup> quia/quod C

<sup>70</sup> Sortes/omnis homo R

<sup>71</sup> quilibet *om.* C

<sup>72</sup> et sic... singulis *om.* C

<sup>73</sup> stat/supponit C, communis *add.* C

<sup>74</sup> ideo non valet/non *om.* R, ideo valet *om.* C

## INDIVIDUATION IN THE ONTOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS

Scholastic philosophers generally view the problem of individuation as the problem of how to account for the numerical difference of any two members of the same species, that is, to explain what divides the special species into individual members. Duns Scotus seems to be the first philosopher to argue that the solution to this problem requires a special individuating entity, a *haecceitas*.<sup>1</sup> His decision to so enrich his ontology rests upon an interrelated set of beliefs about the inadequacies of certain ways of solving the problem, the arguments which can be mustered on behalf of his own solution, and finally the compatibility of his new ontology with certain traditional philosophical positions. In the three sections of this paper I shall endeavor to present these beliefs and to show how Scotus uses them in supporting his own solution to the problem of individuation.<sup>2</sup>

In my discussion I shall focus on three propositions. The first two represent positions which Scotus is unwilling to give up and with which, he believes, any solution to the problem of individuation must be compatible. These propositions are: (1) Essences are neither universal nor nonuniversal in themselves; as they exist in the mind they are universal, and as they exist outside the mind (in individual things) they are singular; and (2) Essences are ontologically prior to

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<sup>1</sup> 'Haecceitas' is seldom used by Scotus who prefers '*entitas singularis*' or '*entitas individualis*'. *Opus Oxoniense*, book II, distinction 3, question 6, marginal number 15, volume XII (Vivès Edition), page 144a-b (both columns). Hereafter abbreviated: *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, p. 144a-b.

<sup>2</sup> I came to this understanding of Scotus, not as a specialist in medieval philosophy, but as a philosopher especially interested in the problem of individuation and Scotus' most important discussion of it. Apart from Leibniz's paper "*De Principio Individui*," I have not found anything which focuses on the considerations which support Scotus in his view, although many are aware of his solution. Thus, I try in this paper to present these major considerations as clearly and simply as possible.

accidents. The third proposition is taken by Scotus to be false ; it is :  
 (3) Signated matter individuates things.<sup>3</sup>

### I. THE SCOTISTIC CRITIQUE

The quantitative accidents of a thing have traditionally been construed as metrical properties such as height, depth, weight, and sometimes place. If we suppose that place, for example, is the individuator of the special species, or, to put in another way, if we suppose that it is place which individuates the essence of a thing, making it this man or this horse, then it becomes impossible to speak of a thing as being the same when it changes places. For if the essence is individuated by its place, different places determine numerically different essences. This general difficulty, which arises for any attempt to individuate through quantitative accidents, is to Scotus in direct conflict with (2), which he takes to mean in part that the essence of a thing can remain one and the same throughout accidental change.<sup>4</sup>

There is a second difficulty in holding that quantitative accidents are the individuators of things.<sup>5</sup> Each category has "upper" and "lower" limits.<sup>6</sup> The lower limit for the category of substance is the class of individuated essences ; the "lower" limit of any category of accidents is the class of individuated accidents. Hence, even if one could explain the diversity of essences in terms of a diversity of their accidents, a further individuating entity would be required, since these accidents are themselves individuated.<sup>7</sup> In short, to

<sup>3</sup> In using these propositions I shall not enter into historical questions concerning their origin and the accuracy of Scotus' understanding of his predecessors. It seems sufficient for their use that they express ideas which are important to Scotus and that they provide a helpful framework for an exposition of the reasons behind his solution of the problem of individuation.

<sup>4</sup> Scotus makes extensive use of the argument that the preservation of the priority of essence over accident precludes accidents as individuators. *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, XII, pp. 91-123. See especially : *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 7, XII, p. 95a-b, where Scotus gives even more content to the claim that essence is prior to accident.

<sup>5</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 7, XII, pp. 95b-96a.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 10, XII, pp. 104a-b. In Scotus' own words, "Furthermore, if quantity first individuates substance, it must be a 'this' in itself and by itself numerically distinct from another,... but quantity is a form predicated like any other."

individuate by what is not itself individual but individuated only postpones the ultimate solution to the problem of individuation.<sup>8</sup>

The arguments against quantitative accidents as individuators enable Scotus in a brief discussion to dismiss (3), the claim that signated matter individuates essences.<sup>9</sup> Matter, Scotus argues, is either indistinct and indeterminate or distinct and determinate. If it is the former, it could not possibly serve as the basis for individuation since it is not even individual; it is not a 'this' (*haec*). If the latter, then since it is quantitative accidents which make matter determinate, we are led back to the arguments against quantitative accidents. As a consequence signate matter, which is distinct and determinate matter, cannot be the individuator of the special species.

## II. THE SCOTISTIC SOLUTION

Having failed to find an answer to the problem of individuation in the accidents and/or matter of individual things, Scotus seeks to find a solution which is free from the major difficulties which beset these earlier suggestions. In particular he seeks to preserve the ontological priority of essence and to find a ground for individuation in an entity which is individual in itself. His solution involves a refinement of scholastic ontology, a refinement which is successful in avoiding the above mentioned difficulties and in preserving what Scotus takes to be central tenets of scholastic philosophy, namely, (1) and (2).

To speak of the ontology of Duns Scotus is somewhat misleading, since Scotus, like most scholastic philosophers, does not do ontology for its own sake. For Scotus ontology has important theological consequences; for example, Scotus argues that if one believes in transubstantiation, then accidents cannot be what individuates essence.<sup>10</sup> However, since we are concerned with a specific problem, which Scotus frequently deals with on an ontological level, it should be harmless, though artificial, to dwell on the Scotistic ontology to

<sup>8</sup> In one place Scotus suggests that if an entity individual in itself is not found, an infinite regress of individuators results. See: *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 12, XII, pp. 135b-136a.

<sup>9</sup> *Oxon.* d. 3, q. 5, XII, pp. 123b-127a. Scotus returns to the argument again at: *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, XII, nn. 30-31, pp. 154-157.

<sup>10</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 4, XII, p. 94a.

the exclusion of theological considerations and consequences. Thus, I shall begin with a digression into some of the basic distinctions and notions of the Scotistic ontology before turning to Scotus' arguments on behalf of his own solution.

In Aristotle's *Metaphysics* there is a well-known distinction between form and matter on the one hand, and composites of form and matter on the other. Form and matter are elements of substances; they are said to be inseparable, in contrast to substances (individual things), which are separable.<sup>11</sup> At least part of what Aristotle means by adjectives such as 'separable' as applied to substances is that substances may have spatial and/or temporal predicates; forms alone or matter alone cannot have such predicates. Neither forms nor matter can exist apart at a place in time.

Form and matter are really distinct, rather than logically distinct. In scholastic philosophy two things are really distinct, if their distinction is "discovered" rather than "manufactured" by the mind. Stated linguistically, this means that there is a real distinction when two names in fact name diverse things or when two descriptions in fact describe diverse things. In contrast, when we refer to one and the same property of a piece of glass as "convex" or "concave," depending upon how we look at it, we make a logical and not a real distinction. In some cases the *relata* of a real distinction are such that at least one of them can have spatial and/or temporal predicates in the absence of the other. For example, an individuated essence is really distinct in this sense from any of its accidents. Thus, I shall say that two things are really distinct in the stronger sense when at least one of them is separable.

The concept of equinity and the concept of humanity are both definable concepts and the *definiens* of each will mention the concept of animality. They have part of their definition in common. When there are two concepts such that the definition of one does not mention the other or when no part of their definitions is common, Scotus calls these concepts formally distinct.<sup>12</sup> In the special case where two concepts are indefinable, they are also formally distinct. These concepts, without definitions, are the elementary concepts out of which all definitions of other concepts are ultimately composed. Entities

<sup>11</sup> *Metaphysics*, Book VII, Chapter 3, 1029a.

<sup>12</sup> Maurice J. Grajewski, *The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus* (Washington, D.C. : The Catholic University Press, 1944), provides the most complete discussion of the formal distinction in Scotus.

represented by formally distinct concepts are formalities, and these are also said to be formally distinct. When diverse entites are represented by undefinable concepts, they are said to be primarily diverse.<sup>13</sup> Formalities which are primarily diverse are really distinct only in the weaker sense; their diversity is not "manufactured" by the mind, but they are inseparable.<sup>14</sup> Scotus distinguishes between a complex thing (*res*) and an entity (*entitas*); only entities are primarily diverse, and only entities are ontological constituents of complexes. Entities are also called realities and conversely.<sup>15</sup> In calling entities realities, Scotus is reminding us that these entities are really distinct from each other; although as we have noted, they are really distinct in the weaker sense only. This ends my digression; I shall now turn to the Scotistic solution of the problem of individuation.

The Scotistic solution rests primarily upon a distinction, which is not unlike the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter, between two kinds of primarily diverse realities, namely, quidditative realities and individuating realities.<sup>16</sup> Every individuated essence contains a quidditative entity, which gives it its kind, and an individuating entity, which makes it individual.<sup>17</sup> Quidditative entities are either determining, such as living thing, animal, and rational, or being which is the only determinable and undetermining quidditative entity. When being is determined by other determining quidditative entities, simple determining quidditative entities are the ultimate specific differences, the result is a specific or generic essence.<sup>18</sup> When a specific essence is further determined by an individuating entity, a *haecceitas*, the result is an individuated essence. Since the individuating realities are primarily diverse entities, any

<sup>13</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 13, XII, p. 135b. Primarily diversity (*primo diversa*) is explicated in terms of simply simple (undefinable) concepts (*conceptum simpliciter simplicem*). This notion of primary diversity is of the greatest importance in understanding the Scotistic solution to the problem of individuation. For, Scotus will maintain that only an entity which is primarily diverse can individuate essences, because only entities which are primarily diverse can be individual in themselves rather than individuated.

<sup>14</sup> For Scotus they are inseparable even by God. Grajewski, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>15</sup> Grajewski, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>16</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 12, XII, p. 135a.

<sup>17</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 7, XII, pp. 95b-96a.

<sup>18</sup> *John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writing*, ed. Allan B. Wolter (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), pp. 166-167. Also, *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 14, XII, p. 136a.

one of them may determine an individuated essence ; they are simply numerically different from one another.<sup>19</sup> If two *haecceitates* should each determine the same specific essence the results would be two individuated essences. Quidditative entities are indifferent to being this or that individuated essence, and the individuating entity adds nothing to the nature or essence of the individual, except its individuality. The relationship between the individuating reality and the quidditative realities it determines is fourfold. First, they are formally distinct entities.<sup>20</sup> Second, the difference between the *haecceitas* and the quidditative entities is "discovered" not "manufactured," hence it is a real difference. Third, the individuating entity and the quidditative entity, since they are formalities, cannot exist apart ; they are not separable, and they are not really distinct in the strong sense. Finally, the *haecceitas* is what actualizes the quidditative reality.<sup>21</sup> Scotus provides an excellent summary of his position when he writes :

And if you ask : What is that individual entity, is it matter or form or a composite ? I reply, any quidditative entity of any genus, whether partial or total, is of itself indifferent *qua* quidditative entity with respect to this or that entity. Quidditative entity is naturally prior to that entity *qua* "this," and because it is naturally prior and cannot be a "this," it can by its nature be a "non-this." And, just as the nature of the composite does not include the entity by which it is this matter, nor does the nature of form include its entity. Therefore, that entity is not the nature of either matter or form, nor their composite, but it is the ultimate reality of being, which is matter, or which is form, or which is their composite. So in anything common and determinable one can distinguish between several formally distinct realities of which this is formally not that. But "this" is formally a singular entity and the other is the entity of nature ; yet, these two realities cannot be different things [separable] (as can be the reality from which genus is derived and the reality from which difference is derived) but they are always in the same, either in part or whole, they are realities of the same thing but formally distinct.<sup>22</sup>

If the Scotistic solution requires two kinds of primarily diverse entities, then Scotus must argue first that there are primarily diverse entities and second that there are two kinds of them, namely, quid-

<sup>19</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 13, XII, p. 135b.

<sup>20</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, p. 144a-b.

<sup>21</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 11, XII, pp. 134a, 135a.

<sup>22</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15, XII, p. 144a-b.

ditative and individuating. He begins his argument by noting that each category is limited at the "lower" end by individuated essences or individuated accidents. If the division of a category stops, as it does, then there must be *differentiae* which are not themselves distinct through *differentiae*.<sup>23</sup> To be distinct without *differentiae* is another way of describing what it is to be primarily diverse. Therefore, Scotus concludes that there are primarily diverse entities.<sup>24</sup> The class of individuated essences has subclasses; for example, the class of all men is a subclass of the class of individuated essences. Each such subclass exhibits a certain unity, seen in the fact that some individuated essences belong to the class while all others are excluded. The individuated essence, for example, Socrates, also has a certain unity, although the unity of Socrates is in contrast to the unity of the class of men. The class of men can be divided into members sharing a common essence; Scotus calls this division into subjective parts. Socrates cannot be divided into subjective parts, that is, members each of which has the nature of "Socrateity."<sup>25</sup> Thus, the unity of the specific essence is a different unity from that of the individual. From the recognition that these are different unities and the principle that every kind of unity is grounded in an entity unique to that unity, Scotus concludes that there are two parts to the individuated essence, a quidditative part and an individuating part.<sup>26</sup> Thus, there must be primarily diverse entities of two kinds, which ground the two kinds of unity exhibited by individuated essences.

Given the soundness of Scotus' positive argument on behalf of the entities he needs to resolve the problem of individuation, he is successful in avoiding the major problems which he found in other suggestions. The individuated essence, *haecceitas* together with quidditative entities, retains its individuality throughout accidental change, thus maintaining the ontological priority of essence over accident. And, since the *haecceitas* is primarily diverse from other individuating entities and a "this" in itself, Scotus' solution is final; there is no need to look further for an individuating entity.

<sup>23</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 9, XII, p. 133a.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 9, XII, p. 132a-b.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

## III. THE CONCEPTUALISM OF DUNS SCOTUS

A final, but nevertheless important, reason behind Scotus' solution of the problem of individuation is that it gives him a way of satisfying a requirement of the conceptualist position expressed in (1). Conceptualism in this sense has two main requirements both of which stem from its anti-Platonism. The first is that concepts and only concepts abstracted from individual things are universal.<sup>27</sup> The second is that everything which exists outside of the mind is in some sense individual, or, as Ockham says, everything is singular (a numerical unity).<sup>28</sup> Scotus agrees with both requirements; and, as we shall see, his ontological approach to individuation gives him a special way of dealing with the second of these requirements.

The Scotistic ontology is very anti-Platonic. By making the individuating entity formally distinct from the quidditative entity, Scotus makes every quidditative entity which is exemplified in the world inseparably attached to some individuating entity. The Platonic separation of quiddity from individual thing is simply impossible in the Scotistic ontology.

Scotus agrees with the conceptualist that everything in the individual thing (outside of the mind) is a numerical unity.<sup>29</sup> The *haecceitas* is a numerical unity primarily; it is in itself a "this." The individual thing is a numerical unity *per se*, that is, through the fact that the *haecceitas* is a part of it. Finally, the common nature is a numerical unity denominatively because it is a potentiality which is actualized by the *haecceitas*. Scotus holds that when a potentiality is limited by an actuality, the potentiality takes on the unity of that actuality.<sup>30</sup> In this case the individuated common nature of this man cannot be further divided into subjective parts, whereas this is not a property of the unindividuated common nature. The individ-

<sup>27</sup> I shall not discuss this side of Scotus' conceptualism; it has been dealt with elsewhere. See: Allan B. Wolter, "The Realism of Duns Scotus," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 59 (1962), 725-736; and S. Y. Watson, "A Problem for Realism: Our Multiple Concepts of Individual Things and the Solution of Duns Scotus," *Studies in the History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), ed. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea, 61-82.

<sup>28</sup> William Ockham, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. and trans. by Philotheus Boehner (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1959), p. 35.

<sup>29</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 10-12, XII, p. 134a-b.

<sup>30</sup> *Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 10, XII, p. 133a.

uating entity by its association with the common nature forms the "lower" level of the category of substance; it is the ultimate division of the special species. Thus, Scotus gives his own special meaning to the conceptualist claim that outside the mind everything is singular.

I have argued that there are three reasons which for Scotus support his solution of the problem of individuation. Only one of these is a direct argument for his position. The other two are: first, other traditional entities such as accidents and signated matter cannot individuate the special species; and second, Scotus' solution maintains two central philosophical positions, namely, conceptualism and the priority of essence over accident. Obviously, these three reasons are interrelated; I hope that by now their relationships are clearer. There are, I am certain, other considerations which lead Scotus to approach the problem in the way he does. However, I am confident that any examination of those sections where Scotus argues for his position will reveal that these three are among the most important.

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## THE DESIRE FOR MARTYRDOM: A *LEITMOTIV* OF ST. BONAVENTURE

Commenting on the twelfth chapter of the *Regula bullata*, Bonaventure began: "Hic tertio docet in martyrio consummare..."<sup>1</sup> This enigmatic phrase can only become clear when two aspects of St. Bonaventure's concept of the nature of the Franciscan Order are understood. They are his use of the image of the city and of the desire of martyrdom as connecting threads between evangelical perfection, the mystical ascent and the missionary quest.

The New Jerusalem is the dominant structural image in the *Expositio super regulam*. The twelve chapters of the *Regula bullata* correspond to the twelve apostles, but also to the four sides and twelve gates of the city described in the twenty-first chapter of the Apocalypse of St. John. The first three chapters are the eastern side. The next three exclude the dangers coming from the north while seven through nine oppose the threatened ruin from the west. The last trio of chapters are symbolically representative of the delightful breezes of the south. Within this fourth wall, the third gate is the twelfth chapter in which Francis "opened the way for those thirsting for martyrdom, teaching them to join themselves to the infidels, leaving their homes."<sup>2</sup>

This is not just another example of the medieval fondness for symbols, artificially linked by numbers. The Franciscan Order has an eschatological function. Its spirituality and its ideal of evangelical

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### Abbreviations:

St. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, edited PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 10 vols. (Quaracchi, 1882-1902). Hereafter cited as O.O.

St. Bonaventure, *Opera theologica selecta*, edited PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 5 vols. (Quaracchi, 1934-1964). Hereafter cited as O.Th.S.

St. Bonaventure, *Decem Opuscula ad theologiam mysticam spectantia*, edited PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1965). Hereafter cited as D.O.

<sup>1</sup> Bonaventure ?, *Expositio super regulam fratrum minorum*, OO. vol. 8, chap. 12, sections 1-2, p. 436.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 1, section 1, p. 393; chp. 10, section 1, p. 431.

perfection are meant to prepare men for the approaching denouement of history. At the same time the Franciscans are the renovators of the life of Christ and the apostles because in their interior and exterior lives they conform themselves to the way of Jesus and the twelve.

For Bonaventure the imitation of the crucified is the key to the foretaste of the New Jerusalem. St. Francis of Assisi was the exemplar of this imitation. In the prologue to the *Legenda maior*, Bonaventure identified Francis with the angel of the sixth seal, rising from the East and bearing the sign of the living God. This sign was the stigmata, the confirmation of Francis's conformity to the passion of Christ.<sup>3</sup> Francis is, therefore, an Elijah-like figure whose role it is to prepare men in these last and most dangerous times for the coming of Christ in glory and the Jerusalem which is the promised ward of the faithful.

In the *Itinerarium mentis ad deum* Bonaventure had indicated that Francis was the model for his and the Order's spirituality.<sup>4</sup> He went to Mount Alverna expressly in order to discover the peace which he discerned in Francis. Recalling the stigmata, he saw in the six-winged seraph the key to his quest. The only way in which a *viator* could ascend to mystical union was through the crucified. Ardent love of the passion meant single-minded desire to conform oneself to Christ's death. This had raised Paul to the third heaven. It had been the dominant force which moved St. Francis.<sup>5</sup>

The ascent to God is composed of seven steps. The first six lead the *viator* to contemplate God through creatures; to behold him in

<sup>3</sup> Bonaventure, *Legenda maior s. francisci*, edit PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, *Analecta franciscana*, vol. 10 (Quaracchi, 1926-1941), Prologue, section 1-2, pp. 558-559.

<sup>4</sup> *Itinerarium mentis in deum*, O. Th. S. 5, Prologus, section 2, pp. 179-180: "Cum igitur exemplo beatissimi patris Francisci hanc pacem anhelo spiritu quaererem... ad montem Aluernae tanquam ad locum quietum amore quaerendi pacem spiritus declinarem, ibique exsistens, dum mente tractarem aliquas mentales ascensiones in deum, inter alia occurrit illud miraculum, quod in praedicto loco contigit ipsi beato Francisco, de uisione scilicet seraph alati ad instar crucifixi. In cuius consideratione statim uisum est mihi, quod uisio illa praeueneret ipsis patris suspensionem in contemplando et uiam, per quam peruenitur ad eam."

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Prologus, section 3, p. 180: "Via autem non est nisi per ardentissimum amorem crucifixi, qui adeo Paulum ad tertium caelum raptum transformatum in Christum... qui etiam adeo mentem Francisci absorbuit, quod mens in carne patuit, dum sacratissima passionis stigmata in corpore suo ante mortem per biennium deportauit."

creatures; to see him through the mind; to contemplate him in the mind; to rise above the mind and behold God as unity; and finally to see him as triune and as incarnate in Jesus Christ. These steps are speculative. They correspond to the six wings of the seraph and to the first six days of creation. The *viator* has arrived at the threshold of inner peace and the entrance to the interior Jerusalem. He is ready for the sabbath of rest.<sup>6</sup> Renouncing speculation, putting aside all the operations of the intellect, he must "consult grace, not doctrine; desire, not understanding; the sigh of prayer, not studious reading; the bridegroom, not the teacher; God, not man; darkness, not brightness; not light, but that fire which inflames totally and carries into God by ecstatic and most ardent affections. This fire is indeed God and his furnace is in Jerusalem..."<sup>7</sup> The *viator* who gives himself up to this fire is inflamed by Christ through the fervor of his passion. It is Christ who is the way and the door through which the viator makes this *transitus*. "He who turns his face fully toward the propitiatory [Christ], seeing him hanging on the cross, by faith, hope, love, devotion, admiration, exultation, appreciation, praise and joy, makes the *pasch*, that is, the crossing of the Red Sea from Egypt into the desert to taste the hidden manna and to rest with him, appearing externally dead, but perceiving within, in so far as is possible for a *viator*, [secundum statum uiae], the meaning of Christ's words from the cross: 'This day you will be with me in paradise.'"<sup>8</sup> This crossing is a spiritual exodus, an

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 7, section 1, pp. 211-212.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, section 6, pp. 213-241: "Si autem quaeras, quomodo haec fiant, interroga gratiam, non doctrinam; desiderium, non intellectum; gemitum orationis, non studium lectionis; sponsum, non magistrum; deum, non hominem; caliginem, non claritatem; non lucem, sed ignem totaliter inflammantem et in deum excessiuis unctionibus et ardentissimis affectionibus transferentem. Qui quidem ignis deus est, et huius caminus est in ierusalem, et christus hunc accendit in feroore suae ardentissimae passionis, quem solus ille uere percipit, qui dicit: 'suspendum elegit anima mea, et mortem ossa mea' (Iob. 7: 15). Quam mortem qui diligit uidere potest deum, quid in habitanter uerum est: 'non uidebit me homo et uiuet' (Exodus 33: 20). — Moriamur igitur et ingrediamur in caliginem, imponamus silentium sollicitudinibus, concupiscentis et phantasmatibus; transseamus cum christo crucifixo 'ex mundo ad patrem' (John 13: 1)..."

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 7, section 2, p. 212: "Ad quod propitiatorium qui aspicit plena conuersione uultus, aspiciendo eum in cruce suspensum per fidem, spem et caritatem, deuotionem, admirationem, exsultationem, appretiationem, laudem et jubilationem: pascha, hoc est transitum, cum eo facit, ut per uirgam crucis transeat mare rubrum, ab aegypto intrans desertum, ubi gustet manna abscon-

entrance into the supernal Jerusalem through the gate of the blood of Christ.<sup>9</sup>

God intended St. Francis to be the exemplar, another Jacob or Israel, by whom all truly spiritual men would be invited to this *transitus* and mental ecstasy, more by example than word.<sup>10</sup> If Francis is divinely commissioned to be the model for those who are seeking to enter the New Jerusalem by contemplation, then by implication this ought also to be a function of his Order.

Evangelical perfection has, therefore, an eschatological function. In his *Questiones disputatae de euangelica perfectione* Bonaventure discussed four aspects of perfection: poverty, chastity, self-abnegation and obedience. "The summit of perfection consists most potently in this that begins with the renunciation of temporal goods through poverty; that it proceeds to chastise the body through chastity; and that it is consummated with the dedication of the interior, mental virtues through the abnegation of the will and the vow of obedience, in which man is rightly said to deny himself according to that saying of the Lord...: 'If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself and lift up his cross and follow me' (Luke 9: 23)."<sup>11</sup> In all of its elements evangelical perfection is the imita-

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ditum, et cum christo requiescat in tumulo quasi exterius mortus, sentiens tamen, quantum possible est secundum statum uiae, quod in cruce dictum est latroni cohaerenti christo: 'hodie mecum eris in paradiſo' (Luke 23: 43).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Prologus, section 1, p. 179: "...quam pacem euangelizauit et dedit dominus noster Iesu Christus: cuius predicationis repetitor fuit pater noster franciscus, in omni sua predicatione pacem in principio et in fine annuntians, in omni salutatione pacem optans, in omni contemplatione ad exstaticam pacem suspirans, tanquam ciuis illius Ierusalem, de qua dicit uir ille pacis, qui 'cum his qui oderunt pacem, erat pacificus: Rogate quae ad pacem sunt Ierusalem' (Ps. 119: 7; Ps. 121: 6)." Cf. section 3, p. 180.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, section 3, p. 212. "Quod etiam ostensum est beato francisco, cum in excessu contemplationis in monte excelso... apparuit seraph... ubi in deum transiit per contemplationis excessum: et positus est in exemplum perfectae contemplationis; sicut prius fuerat actionis, tanquam alter iacob et israel, ut omnes uiros uere spirituales deus per eum inuitaret ad huiusmodi transitum et mentis excessum magis exemplo quam uerbo."

<sup>11</sup> *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione euangelica*, O.O. vol. 8, Question 4, Article 2, Conclusio, p. 186: "In hos potissime conuenit consummatio perfectionis, ita ut inchoetur ab abrenuntiatione bonorum temporalium per paupertatem, proficiat in castificatione membrorum corporalium per castitatem; consummetur autem in dedicatione uirtutum interiorum et mentalium per uoluntatis abnegationem et uotum obedientiae, in qua proprie dicitur homo semetipsum abnegare, iuxta illud domini, Lucae nona: 'Si quis uult uenire post me, abneget

tion of Christ and of the apostles. Self-vilification is imitation of Christ who emptied himself for men.<sup>12</sup> Christ on the cross was the exemplar of perfect virtue. The more nearly, therefore, that one approaches to the crucified, the more perfect one becomes.<sup>13</sup> Christ had made himself poor in order to redeem men, so that those who renounce their possessions become imitators of him.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, Christ was crucified nude, stripped even of all clothing. Total giving-up of goods is an act of conformity to Christ.<sup>15</sup>

In the early Church God had sent men able to work miracles in order to confute the idolators. Then he had raised up men who understood the scriptures and the methods of disputing to combat the heretics. But in the last stages of the world it is avarice which must be opposed. Therefore, God has sent the lovers of poverty and since poverty is an imitation of Christ and the apostles, these men of the final time conform to those of the early church.<sup>16</sup> Bonaventure contrasts the two cities of St. Augustine, the city of Babylon and the city of God. Self-love is the root of the former. Thus con-

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semetipsum et tollat crucem suam et sequatur me' (Luke 9:23; Mt. 16:24); ubi praecipue et potissime uotum obedientiae commendatur." The text of Luke adds "quotidie" after "crucem suam" but it is omitted here.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 1, pp. 117-118. "Item, ad Philippenses secundo: 'Hoc sentite in uobis... qui cum in forma etc. (Philipp. 2:5-8): sed semetipsum exinanire, nihil aliud est quam se ipsum uilificare: si igitur christum in hoc debemus imitari, exinanitio sui et uilificatio conuenit euangelicae perfectioni.' See also Question 1, p. 117: 'Item Lucae decimo septimo: 'Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt uobis... sumus' (Luke 17:10); sed qui recte aliquid dicit uult sibi credi, et credit, uerum esse quod dicit: ergo ad hoc, quod aliquis sit perfectus discipulus christi, necesse est, quod se uilem reputet et quod talis uelit ab aliis reputari.'

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 1, p. 119: "Item, quanto quis ad exemplar uirtutum magis configuratur, tanto est perfectior; sed christus in cruce exemplar uirtutum perfectae, ubi fuit in abiectione summa; ergo tanto quisque perfectior est, quanto magis ad illam accedit."

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 2, Article 1, p. 126.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 2, Article 1, p. 126. "Item, christus maxime fuit imitabilis secundum statum, quem habuit in cruce, secundum illud primae petri secundo: 'christus passus est pro nobis, reliquens exemplum, ut sequamini uestigia eius' (2nd Peter 2:21); sed in cruce fuit omnino nudus; unde Hieronymus ad Heditiam (Epistola 120, alis 150, chp. 1): 'Vis esse perfecta et in primo stare fastigio dignitatis, fac quod fecerunt apostoli: 'Vende omnia, quae habes, et da pauperibus, et sequere' saluatorem, et nudam solamque crucem uirtute nuda se-quareis et sola': ergo etc."

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 2, Article 2, pp. 147-148.

tempt of self must be the root of the latter. *Cupiditas*<sup>17</sup> is characteristic of those who compose Babylon. The members of the city of God must adhere, on the contrary, to poverty.<sup>18</sup>

Evangelical perfection is imitative and eschatological. It is the renewal of the life of Christ and the apostles in the last stage of the world. It is the foundation of the *ciuitas dei* which is opposed by the *ciuitas diaboli*. Imitation, renovation and the image of the city are linked as are humility, chastity, poverty and obedience. Bonaventure utilizes the city in three different forms: the mystical Jerusalem attained by ecstatic contemplation; the eschatological Jerusalem of the future; and the *ciuitas dei*, the body of the elect. But all three are linked into an image which defines the goal of the Order. Its task is to be both contemplative and missionary, striving for union with God while it renews and inspires others to seek the true goal of mankind.

The image of Jerusalem is one link between Franciscan mysticism and the Franciscan mission. The desire of martyrdom is another. Francis is again the exemplar. According to the *Legenda maior*, he was first led to seek conformity with the passion of Christ by the vision of the crucifix at St. Damian, the first of a series of such visions which impelled him to mortification of his body, intense personal meditation and contemplation of the crucified. From his longing to participate in the agonies of the cross, developed the desire of martyrdom which motivated him to become a missionary to the Muslims. The fulfillment of this desire came on Mount Alverna when the stigmata were imprinted in his flesh.<sup>19</sup>

St. Bonaventure, therefore, discerned in the desire for mar-

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 1, p. 119: "Item, ciuitas dei ex opposito se habet ad ciuitatem babylonis; sed ciuitas babylonis incipit ab amore sui et peruenit usque ad contemptum dei; ergo e contrario ciuitas dei incipit a contemptu sui et peruenit usque ad amorem dei. Si ergo se ipsum contemnere et uilificare spectat ad diuinæ ciuitatis fundationem; ergo est opus uirtutis."

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Question 2, Article 1, p. 127: "Duplex est ciuitas, scilicet dei et diaboli, Ierusalem et Babylon, quae oppositionem habent et in se ipsis et in suis fundamentis; sed fundamentum ciuitatis babylonis, ut dicit Augustinus (Enarrat. in Ps 64, no 2), est cupiditas; ergo quanto magis quis recedit a cupiditate, tanto magis recedit de diaboli ciuitate. Sed paupertas, in qua quis in communi et speciali prorsus omnibus abrenuntiat tam effectu quam affectu, ipsa est, quae maxime elongat ab auaritia; ergo etc."

<sup>19</sup> *Legenda maior*, chp. 1, section 5, p. 562; chp. 9, pp. 597-601; chp. 13, pp. 615-620.

tyrdom a stage in the mystical ascent toward union with God. In the Prologue of his *De triplici uia*, he posited four triads which become the structural principles of the ensuing treatise. First there are the three spiritual senses of scripture, the moral, allegorical and the anagogical to which correspond the three modes of ascent, the purgative, the illuminative and the perfective producing respectively peace, truth and love. There are finally three forms of exercise which are able to achieve these steps, reading and meditation, praying and contemplating. Beginning with meditation, Bonaventure treats each of these three types of exercise, showing how they should be practiced in order for the *viator* to be purged, illumined and perfected.<sup>20</sup> They are not to be employed consecutively, but simultaneously as different routes which ultimately converge.

The desire for martyrdom as a necessary part of the mystical quest emerges first in Bonaventure's discussion of prayer. He describes how the *viator* should deplore his misery, beg for God's mercy and worship his creator. The heart must learn to reverence and adore God, render him love and gratitude and rise up to the mutual delight of the "Spouse and the Bride."<sup>21</sup> Delight is subdivided into three parts. It must make the *viator* happy to delight only in God. He must want to please God alone. He must long for others to share his delight. In its first form, desire is gratuitous love; in the second, a love that is due; in the third, a love which combines both the previous loves. First the world is crucified to man. Then man is crucified to the world. Lastly he is crucified for the sake of the world, choosing to die for all in order that all may please God. This is the state and level of perfect love. No *viator*, before reaching it, should think himself perfect. For perfection comes only when he finds his heart not merely willing, but intensely longing, to die for his neighbor's salvation.<sup>22</sup> There are six degrees of the love of God. After sensi-

<sup>20</sup> *De triplici uia*, D. O., Prologus, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 2, section 4., pp. 14-15.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 2, section 8., pp. 16-17: "Complacentiam uero debemus deo triplici modo exsoluere: primo, ut sic coaptetur complacentia nostra ad deum, ut unicuique placeat, quod solus deus placeat sibi; secundo ut hoc placeat, quod ipse placeat soli deo; tertio, ut placeat ei, quod in hac complacentia communicent ceteri. Prima est magna, secunda maior, tertia maxima. In prima est amor gratuitus, in secunda amor debitus, in tertia amor ex utroque permixtus. In prima crucifigitur mundus homini, in secunda homo mundo, in tertia crucifigitur homo promundo, ut pro omnibus uelit mori, ut et ipsi placeant deo. — Et hic est status et gradus perfectae caritatis, ante cuius assecutionem nemo debet

tivity, avidity, and satiety, comes ebriety, a state in which the love of God is so overwhelming that, rather than wanting to be consoled, the searcher loves and seeks the cross. He experiences joy from undergoing torment, abuse or punishment. Since such love expels fear and is sure that nothing can separate it from God, it attains the fifth degree, security, which leads the heart to the final stage, tranquillity.<sup>23</sup>

The goal of prayer is love. Bonaventure saw in the cross the manifestation of the love of God for the *viatores*. Their response is to love God in gratitude, then as an obligation, finally as both. They come to reject the world and hence to be rejected by it, but lastly to be crucified for the sake of the world. Here the desire of martyrdom becomes a step in the development of love, representing love both of God and of neighbor, and desiring to die in order that other men may come to share this love. This is the final stage of love in one sense as tranquillity is in another. At this point, therefore, the missionary must derive his motivation from his spiritual development. His exterior work is dependent upon the love which prayer has created in him.

The third form of exercise is contemplation. Again it is subdivided into three forms: the eternal possession of supreme peace, the clear vision of supreme truth, and the full enjoyment of the supreme goodness of love.<sup>24</sup> Each of these three is composed of seven steps. Under the heading of supreme peace, the purgative aspect of contemplation, the sixth step is called ardor. The *viator* "...conceives a fourfold desire of martyrdom: for the sake of perfect remission of sin, perfect cleansing of blemishes, perfect fulfillment of the

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se a estimare perfectum. Tunc autem hanc perfectionem assequitur, quando cor semper inuenit non solum uoluntarium, sed etiam auidissimum ad moriendum pro salute proximorum, secundum quod paulus dicebat: 'ego libentissime impendam et superimpendar ipse pro animabus uestris' (II Cor. 12: 15). Ad hanc perfectam dilectionem proximi non peruenitur, nisi prius perueniatur ad perfectam dilectionem dei, propter quem diligitur proximus, qui non est amabilis nisi propter deum."

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 2, sections 9-11, pp. 17-19. "Quartus gradus est ebrietas, quae oritur ex saturitate. Ebrietas autem in hoc consistit, quod quis tanto amore diligit deum, ut iam non solum fastidiat solatium, sed etiam delectetur et quaerat tormentum pro solatio, et amore eius quem diligit, delectetur in poenis, opprobriis et flagellis, sicut apostolus. Vnde sicut ebrius se ipsum denudat sine pudore et sustinet plagas sine dolore, sic in isto intelligendum est." Cf. II Cor. 12: 5, 10.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 3, section 1, pp. 20-21.

penalty, and perfect sanctification in grace.”<sup>25</sup> This desire is the necessary state for entrance into quiet. The desire for martyrdom is thus the desire to be completely purged of sin and reformed by grace as well as an expression of love for God and for neighbor.

Expounding the seven steps by which the clear vision of supreme truth is reached, Bonaventure says that in the fifth place the seeker should put on Christ by trying to resemble him and then as the sixth step, should embrace the cross “in an access of desire for suffering. Then the light of truth will shine on him. The illuminative way of contemplation is centered around the cross which is the key, the door, the way, and the splendor of truth. He who is willing to take up the cross and follow its way, as Christ explained ‘does not walk in the darkness, but will have the light of life’ [John 8: 12]”.<sup>26</sup>

Imitation of, fervent meditation on, ardent prayer about and contemplation of the cross are for Bonaventure the steps which alone can lead the spiritual man to his ultimate goal of union with God. The spiritual life must produce in him the desire for martyrdom in order that, fired by this longing for death, he may pass over into peace. The willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of Jesus Christ as he gave his for men, is the goal which must be attained before a man can reach his desired end. Francis was the perfect example of a *viator* who, longing for martyrdom, achieved union with Christ.

It is the desire for martyrdom which Bonaventure stresses, rather than martyrdom itself. This desire expresses the imitation of the crucified Christ. It is a spiritual state formed by prayer and contemplation, both directed toward the cross. It looks beyond itself

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 3, section 2, p. 22: “Sexto, ardor in appetitione martyrii, et hoc propter quatuor, scilicet propter perfectionem remissionis offensae, propter perfectionem purgationis maculae, propter perfectionem satisfactionis poenae, propter perfectionem sanctificationis in gratia. Septimo loco sequitur sopor in obumbratione christi, ubi status est et requies, dum homo sentit, se protegi sub umbra alarum diuinarum, ut non uratur ardore concupiscentiae nec timore poenae; ad quod non potest peruenire nisi per appetitionem martyrii; nec ad appetitionem martyrii, nisi extinxerit incentiuum; nec ad hoc, nisi implorauerit subsidium; nec ad hoc, nisi deploret damnum suum; nec ad hoc, nisi timeat diuinum iudicium; nec ad hoc, nisi recordetur et erubescat flagitium. Qui uult ergo habere pacis soporem, procedat secundum praesignatum ordinem.”

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 3, sections 3-5, pp. 23-26. “Ecce igitur quomodo omnia in cruce manifestantur. Omnia enim ad haec septem reducuntur. Vnde ipsa crux est clavis, porta, uia et splendor ueritatis, quam qui tollit et sequitur iuxta modum praesignatum, ‘non ambulat in tenebris, sed habebit lumen uitae’ (John 8: 12).”

to union with Christ but outside itself to the neighbor who does not yet love God or share in the faith.

As a spiritual state, the desire of martyrdom also has a role in evangelical perfection. According to the *Apologia pauperum* it is the strongest defense of such perfection.

Tension between the secular masters at the University of Paris and the friars arose as early as the 1230's but only became open controversy when the masters attacked the mendicants in 1251. The publication of Fr. Gerard of Borgo San Donnino's *Liber introductorius ad euangelium eternum* (1254) and the attack upon it by William of Saint-Amour began a series of *apologiae* by leading figures on both sides of the dispute. Thomas of York, a Franciscan, wrote his *Manus quae contra omnipotentem tenditur* which drew a reply from the secular master, Gerard of Abbeville, in 1269.<sup>27</sup> Bonaventure in turn countered Gerard by writing the *Apologia pauperum*.<sup>28</sup>

Thomas of York attempted to prove that the status of those who renounced the world and retained nothing worldly was more perfect than the status of those who retained worldly goods. After advancing his proofs he replied to the objections against his view, especially that of the purse which Jesus and his disciples carried with them. He argued that Jesus did some things in order to instruct and give an example not of perfection but to the weak. To do the contrary of these was, therefore, praiseworthy, not wrong. Such things were more laudable if performed rather than omitted and he cited an as example the flight of Jesus to hiding (John 8:59; 11:54) which was not due to any defect in the power of Christ but was done as an example to those not able to face martyrdom.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> The *Manus quae contra omnipotentem tenditur* was edited by M. Bierbaum, *Franziskanische Studien*, Beihefte 2 (Münster in Westf., 1920), 38-168. Gerard entitled his reply *Contra aduersarium perfectionis christiana*. It has been edited by Sophronius Clasen, O.F.M. in "Tractatus Gerardi de abbatisuilla 'Contra aduersarium perfectionis christiana,'" *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, 30 (1938), 276-329; 31 (1939), 89-200.

<sup>28</sup> J. Guy Bougerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure*, trans. Jose de Vinck (Paterson, N.J., 1964), pp. 176, 178. Bonaventure had earlier composed the *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione euangelica* in reply to Guillaume de St. Amour's *De periculis nouissimorum temporum* (E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. by Dom Illyd Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed [Paterson, N.J., 1965], pp. 11-12, 21).

<sup>29</sup> *Manus*, cap. 3, p. 48; *Ibid.*, cap. 4, pp. 59-60. "Restat nunc, ut post hec respondemus illis, que ducere possent homines in huius opinionis positionem,

Gerard took up this example of the flight of Jesus and argued that Christ did not intend to give an example to the weak but that in certain cases the perfect ought to flee. He distinguished between the motives for flight. To flee because of some perversity or malice of the mind or on account of ignorance or mental weakness would be incompatible with perfection. The same could be true of flight induced by natural fear, but even a saint might flee because of humility or where prudent circumspection and an abundance of mercy made such a course wise.<sup>30</sup>

Replying to Gerard, Bonaventure defined perfection as consisting essentially in love. He distinguished three grades of love: first when the commandments of the law are observed; second when the counsels are fulfilled; third when the eternal delights are enjoyed.<sup>31</sup> The three levels of perfection are, consequently, necessity, voluntary obedience and the reward for obedience. Evangelical perfection meant the second or intermediate grade.<sup>32</sup> It comprised the avoidance of evil, the pursuit of good and the bearing of adversity.<sup>33</sup> This last must include a strong desire for suffering and the experience of joy in bearing agony.<sup>34</sup> The desire for martyrdom is perfect as such and flight from it imperfect as such. Evangelical perfection is provided with defenses among which the leading is the longing to be martyred for the sake of Christ, since the desire to die and be with Christ shows perfect love for him.<sup>35</sup> For Bonaventure, to desire death for the sake of Christ, to expose oneself to death for him and to rejoice in the agony of dying are acts of perfect love.<sup>36</sup> To flee from death is, therefore, an imperfect act in itself but if the mo-

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quorum primum est de loculis christi. Et ad hoc facilior est responsio. Nam Christus multa perfectionis ostensionem, sed infirmorum condescensionem, cuius contrarium aliquando facere licet non uituperabiliter, sed laudabiliter, immo, quod laudabilius agitur, quam omittitur, sicut manifestum est in fuga et absconscione eius, sicut habetur in Iohanne 8:59 et 11:54. Que non fuit propter potentie defectam, sed exemplum...”

<sup>30</sup> *Contra aduersarium*, liber 1, pars 1, pp. 291-303.

<sup>31</sup> *Apologia pauperum*, O.O. vol. 8, chp. 3, section 2, pp. 244-245.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 3, section 2-3, pp. 244-245.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 3, section 4, p. 245.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 3, section 7, p. 246.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 4, section 1-2, pp. 252-253.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 4, section 3, p. 253. "...mortem itaque pro christo desiderare, morti se pro christo exponere et in mortis agone gaudere actus est caritatis perfectae."

tive for flight is to insure a more glorious victory later on or to provide consolation for the weak when they might face the threat of death, then fleeing is a part of perfection.<sup>37</sup>

Perfect love is as much a part of evangelical perfection for Bonaventure as is poverty or obedience. The true friar must be a mystic as well as a pauper. Love which unites the other components is the counterpart of the self-love which underlies the *civitas diaboli*. Love is, thus, a necessary part of the friars eschatological role. But the desire for martyrdom must be a part of such love. It expresses the total willingness to deny self, to obey Christ while it unites the lover to Christ and transforms him into his beloved.

The desire for martyrdom is, therefore, a step in the ascent to God and a component of evangelical perfection. It is finally the motivating factor in the ideology of the Franciscan mission. Bonaventure recognized that the desire for martyrdom was the primary motivation of the Franciscan missionaries.

The Friars Minor sought to conform themselves to Christ crucified by interior contemplation while they exposed themselves to suffering and perhaps death in order to persuade infidels to accept the faith. They stressed obedience to the command of Matthew 16:24: "Si quis uult post me uenire, abneget semetipsum, et tollat crucem suam, et sequatur me."<sup>38</sup> Bonaventure recognized that the desire for martyrdom represented this ideology. Thus friars should not be urged onward by inconstancy, impetuosity or the wish to escape the bonds of discipline, nor can they be compelled to go involuntarily. Ministers are to examine those who do desire to become missionaries to see if they are suitable, i.e. possessed of physical

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, chp. 4, section 3, p. 253.

<sup>38</sup> *Expositio super regulam*, chp. 12, sections 1-2, p. 436. "'Quicumque fratrum.' Hic tertio docet in martyrio consummare; et quia martyrium nullum est, nisi fiat in ecclesiastica unitate, primo agit de primo; secundo, de secundo, ibi: 'ad haec per obedientiam.'

In prima parte tangit fratrum hoc desiderio flagrantium 'deuotionem' et ministrorum examinantium 'discretionem,' dicens: 'Quicumque fratrum diuina inspiratione,' non leuitate, non impetuositate, non astutia subterfugiendae disciplinae,' voluerint ire inter saracenos et alios infideles,' ut paganos uel haereticos, uel schismaticos; 'petant inde licentiam a suis ministris prouincialibus,' signanter dicit 'petant licentiam' quia huius rei obedientia non est inuoluntarii imponenda. Vnde subdit: 'ministri uero nullis eundi licentiam' tribunat, nisi eis quos uiderint esse idoneos ad mittendum.' Idonei autem sunt robusti corpore et constantes in fide, probabi uirtute et semper irreprehensibiliter conuersati.

robustness, constancy in faith, proven virtue and an irreprehensible way of life. They must be men who have developed spiritually to the stage where they long for martyrdom, loving God and their neighbor perfectly.

"Hic tertio docet in martyrio consummare..." In this short sentence, Bonaventure has indicated two key elements in his understanding of the Franciscan *via*. The one is the image of the city, the other the desire of martyrdom. Bonaventure saw Francis as the archetype of a Friar minor, whose ideal was the total imitation of Christ, especially of the passion of Christ. This imitation ought to be both interior and external, mystical and active. It demands the growth in the *viator* of a love which directs him at once toward God and his neighbors. Such love, however, requires that he be willing to be martyred. He must long to die for the sake of Christ and those whom Christ suffered to redeem. The desire for martyrdom is a necessary step toward mystical union, as well as a defense of evangelical perfection and the motivation for mission. Both as mystics and as missionaries, Franciscans should desire to imitate the passion of Christ.

The desire for martyrdom is a stage in the ascent toward perfection. The image of the city symbolically represents the goal of Franciscan perfection. The mystic seeks the interior Jerusalem, union with God. The Friars as an order are sent by God to guide men toward the eschatological Jerusalem in this *nouissima hora*. Evangelical perfection as the Friars embody it includes those virtues which help form the *civitas dei*.

Franciscans, therefore, ought to be both mystics and missionaries. Their role in the divine scheme of history demands that they combine both forms of life. The total imitation of the crucified Christ demands both, and in the eyes of Bonaventure, Francis exemplified the combination. The Friars minor, impelled by love and ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Christ, are the means by which the dark and cold world can be renewed before the approaching end comes.

#### APPENDIX: THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *EXPOSITIO SUPER REGULAM FRATRUM MINORUM*

The attribution of the *Expositio* to St. Bonaventure rather than to John Pecham has long been debated, but the thorough exploration of this problem by Conrad Harkins, O.F.M. in his "The

Authorship of a Commentary on the Franciscan Rule Published among the Works of St. Bonaventure" (*Franciscan Studies*, 29 [1969], 157-248) necessitates some comment here. Harkins shows that the strongest argument against attributing the work to St. Bonaventure is the silence of later writers about it before the fifteenth century. The *Expositio* also does not survive in any manuscript earlier than 1400 and one of the two earliest manuscripts gives Pecham as the author. Harkins demonstrates that Pecham's genuine treatises are either dependent upon the *Expositio*, chapters 4 and 9, or that the latter is dependent upon Pecham's earlier writings. He also indicates that on several points the *Expositio* reflects Pecham's controversy with the Dominican, Robert Kilwardby. His conclusion is that Pecham probably wrote the *Expositio* after he had written his *Canticum pauperis*. Although he has exhaustively treated the question, his argument is not decisive and a defense of Bonaventure's authorship could still be made. Furthermore, the telling argument from silence which he uses against Bonaventure, could also be used against the authorship of Pecham, who, if he was not on the same level with the minister general, was scarcely a minor figure and whose *Tractatus* was repeatedly used. Further exploration also needs to be done on the relationship between the *Expositio* and the *Expositio* by David of Augsburg which also employed the image of the New Jerusalem with its twelve gates for the twelve chapters of the Rule (See pp. 189-191). Harkins stresses the agreement between the *Expositio* and thought of St. Bonaventure, stating that "the principal importance of the *Expositio* is that it constitutes a Bonaventurian synthesis" (p. 247). I have concluded therefore, that for the purposes of this article, it is best to employ the *Expositio* while taking account of the doubtfulness of its authorship. Certainly on the topics treated here, the *Expositio* seems to closely reflect the thought of St. Bonaventure.

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## A METAPHYSICAL APPROACH TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Because the present-day world is so complex and so changing, it is an obvious impossibility to describe it both accurately and adequately. The structure of society is being altered by scientific, economic, social and intellectual innovations which are creating both amazing progress and deep disorders. This paradoxical situation is reflected in the prevalent attitudes, ideas and values concerning man's relationship with God. These present-day, paradoxical attitudes indicate two seemingly opposed characteristics, a loss of the sense of God and a restless striving to know God.

In many respects the modern world appears to be a closed system in which God, as the center of that world, has been replaced by man, who is able to exploit and dominate that world. "If there is any one feature of our contemporary crisis which distinguishes it from those of preceding civilizations, it would seem to be the chronic, almost universal loss of the sense of God."<sup>1</sup> This almost universal loss of the sense of God in the present-day world is no simple phenomenon which exhibits a single, clearly defined cause. Rather, it is the result of varied, complex and intertwining social, historical and cultural situations.

Paradoxically, modern society also reveals a striving and a longing that is clearly a search for God. Not just in spite of the loss of the sense of God in our era, but often because of this loss, the problem of the existence of God has been revitalized. At a time when the absence of God is so widespread, the theme of His existence and of His relationship with the world is found to be central in many of the books, articles, motion pictures and plays of contemporary society.

All of this contemporary interest in the question of God implies at least reluctant recognition of the very Reality which man seems intent on denying. Gabriel Marcel has maintained that it "might

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<sup>1</sup> Gleason, R. W. *The Search for God* (New York, 1964), p. 5.

even be that the current rebellion against God could become the initial act in purifying our dialectic, the negative starting-point of a thought capable of orienting itself toward God in the end.”<sup>2</sup> The modern attitude of this loss of a sense of God is able to provide an opportunity to do away with a conception of God that is false, misleading and, therefore, totally inadequate. This modern denial of God is able to be seen as an efficacious criticism of outmoded, inadequate and anthropomorphic representations of the Divine Reality and thereby as a purifying element in seeking a true, yet of necessity an obscure, knowledge of God. Henri De Lubac maintains that “modern civilizations expose us to the risk of losing God. Perhaps they will enable us to rediscover him at a deeper level...”<sup>3</sup>.

This seeking for God, this searching for the affirmation of the existence of the Divine Reality is often referred to as the “problem of God,” especially in the vast number of philosophical-theological books and articles that have been published in the past few years. This is not to say that the problem of God is a limited study of a specified philosophical nature. Rather, “rightly understood, the problem of God is not one problem among several others; it is the only problem there is.”<sup>4</sup> Indeed, “many thinkers are of the opinion that the problem of God... constitutes the essence of the problem of our own time.”<sup>5</sup> This essence of the problem for our time has brought a special urgency to the situation, so much so that Robert Kreyche is able to claim that “Few problems are as urgent as the ‘problem’ of God in society.”<sup>6</sup> The problem of God is not merely a problem of philosophy, it is also a problem of absorbing human interest since it concerns the total existence of man.

Obviously, a study of this total problem of God is far beyond the scope of this article. This article will confine itself to only the philosophical aspect of this problem, that is whether philosophy as “the science in which natural reason seeks an understanding of all things by a knowledge of their first principles”<sup>7</sup> is able to arrive at the affirmation that the Divine Reality does exist. This limitation

<sup>2</sup> Marcel, G. “Contemporary Atheism and the Religious Mind,” *Philosophy Today*, IV, 1960, p. 256.

<sup>3</sup> De Lubac, H. *The Discovery of God* (London, 1960), p. 181.

<sup>4</sup> Ogden, S. M. *The Reality of God* (New York, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Adolfs, R. *The Grave of God* (London, 1967), p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Kreyche, R. J. *God and Reality* (New York, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Wuellner, B. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy* (Milwaukee, 1956), p. 91.

of our study is in no way a disparagement of the importance of the other aspects of this problem, rather it is a necessary limitation in order to scientifically approach and appreciate this all-important aspect of the total problem.

Before presenting an evaluation of an attempt at answering this question, it is necessary to justify the legitimacy of such a philosophical approach in the face of widely differing challenges. There are many who maintain that unaided reason is unable to arrive at a certain knowledge of the existence of the Divine Reality.

Some present-day theologians (for example, Karl Barth) emphatically deny the validity of any philosophical knowledge of God because of the complete otherness of the nature of God. Although this position is understandable enough if one considers the many exaggerations of the past, this reason only does not justify such an extreme position. Even though a philosophical knowledge of God is possible, it is in fact attained only with great difficulty and with far less than a "total" knowledge of God as a result.

Others object to this type of knowledge because of the contradictions that are so evident concerning this question in the long history of philosophy. Without doubt, the history of philosophy does show imperfect and conflicting notions of God, but is this not itself an indication of the profundity and mystery of the Divine Reality?

There are others, having been trained in positivistic, scientific disciplines, who are disconcerted by metaphysical activities, because they fail to find within metaphysics their criteria of certainty. We would be the first to maintain that metaphysical certitude belongs to another order than positive scientific certitude. Because of this difference, the same criteria of evidence are not able to be applied to these widely differing sciences.

Finally, many philosophers, influenced by the prevalence of linguistic analysis, maintain that the existence of God is not a question for the philosopher *qua* philosopher to decide, because the philosopher is not called upon to reason to the existence of God. Rather, they contend that what

...the philosopher is called upon to do is to ask those who believe in God to describe as accurately as they can how they think and speak of Him, so that he may try to find some method of determining the exact logical status of the kinds of statement about God believers make.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Sillem, E. *Ways of Thinking About God* (New York, 1961), p. 1.

The only response possible to such an understanding of the task of philosophy is to restate the definition of the science of philosophy that was just given. We see the task of philosophy in an entirely different perspective than do the followers of the school of linguistic analysis. We maintain that it is false to base the entire task of philosophy on the principle of verification, because to do so is to stretch its range of application beyond all reasonable limits.

We contend, in contrast to the number of objections above, that the problem of the existence of God is posed by the very demands of philosophy itself. The central metaphysical problem is to understand the nature and origin of finite beings and it is the existence of God that appears as its final and adequate solution. We recognize that such an approach to God's existence is always achieved immediately, because the Divine Reality is not the immediate object of the intellect. Our knowledge of God comes to us through our knowledge of the sensible world, not through any natural intuition of God. The capacities and the limitations of human reason must be continually remembered, since the two extremes of agnosticism and rationalism are always to be avoided. Our goal is a perfectly balanced equilibrium between the two — the awareness that reason can indeed arrive at a secure knowledge of the existence of God, but that this knowledge is not a complete grasp of the Divine Reality, since everything we can say of Him is necessarily inadequate. This situation has prompted many modern thinkers to say that all knowledge is dialectical, that is, all statements about Him imply their opposite. This reflection is similar to Saint Thomas' teaching that all that is said of God must also be denied, that negative theology is the necessary complement of positive theology.

God is both known and unknown to us. He is known in that we can determine the truth of certain propositions about Him in an experiential-inferential way ; this removes the extreme claim of agnosticism and of atheism, whether of the emphatic or the unemphatic variety. God is unknown in that none of the finite things from which we draw our knowledge gives us a vision of His divine being in its own infinite actuality ; this removes the extreme claim of the functionalists and dialectical monists, the ontologists and theosophists.<sup>9</sup>

This article is an attempt to present an evaluation of a contemporary Thomistic approach to the philosophical affirmation of the existence of God.

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<sup>9</sup> Collins, J. *God in Modern Philosophy* (Chicago, 1959), p. 402.

An evaluation of the work of The Reverend Thomas C. O'Brien, an American Dominican priest, is the core of this article, not because of any reputation that he has as an original philosopher, but rather because his work is representative of the school of philosophy called Thomism. In 1960 Father O'Brien authored a book entitled *Metaphysics and the Existence of God*, the first volume of a series of texts and studies in Thomism initiated by the Thomistic Press of Washington, D.C. Father O'Brien has shown, in the first part of his study, that the supposed monolithic structure of Thomism is really a group of surprisingly divergent views and opinions on such questions as the place of the question of God's existence in philosophy, the use of a nominal definition of God as a vehicle of approach to the establishment of His existence and the use of the famous "quinq-ue viae" of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas. Although admitting that dispute and discussion is a normal sign of philosophy's vitality, Father O'Brien finds the disconcerting element in this divergence in the fact that each opinion is advanced with the claim of Thomistic authenticity and of fidelity to the thought of Saint Thomas. Father O'Brien states :

The term " Thomistic Philosophy " itself admits of at least a duality of senses. Taken in its intrinsic nature, Thomistic philosophy should bespeak human wisdom as constituted in its systematic totality by principles formulated, developed or inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas. But Thomistic philosophy may also be understood as an historic reality, since as an intellectual perfection it can only reside in the minds of Thomistic philosophers. Nor is the residence a mere passive homage paid to authority ; the philosopher designating himself Thomistic does so on the sole grounds of his own assimilation of, and rationally convinced assent to, the thought of his master. Thomistic philosophy in this concrete sense lies open to a wide diversity of interpretation. While St. Thomas left no " Summa Philosophiae " as a record of the philosophical system that is distinctively his, the variety of interpretations is not primarily due to this fact. Rather it is the necessarily personal assimilation of his thought by Thomistic philosophers that must be recognized as a source of confusion. The philosopher must by conviction make that philosophy he embraces his own. When Thomists present teachings that are drastically incompatible as Thomistic,... then discernment between the content which is truly Thomistic and that which results from the historical or doctrinal conditions personally affecting the proponents of such teachings is demanded.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> O'Brien, T. C. *Metaphysics and the Existence of God* (Washington, 1960), p. 3.

Father O'Brien considers his work to be such a discernment, with the desired result that the authentic Thomistic meaning of the question is distinguished from the ambiguities arising from historical influences and personal commitments inherent in the interpretations of individual Thomistic philosophers.

In the second part of his study, the reflective and critical examination of these theses takes place. He offers in this part a clear exposition of authentically Thomistic principles of metaphysics. He proposes what he considers to be the authentic Thomistic solution to the posed problem of the existence of God. This solution consists in three predominant themes : (1) the order to be followed in approaching the question of God's existence ; (2) the use of a nominal definition of God in metaphysics ; and (3) the function of the "quinq<sup>ue</sup> viae" in this science. It is the solution offered by Father O'Brien in this final section that will concern us here, since his work is a clear and methodic presentation of a manner in which contemporary Anglo-Saxon Thomists approach the problem of metaphysics in relation to the existence of God.

#### THE THOMISTIC NOTION OF METAPHYSICS

Father O'Brien, in the introduction of his volume, gives a very brief summary of some of the names by which metaphysics has been designated in philosophical tradition. Such names as "first philosophy," "wisdom," "the divine science," or "theology" have been employed. In the scholastic tradition, however, "the name metaphysics has been accepted as signifying the science of being as being... Metaphysics signifies the science of being 'qua' being and of those things which either as properties or as causes pertain 'per se' to the consideration of being."<sup>11</sup> It is to this area of philosophical knowledge that the question of God's existence pertains.

Reflection upon the question of God's existence is presented in the order of metaphysics' discovery of the truth. In order to accomplish this task, metaphysics must exercise its judgment in terms of first principles which eventually lead to the discovery of the truth that God does exist. For a metaphysics to be designated as "Thomistic," it is presupposed that such principles, delineating the nature

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

of metaphysics and its proportion to the truth, are to be sought in the works and words of St. Thomas himself. For the enunciation of these principles, Father O'Brien chooses the text of St. Thomas that he considers to be the clearest and most concise concerning this: The Commentary on Boethius "De Trinitate." These principles are to be found in the fourth article of the fifth question, "Whether divine science (metaphysics) is concerned with those things which are without matter and movement?" In this article are found the two principles which Father O'Brien uses to find a solution to the problem of God's existence through metaphysics. These two clearly formulated principles are the principle of extension and the principle of limitation. Through the principle of extension, St. Thomas shows that the consideration of God does pertain to that science (metaphysics) whose subject is being as being and it positively attains to the consideration of God as cause of that subject. The knowledge of God is, indeed, the proper end of this science and such an end corresponds with the natural orientation of the intellect to all being. The negative aspect of this study is provided by the principle of limitation. By this principle it is shown that this science considers God not as its subject, but as principle of its subject, i.e. God considered exclusively as the cause of its subject.

Once these principles have been explained, Father O'Brien then uses them to elaborate a solution in a strictly Thomistic tradition concerning the question of God's existence. The three-fold approach mentioned previously is used for this solution by Father O'Brien; that is, the order to be followed in approaching the question of God's existence, the use of the nominal definition of God in metaphysics, and the function of the "quinque viae" in this science.

#### *A. The order to be followed in metaphysically approaching the question of God's existence*

Father O'Brien insists very strongly on the fact that metaphysics perfects the reflection upon itself in judgments regarding the attainment of truths within the process of its own scientific discovery. Such judgments are advanced only in the light of those principles which are regulative of the nature of metaphysics. In its search for perfect knowledge of reality, metaphysics must consider the first cause of its subject, being in common. The consideration of God

as principle of this subject is the only manner of considering Him that falls within the competence of metaphysics. Therefore, it is this position that must guide both the order of metaphysics' approach to the question of God's existence and the judgment asserting the doctrinal place of this question. This judgment asserts this approach by calculating its validity within the process of scientific discovery made by metaphysics as it seeks its end, the perfect knowledge of its proper subject.

The focal point for Thomistic considerations of God's existence is question two of the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*. This familiar question deals with the proposition "God exists," especially in regard to its evidence, its demonstrability and its demonstration. Yet, concerning this question, it is apparent that St. Thomas locates it carefully within the framework of sacred doctrine, whose principal intention is to develop knowledge concerning God. This question of God's existence is dealt with in the part which considers God in Himself, and specifically in connection with the treatment of the divine essence. Therefore, from its context in the Summa, question two is properly a theological question concerning theology's proper subject, God.

Father O'Brien also maintains that the theological character of the question is apparent from the origin of the question, as it is proposed in article one. Such a question as that of article one, concerning the self-evidence of God's existence, could never occur at the outset of any purely philosophical investigation, rooted as it is for its material in what is available from the sensible order. There is no experience that warrants a question about the objective immediacy, the self-evidence of a thing's existence. However, for the theologian, concerned as he is with the data of revelation, the existence of God is a fact. Concerning the theologian's proper function regarding this truth, the manifestation of how it is true is his concern. The theologian must determine that rational demonstrations are neither superfluous nor impossible; rather, he must seek to advance such demonstrations.

Not only does the origin of the question make clear the theological character of the question, but the mode of procedure also does so. The reasons for the need and the possibility of demonstrating God's existence, as advanced by St. Thomas in articles one and two, would be indeed incongruous in a purely philosophical consideration.

The need to demonstrate God's existence is established because the objective self-evidence, by reason of identity of essence and existence in God, is not available to human reason. The possibility of such a demonstration, "*a posteriori*," relies upon the truth that, since God is the Creator, His effects are available to lead to His existence as their cause. A purely philosophical search into God's existence could hardly employ such truths in order to prepare the way for the demonstration of that existence.<sup>12</sup>

To the theologian, however, such a procedure is entirely in accord with the nature and with the method of sacred doctrine, since its principles are revealed and its dominion extends over all natural truths, which he is able to judge and employ in the manifestation of truths concerning its proper subject, God.

Thus, Father O'Brien insists that the theology of St. Thomas, consonant with the proper theological order, begins with the consideration of God Himself and then deals with the truth that God exists, according to the demonstrability of this truth to the human mind. However, for metaphysics to use this order and process concerning the question of God's existence is to abandon its only justifiable procedure and to assume the privileged point of view of theology. To do this is to appropriate a power and dignity that belongs only to theology, which has God as its subject and revealed truths as its principles.

For metaphysics to assume the proposition "God exists" as a problem to be dealt with in the way that it is developed in the *Summa*, demands the use of truths not yet available to metaphysics, as is clear from the implications of the theological process. For metaphysics so to proceed is to cease to be philosophy.<sup>13</sup>

In rejecting this approach for metaphysics, Father O'Brien insists that, from beginning to end, metaphysics has as its subject being in common. Therefore, the knowledge about God that metaphysics attains is a knowledge of being in terms of its first cause. To assume the order and approach of theology into metaphysics deprives metaphysics of the one authentic way open to it for its fulfillment, the attainment of God, not as subject, but as principle of its subject.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 183.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

**B. The use of the nominal definition of God in Metaphysics**

Father O'Brien is very strong in his insistence that the use of the nominal definition of God has a real, important place in the theology of St. Thomas, but he rejects with equal vigor its use in metaphysics.

The reason Father O'Brien spends considerable time on this aspect of the question is the position of some well-known contemporary Thomists who maintain that a nominal definition of God is necessary to the metaphysical task. Some of these, who are mentioned by the author, are: the Reverend Joseph Gredt, O.S.B. (whose nominal definition is "being a *se*"); the Reverend R. S. Maquart ("a being greater than the being of the world"); the Reverend G. Smith, S.J. ("cause of the existence of things"); Etienne Gilson ("I Am Who am"); and Canon Fernand Van Steenberghen ("provident Creator of the universe").

It is because of this characteristic of the necessity of the nominal definition of God in metaphysics that Father O'Brien presents what he considers to be a more authentically Thomistic line of reasoning in which he rejects such a usage in metaphysics.

The employment of the nominal definition of God in theology is a requisite for a basic intelligibility of terms, a guarantee that every term employed have a definite and distinctive meaning. The definition is qualified as nominal in that the ontological value or status of the terms is as yet unknown. Concerning the *Summa Theologiae*, an examination of the function of the nominal definition of God forcefully emphasizes its theological context. All of the elements concerning this point are properly theological. Since God is the subject of theology, it is He whose nominal definition is involved. In virtue of the principles of theology, which are revealed truths concerning God, the theologian realizes that a real definition of God is impossible, since God's essence is not properly known; yet, despite this, there is still the task of demonstrating God's existence.

The knowledge that God's effects are available as a medium for demonstration enables the theologian to indicate the function and availability of the nominal definition of God in the demonstration of His existence. By reason of the character of theology itself, then, the theologian makes those determinations concerning the nominal definition of God, which are necessary in order to deal properly with the

scientific question, "an sit Deus" (Does God Exist?), as this can be resolved by a demonstration.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, theology, among all the human sciences, is the most exalted since it has God as its subject and revealed truth as its principles. To fulfill its role as wisdom it has the function of explaining, defending and manifesting these principles. It is against such a background as this that it is necessarily faced with the scientific question: Does God exist? Even though this truth is not immediately evident, it is demonstrable. The question is one concerning the medium of demonstration, to be found solely among the effects of God, from which the nominal definition is formulated.

It is not because God is the first cause that the question of His existence arises. Rather it is because God, the subject of such a science as theology, is the first cause, that the question can be answered demonstratively, through a medium which is a nominal definition, imposed from God's effects.<sup>15</sup>

Father O'Brien shows, however, that in metaphysics the use of the nominal definition of God is not necessary to either the principle of extension or the principle of limitation in metaphysics. The principle of extension in metaphysics indicates that it must attain the first cause of being in common, which is God, but it does not mean that it must attain God, who is the first cause of being in common. This difference in the point of view is the difference between metaphysics and theology.

The principle of limitation governing metaphysics' attainment of God determines that God must be considered exclusively as principle of the subject of the science, but not as the subject itself. As has been stated so often, this subject of metaphysics is being in common and it remains so, even as metaphysics approaches its final stage. Metaphysics begins with the knowledge of its proper subject and then seeks to attain with certitude all that necessarily pertains to the subject, that is, all its properties, in the sense in which this term embraces whatever is involved in the total intelligibility of the subject. In the course of this examination, a knowledge of being as limited is attained. This knowledge is the occasion for wonderment, that is, the seeking of the ultimate explanation of being as so limited,

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

the question of the "propter quid." Therefore, the knowledge of limitation, leading to the question of the "proter quid", is the approach of metaphysics to the perfect knowledge of its subject in terms of the ramifications of its dependence upon the first cause. It is in answering the question "propter quid" concerning its subject that metaphysics attains to a knowledge of the first cause. For this task, a nominal definition of God is extrinsic, alien and unnecessary.

### *C. The function of the "quinq̄e viae" in this science*

The function of the "quinq̄e viae" in metaphysics concerns their relevance both to the origin and the resolution of the question "propter quid" concerning the subject of the science, in so far as it manifests limitation. The basic limitation in beings must be discovered by metaphysics, and it is the virtue of the "quinq̄e viae" that they in fact epitomize such varied aspects of limitation found among the concrete existents which metaphysics considers in the light of its proper subject. The aspect of limitation from which the five ways begin is a crucial point in the development of metaphysics. This aspect of limitation is used in the discovery of the real distinction of "esse" and "essentia" which is the sign of the being's dependence upon the first cause. The principle St. Thomas uses for this is not found in the "quinq̄e viae" but rather in his *De Ente et Essentia*. That principle is "Whatever has being (esse) as really distinct from essence is caused by the first cause, which as such is subsistent being."<sup>16</sup> Father O'Brien maintains that through the realization of the basic aspect of limitation in beings there is established the necessary dependence of being as so limited upon subsistent being. This basic aspect of limitation in beings must be discovered by metaphysics and the discovery is necessarily "a posteriori," from more manifest aspects of limitations. Father O'Brien insists that it is the virtue of the "quinq̄e viae" that they epitomize such varied aspects of limitation found among the concrete existents which metaphysics considers in the light of its proper subject.

According to Father O'Brien, the "quinq̄e viae" serve as well to institute the question of the "propter quid" concerning such aspects of limitation. The resolution of this question regarding each of the aspects of limitation from which the "quinq̄e viae" begin, actually

<sup>16</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas. *De Ente et Essentia* (Rome, 1948), p. 4.

leads to the discovery of the ultimate "propter quid" of being itself as limited and thus to the ultimate, "a priori" reason for the real distinction. This function of the "quinque viae," therefore, can be judged in so far as *their starting point, their processes, and their terminations* are suitable and relevant to the objective of metaphysics. We will now briefly see how Father O'Brien applies this reasoning to each of the "quinque viae" individually.

*The starting point of the five ways* shows their suitability to the metaphysical task. All of these ways begin their investigation from the existent order, which is man's proper intellectual environment. They do not proceed, however, merely from fact, but from the formalities of the facts involved, which formalities are interpreted metaphysically. The first way takes as its proper starting point the actual and evident fact of movement, a direct and manifest instance of the act-potency composition of beings. Those things which are subjects of this movement are actual beings, yet they are subjects of movements because of the potency in them. This is true whether the movement be in the substantial order (generation) or in the accidental order (alteration as to quality, augmentation as to quantity, or local motion as to place). Therefore, beginning with the fact of movement, the first way manifests a most universal aspect of the act-potency composition among beings of experience. This leads logically to a causal investigation.

The other four ways follow a similar path. The second way proceeds from the character of efficient causality. The formal aspect of the efficient cause is its efficacy, the efficiency by which it produces an effect. In the order of efficient causes, one cause is the cause of the other's causing and therefore the aspect of limitation is found in the very exercise of efficiency.

The third way begins with possible and necessary beings, yet the intrinsic principles of the "possible" include the composition between matter as potential and form. This bespeaks a pronounced limitation because the possibles are "indifferent" to the being which they actually have. Therefore the question of cause immediately enters.

For Father O'Brien, the fourth way immediately offers aspects of limitation, because the more and the less good, noble and true all indicate that these perfections are presently found in varying degrees, and therefore more or less limited.

Finally, the fifth way, in the order of finality, also manifests

aspects of limitation, since beings lacking in knowledge cannot explain precisely the direction that is involved in the finality that they manifest. Obviously, a causal investigation is thereby demanded.

*The process of the five ways* shows their suitability to the metaphysical task. This is evident since the process of each of them to their proper conclusion is the resolution of an aspect of limitation, according to its metaphysical signification, into its ultimate causal explanation. This is a realization of the Thomistic principle that from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated. In the five ways this means efficient causality, since the existence of actual effects demands an efficient cause, because the effects correspond proportionately to their causes.

Father O'Brien maintains that it is clearly evident that the five ways resolve effects into their corresponding causes. In the first way, since "to be moved is to be reduced from potency to act and to move is to reduce something from potency to act: hence, the efficient cause of movement, the mover, must be a being in act."<sup>17</sup> Thus, a cause is given according to the form of the effect. More, however, is needed. The cause of the form-as-such of the effect must be reached, that is, the cause "secundum esse", of the effect. In the first way this is from movement beyond moved movers to a mover moved by none. The form of the effect as such is transcended in assigning a cause in which the same formality is not found, to which the causing of the form as such is proper.

In the second way "to be an efficient cause is to exercise efficient causality, on the production of an effect since an order of causes is found, and the efficiency cannot be exercised by a cause upon itself, the subordinated cause is at once an effect, and demands a cause superior in efficacy."<sup>18</sup> Here also the process continues from subordinated, caused causes to a first cause beyond all median causes, uncaused as a cause.

In the process of the third way the possible and the necessary are examined. "Of their nature existent things, which are generated and corrupt, are possibles. They thus demand a cause superior in being, a necessary."<sup>19</sup> Again the metaphysical process continues from the possible to a necessary which has no cause of its necessity in being, but is the cause of all other beings.

<sup>17</sup> O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

Concerning the grades that are found in things, of which the fourth way investigates, we see that "such grades in the perfections indicated show that the perfections are limited, and the cause demanded must be superior with regard to such perfection, 'a maximum'."<sup>20</sup> From this we are able to move from graduated perfections, limited perfections, to a maximum, the unlimited cause of these perfections in all others.

Finally, in the fifth way, where the finality of the operation of being is brought into focus, we see that "finalized operation as an effect demands a proportionate cause, the ordered demands an orderer, an intelligent agent giving the teleological determination to nature and operation."<sup>21</sup> The final step in this process is to move from things which are determined and directed, in operating for an end, to an intelligent governor.

Through this line of reasoning, Father O'Brien maintains that the process of each of the ways, developed along the resolatory lines of propter causality, is appropriate to the scientific character of metaphysics, and conducive to the successful conclusion of its quest to know its proper subject, as to its "proper quid," in terms of perfect scientific knowledge.

Finally, *the terminations of the five ways* exhibit a relevance and a suitability to the attainment of the objective of metaphysics in its order of discovery. Father O'Brien maintains that the ways proceed from five formally distinct aspects of reality and reach conclusions, as the result of the process of resolution along the lines of proper causality, which are formally distinct, one from the other. The five conclusions open the way to the discovery of the "proper quid," the first cause of all being, subsistent "esse." These conclusions necessitate further investigation in terms of the proper formality of this science, "habens esse." Such an inquiry, embracing two general steps, leads to the unique, subsistent "esse," which as such is the cause of all being. According to Father O'Brien, the first step in his inquiry is an examination of the conclusions of the five ways in the light of the proper subject of the science, resulting in the realization that each cause is a being without limitation, subsistent "esse." The second step is the further conclusion that subsistent "esse" is necessarily unique.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

Since we have now exposed, in very general lines, the function that Father O'Brien assigns to the five ways, we will now examine and evaluate this Thomistic approach to the existence of God that receives such high praise from Father O'Brien.

Employed within the context of metaphysics' order of discovery, in its investigation of its proper subject, the "quinque viae" in their starting point, in their processes, and in their conclusions are eminently relevant. Through them a subsisting being is discovered.<sup>22</sup>

For Father O'Brien, the five ways retain all their value as metaphysical demonstrations of the existence of the First Cause. The conclusions are formally distinct, but through them the way is opened to the discovery of the unique First Cause of all being.

#### CRITICISM AND EVALUATION OF THIS THOMISTIC APPROACH

In the clear and methodic presentation of Father O'Brien's position there is much to be gained in philosophical research and progress. Although we find wide areas of agreement in his penetrating study, there are other theses of the author to which we cannot subscribe.

We agree with his definition of metaphysics as "the science of being-*qua*-being and of those things which either as properties or as causes pertain 'per se' to the consideration of being," since all conceptions that make God the subject of metaphysics are to be rejected. We see as more consistent with the authentic position of Saint Thomas himself Father O'Brien's rejection of the opinion of the Gilsonian School which makes God the proper object of Metaphysics.

In raising our thoughts to the consideration of Him Who is, Christianity revealed to Metaphysics the true nature of its proper object. When with Aristotle a Christian defines Metaphysics as the science of being as being, we may rest assured that he understands it always as the science of Being as Being... that is to say, God.<sup>23</sup>

Father O'Brien is more consistent here with the order of metaphysics' discovery of the truth as the science of being as being,

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>23</sup> Gilson, E. *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1940), p. 80.

with the consideration of God coming only as the final chapter of that study, as the cause of that subject. Metaphysics is the human science which considers being in common as its proper subject, which consequently attains God solely and exclusively as principle of this subject.

In considering the order to be followed in approaching the question of God's existence, we subscribe to Father O'Brien's position of rejecting the order of the *Summa Theologiae* as unsuitable for the metaphysical task.

Many Thomistic authors, considering the question along the same lines as Father O'Brien, have emphasized the need of situating the third article of the second question of the first part of the *Summa Theologiae* in the context in which it was written. Canon Van Steenberghen has continually stressed this need.

I have always tried to understand them (the *quinque viae*) as an historian of philosophy should try to understand an author of the 13th century: he should try to grasp what this author has wished to say and, for that, he should take account of the whole of his doctrine and its historical context.<sup>24</sup>

Continuing in the line of reasoning as an historian of philosophy, the same author has clearly applied this to the five ways.

When we isolate the text of the Five Ways from its immediate context, we are guilty of unjustifiably mutilating the thought of St. Thomas. We do something wrong when we present as his last word on the subject a summary and incomplete exposé of his ideas on the proofs for God's existence.<sup>25</sup>

This emphasis is also reflected in the wisdom of Victor White's remarks at the beginning of his paper "Prelude to the Five Ways." He writes:

It has become extraordinarily difficult to read the text of St. Thomas Aquinas as he wrote it, or as it would have been read by his contemporaries... Those sections of the text which have a particular interest and importance of their own may all too easily be read torn out of their context in the closely-knit unity which is the *Summa Theologiae*, and disregard for what precedes or follows them in the original text can too

<sup>24</sup> Van Steenberghen, F. "Critical Notices," *Philosophical Studies*, XII (1963), p. 147.

<sup>25</sup> Van Steenberghen, F. *Hidden God* (Louvain, 1966), pp. 159-160.

easily distort their meaning and purport. There is also the risk that we seek in the *Summa* for contributions to controversies which are not yet arisen when it was written ; or answers to questions which the original text had already excluded... Our reading of the *Quinque Viae* — the so-called “Five Ways” of proving the existence of God — in the *Summa* (I, ii, 3) is perhaps rather especially liable to be blurred in these ways.<sup>26</sup>

This context, as Father O’Brien clearly states, is a theological setting — question two is properly a theological question concerning theology’s proper subject, God. Most Thomistic authors concur on this point. Edward Sillem is but one clear example.

For Saint Thomas the question of establishing the existence of God is a part of the vaster question about the essence of God, and it is planned to be treated not for its own sake, but for the sake of showing what the divine essence is... St. Thomas is clearly not planning his *Summa Theologiae* in the way that a philosopher now-a-days needs to plan his natural theology... St. Thomas is concerned with God as He has revealed Himself to us, with what God has told us about Himself, or in technical terms, with the divine essence itself, and not simply with God as the cause of created things... In other words, the question of the existence of God, and equally that of how God does not exist (which is necessary to show how different God is from all created things) is regarded by him, not as a separate question to be treated on its own philosophically, as though it had nothing to do with the revelation of God, before treating the divine essence, but as involved in the theological study of God’s essence.<sup>27</sup>

Victor White sums up this aspect of the historical and doctrinal context of Question two with the statement

The *Summa Theologiae* is not, as it is sometimes supposed, a “pot-pourri” of theology and philosophy ; it is wholly a Summa of Theology concerned with the *Sacra Doctrina*, the Holy Teaching of salvation given by God’s revelation. But because it is that, it can use philosophical argument for its own end — which is “hominis salus” — the health or salvation of man.<sup>28</sup>

We therefore align ourselves with Father O’Brien and the many other Thomistic philosophers in rejecting the order of Question Two of Part One for the metaphysical task. We concur with this author in criticizing M. Gilson and his followers in claiming the right to ex-

<sup>26</sup> White, V. *God the Unknown* (London, 1956), p. 35.

<sup>27</sup> Sillem, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>28</sup> White, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

pound the philosophical thought of the Angelic Doctor along the lines of its original development. Gilson is at pains explicitly to present the order of the *Summa* as Saint Thomas' philosophical doctrine on the existence of God. We, in union with Father O'Brien and a host of other Thomists, vigorously oppose such an opinion. This we do because M. Gilson has advanced, as the philosophy of St. Thomas in regard to God's existence, a treatment and an order which is theological. To neither sacred theology nor to metaphysics is such a treatment and an order a service.

We also subscribe to Father O'Brien's thesis that the discovery of Infinite Being in metaphysics is not made by starting from a nominal definition of God. We agree that the usage of a nominal definition of God is inappropriate to metaphysics. The inclusion of Canon Van Steenberghen in the list of that group of philosophers who hold that a nominal definition of God is necessary has been shown to be due to a misunderstanding by Father O'Brien of Canon Van Steenberghen's treatment of metaphysics. In a review of Father O'Brien's book for the 1963 issue of "Philosophical Studies" (vol. XII), the Canon has emphasized that

...there is never a question of a "nominal definition" of God in the pages of my "Ontology" where the existence of Infinite Being, unique cause of the order of finite being, is demonstrated... Only once in my "Ontology" is mention made of the nominal definition of God, where I show that the metaphysical proof of the existence of an Infinite Being is also the sole rigorous proof of the existence of God. Thus I indicate the connection between the Metaphysical theme of the infinite Being and the religious problem of the existence of God. It is apropos of this religious problem only that a nominal definition of God is required.<sup>29</sup>

In evaluating the presentation of Father O'Brien, it can be seen that we are in accord with a large part of his presentation, beginning with his definition of metaphysics, continuing through the order to be followed in this study and, finally, with his rejection of the usage of a nominal definition of God in metaphysics. Yet, the next step, the function of the "quinque viae" in the science of metaphysics, is the area of our genuine disagreement with the author. In the light of the vast amount of philosophical writing that has been devoted to a critical study of the five ways, we feel justified in opposing the thesis of Father O'Brien in three large areas of his presentation.

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<sup>29</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 144-145.

1) The first point of disagreement concerns Father O'Brien's approach to a knowledge of being as limit. He confirms that the metaphysician, after having established the fact that limited being exists, is justified in posing the question "propter quid," whose response will be the affirmation of the First Cause of finite beings. Yet, Father O'Brien claims that the "knowledge of beings as limited... is derived from the realization of the real composition of essence and existence, as well as of more evident aspects of an act-potency composition in the beings of experience."<sup>30</sup> This appears to be a direct reversal of the process of knowledge — the knowledge of beings as finite precedes the knowledge of the real composition of essence and existence of those beings.

2) The second area of disagreement is in line with a large number of authors who find the reasoning of the five ways unsatisfactory and completely lacking in suitability for the metaphysical task. Father O'Brien has claimed that the five ways are "eminently relevant"<sup>31</sup> to the metaphysical task. It seems that he fails to perceive the many pertinent difficulties attributed to the five ways. Some difficulties of each way follow.

*Concerning the first way:* A capital difficulty in this argument is that metaphysical examination of change establishes the fact of at least one unmoved mover, but it does not demonstrate the existence of only one unmoved mover. Canon Van Steenberghen has clearly highlighted this difficulty.

The reasoning as such is well defined and accurate, but it does not permit us to conclude immediately to the unicity of the First Principle... Aristotle proved the unicity of the First Mover on astronomical grounds derived from the unity of the cosmos and the unicity of the first changeable or the first heaven... In the *Summa Theologiae* the points derived from the Aristotelian astronomy have happily been left aside, but the proof of the unicity of the First Mover is also lost with them.<sup>32</sup>

Walter Kaufmann of the Philosophy faculty of Princeton University has also emphasized this difficulty. He says

We become involved in Thomas' metaphysics, in his adaptation of Aristotle... Aquinas' God, like Aristotle's first mover, is unmoved, but Aristotle used this argument in his Metaphysics, from which Thomas

<sup>30</sup> O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>32</sup> Van Steenberghen, F. *Ontology* (New York, 1952), pp. 148-149.

has derived it, to infer the existence of over forty unmoved movers. Is not Thomas arbitrary in supposing that there is but one? Later in the *Summa*, he tries to show why there can be only one God. But why call this one god, "God?"<sup>33</sup>

It therefore seems that the conclusion of the first way which states that "it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God" to be beyond that which has been proved in this first argument.

*Concerning the second way:* The second way, because it closely parallels the first, centering in the concept of cause rather than motion is therefore subject to the same weakness of a premature conclusion. Canon Van Steenberghen forcefully indicates this in "Hidden God" under the chapter entitled "Incomplete Solutions."

It proves that you must seek the absolute beyond dependent or caused causes and that there exists therefore at least one first cause. But is this first cause one or many? Is it finite or infinite? Creative or merely transforming? Corporeal or incorporeal? Personal or impersonal? The text of the "secunda via" provides no answers to these questions, though they are very important to the theistic theory. Here, too, we find ourselves in the presence of a demonstration that is incomplete and that calls for indispensable development.<sup>34</sup>

Professor Kaufmann remarks in a similar vein concerning this point.

Whether taken by itself or in conjunction with the first proof, the second way no less than the first says in essence that the universe cannot be understood without postulating at least one occult entity.<sup>35</sup>

Like the first way, the conclusion of the second way goes beyond that which has been proved by the argumentation.

*Concerning the third way:* This way, as listed in the *Summa*, is presented in a complicated and confusing form which is better corrected by the argumentation found in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (I, 15). By the use of this clearer, parallel text, we are able to formulate the reasoning of Saint Thomas into a simpler form, beginning with the observation that contingent beings exist. However, we

<sup>33</sup> Kaufmann, W. *Critique of Religion and Philosophy* (New York, 1961), pp. 151-152.

<sup>34</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Hidden God*, p. 124.

<sup>35</sup> Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

know that every contingent being is caused and consequently can be explained only by the necessary. Yet a distinction is needed in the category of the necessary, since the necessary can be either necessary of itself or it can draw its necessity from a cause. In this latter case, one must rise to a being which is necessary of itself, that is, an absolute being.

Once again in this line of logical progression, as in the first two ways, we find the premature assumption of one, sole "per se" first principle. The argument does lead logically to at least one "per se" necessary being but it does not establish that there is only one such necessary being. We therefore see that the criticism of the first three ways is similar, they all contain a premature conclusion based upon the lack of establishing a unique first principle.

*Concerning the fourth way* : The criticism of this proof is usually directed to two principles used here by Saint Thomas as universally true, yet in reality these two principles are found not to be true in all cases. The criticism of the first of these principles is well formulated by Canon Van Steenberghen.

The principle that "the more and less are so called with respect to a maximum" is certainly not true in all cases, for "the more and less" are often so designated with respect to a unit of measure. Thus a person is more or less rich according as he possesses a more or less impressive number of "francs" or "dollars."<sup>36</sup>

In replying to this frequently stated criticism, Father O'Brien maintains that this principle should be understood only of transcendental perfections. Canon Van Steenberghen answers

I reply : 1) it is a pity St. Thomas did not actually say it ; it would have sufficed to add two words : "magis et minus in *transcendentalibus* dicuntur..." ; 2) even in this new form the truth of the principle appears only to him who already knows that the "Maxime ens" exists : before that, one does not know if the perfection of being can exist in a pure state ; one establishes the fact that finite beings share the perfection of being but one does not know yet if they participate in a perfection fully preexisting ; hence the principle cannot serve to prove the existence of the "Maxime ens."<sup>37</sup>

A Second principle in this argument, here criticized by Professor Kaufmann, is equally invalid

<sup>36</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Ontology*, pp. 150-151.

<sup>37</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 148-149.

The second principle will recommend itself to few readers indeed. In spite of its noble ancestry, we should not admit that "the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus," as if there must be something hottest that is the cause of all heat and something most purple that is the cause of purple in all purple things.<sup>38</sup>

Because of these two invalid principles, upon which Saint Thomas has essentially based his process of argumentation, this fourth way must be regarded as an unsatisfactory proof.

*Concerning the fifth way:* The fifth way involves a double difficulty in its reasoning. Again, the conclusion goes beyond that which has been proved, which is the most serious difficulty in this argument. The second area of misunderstanding is the example of the flying arrow that Saint Thomas uses to illustrate his argument. In this fifth way he is reasoning concerning beings which have a specific nature, that is, a principle of a determined activity, yet the example of the arrow does not illustrate this, since the arrow is an inert body deprived of all natural movement. Therefore, the arrow example should be discarded, since it fails to serve the purpose of an example, which is to make intelligible a doctrine or a principle.

The first difficulty, concerning the premature conclusion is highlighted by Canon Van Steenberghen.

...it is the existence of finalized natures which requires an intelligence. I am quite disposed to accept this idea, which I believe pertinent and fertile. But it must be admitted that numerous precisions have to be added before concluding to the existence of God. Is there one sole intelligence at the origin of all natures? Is it immanent in the world or transcendent? Is it a Demiurge who organizes the primitive chaos a Creator? It would be ridiculous to claim that all these problems, still debated lively today, are resolved at the end of the quinta via.<sup>39</sup>

Professor Kaufmann has interpreted this argumentation as an analogy between the universe and a human artifact. It appears that the example of the arrow has misled him. He speaks of an inert human artifact rather than a "natural" being, that is, a being having need of being directed by an intelligence. Kaufmann's consequent rejection of the argument is, therefore, really a rejection of the reasoning that the world is made even as things are made by human beings. Obviously, this is unacceptable.

<sup>38</sup> Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

<sup>39</sup> Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

The main reason for our rejection of this fifth way as a rigorous proof of the existence of God is that the extension of the conclusion is too vast. This invalidating defect, added to the confusion of a poorly chosen example, makes the process of the argumentation unacceptable.

*Conclusion of the Five Ways:* It is in the light of all of these critical evaluations that the use Father O'Brien makes of the five ways must be rejected. The very serious objections raised against them contradict Father O'Brien's high praise of the five ways as being "admirably appropriate to metaphysics as a process of discovery."<sup>40</sup> Rather, it has been shown that there is a basic sufficiency in the five ways; the first two ways must be completed, the third and fifth ways have to be corrected and then completed, and the fourth way is unsatisfactory. The statement of Canon Van Steenberghen concerning the five ways as a line of argumentation for the existence of God is a good conclusion to this area of our study.

The conclusion of all this is obvious: it is time for contemporary Thomists to abandon the "fetishism" of the *quinque viae*... I am convinced that if St. Thomas returned among us, he would be the first to disavow the text of the *quinque viae* and to request his disciples to use it with more discernment than they have too often shown.<sup>41</sup>

3) Our third area of disagreement with Father O'Brien is in his use of these *quinque viae* in the metaphysical task. We agree with him that the conclusions of these arguments do not give us "Ipsum esse subsistens" as he strongly emphasizes in expounding the double process necessary to pass from the conclusions to the existence of the unique Subsistent Being. Our area of disagreement is in using the five ways for the metaphysical critique of limited being which should lead to the discovery of unlimited and unique Being. This critique must be a critique of limited being, as limited or finite. The use of the five ways reveals characteristics that are discovered in corporeal beings (they change, they depend on causes, they begin and they cease to exist, they tend toward a determined end) but are not necessarily characteristics which belong to finite beings as such ("characteristics which manifest its radical relativity or dependence: I think that these characteristics are the ontological

<sup>40</sup> O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

<sup>41</sup> Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

likeness of finite beings among themselves and their essentially active tendency.'')<sup>42</sup>

The first three ways and the fifth way can conclude immediately only to a transcending of the corporeal world and a further reflection is indispensable in order to transcend the created order entirely. It therefore seems that the use of these cosmological arguments is an unnecessary deviation that prolongs and complicates the exposition.

Because of these three areas of basic, fundamental difference with the author, it would seem to be impossible to subscribe to the thesis of Father O'Brien that the clearest and the most fundamental argumentation for arriving at the existence of God is the metaphysical approach using the five ways of Saint Thomas.

#### A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM

To proceed to the affirmation of the existence of God only two requirements are necessary, the witness of experience and the use of reason. The requirement of the witness of experience fulfills the need of an "a posteriori" proof, since such a proof proceeds from the plane of real, existing effects to the plane of the cause of that reality. The second requirement, that of the use of reason, retains the proof on the necessary metaphysical level, which involves a demonstration based upon a reflection on the nature of reality as such and on the condition of real existence.

*The first step of the proof* is to examine the implications of that which experience reveals to us — the existence of sensible things, whether animate or inanimate. The tangible empirical data of our experience is a world of things and persons. The examination of this data reveals that we exist and the world exists but this existence and life are a perpetual wonder to us, a mystery, a cause of endless amazement. A large part of this wonderment concerns the fact that this existence is present to us as something imposed, something given, something that does not explain itself, something that we ourselves did not cause. The fact that our experience reveals a non self-explanatory existence impels us to seek an explanation, to seek the fundamental source and origin of this "given" existence.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

That which is not self-existent, which cannot provide within itself an explanation of its own existence is obviously contingent, dependent and relative. This appears to be the condition of not only human existence but also of the existence of the other things in the universe and the universe itself, since nothing in the experienced universe provides the explanation of its own existence. Neither man, nor the things of the world, nor the universe itself appear as self-explanatory, self-sufficient, absolute. The crucial question of the first step of the proof is to determine if man's knowledge is able to proceed beyond this condition of relative reality to that of an absolute, an unconditioned reality sufficient to account for its own existence. It is obvious that only one of two responses is possible to this question. These two responses are: a) no known Absolute exists, or b) an Absolute must and does exist. These are the only two possibilities, there is no middle ground. We shall now examine each of these possibilities.

(a) *No known Absolute exists*

The first possible response is one that has great popular appeal today. According to some philosophers today, especially some of the contemporary "existentialists" of whom we spoke in the introduction of this chapter, beings simply exist as a matter of fact. They claim that no metaphysical justification for these is possible. The empirical fact of existence is a fact without explanation — it is simply given. Objective reality has no sufficient explanation — it is simply there. As such it is meaningless and thus irrational. In this light, existence is considered to be absurd (in the sense of meaningless) and no metaphysical explanation of it is possible. Because of this inability of explanation, these philosophers maintain that no judgment is possible concerning the question of an absolute basis for existence.

Such a position is itself a metaphysical thesis, since this proposal, which affirms the absurdity of existence, refuses to attempt any metaphysical inquiry which aims at explaining existence. A methodical doubt, which involves a provisional suspension of the metaphysical inquiry, is here dogmatized into a definite and final metaphysical position, a position which refuses any ontological judgment.

It is without doubt that absurdity certainly exists, but it does not exist in being. Rather, it exists as a mental attitude toward being.

The idea of the absurdity of being and existence, like the idea of nothingness which was so competently analyzed by Bergson, is one of those negative ideas which are actually nothing more than pseudo-concepts, implying contradiction, because they merely express a mental annulment of what has just been stated.<sup>43</sup>

This position, that objective empirical reality rests upon no Absolute whatsoever, is a radical hypothesis which itself requires a rational support and basis which is not offered by those who present it. The affirmation that objective reality is irrational and meaningless is not sufficient from the philosophical point of view. Reasons for such an hypothesis are required since this hypothesis represses a natural and spontaneous tendency of the human person who does not find satisfaction in the simple ascertainment of the fact of existence. Rather man, as a questioning animal, inevitably seeks the basis, the source, the cause of such existence. Hence, this thesis, and any such thesis which denies the absolute, is an important thesis which requires proofs. Those who maintain this position, however, offer no such justification. It thereby seems to be a position contrary to the very nature of man to accept such an hypothesis as that of "absurd existence" as an understanding of the human condition.

(b) *An Absolute must and does exist*

This only other alternative is to affirm that non self-sufficient existence implies the existence of an absolute, that the relative necessarily leads to the absolute. Since relative means dependent, conditioned and non self-sufficient, the absolute reality by definition would be independent, unconditioned and self-sufficient. Since relative reality exists, an absolute reality must exist to account for it. Everything cannot be relative. There must be at least one being who is self-existent, who has existence without having received it from a cause. The impossibility of its contradictory makes this evident. To state that everything which exists, exists in virtue of something else is clearly contradictory, since both logically and conceptually it is impossible and thereby destroys itself. There must be an absolute to account for the relative, which absolute is self-existent. In short, since something exists, something is self-existent.

The history of philosophy has shown that the existence of an

<sup>43</sup> Tresmontant, C. *Toward the Knowledge of God* (Baltimore, 1961), p. 26.

absolute has been acknowledged by most great thinkers. It is the understanding of the nature of this absolute that has differed greatly in this history of philosophy. Two general groupings, however, are able to be distinguished concerning the understanding of an absolute.

The first group, those who acknowledge a necessary, unconditioned existence, an absolute as the foundation of reality, had conceived the absolute in various, yet similar ways. In these theories, empirical reality is based upon, or established within, this absolute in such a way that empirical reality, the world itself, is the absolute or a modality or aspect of the absolute substance. The human conscious subject, and indeed the world with its totality of empirical reality, is totally immersed in the absolute and thereby is part of the absolute. Often this participation in the absolute is seen as a condition of alienation, exile or a similar mode of relationship toward the absolute.

Such a metaphysical hypothesis, in varying interpretations, has a long tradition extending from the Upanishads to Plotinus, Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Even materialism (as proposed, for example, by Marx and Engels), while refusing to accept the universe as a modality of a reality in alienation from the absolute, can be classified in this category since these proponents strongly maintain that matter itself is the absolute.

Attempts to show the insufficiency, and thus the unacceptability, of such hypotheses have often been on the elementary, empirical level where the first fact which is acknowledged is that man is not self-sufficient. The realization that existence is as something given, something which neither created itself nor is able to account for its own existence, extends from man to the universe as a whole and to all the elements of the universe. Neither the universe nor any of the beings which exist within the universe, are self-sufficient. Everything in the universe appeared at a particular moment in time and science affirms that everything is likewise perishable.

Such refutations as these do not seem to be an adequate answer to those who maintain that matter itself is the absolute. Although materialism leaves unanswered many important questions (e.g. How does matter explain the obvious finality apparent in nature, especially living organism? ; How is the evident evolution in the world from the imperfect to the perfect explained? ; etc.), a refutation of it on this empirical level is not enough. We maintain that the only

adequate refutation of this problem is the one that we shall offer in the second step of our proof.

The other grouping of thinkers, who acknowledge the existence of an absolute, has been those who maintain that the absolute must be wholly other than the material, the empirically objectivized. The absolute must be ontologically distinct from the universe and every part thereof, yet be the cause and reason for its existence. The concept of causality is, they maintain, a valid vehicle with which to arrive at the knowledge of the absolute beyond the material universe. The principle of sufficient reason allows one to see, in the analysis of the continually evolving system of the universe, that in the passage of time something "more" is continually being manifested, which the former (and lesser) is unable to adequately explain. Matter cannot, in itself, account for life, just as life cannot adequately explain the thinking and personal monads that are the human beings. At the very beginning of such a process of evolution, nothingness cannot possibly account for the emergence of material reality. It is obvious that only being can account for being and the principle of sufficient reason indicates the inability of trying to explain being in terms of non-being, the greater in terms of the lesser and the new in terms of the old.

If the search for the absolute stops at this point, then all the objections and criticisms which we have made concerning the cosmological arguments of Saint Thomas could aptly apply here also. All that has been proved, at this point, is that an absolute or some absolutes must exist, and that this absolute must be sought beyond the world of material beings. There is nothing at this point in this argumentation to prevent the absolute or absolutes from being found within the realm of non-material finite being. The relativity of material beings does not in itself show the relativity of other finite beings which may exist beyond this category. It will be recalled that this was one of our objections to Father O'Brien's use of the five ways of Saint Thomas.

We maintain that to rigorously attain the true absolute it must be demonstrated that this absolute is beyond the total order of *all* finite beings. This is the task of the second step of our proof — to demonstrate that the finite order, as such, is relative, dependent and contingent and by so doing, proving the existence of an infinite being as the Absolute, the cause of that finite order.

*This second step in the proof of the existence of God is without*

doubt more difficult than the first, since this step concerns the area beyond that of immediate perception, that is, beyond the empirical order of human experience. It is strictly a metaphysical process, a reflection bearing upon being as such and upon the conditions of the real as such. This is the only way to go beyond the order of experience itself and make affirmations concerning *every* finite being, even those outside the world of human experience. The whole force of the arguments rests upon the demonstration that the finite order (the totality of all finite beings) is relative. The whole finite order, synthesized by the mind, never departs from the real plane, the plane of existence.

The long history of philosophical inquiry shows the various attempts to prove the relativity or dependence of the total order of finite being. Many of them are obviously defective since they fail to rigorously establish that which they seek to prove.

Some claim that this relative characteristic of finite being is proved by its real composition, that is, the synthesis of two correlative elements — essence and existence. This is Father O'Brien's contention in which he states that "knowledge of being as limited is derived from the realization of the real composition of essence and existence."<sup>44</sup> It was exactly this point which was the first area of disagreement that we made in our criticism and evaluation of Father O'Brien's presentation.

Others have maintained that the fact that existence does not enter into the definition of finite being indicates its relativity. Many of the qualified criticism leveled against the ontological (*a priori*) argument of Saint Anselm, concerning the inability of passing from the logical plane to the real plane, are able to be applied to this attempt to show the non-absolute character of the finite order.

Another approach has been a consideration of the range or hierarchy that the total order of finite beings manifest. This hierarchy implies or suggests an absolute maximum at its summit and relativity or dependence for everything below this summit. Although an absolute does indeed seem to be implied in this hierarchy of finite beings, the existence of this absolute is not the conclusion of a strict process of reasoning and is thereby unacceptable.

A more satisfactory approach to this question has been the strong insistence that

<sup>44</sup> O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

...knowledge of the relativity of the finite as such can be acquired only by the metaphysical critique of its *being* and of its *activity*, for these are the only two aspects of any finite being which are accessible to us.<sup>45</sup>

This two-fold critique of finite being clearly presents the entire finite order as relative, dependent and non self-sufficient. Each of these two aspects serves as a sign of fundamental dependency.

#### CONCERNING THE *BEING* OF THE FINITE

The being of the finite beings shows a relation of both opposition and of similarity to other finite beings.

The opposition is seen by the fact that each finite being is one, distinct and individual, and by being so is thereby opposed to each other finite being. Each of these other finite beings is also, in its turn, one, distinct and individual and thus opposed to all others. The only being which would not be so opposed to each and every other would be the total cause of the other, since the total cause precontains the one caused, and is therefore obviously not opposed. It is evident, therefore, that one finite being cannot be the adequate cause of another, since if it were this creative cause it would precontain the other and so could not be in opposition to it. This relation of opposition does not of itself imply real dependence between finite beings but rather isolation and separation, one from the other.

It is the profound similarity (despite the diversity and opposition) that reveals the fundamental relativity of all finite beings, since all finite beings are altogether alike as beings. The ontological similarity must remain unintelligible unless we go outside the finite order, because it can only be accounted for by their common dependence on one single cause transcending all finite beings.

It is from this critique of the *being* of finite beings that we reach the realization that the absolute cannot be finite but rather, of necessity, must be non-finite (which is infinite).

#### CONCERNING THE *ACTIVITY* OF THE FINITE

Finite beings possess the power of activity. This is readily seen in those finite beings of experience which visibly manifest change, transformation and growth. The science of metaphysics clearly in-

<sup>45</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Hidden God*, p. 189.

dicates that this is likewise true of *all* finite beings, since all finite beings possess existence and thereby possess the power to perfect that existence, yet each in a way or mode proper to its own type of finite existence. Indeed, Canon Van Steenberghen, in his textbook "Ontology" devotes five pages to the proof of this fact through a metaphysical analysis of the self.<sup>46</sup>

This power of activity is the striving or acting of a being to seek new perfection, to extend itself by entering into relationship with surrounding beings. This property of activity plainly indicates certain characteristics of finite beings, including both the dependency upon other beings to gain this perfection (because no being can give itself a perfection it does not already possess) and the power or desire of perfection which makes the particular finite being act. Both of these aspects of activity reveal the essential dependency of finite being. In the first case it is dependent because it tends positively toward other beings in order to perfect itself. The power of expansion directs finite being towards other finite beings in which it finds its complementary perfection. Without other finite beings, one finite being cannot conquer its isolation or realize itself fully.

The activity that emanates from the very nature of the active, finite being (the power of expansion and perfection) is also an indication of its essential dependence. This power of self-perfection shows that, in its very being, the finite being is under the influence of a cause which, in giving it being, gives it by that very same fact, this power to expand and to perfect itself. In this way it is obviously dependent upon that cause.

Finally, it must be noted that because one finite being perfects itself by means of another or other finite beings it does not necessarily entail the lessening of the perfection of the other. Rather, an increase of perfection is added to the total order of finite beings. This obvious need of others in order to accomplish activity indicates, as we have just shown, the relativity of finite beings on the individual level. However, what is true of individual finite beings is likewise true of the collection of these individuals which is the order of finite beings. In this way, the total order of finite beings is relative, since all change involves dependency and is thereby obviously not the absolute. Rather, the absolute must be outside the total order of the finite, it must be non-finite (which is infinite).

<sup>46</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Ontology*, pp. 120-125.

The fact that the absolute, the infinite is only one sole being is immediately perceived since unicity is a corollary of infinity.

The exact meaning of ontological infinity is thus brought out: the infinite Being is that being who is opposed to nothing, who is limited by no other. There is evidently only one such being for, if there were many infinite beings, they would be opposed to one another and consequently finite. The expression "many infinite beings" is a contradiction in terms.<sup>47</sup>

Our metaphysical, rational proof has brought us to the existence of one infinite being, the cause of the totality of the finite order. That which is implied in the attribute of cause can lead us to the primary consideration in our proof of God, that of personality. We have seen that the ontological likeness between finite beings is based upon their common participation in the Infinite who is their total cause. The very nature of causality reveals that the cause, as cause, necessarily precontains its effect, as effect. By this is not meant that causality is some sort of a transfer of a perfection from the cause to its effect. Rather, the cause precontaining its effects means that in order to have the power or capacity to produce some effect, a cause itself must possess a degree of perfection at least equal to that of its effects.

This principle, when applied to the infinite being, the cause of the totality of the finite order, can give us a glimpse of the nature of this infinite being by a careful study of the caused (or created) universe. Everything that is genuine perfection or real worth in creatures preexists in the creative cause, yet in an incomparably more intense way. This is true whether the perfections are mixed (that is, essentially finite and some even corporeal) or if they are unmixed (that is, in no way essentially bound up with the finite). Mixed perfections, revealed to us through our perceptive experience of the corporeal world, are essentially linked to finitude since to purge them of all reference to the finite is for them to lose their specific connotation. Therefore, these perfections cannot be predicated of the infinite in a formal way since this would imply attributing finitude to the infinite, which is obviously contradictory. These perfections are able, however, to be predicated virtually of the infinite since he has the power to create these perfections.

Our internal experience reveals to us perfections that are un-

<sup>47</sup> Van Steenberghen, *Hidden God*, pp. 196-197.

mixed, or simple. Our knowledge of ourselves puts us in presence with a reality which, although corporeal, is different from the rest of the corporeal world — the reality we call a person. One is aware of himself as person, as a “subject capable of *thinking* and *willing*, a center of *knowledge* and *love*. ”<sup>48</sup> This personality is, to us, imperfect, finite, changing and dependent. However, the perfection of personality itself is not essentially bound up with finitude, since the notion of person is not destroyed if it is freed from the imperfections which finitude brings to it. This perfection of personality can be said to be precontained in its cause formally, that is, in its own form. In this way the infinite being must be a personal being, capable of thinking and willing, a center of knowledge and of love.

We have here arrived at the affirmation of the existence of an infinite person who is the cause of all finite beings, the One who corresponds to what religion has traditionally designed as “God.”

Some will certainly object that such an approach is a cold and artificial way to arrive at the existence of God, but this objection is not to say that it is out of place or wrong. Although the terms and statements used are simple and commonplace, it is only by reflection that their full implication can be appreciated.

One of the mistakes of the modern nominalists is to treat necessary truths as platitudinous and, therefore, as uninformative; they ignore one curious fact of human experience, a fact which cannot be denied, however difficult it may be to explain it. This fact is that many so-called obvious or trite statements take a long time to be appreciated or realized. I use the word “realize” because it brings to mind Newman’s famous distinction between notional and real assent. Most of us are slow to realize what is familiar or to put together what is really connected because an effort of mind is required to effect the connection.<sup>49</sup>

It is highly likely that most people come upon the awareness of God and accept His existence in ways which are far less formal and mediate than those which are expressed in the syllogistic premises of metaphysical reasoning. Nevertheless, whatever is the means that leads one to the knowledge of God’s existence, it is justifiable to express the evidence and the certainty arising from it in metaphysical language and reasoning in the form of a strict logical demonstration. This natural mode of intellectual conviction is the explanation of

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>49</sup> D’Arcy, M. *No Absent God* (New York, 1962), p. 64.

the logical and real connections between the premises that one accepts and the conclusions that necessarily follow from them.

To some this remains too simple a process, since to use the finite-with-finite relation as a model for the infinite-with-finite relationship is to abuse and stretch these ideas beyond their compass. Those who maintain this inability to reach the awareness of God through metaphysical reasoning do not seem to take into account our human awareness of dependence, of belonging and of kindred. This relationship could not be without there being one who is the cause of this dependency and belonging, without in any way having the dependent and imperfect status which is linked to our existence. Our awareness of this cause is, without doubt, almost wholly incompetent to describe its true nature, but the fact that we are an effect of this cause does give us a glimpse, indistinct as it is, that can be used to enrich our understanding of both ourselves (as finite effects) and of God (as the infinite cause).

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## THE FRANCISCAN CRISIS UNDER JOHN XXII<sup>1</sup>

Clément Schmitt in his work on Benedict XII and the Franciscans calls the period of the pontificates of John XXII and Benedict XII the most formidable crisis in the history of the Franciscan order.<sup>2</sup> He might have distinguished John's as the worst moment, because it was under him that the order suffered the famous hostile definition of the poverty of Christ in the Bull *Cum inter nonnullos* and endured the expulsion and flight from the body of the order of two distinct groups of dissident friars. By Benedict XII's time the worst was over. The Bulls had been launched, the Spiritual group of dissidents no longer troubled the order itself, though Fraticelli were still in evidence, leading their hunted lives in obscure parts of Italy: the Michaelist group of rebels at the court of Lewis of Bavaria in Munich were beginning to disintegrate. John's reign was indeed a black time. For much of the eighteen years of his tenure of the papal monarchy he was engaged in conflict with one section or another of the friars minor. It is not surprising that the Franciscans then and now have not been anxious to study this period of their history, or that the personality of the Pope has appeared to them in harsh and sombre hues. The great volume of work done on Franciscan history has centred on St. Francis himself and on the first sixty years or so of the story of the order. After the death of St. Bonaventure, the dramatic story of the rise and fall of the Spiritual movement of protest has found distinguished historians, amongst them M. Bihl and L. Olinger from the friars, and in England Decima Douie, who is currently engaged in carrying the story of both the Spirituals and the contemporaneous Franciscan missions on into the fourteenth century. J. R. H. Moorman's general history has spanned the whole

<sup>1</sup> This article forms the substance of the W. W. Seton Memorial Lecture delivered at University College, London. I am grateful to the late Professor R. Weiss and his committee for their invitation.

<sup>2</sup> C. Schmitt, *Un pape réformateur et un défenseur de l'unité de l'église. Benoît XII et l'ordre des frères mineurs 1334-1342* (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1959), p. x.

episode;<sup>3</sup> recently G. Leff has advanced the subject by including in his synthesis on the Franciscan disputes a fresh investigation of the whole sequence of John's arguments in his Bulls on poverty.<sup>4</sup> But his prime concern is not John's personal viewpoint or the place of his pontificate in Franciscan history<sup>5</sup> and apart from him, very few have focussed their attention on the settlement of the Spiritual dissensions, so emphatically the work of John XXII.<sup>6</sup> The *étude d'ensemble* on John XXII is still lacking. The time for a full work has not yet come — there are issues which are still being disentangled by Anneliese Maier, Edith Pásztor and others. But enough original material, with some recent MS discoveries, exists for me now to venture on a few preliminary remarks that I hope may illuminate the course of events, as a step towards that full study that remains to be written. In particular, I hope I may put the personality and motives of the Pope into a somewhat better and fairer perspective than the majority of historians have hitherto done.

John's actions have found few defenders. R. Manselli, referring to the Bull of settlement which dealt with the problems of the Provençal Spirituals, *Quorumdam exigit*, has this to say: "It was a decision that reflected... his characteristic psychology as a jurist together with the most complete insensitivity to the religious values he was touching."<sup>7</sup> Edith Pásztor, his pupil, writes similarly when she concludes that John's move to condemn Petrus Johannis Olivi proceeded from an entire misunderstanding of Olivi's doctrines in the *Lectura* on the Apocalypse.<sup>8</sup> Modern writers in this vein do no

<sup>3</sup> *A History of the Franciscan order from its origins to the year 1517*, (Oxford, 1968), pp. 177-204, 307-25.

<sup>4</sup> *Heresy in the later Middle Ages I* (Manchester, 1967), pp. 157-66, 238-55. The Franciscan synthesis is given in part one, *Prophecy and poverty*, pp. 51-255: for its value see H. S. Offler in *EHR* LXXXIV (1969), 572-6 and my review in *History* LV (1970), 75-9. The account of *Quia quorundam mentes*, pp. 241-3, is a good example of Leff's powers of summary assessment.

<sup>5</sup> *Heresy in the later Middle Ages I*, 51; note the comment on p. 161.

<sup>6</sup> One facet of John's work, his views on property and the *status innocentiae* in *Quia vir reprobis*, is discussed by B. Töpfer, "Die Anschauungen des Papstes Johannes XXII über das Dominium in der Bulle 'Quia Vir Reprobis'", *Folia Diplomatica* (Brno 1971), 295-306, as a preliminary to a forthcoming book on medieval ideas of the state of innocence.

<sup>7</sup> *Spiritali e Beghini in Provenza*, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, *Studi Storici* 31-4 (Roma, 1959), p. 137; See the comment of C. Schmitt in *AFH* LIII (1960), 330-2.

<sup>8</sup> "Le polemiche sulla 'Lectura super Apocalipsim' di Pietro di Giovanni

more than reflect the even harsher things which were said by some of the friars who witnessed his measures. To them, as any reader of the voluminous original literature on the poverty of Christ will realise, he was the heretic Jacques Duèse. To the Fraticelli against whom he unleashed the Inquisition he was the king of the locusts who destroyed the poverty of Christ<sup>9</sup>. Even in the compilation of Nicholas Glassberger, who wrote as a moderate Observantine in the early sixteenth century, far from the heat of events, John appears through the sources he uses as a tool in the hands of the enemies of the friars, led away into these erroneous acts by Dominicans and slanderers of the order.<sup>10</sup> Friars who tried to understand the ferocious sequence of events and John's motive for acting as he did fell back on easy personal explanations, stressing John's dislike of the Franciscan Rule, his belief that it was hypocritical and impossible to observe, and similar remarks thrown off in the emotional outbursts to which the Papal court was treated from time to time. I would submit that to stress these *obiter dicta* of a deeply emotional man will not do justice to the logic and coherence of the Pope's thinking, or to the difficulties of the Franciscan situation. In his fiery statements John was often his own worst enemy. His policy and his enactments were better based and more defensible than has generally been allowed, and his place in Franciscan history a more honourable one than he has usually been assigned.

Everyone has agreed that John had no solid theological training. He was brought up by the Dominicans, but all his subsequent experience as a churchman lay in the field of administration and law.<sup>11</sup>

Olivi fino alla sua condanna", *Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo e Archivio muratoriano* LXX (1958), 365-424; judgment implicit in the two concluding sentences, p. 416.

<sup>9</sup> See the Joachimite conclusion to the anonymous treatise in M. Bihl, "Fraticelli cuiusdam 'Decalogus evangeliae paupertatis' an. 1340-1342 conscriptus", *AFH* XXXII (1939), 279-411. It is Bihl's assumption that John XXII is meant, despite the earlier diplomatic references to him.

<sup>10</sup> *Chronica Fratris Nicolai Glassberger, Analecta Franciscana* II, pp. 129, 131-3; the compilatory nature of the work is stressed by H. Boehmer in his edition of Jordan of Giano, *Chronica Fratris Jordani*, (Paris, 1908), pp. xxx-xxxiv.

<sup>11</sup> The classic account by N. Valois, "Jacques Duèse, Pape sous le nom de Jean XXII", *Histoire Littéraire de la France* XXXIV (1915), 391-630, to be supplemented by B. Guillemain, *La Cour pontificale d'Avignon (1309-1376), Étude d'un société* (Paris, 1962), esp. pp. 130-4; G. Mollat, *Les Papes d'Avignon* 10th edition, (Paris, 1965), 39-71.

He was both civil and canon lawyer, with, probably, doctorates at Paris and Orléans. He rose in the service of a secular ruler, Charles II of Naples, finally attaining the position of chancellor. It was typical of his talents that the task he could have been assigned at the Council of the Church at Vienne was to put in order the memoranda drawn up by the clergy on the usurpations of temporal lords. When he became Pope, his greatest achievement lay in the sphere of papal finance, where he converted in the course of eighteen years the debts of his predecessor into an unprecedented surplus. In a sense, he was the true creator of the Avignonese Papacy, who made secure and thus more permanent the temporary seat of the Popes by taking over the episcopal palace of Avignon and Fortifying it. It was thus in practical matters which could be strictly delimited and settled that the gifts of the Pope were well displayed, not in the highest affairs of state or of theology, the conflict with the Empire under Lewis of Bavaria, the Beatific Vision, the Franciscan crisis itself, where the issues were more complex and uncertain or the subject matter was purely intellectual.

William of Ockham's verdict on John was that he was completely ignorant in theology. But the Pope, in the midst of an exceptionally active pontificate, made every effort to educate himself in theological matters, often following out interests which were not most immediately linked with his day to day preoccupations.<sup>12</sup> Clement V had left very few books in the papal library: John from the outset embarked on an energetic buying policy. The works he so obtained included a copy of the Franciscan Rule of 1223 with the explanatory Bulls, *Quo Elongati* of 1230 and *Exit qui seminat* of 1279. There was a *Summarium* of Gratian and a summary of part of Aquinas's *Summa*. He had a preference for digests which summed up information in a handy form, so that he could use intervals of time for study.<sup>13</sup> The pursuit of knowledge tended to be clearly religious rather than profane — the study of Livy which he commissioned from the Dominican Nicholas Trivet was the exception rather than the rule<sup>14</sup> — but it was wide and miscellaneous. That there was an

<sup>12</sup> Guillemain, *Cour pontificale*, pp. 131-2; A. Maier, "Annotazioni autografe di Giovanni XXII in Codici Vaticani", *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* VI (1952), 317-32.

<sup>13</sup> See Petrarch's verdict in Guillemain, *Cour Pontificale*, p. 132, n. 181.

<sup>14</sup> W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge 1955), p. 143.

element of study of theology and allied subjects for its own sake emerges most clearly from the MSS of Aquinas's works in the papal library. Page after page of the codices have been annotated in the Pope's own hand, a small calligraphy, fine and graceful, almost nervous, often difficult to read.<sup>15</sup> They cover not only the most clearly theological works, the *Summa theologiae*, the fourth book of the commentary on the Sentences, the *De Veritate*, the *De Potentia*, the *De Malo* but also the *Politics* of Aristotle with Aquinas' commentary. In the MS Thomas is referred to as plain "frater Thomas": the MS was therefore produced before the date of his canonisation in the June of 1323. This is exactly the time of intense discussion over the poverty of Christ issue, settled by *Cum inter nonnullos* in November of the same year. The MS annotations can most naturally be placed in the period before Aquinas was canonised and be understood as part of the necessary examination of the candidate's work, but the extent of the Pope's marginal comments goes well beyond what was required for this immediate purpose — they show the Pope interested in this material for its own sake and making himself a serious student of Thomism, with all its restraints in the matter of poverty and its moderate, non-Franciscan and instrumental view-point, just on the eve of his own definition. It is clear from the extent of this annotation — against what I had myself earlier thought<sup>16</sup> — that Thomism did play a part in the Pope's mind before the definition. It suggests, not so much that the Dominicans guided his hand and turned him against the Franciscans but rather that the Pope read his theology for himself. The same impression of personal participation is given by the MS of the Franciscan Rule. The Pope's hand has repeated in the margins a number of words as they appear in the Rule, "consulit," "monet et hortatur," "dicit non debere," "teneantur."<sup>17</sup> The numerous subjunctions of the Rule obviously interested him: he is reading the text as a jurist would, trying to clarify the distinctions implicit there between precept and counsel and the shadings of meaning that lie between, giving closest attention to the force of the Rule's prohibition of the use of money. He is, of course, reading exactly as St.

<sup>15</sup> The description given by Anneliese Maier who has tracked down the annotations: *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* VI (1952), 318.

<sup>16</sup> M. D. Lambert, *Franciscan poverty. The doctrine of the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles in the Franciscan order, 1210-1323*, (London, 1961), p. 241.

<sup>17</sup> Maier in *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* VI (1952), 322.

Francis did not wish his friars to. His continuing personal interest in theology is shown by his commissioning *reportationes* of thirty-four of his private sermons and providing for parchment for their copying out for posterity: some had meditative themes but a good number touch on the controversial theological issues of his pontificate. Among them we find the issue of the temporal powers of the Papacy, raised by the Lewis of Bavaria conflict, the poverty of Christ and finally the question of the Beatific Vision, that King Charles's Head of his last years, first carried into his mind as a by-product of the Franciscan case.<sup>18</sup>

John's handling of the Franciscan affair suggested that he had arrived with his mind already made up on the issue.<sup>19</sup> He moved with great speed, especially when one considers the accumulation of unfinished business in the Church generally that he inherited. He was crowned late in 1316, at once received petitions for action from both sides, Spiritual and Community, within the order, initiated investigation at once, carried it on through 1317, and settled the matter by a Bull for the Italian Spirituals in 1317 and by the Bull *Quorundam exigit* for the Midi Spirituals in 1318 — all in less than two years, as contrasted with the comparable investigation of Clement V, which began in 1309, carried on through the Council of Vienne and was still unfinished, left as an unfortunate legacy to John, when that ended in 1312. He was of course a Midi Pope and it is now becoming ever clearer how much the Franciscan crisis arose from a Midi problem.<sup>20</sup> And thus it was that personal knowledge cut short the need for true investigation. John's actions 1316-1318 are concerned not so much with eliciting the facts as with establishing correctly the true ground for condemning one side, the Spirituals. He regards their position from the outset as quite untenable; what he is concerned about is making sure what precisely is the boundary between heresy and orthodoxy that they have already crossed. Hence the relative slimness and inadequacy of the interrogation, carried on personally by the Pope, of the Spirituals who came before him. They, as individuals, were of no great interest to him. Angelo da Clareno, in his

<sup>18</sup> E. Pásztor, "Una raccolta di sermoni di Giovanni XXII", *Bullettino dell'Archivio Paleografico Italiano*, N.S. II-III (1956-7), 265-89.

<sup>19</sup> Lambert, *Franciscan poverty*, p. 210.

<sup>20</sup> This is a principal service of Manselli, *Spirituali*, and of Pásztor in *Bull. dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.* LXX (1958).

*History of the Seven Tribulations of the Order of St. Francis*, recounts, perhaps as an eye-witness, what happened as the Spirituals who had gathered in the convents of Narbonne and Béziers were summoned to the Papa presence in the curia. He describes the scene in terms of a grim, clipped dialogue.<sup>21</sup> Angelo is too fair a chronicler, at least for the fourteenth century, and the story hangs too well with the Pope's sardonic tongue as described by the Aragonese ambassadors for us to dismiss it. Here he descended merely to intimidation. But it is reasonable to assume that he already was familiar with the situation. The Spiritual movement was only a genuine popular and lay movement, with its own saint *cultus*, relics and literature (and dangerous because of that) in the Midi, in the Franciscan province of Provence. Here John knew his men. He was born the son of a bourgeois from Cahors and the number of Quercynois appointments in his pontificate shows he had not forgotten his native land.<sup>22</sup> He was chancellor to a southern ruler who at this time held the county of Provence. He became bishop of Fréjus, then of Avignon: thus much of his experience and acquaintance was in a field closely neighbouring the maximum catchment area of the Spirituals, lay and Franciscan. An interesting episode of his earlier career, when he was still plain Jacques Duèse, teacher of canon law, reveals him in contact with the Spiritual movement, and, by implication, with an already settled and cold opinion of its beliefs. The occasion was the canonisation process of St. Louis of Toulouse, eldest son of John's patron, Charles II of Naples, and briefly Archbishop of Toulouse 1297-8, before a fever combined with the austerities of his holy life to carry him off in 1298.<sup>23</sup> Louis with his brothers while in captivity in Aragon fell under the influence of the great Provençal Spiritual, Petrus Jo-

<sup>21</sup> The chronicle, ed. F. Ehrle in *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* II (Berlin, 1886), pp. 144-6; D. Douie, *The nature and effect of the heresy of the Fraticelli* (Manchester, 1932), pp. 18-19, 63.

<sup>22</sup> Guillemain, *Cour pontificale*, pp. 176-7.

<sup>23</sup> E. Pásztor, *Per la storia di San Ludovico di Angio* (1274-1297), Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, Studi Storici 10 (Roma 1955); criticism by G. Fussenegger in *AFH* XLIX (1956), 196-8. Pásztor is concerned to bring out certain facets of the canonisation process; see also M. R. Toynbee, *St. Louis of Toulouse and the process of canonisation in the fourteenth century*, *BSFS* 15 (Manchester, 1929); canonisation documents in *Processus canonizationis et Legendae Variae S. Ludovici O.F.M. episc. Tolosani, Analecta Franciscana* VII (Ad Claras Aquas, 1951); see on this M. H. Laurent's criticism in *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* XLVI (1951), 786-91.

hannis Olivi<sup>24</sup>, and took him as a personal guide. This influence led him to renounce the Neapolitan throne, take the habit and as Archbishop of Toulouse lead a life of extreme poverty and restraint, realising in a sense in his own person Olivi's view, expressed elsewhere, that a Franciscan friar who was elected to the office of a bishop ought to lead a life of poverty "in some way still more than before."<sup>25</sup> Louis was deeply influenced by Olivi, included in his entourage at Toulouse Franciscans of known Spiritual sympathies, among them for example William of Cornillon, a representative of the Spiritual side in the early part of the investigation under Clement V at Vienne. The canonisation process was initiated under Clement V, then dropped and brought to a successful conclusion by John himself in 1317, the very year of shipwreck of the Spirituals. John was originally despatched to the household of Louis by Charles II to act as his "familiaris et domesticus," and he was able to assist Louis, particularly with legal advice, for which he visited him from time to time. Here we can catch John, before he became Pope and before he was directly involved as far as we know in the strife within the Franciscan order, in contract with a bishop who had certainly been touched by personal influence from the Spirituals and with a household sympathetic to them. He spoke as a witness to Louis's virtues, and certainly he believed in his sanctity, otherwise he would never have permitted the revival of the canonisation proceedings when he became Pope. But what is significant is what is left out of his evidence. John praises Louis for his piety and humility and contempt for the world, explains how he never kept hunting dogs or falcons, how he wanted to use up his revenues on gifts to the poor.<sup>26</sup> John was an occasional visitor, not the closest confidant — he could well have missed something of the inner life of the saint — nevertheless it is noteworthy what a turn his evidence has given to Louis's

<sup>24</sup> Oieu is correct, as A. Thomas, "Le vrai nom du Frère Mineur Petrus Johannis Olivi" *Annales du Midi*, XXV, 1913, 68f, points out, but Olivi is now too well established to be supplanted. The latest account of his thinking in Leff, *Heresy in the later middle ages I*, 100–39, adds perspective. Some contrast in tone in his conclusions, p. 139, and the judgment of R. Manselli, *La 'Lectura super Apocalipsim' di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi*, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, *Studi Storici* 19–21, (Roma, 1955) should be noted.

<sup>25</sup> Cited from his *Tractatus* on Franciscan poverty by F. Ehrle in *Archiv für Literatur* III (Berlin, 1887), 511.

<sup>26</sup> *Processus Canonizationis, Analecta Franciscana* VII, 75.

poverty — it is in essence, whether consciously or not, an instrumental view. The authentic Franciscan note of the burning passion for poverty bringing the friar closest to the supremely poor Christ — that is quite missing from John's personal testimony and very largely missing from the Bull of canonisation in 1317.<sup>27</sup> We miss it and we realise suddenly what it is that has been lacking when we read the testimony in the same process of William of Cornillon about St. Louis deathbed (at which John had also been present). “Dixit eciam idem qui loquitur,” William is cited as saying, “quod, quamquam dominus Ludovicus esset tantus prelatus, tantus homo et filius tanti regis, cum laboraret in agonia non potuit habere de omnibus vasis suis argenteis unam tassam nec unum cloquear, cum quo ministraretur sibi aqua vel vinum ad lavandum os suum; sed oportuit ut haberet commodatam tassam unam a quodam familiari suo. Nec potuit habere de suis femoralia vel lumbare; unde oportuit quod unus socius suus traderet femoralia sua, que habebat munda, cum quibus fuit sepultus, et lumbare fuit sibi factum de una corda cum qua cludebatur et aperiebatur una fenestra. Et cum difficultate maxima potuerunt habere paramenta episcopalia ad sepelendum eum, ut dixit.”<sup>28</sup> Here, we may say, before his election he had been in contact with something of the spirit of the heart of the Spiritual movement. If not hostile, he was already indifferent to it. He knew his Midi and his Spiritual poverty.<sup>29</sup> Hence the short shrift which the Spirituals as personalities had from him.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 395–9. Fussenegger notes, against Pásztor, that the Bull does say “habitum vilem portabat” and refers to his washing of the feet of the poor; nonetheless it seems to me that the passion for poverty, as represented in William of Cornillon's testimony (*infra*, p. 15) does not adequately come over, and that the absence of any reference to his fidelity to the Rule is curious.

<sup>28</sup> *Processus Canonizationis, Analecta Franciscana* VII, 29.

<sup>29</sup> Manselli in his book *La 'Lectura'* argues that Olivi was orthodox, even in his apocalyptic speculations. In his later book, *Spirituali*, he argues further that he was the true master of the Spirituals and Beguins of Provence, and that these were essentially orthodox at the outset. Only later were they drawn into heresy, especially the distortion of the apocalyptic views of Olivi that would crudely equate the Roman and the carnal Church. Persecution, he believes, actually aided the development of heresy — a persecution for which John carries major responsibility. The burning of four Beguins at Marseilles in 1318 especially had a major and deleterious impact. The lateness of the deviation into heresy is, however, hard to prove and Manselli admits, p. 179, that documentation for the Beguins is sparse in the period 1300–18, before John's major prosecutions begin. Records of investigation by the Inquisition (which did not take place before

If the practical side of the Spirituals' affairs received swift and unfeeling settlement, the theology believed to underlie the movement in the Midi was treated with remarkable care and thoroughness. The researches of J. Koch before the war and more recently of Edith Pásztor have shown what a wealth of expert judgment was thrown up by the investigation of the *Lectura on the Apocalypse* of Olivi, which began when John turned his attention to the Spirituals in 1317.<sup>30</sup> The Inquisitors believed that the *Lectura* was an important source of the heresy of the Provençal Beguins, and they wanted a condemnation of Olivi in order to be able to act against the dead leader whose writings and example acted as such a powerful stimulus to Spiritual Franciscan devotion. It was natural for John to examine the *Lectura* at the same time that he investigated the Midi Spirituals. But in the intellectual sphere, John was not easily satisfied. He first entrusted the *Lectura* to Cardinal Nicholas de Albertis, who made excerpts and handed them over to another theologian for analysis, and perhaps a little later appointed a commission of eight masters of theology to examine the excerpts. Later still, an anonymous theologian and Bishop Francesco Silvestri can be seen replying to four questions formulated by the Pope himself on the basis of the *Lectura*; and, in addition, a commission sat in 1318 before the burning of the four recalcitrant Spirituals of Marseilles in order to determine the orthodoxy of their understanding of the relation of the Rule and the

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1318) will reveal the most damning thoughts of the accused; other records (all we have before 1318) may not. A profession of faith, like that of Matteo de Boscis before 1304, may be intended merely to ward off suspicion of heresy; it can be that, like the public profession of faith of the Languedoc Cathars at Lombers in 1165, it does not reveal a heretical core of belief. The evidence can hang perfectly well with the hypothesis, which I would defend, that dangers in the Provençal movement antedated John's destructive actions of 1318 onwards. The Provençal Spirituals had been persecuted well before that date, though not so effectively. John simply saw the dangers more clearly than others, and acted more vigorously. Manselli, *Spirituali*, p. 154, seems to me not to see the dangers of a radical distortion of Christianity embedded in the Spiritual movement generally — noble as some of its adherents were.

<sup>30</sup> J. Koch, "Der Prozess gegen die Postille Olivis zur Apokalypse", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* V (1933), 302-15; criticism by M. Bihl in *AFH* XXIX (1936), 254-7. Koch was the pioneer who saw how both the Spiritual controversies under John XXII and the poverty of Christ conflict link to Olivi. Pásztor in *Bull. dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.* LXX (1958) reinvestigates the material more fully than Koch and relates it more firmly to the Provençal background.

gospel, and two other theologians, Petrus de Palude and Guido Terreni, reported on a Catalan treatment of Olivi's *Lectura*. Even while the Inquisitors and the enemies of the Spirituals pressed for a condemnation of the *Lectura* and the Franciscan order in their chapter-general in 1319 outran a Papal decision and themselves condemned Olivi's work and forbade friars to use them, John declined to make a move. The early expert opinion that he had obtained did not satisfy him; after the first sets of judgments came in, he formulated questions himself and asked for renewed judgments. The investigation of Olivi lasted such a long time, from 1317 to final action in 1326,<sup>31</sup> in great contrast to the brevity of the proceedings about Spirituals lasting through 1317 and 1318, because of the Pope's determination to plot more accurately than his expert advisers had the proper borderline between heresy and orthodoxy. The four questions which gave Silvestri the framework for his judgment provide the clue to the Pope's thinking — they were concerned with (1) the significance of propertylessness in relation to the pontificate of Christ in Olivi's theology, (2) the nature of the Beatific Vision in the third *status* of the history of the Church, (3) the number of the elect in Olivi's interpretation, and (4) the orthodoxy of Olivi's belief that Francis had been the highest observer of the evangelical rule and life.<sup>32</sup> They revolved round the two issues, poverty and Joachimism, that were central to Olivi's teaching in the *Lectura* and yet were precisely the themes on which theologians found it peculiarly difficult to plot the boundary of faith and heresy.<sup>33</sup> No body of decisions existed on what was a legitimate form of Joachimite speculation and what was not: only the crude Joachimite work of Gerard of Borgo San Donnino had been condemned, and that was over half a century ago. On poverty, the difficulty was that the views of Olivi were in many ways close to those of the whole Franciscan order. John wanted a condemnation of Olivi that should be as thorough and complete as he could make it, so that he could both end the Beguin movement in Provence and cut away any opportunity for its recurrence. He was convinced of Olivi's unorthodoxy. The purpose of the commissions was to provide a properly clear technical basis for condemnation and John was prepared to wait until he had got this.

<sup>31</sup> On this see Pásztor in *Bull. dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.* LXX (1958).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 392-4.

<sup>33</sup> See Leff's comments, *Heresy*, I, 157-62.

But the vital issue of poverty was precisely the one where any commission of theologians had greatest difficulty in defining what was heretical and what was not. All friars, whether Spiritual or Conventual, believed in the vital importance of poverty in the religious life, and the identification of their poverty with that of Christ and the apostles as recorded in the gospel. Where they differed lay in the way to realise it, the Conventuals laying stress on the renunciation of all property rights as constituting true poverty, the Spirituals on the poverty of the actual day to day use of things. Olivi virtually invented the particularly Spiritual doctrine of the *usus pauper* obliging the friars by their Rule under sin, but much as he might differ from the Community in certain things, he entirely shared the common estimate of all friars of the significance of poverty. The Franciscan views on poverty and on the poverty of Christ had been repeatedly approved by the Popes, as they defended their protégés against enemies in the world, in a series of Bulls, culminating in the composite defence of the order, on the level of both theory and practice, *Exit qui seminat* of 1279<sup>34</sup>. Any theologian or Inquisitor who was uneasy about the interpretations of the place of poverty in the Christian life that were current among Olivi and his followers, was liable thus to run up against the earlier approval of the Church for some very high estimates of the value of propertylessness and the perfection thereby of the order of Franciscan friars. This is what happened in the case of the commission which reported on theses from the *Lectura* in about 1319. They were concerned with Olivi's identification of the Rule and the gospel — which in one sense they regarded as both erroneous and dangerous — but they were bound to admit there was another in which Olivi's view could be held to correspond simply with that expressed by Nicholas III in *Exit qui seminat*. "Ubi videtur de regula beati Francisci, quam vere et proprie illam evangelicam et caetera quae de ipsa adjungit, quod si haec verba capit secundum intellectum et declarationem decretalis *Exit qui seminat*, verum dicit."<sup>35</sup> In pursuing the Midi heresy, John was thus brought up against the issue of Franciscan poverty as a whole,

<sup>34</sup> Lambert, *Franciscan poverty*, pp. 126–40; for the earlier developments, pp. 68–102.

<sup>35</sup> E. Baluze, *Miscellanea*, ed. J. D. Mansi II (Lucae, 1761), p. 261b; Koch in *Recherches de théol. anc. et méd.* V (1933), 308. That John actually went on to excerpt article 22 of the commission's judgment, containing this quotation, and asked for verdicts on that, is not proven, as Leff, *Heresy I*, 161, n. 2, points out.

and not merely a particularly Spiritual understanding of it. He was made to see past decisions on poverty and the poverty of Christ as a barrier to the condemnation of Olivi. He determined to remove this barrier, and the chance of an appeal by a Franciscan lector at the seat of the Dominican Inquisitors campaigning in Narbonne, anxious that Dominicans should not treat the Franciscan concept of the poverty of Christ as itself heresy, gave him the justification he needed for throwing open the issue to general discussion in 1321-2.<sup>36</sup>

The poverty of Christ conflict, the second major Franciscan disturbance in the pontificate, was thus a somewhat artificial affair, a postscript to the Spiritual investigation. There was no deep, pre-existing conflict on the issue dividing the Church. The Franciscans themselves were by now very isolated in their views. It was known that John was committed against them. Outside the gossip of the curia, the evidence for John's partisanship lies in his annotations to *Vat. Lat. 3740*, the MS containing versions of the replies solicited by the Pope on the poverty of Christ from the cardinals and the Church at large, where the Franciscan replies are given slight attention, with the addition in the margin of an occasional *cave, cave* or a fresh and anti-Franciscan text, where the argument displeases him.<sup>37</sup> The dominican's replies, especially those of Durand of St. Pourçain and Hervaeus Natalis, by contrast are treated to thick annotation, with additional references that the Pope thinks could reinforce their case — material which forms a nucleus for his later, personal reply to Michael of Cesena in the Bull *Quia vir reprobus*.<sup>38</sup>

What put emotion into an otherwise arid conflict and prevented the Pope merely proceeding smoothly to a definition that should upset *Exiit*, was the reaction of the order assembled in chapter general at Perugia in 1322, where in an encyclical despatched to the whole Christian world they declared the Franciscan doctrine of the poverty of Christ to be, in effect, immutable and inaccessible to any fresh Papal decision.<sup>39</sup> In this the firars were pressing on a tender

<sup>36</sup> Baluze-Mansi *Miscellanea*, III (Lucae, 1762), p. 207. If John had not wished it, there would have been no need to give the issue the maximum publicity that he did.

<sup>37</sup> Maier in *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* VI (1952).

<sup>38</sup> *Bullarium Franciscanum* V, ed. C. Eubel (Roma, 1898), no. 820, pp. 408-49; analysis in Leff, *Heresy* I, 247-9. For sources for *Quia vir reprobus* in Romam law see Töpfer in *Folia Diplomatica* I (Brno, 1971), 305.

<sup>39</sup> Lambert, *Franciscan poverty*, pp. 228-30. Glassberger's chronicle is our

nerve. Temperamentally, John was disinclined to accept any diminution of Papal powers. The one point, for example, in the *Summa* of Aquinas where he sharply dissents from St. Thomas is the passage where the Angelic Doctor argues that the Church can have no right to punish for infidelity those who have never received the faith. In the margin John wrote, in letters larger and more energetically impressed on the page than was his wont, the annotation: "Hoc est dubium valde."<sup>40</sup> His reply to the encyclical was intended to assert the freedom of action of the Papacy and at the same stroke knock a hole in the Franciscan claim to a unique poverty. The friars claimed to have no common property at all because all rights over their goods were held by the Papacy — it was an ancient system, in practice somewhat notional, and John with his Bull *Ad Conditorem* cancelled it by a stroke of the pen.<sup>41</sup> The Bull has more than his usual pungency: the opening line makes his answer to the chapter-general. They had denied him the right to alter the Bull *Exitit* — very well, he could alter one of its terms, the vesting of Franciscan property in the Papacy. "Ad conditorem canonum non est dubium pertinere..." "To the legislator there is no doubt that it pertains to provide new laws when he sees that those of himself or his predecessors are harmful rather than helpful..." Here, more than at any other time, the Pope was carried away by his own feelings. The Bull has flaws. The weaknesses were such that after hearing an appeal for the order by Bonagratia of Bergamo John took the Bull down, altered and strengthened its arguments, before replacing it in a better version bearing the same date and place of origin as the first. Bonagratia of Bergamo was put in prison for a year. The technical contradictions within the text provided a rich field of study for Ockham later on, a main support for the long list of errors in his *Opus Nonaginta Dierum*.

I would not here attempt to defend John from the charges of

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witness for the effect that the encyclical had on the Pope. "Super qua determinante fuit dominus Papa non modicum indignatus," *Analecta Franciscana* II, 131. Michael of Cesena's account of his acrimonious interview with the Pope shortly before his flight in 1328 shows that the issue of the encyclical was still troubling John six years later. "Et specialiter increpavit me de quadam littera Capituli generalis facta Perusii...", Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea* III, 2386.

<sup>40</sup> Maier in *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* VI (1952), 325.

<sup>41</sup> First version in *Bullarium Franciscanum* V, 235b(note)-237a (note); second *Ibid.*, 233b-246b. For its arguments, Leff, *Heresy* I, 164-5.

haste and inaccuracy which have often since been levelled at him. But I would suggest that the whole body of his major Bulls for the order, settling the Spiritual crisis and later attacking the Franciscan position on the poverty of Christ, *Quorundam exigit, Ad Conditorem, Cum inter nonnullos*, deserve to be taken as a whole and regarded as the fragments of a possible reform in the early fourteenth century doctrine of poverty of the Franciscan order. It is as if the Pope's thinking here takes place at two levels, the one petulant, sardonic, personal, much influenced by his quarrel over the encyclical of Perugia, the other shrewd and realistic, understanding within his limitations the true state of the friars in the 1320s. Few would deny that by this time the Franciscan leadership had reached an impasse. The Spiritual movement had not produced the necessary sustained drive to reform, but had often solidified opposition to reform; at the same time the ministers of the day had not faced the implications of the vast developments in the order in the thirteenth century which had so overtaken the initial poverty. John offered realism. *Quorundam exigit*, for example, is the first in the long series of Papal clarifications of the Rule that faced the friars bluntly with the necessity of some kind of dispensation from the literal provisions of the Rule.<sup>42</sup> Earlier glosses, following on the tradition of Ugoline, had represented their decisions as explanations or clarifications of points in the Rule, that were, to use the language of *Quo elongati*, "doubtful and obscure and difficult to understand."<sup>43</sup> A possible dichotomy between the Rule and the modified observance had never been discussed: but in effect the order had changed, and its changes had been sanctioned by a train of Papal decisions. In *Quorundam exigit* the issue was faced: obedience, at least in the *minutiae* of habits and granaries under discussion, did matter more than poverty, and the present decisions of superiors should be obeyed.<sup>44</sup> Again, in *Ad Conditorem*, the Pope was rightly recalling to the brothers the weakness of an interpretation of poverty based so exclusively on a theoretical renunciation of property rights. As he said, sarcastically, who could imagine that Nicholas III intended to reserve to the Roman church property rights over one crust or one

<sup>42</sup> *Bullarium Franciscanum* V, no. 289, pp. 128-30.

<sup>43</sup> *Bullarii Franciscani Epitome*, ed. C. Eubel, (Apud Claras Aquas, 1908),

<sup>44</sup> *Bullarium Franciscanum* V, 130.

bean that the friars were going to consume? <sup>45</sup> Under pressure of the Spiritual attack, the body of the friars had come to shelter behind a series of theoretical defences of their now damaged poverty, which in practice deceived no-one. John did well, for all his carelessness, in showing the hollowness of these interpretations. The Bull of definition itself, *Cum inter*, was restrained and unmarked by polemic — with technical virtuosity, it avoided a direct clash with the terms of *Exitit qui seminat*. <sup>46</sup> To use the language of castle-breakers, *Exitit* itself had in fact been slighted but there had been no contravention of the dogmatic decisions of a predecessor, and John had then attained his initial objective, and could move towards a definitive end of the Beguin movement.

The whole affair had thus been aroused by John's determination and tenacity in the pursuit of heresy — it was not entirely his fault that he roused a controversy that lasted very much longer even than his own pontificate. He had, admittedly, no "feel" for Franciscan poverty; but his work contained a great deal of sound sense. In the end, the order was bound to abandon its one-sided stress on mere property rights — John showed them its faults, and offered, so to say, by implication, a blueprint for a fresh start. He knew the raw material of his subject and was at pains, as his MS annotations show, to master its details. He was right to see in some of the Spirituals' views, as they had developed by 1316, a heresy and he directed a thorough campaign against it. His moves against the friars were not gratuitous or inspired by spite, and even his later dabblings in the Beatific Vision were related to his initial concern with Olivi's heresy. <sup>47</sup>

Yet, for all the importance of John's Bulls for the Franciscans, these decisions did not unleash a healing crisis within the order. The effects we have seen were negative, not positive. There was no new beginning. The views which friars expressed on the episodes lacked much insight into the deeper issues involved. Nicholas Glassberger, for example, was not Spiritual or Michaelist in his sympathies, yet

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 236, 238.

<sup>46</sup> Lambert, *Franciscan poverty*, pp. 235–9; Leff, *Heresy I*, 165–6, 241, 248. His characterisation of John should be noted, *Ibid.*, pp. 206–7. *Quia vir reprobus* in 1329 contains the most positive indications of the Pope's thinking, yet avoids a clash with what is said in *Exitit*. See Leff's observation, *Ibid.*, p. 249.

<sup>47</sup> This emerges from Pásztor in *Bull dell'Ist. stor. ital. per il med. evo e Arch. murat.* LXX (1958), 411–15.

his only comment on *Cum inter* was to quote another historian as saying that he did not think it had much to do with Scripture.<sup>48</sup> The otherwise unknown author of an ordinary *Exposition on the Rule* contained in *MS xi, 148* of the monastery library at St. Florian in Upper Austria, written between 1342 and 1348, in his transcription of the *Catalogus Ministrorum generalium* stops short at Michael of Cesena.<sup>49</sup> An account of Guiral Ot is entered, and a mention of Vassalli after him, in a separate column, plainly as intruded generals. He, like Glassberger later, has not thought that the controversy might have painful lessons for the friars: he treats it simply in the body of the text as a time of persecution and Cesena as a victim of events, who was forced into exile. I venture to think that this reaction, this thinking of John's proceedings as a time of suffering the order had to pass through, was a very common one. John's Bulls were in practice largely ignored and the brothers went on thinking about their poverty in traditional juridical ways. Nothing can be more striking than a perusal of the text of *MS. 48* of the Consistorial Library at Colmar containing the theses on the subject of evangelical poverty which were discussed by the General Chapter of the Observants at Bruges in 1484.<sup>50</sup> It is only a general report of their conclusions<sup>51</sup>, yet to judge from the wording the Observantines in their Chapter were talking of the poverty of Christ as if *Ad Conditorem* and *Cum inter* had never been issued. The friars discussed the question: "Utrum Christus et Apostoli fuerint perfecti pauperes evangelici?" and their first conclusion was: "In rebus [temporalibus] simplex facti usus a proprietate et dominio et iure civili separari potest..." and their second conclusion: "Proprietas, dominium, numisma et ius civile in rebus [temporalibus] non sunt de iure divino aut naturae instituta, sed introducta in magno iure propter peccatum et ex iniquitate" and, the corollary to this: "Perfectus reformat naturae, Christus, noluit viros evangelicos habere rerum dominium, proprietatem aut pecuniam."<sup>52</sup> These are remarkably free

<sup>48</sup> *Analecta Franciscana* II, 133.

<sup>49</sup> K. Esser, "Eine 'Epositio regulae Ordinis Fratrum Minorum' aus dem 14. Jahrhundert", *Franziskanische Studien* XXXVII (1955), 18-52; this reference, p. 19.

<sup>50</sup> C. Schmitt, "La pauvreté évangélique discutée au Chapitre Observant de Bruges (1484)," *AFH* LVI (1963), 332-46.

<sup>51</sup> See Schmitt's comment, p. 338.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 344.

of any thought of the implications of John's teaching, which had after all been received into the *Extravagantes* and remained, so to speak, on the statut book when the Observantines held their debate. Earlier in the century the giants of the Observance, St. James of the March and others, used the Johannine Bulls as an objective standard of measurement for heresy in their campaigns against the Fraticelli, whose movement they finally brought to an end; but the most living branch of the order in the fifteenth century never, it would seem, took the Bulls into their own understanding of poverty and its internal interpretation. They remained an external thing, only in their deleterious effects significant in the course of Franciscan history.

Why did they not have a more positive effect? The answer, I think, must lie in the manner of John's own approach to the problem of the friars. He did not lack skill in acting as a doctor to religious orders that had fallen on evil days. Two orders, less important than the Franciscans and with less complicated problems, the Grandmontines and the Hospitallers, felt the beneficial effect of this intervention.<sup>53</sup> Statutes were revised, superiors absolved from office and replaced by others, and, characteristically, finances were put in order. But the Franciscan difficulties were not capable of being resolved lightly; more important, John never intervened for the sake of the order itself. The surgery, the excising of the Spirituals and the Beguins, the new Bulls with their implied changes, the removal and replacement of superiors that accompanied and preceded the Michaelist rebellion, all was undertaken not expressly for the sake of the order but as a mere byproduct of the pursuit of heresy, to some extent in Italy, most of all in the South of France. The friars could never feel in their dealings with John that he had fully understood the basis of their feelings over poverty. For a few years this divergence was masked for the majority in the excitement of making an end of the Spirituals. From 1322 it was quite apparent, and vitiated the possibilities of reform. John did not have the interests of the

<sup>53</sup> Mollat, *Les Papes d'Avignon*, pp. 52-4; I am indebted to Dr. J. A. Luttrell for further references on the Hospitallers. His own research work (conveniently listed in his article in *Speculum* XLI (1966), p. 31, n. 1) supersedes portions of J. Delaville le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes jusqu'à la mort de Philibert de Naillac 1310-1421* (Paris, 1913). In a private letter he tells me that in John's work "financial questions played a big part" and that the "basis of action was practical rather than doctrinaire."

order chiefly at heart. The removal of superiors was undertaken for a plain negative end: to ensure that there was no rebellion against his Bulls.

The way forward could in the end only be found by a returning to the strict way in day to day living rather than a preoccupation with envenomed questions of theory. The effects of the Johannine crisis on the positive side, less predictable and less immediately linked to the theory of poverty, lay in the field of literature. The period which coincides with the Clementine investigation and the Johannine crisis is a period rich in the compilation of biographical material about St. Francis and the holy friars of primitive days.<sup>54</sup> This was the fertile age of the *Speculum perfectionis*. The enemies of the order, ultimately John himself, had put the state of the friars minor as following the highest perfection under serious doubt. The literary works of the time thus gather all the material that can show the Rule and its ideal of poverty is of divine origin. The old Spirituals had made Francis another Christ, whose sanctity is the justification of those who follow after him. The arguments about the Rule and the gospel, about the *usus facti* and dominion rights, are not met directly, but rather bypassed. Hence the burgeoning of compilations stressing, and overstressing the divine inspiration on Francis and the early companions. The titles alone suggest the purport of this literature — *Actus sancti Francisci*, *Catalogus sanctorum fratrum*, *Sanctorum splendor*, *Fac secundum exemplar*. The crucible of, first, the Spiritual and then the Michaelist crisis helps to explain the special atmosphere of much of this literature. The nucleus for this material lay in the recollections of the early companions of Francis, refracted through the minds of the Spirituals and sometimes distorted by the pressing necessities of their situation under persecution. Just how far the crucible of the order's fiery history in these years has distorted St. Francis' words will probably now always remain controversial.<sup>55</sup> What the Johannine crisis did was to scatter this partially Spiritual material much more widely in the Franciscan world, as so many friars felt the necessity of defending their ideal in a way that was not accessible to these rather gaunt arguments from law and reason,

<sup>54</sup> For what follows see the illuminating passage by Esser in *Franziskanische Studien* XXXVII (1955), 48–9.

<sup>55</sup> For the latest, serene exposition on this see now the introduction to *Scripta Leonis, Rufini et Angeli Sociorum S. Francisci*, ed. R. B. Brooke (Oxford, 1970).

by returning to the holy places of the primitive years and seeing how the Rule and the poverty could not have been a mistake — what Harnack in another century and a quite other context called the Franciscan misunderstanding<sup>56</sup> — because it had been given the seal of God's approval, and was guaranteed by the personal sanctity of the early friars. In this way the literature about the origins of the order (that so aroused enthusiasm for Franciscan history and lay at the root of the movement represented by the British Society for Franciscan Studies), touched by the ideals of the Spirituals, was spread much more widely in the order than the Spiritual movement itself had ever been. Not every province that produced these MSS was ever Spiritual, far from it, but through the crisis some of their ideas paradoxically received this much broader diffusion.

In the general context of Church history, on the wider field than that of the Franciscan order, the most lasting memorial to John's action lies in the political works of William of Ockham. It is true that Ockham was already suspect when he joined Cesena's revolt: his case had long been pending in Avignon and if he threw in his lot with Michael of Cesena in 1328 he had not much more to lose. That is true, but it is hard to see how he could have been persuaded by anything less than a strong conviction to carry on turning out treatises on John's errors and their implications for the best part of twenty years in the rather precarious isolation of the Franciscan convent at Munich. It was merely chance that one of the leading minds of the fourteenth century happened to be in Avignon at the time when Michael of Cesena was meditating flight and was there initiated into the poverty of Christ. We may believe Ockham when he tells us that he had never thought about the matter before Michael drew him on to read the Bulls and listen to the Franciscan arguments: <sup>57</sup> the English province had not been distinguished by an especially strong involvement in the matter. After he read and listened, he became convinced and joined the Michaelist group for the rest of his life. In his political treatises Ockham shows his distinction. He stands out from all the rest of the rebellious friars, whether Spiritual or Conventual, by the way in which he draws out to the full

<sup>56</sup> A. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, Leipzig, 1926, p. 61. He had in mind, particularly, Franciscan begging.

<sup>57</sup> *Epistola ad Fratres Minores* in Guillemi de Ockham, *Opera Politica* III ed. H. S. Offler (Mancunii, 1956), p. 6; L. Baudry, *Guillaume d'Occam* (Vrin, 1949), p. 112.

the implications of the state of affairs in which he believes a Pope is a heretic. His quality of mind can be seen to emerge if one turns to the writing of another friar, one of the Fraticelli and thus on the Spiritual wing of the order, who wrote a little known *Decalogue of Evangelical Poverty* about 1342-3. The author, outside the main body, faced a similar dilemma to Ockham. He left the order because it had suppressed the Spirituals and because he believed that the works of John XXII on the poverty of Christ were heretical but he does not face the implications of his own stand. He twists and turns to avoid a clear answer, puts the blame for the Spiritual persecution on Bongratia of Bergamo, interprets *Quorumdam exigit* as being against the true mind of the Pope, fails to answer the obvious criticism that to attack Guiral Ot for his views on poverty is to attack John XXII and to make his successors into heretics.<sup>58</sup> All this was boldly faced by Ockham and made the basis for a distinctive and consistent point of view in his *Opera Politica*. These treatises were the most lasting products of the whole Johannine crisis, and it is perhaps appropriate, after a conflict that directly achieved so little, that they should have had a largely negative effect.

A conclusion can only be that profound reforms in an order's thinking are not easily made effective by an ecclesiastical superior without sympathy. All the intelligence and care which John brought to the problems of poverty and heresy were vitiated, as far as the friars were concerned, by the harshness and controversial zeal which blended with his keen logical sense. By his actions he ended a potentially dangerous heresy in the Midi, and this was his achievement. Within the order a restoration of the observance and of a healthier mode of thinking about the true nature of their poverty was not aided by John's legislation or the superiors he promoted, but only by time and the return to St. Francis's words and example.

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<sup>58</sup> Bihl in *AFH XXXII* (1939), 279-411; see esp. the text, pp. 391, 395-6, 407-10.

## RAMÓN LLULL, *LOGICA BREVIS*

Among the works of Ramon Llull constituting complete treatises on logic the Electorium catalogue — the oldest (1311) and most authentic inventory of Llull's works — lists only two works : *Logica nova* and *Logica brevis*.<sup>1</sup> The first of these treatises is well known. The *Logica nova* was composed in Genoa in May of the year 1303, and beins with the words : Deus, cum tua benedictione novum et compendiosum incipimus opus, ubi novam logicam compilamus. Considerantes veterem logicam et antiquam. This important work is found in a great number of manuscripts and two printed editions.<sup>2</sup>

The identification of the *Logica brevis*, however, presents more difficulty. Two works have come into consideration : (1) *Logica brevis* (otherwise : *Logica brevis et nova* ; *Logica abbreviata* (= *LBN*) with the incipit : Deus, cum tua summa perfectione incipit Logica brevis et nova. Logica est ars, qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et argumentative discernuntur. In logica considerantur tria inter alia, scilicet terminus, propositio et argumentum. Terminus est... / ...contrarietas quam habent circa hoc de quo disputation. This work is found in five manuscripts : *Kobenhavn* Kbl. Bibl. Ny kgl. S. 640.8° (XV) f. 1<sup>r</sup>-12<sup>v</sup> (fragm.) ; *München* Staatsbibl. Clm. 4381 (A.D. 1497) f. 34<sup>v</sup>-45<sup>v</sup> ; *Palma de Mallorca* Bibl. publica 1026 (XVIII) 19 fols. (fragm. ; *expl.* : per me Bernardum Lavinhetam) ; *Vaticana* Vat. lat. 986 (XV) f. 200<sup>r</sup>-219<sup>r</sup> ; Vat. lat. 3069 (XV) f. 4<sup>v</sup>-12<sup>r</sup>. It is also found in the following printed editions : Venezia 1480

<sup>1</sup> E. W. Platzeck, *Raimund Lull* II (Düsseldorf 1964) 115\* no. 26-27. In this article the following abbreviations will be used : *CLA* = *Compendium logicae Algazelis* ; *LBN* = *Logica brevis et nova* ; *LDG* = *Logica del Gatzel* ; *LN* = *Logica nova* ; *LP* = *Logica parva* ; *RD* = E. Rogent and E. Durà, *Bibliografía de les impressions lul·lianes* (Barcelona 1927). References will be made by page or by folio to the following editoons : *CLA* = C. H. Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' Compendium logicae Algazelis : Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik* (Freiburg i. Br. 1967) 94-123 ; *LBN* = Venezia 1480 (RD 2) ; *LN* = Palma 1744 (RD 327) ; Bernhardi de Lavinhetra *Opera omnia* (ed. J. H. Alsted ; Cologne 1612).

<sup>2</sup> Platzeck, *op. cit.* 41\* no. 112.

(RD 2), Barcelona 1489 (RD 11), Valladolid 1497 (RD add. 2), Sevilla s. XVI<sup>in.</sup> (RD add. 6), Barcelona 1512 (RD 47), Paris 1516 (RD 60), Paris 1518 (RD 68), Palma 1584 (RD 129), Strasbourg 1598 (RD 144), Strasbourg 1609 (RD 162), Strasbourg 1617 (RD 180), Strasbourg 1651 (RD 233). A French translation by M. de Vassy appeared under the title: *Logique brieve et nouvelle* in Paris in the year 1632 (RD 206). (2) *Logica parva* (otherwise: *Dialecticae introductiones*) (=LP) with the incipit: *Gratia summi radii fontalis* (*Gratia et illustratione divina*) pullulat arbor scientiae logicalis in arboribus quinque inserta, cuius fructum est verum et falsum... — *Logica est ars et scientia cum qua verum et falsum ratiocinando cognoscuntur et unum ab altero discernitur, verum eligendo et falsum dimittendo*. Cuius principia specifica sunt tria, scilicet terminis... / ...haec fallacia proveniat secundum multa. This work is known in six manuscripts: *München Staatsbibliothek Clm. 10542* (XIV/XV) f. 42<sup>r</sup>-64<sup>r</sup>; *Palma de Mallorca Biblioteca Provincial L. 95 Int. III*; *Biblioteca Publica 1044* (XVI) 31 fols. (*Expl.*: *Vincentius Valeriis discipulus Nicolai Pachis*); 1061 (XV/XVI) II f. 25<sup>r</sup>-56<sup>v</sup>; 1082 (XVI) f. 1<sup>r</sup>-44<sup>r</sup>; *Causa pia Lulliana* 1 (XVIII) f. 59-93. It is also found in two printed editions: *Alcalá 1518* (RD 69), *Palma 1744* (RD 327). This second work formed the basis for Prantl's analysis of Lullian Logic.<sup>3</sup>

Nicolás Antonio seems to have been the first to have included these two treatises in the list of Llull's authentic works; earlier inventories mention various complete treatises on logic, but give little help toward identification. The list in *Cod. Cusanus 85* f. 48<sup>v</sup> which dates from about 1430 cites a *Logica brevis* and the *Logica nova*.<sup>4</sup> The inventory of the Escuela Luliana of Barcelona of the year 1466 mentions the *Logica nova*, a *Logica Algazelis* which is without doubt Llull's early *Compendium logicae Algazelis* (=CLA),<sup>5</sup> and a *Logica*.<sup>6</sup> In the sixteenth century Alonso de Proaza mentioned the *Logica*

<sup>3</sup> C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* III (Leipzig 1867) 146-55.

<sup>4</sup> M. Honecker, "Lullus-Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Kardinals Nikolaus von Cues," *Spanische Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft* 1. Reihe 6 (1937) 252-309 at 279-81.

<sup>5</sup> Platzeck, *op. cit.* 11\* no. 33. Cf. also J. Rubió Balaguer, "La Lògica del Gazzali, posada en rims per En Ramon Lull," *Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans* 5 (1913-14) 311-54; C. H. Lohr, *op. cit.* 2f.

<sup>6</sup> F. de Bofarull y Sans, *El testamento de Ramón Lull y la Escuela Luliana en Barcelona* (Barcelona 1896) 35; P. Blanco Soto, *Estudios de bibliografía luliana* (Madrid 1916) 68-72.

*nova*, a *Logica brevis*, and a *Logica de quinque arboribus*, which may possibly be the *LP* mentioned above.<sup>7</sup> The inventory of the Biblioteca Vileta includes the *Logica nova*, a *Logica parva*, and a *Tractatus parvus de logica*.<sup>8</sup> In the following century Luke Wadding lists the *Logica nova*, a *Liber qui vocatur Logica de Grozell*, in vulg., which is no doubt the Catalan adaptation of *CLA* published by Llull under the title *Logica del Gatzel* (= *LDG*), and the *Logica parva*, certainly the work cited above, since he gives the incipit: *Logica est ars et scientia, ad* lists two editions: Alcalá 1518 and Palma 1584.<sup>9</sup> It should be noted, however, that whereas the edition of Alcalá 1518 actually contains the *LP*, the edition of Palma 1584 contains the *LBN*, and not the *LP* (RD 129). This confusion was eliminated by Nicolás Antonio, whose inventory of Llull's libri logicales includes the following titles: No. LXVI *Liber qui vocatur Logica del Grozell* (probably *LDG* and not *CLA*); No. LXVII *Logica parva, inc*: *Logica est ars et scientia* (with the note that this work appeared in Alcalá in 1518 and was commented on by Antonio Belver); No. LXVIII *Logica nova, inc*: *Considerantes veterem*; No. LXIX *dialectica seu logica nova, inc*: *Logica est ars qua verum* (with the note: *quam in editione Argentoratensi toties laudata exstantem Bernardus Lavinhetus emendasse restitutis iis quae olim fuerant sublata dicitur*).<sup>10</sup> His Nos. LXVII and LXIX correspond respectively to the *LP* and *LBN* described above. Criticism of this inventory begins in the eighteenth century. Whereas Salzinger mentions the *Logica nova* and the *Compendium logicae Algazelis*, but not the *Logica brevis*,<sup>11</sup> Pasqual under the heading *De artibus liberalibus* in his *Catalogus librorum* lists the *Logica nova*, the *Compendium logicae Algazelis*, and a *Logica (rithmice)*, which is no doubt to be identified with the *LDG*.<sup>12</sup> In his chronological account of Llull's works Pasqual mentions the *Logica nova* under the year 1303, but makes no reference to a *Logica brevis*.<sup>13</sup> The more recent bibliographers agree in including

<sup>7</sup> Alphonsus de Proaza, "Index librorum," in: *Raymundi Lulli Ars inventiva veritatis, Tabula generalis, Commentum in easdem ipsius Raymundi* (Valencia 1515) f. 220<sup>v</sup>-222<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> R. de Alós, *Los Catálogos lulianos* (Barcelona 1918) 67-83.

<sup>9</sup> L. Wadding, *Scriptores ordinis Minorum* (Rome 1650) 297.

<sup>10</sup> N. Antonio, *Bibliotheca hispana vetus* II (Madrid 1788) 128.

<sup>11</sup> I. Salzinger, *Raimundi Lulli opera* I (Mainz 1721; repr. Frankfurt a.M. 1965) 55, 61, 73.

<sup>12</sup> A. R. Pasqual, *Vindiciae lulianae* I (Avignon 1778) Vita 376.

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, I Vita 243.

*LN*, *CLA*, *LDG* in the inventory of Llull's works, but differ in their treatment of *LBN* and *LP*. The editors of the article on Llull in the *Histoire littéraire de la France* (1885) seem to be the first to identify the *Logica brevis* of the Electorium catalogue with the work cited by Antonio with the incipit: *Logica est ars qua verum et falsum rationcinando cognoscuntur.*<sup>14</sup> They also include the *Logica parva*, although this work is not mentioned in the Electorium catalogue.<sup>15</sup> Longpré (1926) lists both the *LBN* and the *LP* at the conclusion of his account of Llull's philosophical works,<sup>16</sup> Ottaviano (1930) similarly among undated works<sup>17</sup>. Glorieux (1933) is the first to associate these two works with the *Logica nova* under the date of 1303.<sup>18</sup> Avinyó (1935) marks an important stage in the criticism of these attributions. Although maintaining the identification of *LBN* with the Electorium catalogue's *Logica brevis*, he excludes the *LP* from the authentic works with the note that the form of exposition used in the *LP* seems to be an amplification of *LBN*, and that the work is possibly to be ascribed to Nicolas de Pax who had it printed in Alcalá.<sup>19</sup> Carreras y Artau (1939), following Avinyó, excludes *LP*, but note with regard to *LBN* that, although date and place of composition are unknown, the work is probably to be situated immediately after *LN*.<sup>20</sup> Finally, Platzeck (1964) associates *LBN* with *LN* in the same way, but excludes *LP* from his inventory.<sup>21</sup>

In the following pages I want to maintain that neither the *LBN* nor the *LP* is an authentic work of Llull. A comparison of both works with the certainly authentic *LN* and *CLA* will be the basis for this conclusion. Finally, a suggestion will be made as to the identification of the *Logica brevis* cited by the Electorium catalogue.

<sup>14</sup> M. P. E. Littré and B. Hauréau, *Histoire littéraire de la France* XXIX (Paris 1885) 242f. no. 57.

<sup>15</sup> *Loco cit.* no. 58.

<sup>16</sup> E. Longpré, art. "Lulle," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 9 (1926) at col. 1096, nos. 52-53.

<sup>17</sup> C. Ottaviano, *L'Ars compendiosa de R. Lulle* (Paris 1930) 93 nos. 220-221.

<sup>18</sup> P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* II (Paris 1933) 160f. items ct, cv, cw.

<sup>19</sup> J. Avinyó, *Les Obres autèntiques del beat Ramon Llull* (Barcelona 1935) 178-81 no. 94.

<sup>20</sup> T. and J. Carreras y Artau, *Historia de la Filosofía española: Filosofía cristiana* I (Madrid 1939) 295 no. 46, 334 no. 37.

<sup>21</sup> Platzeck, *op. cit.* (supra note 1) 41\* no. 114.

I. *LOGICA BREVIS ET NOVA*

The *LBN* is certainly a work belonging to the Lullian tradition. It begins with a typically Lullian invocation : Deus, cum tua summa perfectione incipit Logica brevis et nova. Logica est ars... (f. 1<sup>r</sup>). Moreover, the Lullian principles, bonitas, magnitudo, etc. are used in examples of terms (f. 1<sup>r</sup>), propositions (f. 1<sup>r</sup> etc.), and syllogisms (f. 4<sup>r</sup> etc.). Again, Llull's demonstratio per aequiparantiam is added to the traditional demonstratio per quid and demonstratio per quia in the treatment of the methods of proof (f. 3<sup>v</sup>). <sup>22</sup>

However, when we compare the structure and contents of *LBN* with *LN* — a work of which it is supposed by many authors to be a shorter form —, significant differences appear.

First, the structure of the two works is basically different. *LBN* is divided into three major sections : 1. De termino, 2. De propositione, 3. De argumento (f. 1<sup>r</sup>). *LN* is divided into seven distinctions : 1. De arbore, 2. De praedicabilibus, 3. De praedicamentis, d. De centum formis, 5. De syllogismo, 6. De applicatione, 7. De quaestionibus (p. 2). To the distinction De arbore (p. 2-18), which concerns the Lullian nine subiecta and ten regulae or quaestiones, as well as to the distinctions De centum formis (p. 60-75), De applicatione (p. 113-127), De quaestionibus (p. 127-161) — a distinction with which Llull characteristically concluded his works — there is nothing comparable in *LBN*. <sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, the treatment of the predicables and predicaments is quite different in the two works. The treatment in *LBN* (f. 3<sup>r</sup>) is extremely brief, and whereas the definition for the predicables genus, species, and accident do resemble those of *LN*, the definitions for differentia and proprietas betray an entirely different understanding of the predicables than that developed by Llull in *LN*. *LN*: differentia est id, ratione cuius bonitas, magnitudo etc. sunt rationes inconfusae (p. 26); *LBN*: Differentia est ens per quod quaedam ab aliis differunt (f. 3<sup>r</sup>). *LN*: Proprietas est illa forma propter quam quodlibet ens consistit in suo proprio numero (p. 29); *LBN*: Proprium est id quod uni convenit, alteri non (f. 3<sup>r</sup>). <sup>24</sup> In *LN* these two distinctions (p. 18-60) constitute the heart of the work, but for the revolutionary understanding which Llull there proposes for the predi-

<sup>22</sup> Confer Platzeck, *Raimund Lull I* (Düsseldorf 1962) passim.

<sup>23</sup> Concerning the *Logica nova* see Platzeck, *op. cit.* I 393-445.

<sup>24</sup> Concerning these definitions see Platzeck, *op. cit.* I 211-14, 285-7.

cables and predicaments in terms of his own doctrine of correlatives of action<sup>25</sup> and the ascent of the intellect<sup>26</sup> *LBN* does not reflect the slightest comprehension.

The term is treated in *LBN* under the headings: communis-discreta, universal-particular, copulative-subject-predicate (f. 1<sup>r</sup>). There is nothing corresponding to this in *LN*.

The treatment of the proposition in *LN* is quite different from that in *LBN*. *LBN* distinguishes vera-falsa, categorica-hypothetica, affirmativa-negativa (f. 1<sup>r</sup>-v); *LN* distinguishes necessaria-contingens, in potentia-in actu, brevis-longa, clara-oscura, convertibilis-non convertibilis, coniunctiva-disiunctiva, maior-minor, per se nota-dubitativa (p. 76-78, 80). In *LBN* the conversion of propositions is handled in the usual Scholastic manner (f. 1<sup>v</sup>-2<sup>r</sup>); in *LN* the discussion is perfunctory and apparently without great interest for the author (p. 78-79). In *LBN* there is nothing matching the analysis of various types of propositions on which arguments may be based (p. 79-80) and the various classifications of seemingly contradictory propositions which Llull derived from Muslim sources and developed at great length not only in *LN* (p. 80-81), but also in *CLA* (cf. infra).<sup>27</sup> In *LBN* the treatment of hypothetical propositions is, in accordance with late medieval interest in the theory of consequences, complete, though brief (f. 2<sup>v</sup>); *LN* omits them entirely. On the other hand, *LBN* has nothing to the following section on definition in *LN* (p. 81-82).

Llull's understanding of the methods of argumentation represents a transformation of traditional doctrine, but in *LBN* the treatment is in the standard Scholastic manner: definition and terms of the syllogism, distinction of moods and figures, the three figures (f. 3<sup>v</sup>-5<sup>r</sup>). *LN*, on the contrary, discusses quomodo fit syllogismus, the comparison of the syllogism — its positive, comparative, and superlative degrees, in accordance with Llull's doctrine of the degrees of knowledge<sup>28</sup>, the condition of the syllogism, and proof; the syllogism is then taken up under the ten Lullian questions, and examples are given of the three figures of the syllogism (p. 82-94).

The discussion of the topics is similar and traditional in both

<sup>25</sup> Concerning this doctrine see Platzeck, *op. cit.* I 171f. and *passim*; R. Pring-Mill, *El Microcosmos Lullià* (Oxford 1962) 137-68; E. Colomer, *Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Llull* (Berlin 1961) *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> Concerning this doctrine see Platzeck, *op. cit.* I 379-83; Pring-Mill, *op. cit.* 51-8; Colomer, *op. cit.* 75-82; Lohr, *op. cit.* (supra note 5) 68.

<sup>27</sup> Confer Lohr, *op. cit.* 46-50, 68f.

<sup>28</sup> Confer Colomer, *op. cit.* 78.

works (*LBN* f. 5<sup>r-v</sup>; *LN* p. 84-85), but at the end of this discussion *LBN* adds a treatment of consequences (f. 5<sup>v</sup>-6<sup>r</sup>), to which there is nothing comparable in *LN*.

The treatment of the falacies in *LBN* is traditional and very schematic (f. 6<sup>r-v</sup>), and gives no indication that the author was even acquainted with the so-called vicesima fallacia or fallacia contradictionis, which Llull began to elaborate for the first time in *LN* (p. 94-113). Llull's later thought on the subject of fallacies builds on the classification of seemingly contradictory propositions mentioned above, and leads by way of the fallacia contradictionis, first adumbrated in *LN* (p. 111-113) and completely developed in *De novis fallaciis* (1308) and *De refugio intellectus* (1308), to a radically new and important method of demonstration proposed in *Liber facilis scientiae* (1311) and *De novo modo demonstrandi* (1312);<sup>29</sup> of these developments *LBN* is completely ignorant.

Finally, *LBN* gives no indication in the explicit of the place and date of composition, although this is the practice of Llull from the year 1290 on<sup>30</sup> a fact which would provide either a terminus ante quem for the composition of the work, or an argument for its inauthenticity.

However, a date before 1290 for *LBN* would justify the conclusion that the work shold resemble *CLA* which was completed in its final form about that time<sup>31</sup> but on this hypothesis we would not be able to account for the title *Logica brevis 'et nova'*. And a comparison of the two works precludes the possibility of ascribing them to the same author, at least at the same time in his career.

Whereas *LBN* treats the term quite extensively and the predicables and predicaments very schematically, *CLA* omits any consideration of the term as such, but gives a complete discussion of the universals (Dist. I; p. 94-96), predicaments (Dist. VI; p. 112-115), and the Porphyrian tree (Dist. VII; p. 115).

Again, the respective sections *De propositionibus* are quite different. An indication of the treatment in *LBN* has been given above. *CLA* gives simply a brief division of types of propositions (p. 98) and then goes on — as in *LN* — to a discussion of the various types of propositions on which arguments may be based (p. 100-101) and

<sup>29</sup> Concerning this development see Platzeck, *op. cit.* I 428-44; Lohr, *op. cit.* 72f.

<sup>30</sup> This rule was first observed by M. Obrador y Bennassar, in the Prologue to *Obras de Ramon Lull* (ed. J. Rosselló; Palma de Mallorca 1901) xlvi.

<sup>31</sup> See Lohr, *op. cit.* 37.

of various classifications of seemingly contradictory propositions (p. 98–99) <sup>32</sup> *LBN*'s discussion of hypothetical propositions is not found in *CLA*.

The sections *De argumentis* also reflect the divergent interests of the authors. In *LBN* there is nothing to correspond to the various subjects which Llull takes up in *CLA*: *De materia argumenti*, *De requisitis syllogismorum*, *De conditionibus syllogismi*, *De speciebus argumentationis*, *De obscuratione argumenti*, *De inquisitione syllogismi*, *De modis interrogandi*, *De oppositione* (p. 101–104). <sup>33</sup>

After a discussion of the figures of the syllogism (*CLA* p. 110–112) and of the fallacies (*CLA* p. 104–108) which reveals the dependence of both works on a common tradition, *LBN* turns to a treatment of the consequences and concludes with some notes on the conduct of disputations, whereas *CLA* provides some cautions to be observed in avoiding fallacies (p. 108–109), a favorite subject of Llull, and at the end makes certain *Additiones de theologia* (p. 116–123).

Llull's thought on formal logic developed very rapidly from the early excerpts from the logic of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* to the revolutionary *LN* and the late treatises on the methods of demonstration. His early work is more indebted to Arabic sources than to the standard Scholastic authors. But even in the earliest period the interests are revealed which will develop in *LN* into an elaboration of the regulae or quaestiones, a radically new understanding of the predicables and predicaments in terms of the correlatives of action and the ascent of the intellect, and in the latest works from a fascination with fallacies and seemingly contradictory propositions into an ultimate rejection of the Aristotelian syllogism and substitution of a new form of demonstration. <sup>34</sup> *LBN* betrays not the slightest understanding of these developments. *LBN* can not be regarded as a compendium either of *CLA* or of *LN*; it is rather a typically Scholastic treatise on logic with some Lullistic touches. The author does not even seem to have been acquainted with *CLA* or *LN*. Since there are no manuscripts earlier than the fifteenth century, the work may probably be assigned to this period. It was studied by Bernard de Lavinheta, the well-known Lullist of the late fifteenth century († after 1523). <sup>35</sup> To judge by the explicit of MS

<sup>32</sup> Confer note 27 supra.

<sup>33</sup> Concerning these sections see Lohr, *op. cit.* 70f.

<sup>34</sup> Confer Platzeck, *op. cit.* I 441–4.

<sup>35</sup> Concerning Lavinheta see É. d'Alençon, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* IX (1926) 36f; A. Renaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les*

Palma Bibl. Pública 1026, it was copied by him. Moreover, he took up the entire work into the section on logic in his *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli* (Lyons 1523 [RD 78]; Cologne 1612 [RD 168]. The following table will make clear the relation of the two works. To the sections enclosed for Lavinheta's work there is nothing corresponding in *LBN*. It should be noted that the sections on the predicables and predicaments are very different in the two works.

<i>LBN</i>	<i>Lavinheta</i>																						
I. De termino (f. 1 <sup>r</sup> )																							
	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>1. Generalia logices</td><td>(p. 1)</td></tr> <tr> <td>2. De universalibus</td><td>(p. 1-2)</td></tr> <tr> <td>3. De praedicamentis</td><td>(p. 2-3)</td></tr> </table>	1. Generalia logices	(p. 1)	2. De universalibus	(p. 1-2)	3. De praedicamentis	(p. 2-3)																
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2. De universalibus	(p. 1-2)																						
3. De praedicamentis	(p. 2-3)																						
II. De proposizione (f. 1 <sup>r</sup> -2 <sup>r</sup> )	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>4. De propositione (p. 3-4)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>5. De conversione (p. 4-5)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>6. De oppositionibus (p. 5-6)</td><td></td></tr> </table>	4. De propositione (p. 3-4)		5. De conversione (p. 4-5)		6. De oppositionibus (p. 5-6)																	
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5. De conversione (p. 4-5)																							
6. De oppositionibus (p. 5-6)																							
De propositione hypothetica (f. 2 <sup>v</sup> -3 <sup>r</sup> )	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>7. De aequipollentiss</td><td>(p. 6-7)</td></tr> <tr> <td>8. De materia propositionum</td><td>(p. 7)</td></tr> <tr> <td>9. De legibus propositionum</td><td>(p. 7)</td></tr> </table>	7. De aequipollentiss	(p. 6-7)	8. De materia propositionum	(p. 7)	9. De legibus propositionum	(p. 7)																
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9. De legibus propositionum	(p. 7)																						
	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>10. De propositione hypothetica (p. 7-8)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>11. De modalibus (p. 8)</td><td></td></tr> </table>	10. De propositione hypothetica (p. 7-8)		11. De modalibus (p. 8)																			
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	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>De quattuor oppositionibus</td><td>(p. 8-9)</td></tr> <tr> <td>12. De suppositionibus</td><td>(p. 10)</td></tr> <tr> <td>13. De ampliationibus</td><td>(p. 10)</td></tr> <tr> <td>14. De restrictione</td><td>(p. 10)</td></tr> </table>	De quattuor oppositionibus	(p. 8-9)	12. De suppositionibus	(p. 10)	13. De ampliationibus	(p. 10)	14. De restrictione	(p. 10)														
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12. De suppositionibus	(p. 10)																						
13. De ampliationibus	(p. 10)																						
14. De restrictione	(p. 10)																						
De praedicabilibus (f. 3 <sup>r</sup> )																							
De praedicamentis (f. 3 <sup>r</sup> )																							
III. De arguento (f. 3 <sup>v</sup> )																							
De Syllogismo (f. 3 <sup>v</sup> -4 <sup>r</sup> )																							
De prima figura (f. 4 <sup>r-v</sup> )																							
De secunda figura (f. 4 <sup>v</sup> -5 <sup>r</sup> )																							
De tertia figura (f. 5 <sup>r</sup> )																							
IV. De locis, a maiori (f. 5 <sup>r-v</sup> )																							
De loco ab aequali (f. 5 <sup>v</sup> )																							
De loco a minori (f. 5 <sup>v</sup> )																							
V. De consequentiis (f. 5 <sup>v</sup> -6 <sup>r</sup> )																							
VI. De fallaciis (f. 6 <sup>r-v</sup> )																							
VII. De disputatione (f. 6 <sup>v</sup> )																							
	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>15. De arguento (p. 10-11)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>16. De syllogismo (p. 11-12)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>17. De prima figura (p. 12-13)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>18. De secunda figura (p. 13-14)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>19. De tertia figura (p. 14-18)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>20. De locis, a maiori (p. 15)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>21. De loco ab aequali (p. 15-16)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>22. De loco a minori (p. 16)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>23. De consequentiis (p. 16-17)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>24. De fallaciis (p. 17-19)</td><td></td></tr> <tr> <td>25. De disputatione (p. 19)</td><td></td></tr> </table>	15. De arguento (p. 10-11)		16. De syllogismo (p. 11-12)		17. De prima figura (p. 12-13)		18. De secunda figura (p. 13-14)		19. De tertia figura (p. 14-18)		20. De locis, a maiori (p. 15)		21. De loco ab aequali (p. 15-16)		22. De loco a minori (p. 16)		23. De consequentiis (p. 16-17)		24. De fallaciis (p. 17-19)		25. De disputatione (p. 19)	
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25. De disputatione (p. 19)																							

*premières guerres d'Italie* (Paris 1616) 671f, 686; RD *passim*; T. and J. Carreras y Artau, *Historia de la filosofía española: Filosofía cristiana* II (Madrid 1943) 209-14, 238-40; P. Rossi, *Clavis universalis* (Milan-Naples 1960) 74-8 and *passim*; W. Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit* I (Stuttgart 1964) 536f.

2. *LOGICA PARVA*

The *LP* is a work more closely related to *LBN* and Lavinheta's *Logica* than to *CLA* and *LN*. It is divided into sections: I. De termino, II. De propositione, III. De suppositione etc., IV. De argu-  
mento, V. De fallaciis. The first three sections correspond roughly to the first fourteen chapters of Lavinheta's work, but the following sections appear to be completely independent. Since the attribution to Llull has generally been rejected, it is not necessary to consider the work any further, although it might be noted that the ascription to Nicolas de Pax might be supported by the explicit in MS Palma Bibl. Pública 1944, given above.

3. *LOGICA BREVIS*

At the conclusion of this dry inquiry I should like to suggest that the *Logica brevis* of the Electorium catalogue is simply the cer-  
tainly authentic *CLA*. The intrusion of *LBN* and *LP* into the cat-  
alogues from the time of Wadding and Antonio has confused the  
question, and seems to have been the reason for the identification by  
the editors of the *Histoire littéraire* of *LBN* with the *Logica brevis*  
cited in the Electorium catalogue, their great discovery. Salzinger  
and Pasqual, both distinguished by an intimate knowledge of Llull's  
works and their tradition, were apparently aware of the problem and  
justified in including only *LN*, *CLA* (and *LDG*) in their listings.

The two works *LBN* and *LP* are valuable as showing the under-  
standing of Llull's thought on formal logic which was current in  
certain circles in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But the real  
depth and direction of his thought was appreciated not by the au-  
thors of these treatises, but rather by Nicholas of Cusa. It is prob-  
ably not by accident that the list in Cod. Cusanus 85 mentions only  
a *Logica brevis* and *Logica nova*.

# THE OBSERVANT REFORM MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

The Observant reform which swept through the Franciscan Order in the 15th Century and took control of the Order in 1517 has received little attention from historians.<sup>2</sup> The reason for this is clear enough. Modest in its enunciation of goals, the movement had none of the élan of the Spirituals of a century earlier. The Observants generated sufficient acrimony but in actuality their differences with the Conventuals were not fundamental.

The Observant rhetoric was essentially quantitative. The reformers called for the more perfect keeping of the rule of St. Francis. They had no vision of cosmic reform, they propounded no absolutes as did the Spirituals. In particular, the last stage of the conflict just before its final resolution in 1517 seemed trivial in comparison with the issues which were to be raised later that same year.

However, the Observant movement should not be written off as trivial. More important than the goals themselves were the methods used to achieve them. More important than the adoption of a stricter

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<sup>2</sup> Scholarship on all aspects of Franciscan life has been ably summarized by Bishop Moorman in *A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origins to the Year 1517*. (Oxford, 1968). For his characterization of the Observant movement see pp. 369-383 and 441-456. For his comment on the Observant abhorrence of the Spirituals see p. 454. Among older histories, Raphael M. Huber's *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order* (Milwaukee, 1944) is thoroughly researched in source material but written from a cramped, partisan perspective. For Huber's comments on the loyalty of the first Observants to the Order see pp. 277, 278. Among the older German historians Conrad Eubel's *Geschichte der oberdeutschen (Strassburger) Minoriten-Provinz* (Würzburg, 1886) demonstrates the most intimate knowledge of the sources but, unfortunately, Eubel's primary interest was to participate as a loyal Conventual in the Conventional-Observant debate, not to analyze as an historian.

observance within the friaries was the changed relation between the friaries and the outside world, ecclesiastical as well as lay.

The Observants were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Spirituals. Flaming ideals and grand programs had achieved little in the face of entrenched institutional power. The Observants succeeded because they gained the support, not the enmity, of the powerful. To establish their place in the Order they had, first of all, to find allies among the clergy. Since the Church of the 15th Century was no monolithic structure, competing ideologies and competing power centers allowed the Observants to play one faction against another. Especially adroit was their manipulation of the papal-conciliar conflict. Even outside the clergy the Observants found important allies. In South Germany, in particular, princes and town councils often were their powerful sponsors.

This study pursues the growth of Observant power in the South German Franciscan Province where the Observant-Conventual struggle was particularly prolonged and bitter. Where the struggle was more severe, the results are more clearly visible.

#### OBSERVANT CONCILIARISM

When an Observant community first gathered in Brugliano in the mid-14th Century, informal arrangements were made to allow this special community to pursue a stricter keeping of the rule. By the early 15th Century these arrangements no longer sufficed. What had been a handful of special communities had become a significant faction in the Order with adherents in Burgundy and Southern France as well as Italy.

The movement now sought institutional definition. The Observants complained that the hierarchy of the Order impeded their more perfect keeping of the rule. Therefore, they desired to obtain institutional autonomy, to build an Order within an Order.

The initial institutional autonomy was achieved at the Council of Constance. Having appealed to the Council Fathers that subjection to the regular provincials obstructed their search for perfection, they were granted their own superiors — vicars — who were relatively free from the control of the provincials.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The appeal to Constance is described by Nicholas Glassberger in his *Chronica, Analecta Franciscana*, II (Quaracchi, 1887) p. 256, hereafter cited as

What the Council intended to achieve is unclear. On the face of it the settlement seems unstable, an invitation to conflict within the Order. However until this time the Observants had been careful to demonstrate an attitude of humility and obedience quite different from the reputation of the Spirituals.

Regardless of the intentions of the Council Fathers the Observants interpreted the declaration as the founding document of an aggressive movement. Often the Observant-Conventual battle became a legal struggle over the control of a specific house. The repeated presentation of such cases to Rome for adjudication led several popes to seek tranquility by issuing new guidelines forbidding extreme tactics by either side. One side, or in many cases both sides, would consider the new regulations a threat and challenge them, insisting that they contradicted some earlier declaration.

Although both sides attempted to portray themselves as high-minded disputants — the Observants saw themselves as relentless seekers of rigorous religion while the Conventuals insisted they themselves were lambs threatened with slaughter by aggressive wolves — in the end both sides frequently resorted to the presentation of a legal brief. Since the Observants' legal standing was due in the first place to the decree of Constance there was reserved for that Council an especially fond place in the memory of Observants.

Fearing that the legacy of Constance was under attack the Observants moved to seek confirmation of their position from the restored papacy. Eugene IV (d. 1447) in particular made clear that the papacy would not weaken the Observants.<sup>4</sup>

But amidst the shifting sands of 15th Century ecclesiastical politics, the Observants could not depend on only one power center. In 1435 the Council of Basel became the battlefield for the minorite conflict. Despite an aggressive presentation by the Conventuals Basel eventually assured the Observants that the decree of Constance would not be overturned.<sup>5</sup>

Thus it was that somewhat by accident the Observant cause

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Glassberger. For the text of the decree from Constance see *Bullarium Franciscanum*, VII, 493-500. Cf. Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order*, pp. 382, 383.

<sup>4</sup> Moorman, pp. 441-456 and Huber pp. 366, 367. The definitive statement by Eugene was *Ut Sacra* issued in 1446. See *Bullarium Franciscanum*, new series, I, pp. 497-500.

<sup>5</sup> Glassberger, pp. 294-298. Cf. Moorman, p. 449.

included as a corollary a defense of the force of conciliar decisions. However, as the papal reassertion of power gained momentum, this aspect of the Observant argument became increasingly complicated. These complications are illustrated by an entry in Glassberger's *Chronicle for 1456*.

William Pickard, vicar of the Observants in the Province of Tours, was dissatisfied with a decision by Pope Calixtus which in Pickard's view was prejudicial to the Observants' cause. He wrote an appeal to the Pope full of the typical Observant claims. They had been given their rights by Constance and no one had authority to take them away. Since he was certain that the papal decision was unjust, Pickard ended his letter with an appeal to a pope better informed and to a future council. Glassberger, however, sensed the discordance between Pickard's letter and the prohibition of appeals to future councils issued by Pius II in 1459. Immediately after quoting the letter Glassberger noted very circumspectly that due to the issuance of *Execrabilis* only the appeal to a pope better informed could stand.<sup>6</sup>

Glassberger's scruples notwithstanding, the prohibition of appeals to future councils did not create a great crisis for the Observants. Although their rhetoric spoke of councils, they kept firm alliances with the papacy. Bernardine of Siena and John of Capistrano were at the same time spokesmen for the Observants and advisers to the papacy. The latter was especially well known in South Germany since he stopped there on his travels to Eastern Europe as a papal representative directing the crusades against Turks and Hussites alike. Hence, the Observants could, in some instances, lean on the papacy for support — or in the face of hostile decisions from Rome — hark back to the council.

Before the final settlement of the dispute in 1516 there was one last round of pamphleteering. In South Germany it was Kaspar Schatzgeyer, Observant vicar, who came forth as spokesman for his side. Boniface of Ceva, provincial of the province of Paris, had been attempting to enforce a compromise plan for unity in his jurisdiction. Under this plan, Conventual houses were to live according to Observant standards while remaining under the regular hierarchy. The goal was a unified order, all meeting Observant standards, all living under one hierarchy. Although both sides objected to the tactics of Bon-

<sup>6</sup> Glassberger, pp. 358-364.

iface, the Observants incurred the greater share of his wrath.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, Boniface issued a studied attack on their legal claim to autonomy. In response, Schatzgeyer stated the Observant rationale for refusing a compromise.

Boniface led off the debate by attacking the aggressive behavior of the Observants. He pictured them as power — hungry seizers of friaries who camouflaged their aggression by paying lip service to notions of strict observance of the rule.<sup>8</sup> But he was not content to label the Observants wolves among lambs. In addition, he issued a careful analysis of his opponents' legal position. This involved, of course, their appeal to Constance as the first statement of their rights.

First, Boniface noted the fundamental ambivalence in the Observant argument. While they came down hard in favor of councils when that was to their advantage, they could with equal fervor advocate papal power over the council if that extended their rapacious grasp beyond the limits allowed by Constance.<sup>9</sup>

These opportunistic and ambiguous views of the Observants needed correction. According to Boniface, the Observants had over-interpreted the intent of Constance. In allowing the system of vicars to guide the Observants, the fathers of Constance had not intended to create a permanent division in the Order, he claimed.<sup>10</sup>

But surely even this limited construction of the intent of the Council Fathers gave the Observants some footing. Was it an eternal guarantee of their position? Boniface attacked the Observants for claiming that only another council could amend (*mutare*) the declaration of Constance.<sup>11</sup> However, even Boniface's logic set some limits to the jurisdiction of papal power. Constance might be altered but the essentials of the Order as established by St. Francis were said to be beyond the reach of papal amendment. These essentials were, in Boniface's view, most correctly followed by the Conventuals.<sup>12</sup>

Hence, when Schatzgeyer took up the defense of the Observant position the issues had been clearly defined. The dispute was to be

<sup>7</sup> Moorman, pp. 567-575.

<sup>8</sup> Boniface of Ceva, *Defensorium elucidativum observantiae regularis fratrum minorum* (Strasbourg, 1515?).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 5<sup>v</sup>, c. 6<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 2<sup>v</sup>, g. 2<sup>v</sup>, g. 3<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, g. 3<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, e. 3<sup>v</sup>.

judged by the papacy. How could he deal with Boniface's insightful analysis of the Observants' ambiguity?

Instead of explaining away this ambiguity, Schatzgeyer made it into a firm principle. First he cited the legal precedents favoring the Observants, beginning with Constance and continuing with favorable papal decisions.<sup>13</sup> Then he stated his argument as an ecclesiological principle. The apex of hierarchical power is occupied by the pope or the council acting together or separately.<sup>14</sup>

If one of the two supreme powers was preferred to the other by Schatzgeyer it was the council. As the conciliarists of a century earlier had so often repeated, he declared that the council when properly convoked spoke infallibly.<sup>15</sup> Since the council occupied so important a position Schatzgeyer concluded that all believers should be free to appeal to it to remove all impediments to their salvation.<sup>16</sup> In the process of shoring up the Observants' case, Schatzgeyer presupposed basic revisions of the pattern of papal-conciliar relations envisioned by Pius II.

The Reformation, following immediately after the definitive division of the Order in 1516, swept like a tidal wave through the debris left by the Observant-Conventual dispute. Suddenly Schatzgeyer found himself to be the defender not of the peculiarities of Observant Franciscans but of religious orders in general. But even in this new conflict Schatzgeyer preserved his affection for the council. Now it was to serve a new function.

The convocation of a general council was seen by Schatzgeyer as the way to mend the broken body of the Church and settle the disputes regarding the correct understanding of the faith.<sup>17</sup> No

<sup>13</sup> Kaspar Schatzgeyer, *Apologia Status fratrum ordinis minorum de Observantia nuncupatorum declaratoria* (Basel, 1516) a 4<sup>r</sup> – c 1<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> "...concilium generale legitime congregatum universalem ecclesiam representans et summus pontifex coniunctim vel divisim plenissimam habent potestatem omnes leges interpretandi, omnia iura decernendi..." *Ibid.*, C 1<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> "Sacrum generale concilium legitime in spiritu sancto adunatum, sicut quo ad necessaria ad salutem a cunctis fidelibus credenda et agenda, in decernendo non errat..." *Ibid.*, c. 1<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> "Sequitur ex illa quod pro quibusunque obstaculis animae salutem impedientibus amovendis et necessariis adminiculis eandem promoventibus impetrandis, tutum et securum fidelis quique ad ipsum concilium habere potest recursum." *Ibid.*, c. 1<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> "Quia Concilii generalis celebratio unicum (via humana) videtur tollendorum schismatum, haeresum et scandalorum de ecclesia remedium." *Tra-*

other holder of ecclesiastical power could substitute for the council in the midst of the urgent needs of the Church. When it is a question of deciding the difficult and disputed questions of the faith, the council, Schatzgeyer held, speaks as it were from the very throne of God himself.<sup>18</sup>

The council was directly linked in Schatzgeyer's thought with the problem of Reformation disputes about the proper interpretation of Scripture. One could conceive of an example in which two men of good intentions were in disagreement about the correct interpretation of a particular Scriptural passage. No matter what comparative exegetical procedures were followed the two remain in basic opposition to each other. They, themselves, cannot solve the dispute, nor can Scripture do it for them.<sup>19</sup> The dispute can be settled only when the authoritative interpretation is made clear by the Spirit. The channel through which the Spirit speaks is the general council of the Church.<sup>20</sup>

The authority possessed by the council was not, in Schatzgeyer's view, distinct from the normal teaching authority of the Church. It was an extension of that authority. The mind of the Church could be expressed through its regular teaching and practice or in special instances through the council representing the whole Church.<sup>21</sup>

Schatzgeyer spent little time discussing the details of the proper convening and conduct of a council. In general he emphasized that the council should be representative of the entire Church and that its procedure should be modeled on that of the Apostolic Council

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*ductio Sathanae* in the *Opera Omnia* (Ingolstadt, 1543) 265 K, hereafter cited as *Traductio*.

<sup>18</sup> "In ecclesia militante necessarium est ponere aliquod consistorium *ex quo* tanquam ex throno dei in quibuslibet causis arduis et ambiguis salutem... haberi et procedere possit iudicium in veritate infallibile..." *Traductio* 262 O.

<sup>19</sup> *Fürhaltung XXX artigkl, so in gegenwärtiger Verwerfung auf die pan gebracht und durch einen neuen beschwörer der alten schlängen gerechtfertigt werden* (Munich, 1525), C ii<sup>v</sup>, C iiir, hereafter cited as *Fürhaltung*.

<sup>20</sup> "On allen zweyfel der heylig geyst der dann auch ain offennbarer der schrift ist. Wie werden wir seinen verstandt empfahen? Nemlich durch die gemein der gotforchtigen und Christglaubigen versamblt imm heyligen geyst zu nutz und not gemainer Christlichen kirchen." *Fürhaltung*, C iiir.

<sup>21</sup> "Igitur intellectus Ecclesiae generalis in scripturis divinis debet fideli cuvis esse certus et indubitabilis. Hic autem intellectus duobus innotescit modis. Uno modo, *ex generali usu ecclesiae et practica...* Secundo modo *ex determinacione generalis Concilii...*" *Traductio*, 263 T.

of Jerusalem.<sup>22</sup> He did approve the calling of a council by someone other than the pope in emergency cases as was done for the Council of Constance.<sup>23</sup>

The council was to be guided in its deliberations by the Spirit, by Scriptures and by the decrees of previous councils.<sup>24</sup> The decrees of previous councils which had been further confirmed by acceptance into the practice of the Church were the products of the Spirit's guidance and hence were to be considered authoritative bases for deliberations in any council.<sup>25</sup>

Throughout Schatzgeyer's discussion of the council he asserted repeatedly that the decision of the council is infallible.<sup>26</sup> Hence, the decision of the council should be accepted by all the faithful.<sup>27</sup> Since this high place of authority is conceded to the council, what was in his view the role of the papacy?

The primacy of council over pope was emphasized even more than in pre-Reformation writings. The council is the supreme consistory of the Church.<sup>28</sup> The council's authority comes directly from God. The papacy does not mediate this power from God to the council. Rather, the pope comes to the council as a member and contributes his authority to that of the council as a whole, thus confirming the power of the council to reform all members of the Church without exception.<sup>29</sup> The logic of Schatzgeyer's assertion is that the council

<sup>22</sup> *Examen*, 132 K, cf. Heinrich Klomps, *Kirche, Freiheit und Gesetz bei dem Franziskanertheologen Kasper Schatzgeyer* ("Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte," 84; Münster/W., 1959), pp. 69, 70.

<sup>23</sup> *Traductio*, 263 X.

<sup>24</sup> *Traductio*, 264, 265 D.

<sup>25</sup> *Traductio*, 265 D.

<sup>26</sup> "Cum Concilium generale in spiritu sancto legitime congregatum et secundum Evangelicam formam procedens errare... non possit..." *Traductio*, 265 F. Cf. *Examen*, 132 L; *Traductio*, 263 T, 264 Y, D.

<sup>27</sup> See above n. 25 and below n. 29.

<sup>28</sup> "Ad quam, sicut ad supremum consistorium sensibile, arduae causae referantur, credenda et agenda respicientes..." *Examen*, 132 F.

<sup>29</sup> "Concilii potestas, omni ambiguitate depulsa, a Deo est. Non modo quia omnis potestas a Deo est, verum etiam, quia immediate ad animarum salutem, et finem ordinatur supernaturalem unde et supernaturalis potestas est. Est autem potestas Christi plenaria in eo, quantum ecclesiae sponsae suae reliquit in terris. Cum Apostolicam quoque complectatur auctoritatem, sicut et Apostolicus Petri successor membrum ecclesiae est, quia caput subalternum, unde corrigere et reformare omnia membra potest nullo dempto." *Traductio*, 265 E. Klomps interprets this passage as emphasizing that there can be no council

has authority even over the pope, one of the members of the Church. Schatzgeyer did not make this explicit. He did, however, note that at the Council of Jerusalem, Peter's position was finally overruled by the Council but Peter nevertheless accepted the Council's decision as final.<sup>30</sup>

The mere fact that the Observant movement depended so much on conciliar doctrine is striking. But the milieu which nourished the growth of this conciliarism is even more noteworthy. The entire episode is an instructive example of the relation between ideas and institutions.

Ludger Meier has made the unfortunate suggestion that the historian should try to isolate ideology from institutional controversy. In a study of German Franciscan thought on papal-conciliar relations, Meier was eager to vindicate the orthodoxy of the friars. However, he had to come to terms with the strident conciliarism current in the circle of Spiritual Franciscans gathered in the court of Louis of Bavaria.

Meier's solution was to declare that statements deflected by the heat of controversy were to be thrown out as invalid. Only the carefully-reasoned product of the study or lecture hall should be taken as an accurate sample of historical evidence. On these grounds Meier was able to declare that the reliable historical evidence showed the late medieval Franciscans to be orthodox on the question of papal authority.<sup>31</sup>

Meier's method represents an unacceptable truncation of history. Observant conciliarism was not fully intentional and calculated, but it is not, therefore, to be banished from the historian's view.

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without the pope. See *Kirche*, p. 67, cf. "Konzils gedanken bei dem Franziskanertheologen Kaspar Schatzgeyer," *Die Kirche und ihre Ämter und Stände: Festgabe Kardinal Frings*, ed. by Wilhelm Corsten, Augustinus Frotz and Peter Linden (Cologne, 1960) pp. 453-461, especially pp. 456, 457. Schatzgeyer asserts, on the contrary, that the Council can act independently of the pope. See above, n. 14. Further, the passage speaks of the pope as present as a member of the Church, not as a ruler over the Council.

<sup>30</sup> "Petrus quoque iudicium suum proponens, quamvis esset primus inter Apostolos, sententiam tamen diffinitivam non promulgavit, nec se aliis vel in minimo praetulit, Jacobus sententiam suam per scripturas probavit." *Examen*, 132 K.

<sup>31</sup> Ludger Meier O.F.M., "Die Lehre vom Primät in der deutschen Franziskanertheologie des Ausgehenden Mittelalters," *Franziskanische Studien*, 19, 1932, pp. 269-291 especially pp. 277, 278.

Far from regarding this episode as an imperfect sample of historical evidence, the historian should emphasize it as a clear example of the interrelation between institutions and ideas.

### THE WORLD AND THE FRIARY

The spread of the Observant movement is not to be credited to the political acumen of Observant leaders alone. Powerful political friends were of great assistance. Throughout South Germany, princes and town councils were often the initiators of the reforms.

Glassberger's account of the first introduction of Observants into South Germany in 1426 is typical of the patronage by the princes.<sup>32</sup> Louis III, ruler of the Rhine Palatinate, took as his second wife Mathilda of the Piedmont branch of the house of Savoy. Mathilda's spiritual nurture had been supervised by the Observants of the Province of Tours. After coming to Heidelberg she discovered to her dismay that the discipline in the local friary was seriously deficient according to the standards of her homeland. She took particular offense when quite by accident she happened to witness recreational sports being conducted in the courtyard of the friary.

To correct the evil she did not appeal to the friars. Instead she went to her husband with the suggestion that he import some Observants from Tours who could provide an example of the more perfect keeping of the rule. The power conflict which ensued eventually overshadowed the original issue of reform.

Louis was prepared to proceed with the plan until he encountered opposition from the Conventual provincial. The latter quite justifiably viewed the program as a threat to his position. The Heidelberg friary might slip out of his control. Therefore, after the "examples" had arrived the provincial devised a means of diminishing their impact. They were rotated rapidly from one house to another so

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<sup>32</sup> The entire account which follows is taken from *Glassberger*, pp. 282-285. The same events are recounted by Fortunatus Hueber in his *Dreyfache Cronikh von denen Ordens-Ständen des h. Vatters Francisci*, cols. 231-238 hereafter cited as Hueber, *Dreyfache*. However it would appear that, as is very often the case in Hueber's chronicle, the account is dependent on Glassberger. Not only Louis's preoccupation with military affairs but his own inability to rule may have forced Mathilda to prod Louis. See Henry J. Cohn, *The Government of the Rhine Palatinate in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford 1965), pp. 7, 8.

that their new discipline was never allowed to take firm root in any one location. It appeared that the provincial had successfully warded off the threat.

However, the Observants found a new champion, Nicholas Caroli, the guardian of the Heidelberg friary. Nicholas had been a secular priest when, instructed by a vision in the night, he had subjected himself to the Franciscan rule. Having risen quickly to the position of guardian, he now took up the Observant cause.

Again Louis was called on to be arbiter of the affair. Nicholas reported to Mathilda that the imported Observants were so distressed with their reception that they were planning to leave and that he intended to accompany them. The complaint fell on receptive ears. Mathilda begged him to stay, promising to deal with the problem.

When Mathilda appealed to her husband a second time she encountered a hostile reception. He was annoyed to hear again about the quarrels among the friars. Matters of state occupied his attention and he wished not to be bothered with "transferring friars." Eventually Mathilda had to threaten to take her children and leave before Louis agreed to her demands. Requests were sent to her homeland for still more Observants. Louis announced his readiness to help provide for them and assure their tranquil residence in Heidelberg. Such was the beginning of Observant power in South Germany.

Not only princes favored the Observants. Town councils too lent their influence to the movement. In Nuremberg it was the Council which took the initiative in establishing the reform. Following a pattern repeated in many other cases, the Council, complaining that affairs in the friary had come to a sad state, appealed to the pope for reform. The pope agreed with the Council's proposal and instructed not only the Franciscan hierarchy but the Bishop of Bamberg as well to proceed with the reform in 1446. The Conventual guardian and lector were removed from their offices and the house was placed under Observant control in a ceremony witnessed by representatives from the Council.<sup>33</sup>

It is a telling commentary on the efficacy of the reform that only a decade later the council was presenting even worse complaints about the situation in the house. A guardian was in charge who decorated his room in the style of a prince, allowed women of questionable reputation to visit and blithely farmed out to neighboring friaries

<sup>33</sup> Glassberger, pp. 316, 318-320. Cf. Hueber, *Dreyfache*, 449-455.

masses and prayers which had been purchased by the faithful in Nuremberg. During this same period the friary was accused of pawning its precious altarware when the house treasury was short of funds. These abuses were corrected but they are evidence that the imposition of the Observance from above was no guarantee of strict discipline.<sup>34</sup>

So the reform spread. Princes, city councils, even bishops in the cases of Bamberg and Oppenheim initiated the reform.<sup>35</sup> What did the subjects, the friars, think about this? The chronicles treating this period say remarkably little about "popular" reaction for or against the reform. To be sure there was a Nicholas Caroli who supported reform in Heidelberg and was brought to Nuremberg to officiate when the reform was installed there. But in other instances there is evidence of popular resistance among the friars who were subject to the new discipline.

The reform in Munich was one of the most disputed. Although the reform actually took place in 1480 attempts to carry it out began as early as 1464 when Duke Louis ordered the Bishop of Freising to reform all religious houses in Bavaria. Within a year, the friaries in Ingolstadt and Landshut were reformed. Alarmed by these defections the Conventual provincial succeeded in obtaining a statement from Paul II forbidding such summary dismissal of Conventual control.<sup>36</sup> There the matter rested until 1480 when another Duke, Albert, and another Pope, Sixtus IV, combined to order the reform. In this case the Bishop of Freising and Abbots of Tegernsee and Ebersberg were deputized to oversee the reform.<sup>37</sup>

When the reforming entourage, including Observant representatives from Nuremberg, arrived in the friary a hostile greeting awaited them. Even Glassberger, the Observant chronicler, concedes that

<sup>34</sup> G. Pickel, "Geschichte des Barfüserklosters in Nürnberg," *Beiträge zur bayerischen Kirchengeschichte*, 19 (1913), pp. 8-12. The Council's concern for the friary continued. In 1506 Willibald Pirckheimer wrote to the pope on behalf of the Council expressing continued support for the Observants. See *Willibald Pirckheimers Briefwechsel*, ed. by Emil Reicke (Munich, 1940), I, pp. 357-360.

<sup>35</sup> For the reform in Bamberg see Glassberger, p. 385. The reform in Oppenheim is discussed by Berard Müller in his *Chronica de Ortu et Progressu Almae Provinciae Argentinensis sive Superioris Germaniae* (1703) edited by Meinrado Sehi in *Alemania Franciscana Antiqua*, XII (Ulm, 1964), p. 133, hereafter cited as Müller. Cf. Glassberger, p. 440.

<sup>36</sup> Glassberger, pp. 418-422.

<sup>37</sup> The events in Munich are discussed by Glassberger, pp. 472, 473, and Hueber, 467-470.

the *fratres* rejected the order to reform citing the protection given them by Paul II. Leading the opposition to the reform was John Sartorius, a local boy, whose education had been supported by the Duke. Sartorius denied that this sort of change of administration amounted to a reform. Strict observance of the rule, he insisted, could be fostered without Observant control. The Observants he labeled not *Fratres Minores* but *Fratres de Bulla*, *i.e.*, they were not humble friars but legalistic power seekers.

Although the Observants took control of the house, some of its residents never submitted to the new regime. Sartorius took a room in the city where he continued to receive the prince's support. Other friars also moved in to the city, later dispersing to other Conventual friaries in Bavaria. The valuable liturgical silver was sent off to the Conventual house in Augsburg so that it should not fall into Observant hands. It was with considerable justification that Tschamser, the Conventual chronicler concluded that the imposition of the reform in Munich was a case of *Gewalt over Recht*.<sup>38</sup>

The reform in Freiberg in 1515 provides another example of resistance from the friars. The initiative in this case came from the highest source, the Emperor Maximilian. At the request of the Emperor the ecclesiastical hierarchy as well as that of the Order was commanded by Leo X to initiate the reform. The Conventual chroniclers claim that the real issue was not reform but rather a forest which the city magistrate wished to take away from friary control. Whatever the underlying issue the "reformed" friars considered themselves much aggrieved and complained and appealed until they were silenced at the next Provincial Chapter.<sup>39</sup>

Although one of the goals of the Observants was to separate the friars from the world there were some entanglements between friary and world which were not so easy to sever. For example, crypts in the friary were used as burial locations by town families. In Nuremberg the families whose ancestors were interred in the friary had become accustomed to displaying their family shields near the burial place. Several times, (1469 and 1480) attempts were made to remove these shields to less conspicuous places but after the second attempt the Waldstromer family appealed its case to the papacy. The order

<sup>38</sup> Malachiam Tschamser, *Annales oder Jahrs-Geschichten der Bäarfuseren Oder Minderen Brudern* (1724) edited by Abbé François-Joseph Merklen (Colmar, 1864), I, p. 651, hereafter cited as Tschamser.

<sup>39</sup> Tschamser, I, pp. 733, 736; Müller, p. 65; Glassberger, p. 555.

from Sixtus IV commanding the return of the insignia made it clear that a part of the argument justifying such display was the family tradition of benefaction to the friary.<sup>40</sup> Although in theory the Observants wanted to protect the friary from the world their task was not easy. They might, as their rules specified, keep townspeople out of the dining room during meals but the family insignia hung perpetually near the crypts and princes and city governments made basic decisions about life in the friary.

The spread of the Observants displays the dispersion of power within the Church. The pope was in most cases the final court of appeal but neither personalities nor policies in Rome were permanent. Although the friars were zealous in defense of their sacerdotal powers against attacks from the secular clergy, nevertheless the hierarchy of the secular clergy could interfere within the Order. Often bishops played a central role in executing reform. Finally it is clear that lay powers thought it their duty to promote reform in the Church and their right to intervene powerfully if that seemed necessary.

#### CONCLUSION

When St. Francis founded his Order of humble brothers the problems of obedience and integration into the ecclesiastical power structure were solved quite simply. Obedience was owed to superiors within the Order and eventually to the pope. The commitment to poverty was to free the friars from secular obligations.

Two centuries later this simple solution seemed inadequate to the Church hierarchy, to lay patrons of the Order and indeed to the friars themselves. The dispute about the right observance of the rule led to a dispute regarding the legitimate ruler in the Order and finally regarding the final court of appeal in the entire Church. The pursuit of power within the Order and within the Church became a reality of Franciscan life.

Nevertheless the sanctity of the friars attracted lay patrons who wished to share in the Order's holiness. Gradually their patronage became control. The Observants spoke about the rigorous keeping of the rule but by their actions they acknowledged that the friary was an integral part of the power structure of the Church and of the world.

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<sup>40</sup> Glassberger, pp. 440, 441, 471.

# CHRONOLOGY OF ST. BONAVENTURE (1217-1257)

## SHORT HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

In the year 1902, the Quaracchi editors of St. Bonaventure's works dated his birth to 1221 and his entry into the Franciscan Order to 1238. The editors, following Francis of Fabriano, said that St. Bonaventure got his licence in theology under Alexander of Hales, who died in 1245, so that St. Bonaventure was sent to Paris no later than 1242. He was licenced, as Salimbene recorded, by John of Parma in 1248 when St. Bonaventure read the Gospel of St. Luke and, thereafter, read the *Sentences*. According to the *Catalogus XV Generalium* (*C15G*) and the *Chronica XXIV Generalium* (*C24G*), he read the *Sentences* in the 7th year, and got his magistral chair in the 10th year, after he entered the Order. The Quaracchi editors, relying also on the *Chronica Veneta* (*CV*) and Bartholomew of Pisa, concluded that St. Bonaventure was licenced to read the *Sentences* privately in 1245 and received his chair in 1248, but he was not recognized as a master by the university until 1257. The *C24G* noted that he was elected Minister General on February 2, 1256 in the year of the Incarnation, or 1257 in the year of the Nativity. Giving 1257, Salimbene said that St. Bonaventure ruled the Order for 17 years. Taking 1256, the *C15G* and the *CV* said that he ruled for 18 years, died in his 53rd year, and was made Minister General in the 12th or 13th year after he entered the Order. To conform the latter figures to 1238, the Quaracchi editors followed Sbaralea in emending them to the 17th or 18th year.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*, (Quaracchi, 1902), v. 10, pp. 39-48. The chronology was rejected by the following, who preferred 1243 as the year of St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order: *Analecta Bollandiana*, 22 (1903), pp. 360-63; L. Lemmens, *Der hl. Bonaventura, Kardinal und Kirchenlehre aus dem Franziskanerorden (1221-74)*, (Kempten und München, 1909), p. 19. The Quaracchi chronology was accepted by these authors: Hilarin Felder, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franziskanerorden bis um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts*, (Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder: 1904), pp. 219-31 [French edition: *His-*

André Callebaut indicated, in 1921, that both the *C15G* and the *C24G* used the calendar of the Incarnation in saying that St. Bonaventure ruled the Order for 18 years (1256-74). The *C15G* recorded that he became Minister General in his 12th or 13th years as a religious, which was 1256, or 1257 in our calendar. Taking 13 from 1256, Callebaut arrived at 1243 as the year of St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order; so he read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1250 (7th yr.) and got his chair in 1253 (10th yr.). This conformed to the testimony of Salimbene, who referred to St. Bonaventure receiving his licence only as a *baccalarius biblicus ordinarius* to read St. Luke in 1248; as a *baccalarius sententiarius*, he began to read the *Sentences* in 1250. Callebaut, producing a better version of the text from Francis of Fabriano than the one used at Quaracchi, showed that this text concurred with the other sources only in saying that St. Bonaventure became a master in theology after he entered the Order. The text was probably correct, however, in stating that he completed his studies in the arts at Paris before entering the Order. Though he entered at Paris, St. Bonaventure was affiliated to the Roman Province.<sup>2</sup>

The Quaracchi chronology was revised differently by Franz Pelster in 1924. He took the text of the *C15G* as it stood and rejected as unwarranted its emendation by the Quaracchi editors. Pelster, following Salimbene, chose 1257 as the year of St. Bonaventure's election as Minister General, and so, subtracting 12 or 13, he had 1245 or 1244 as the year of St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order. Using the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, Pelster drew up this chronology: St. Bonaventure entered the Order in 1244 and was licenced as a bachelor in 1248 to read St. Luke; he began to read the *Sentences* probably in the autumn of 1250, ending in 1253 or

toire des études dans l'Ordre de Saint François, traduit par Eusèbe de Bar-le-duc, (Paris, Picard: 1908), pp. 229-42]; L. Olinger, *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, 3 (1910), pp. 245-46 & 15 (1922), pp. 533-34; F. Palhoriès, *Saint Bonaventure*, (Paris, Bloud: 1913), pp. 1-15; F. Ehrle, "Der heilige Bonaventura, seine Eigenart und seine drei Lebensaufgaben," *Franziskanische Studien*, 8 (1921), pp. 109-24.

<sup>2</sup> "L'entrée de S. Bonaventure dans l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs 1243," *La France franciscaine*, 4 (1921), pp. 41-51. The Quaracchi chronology was still followed by: E. Smeets, "Bonaventure (saint)," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, (Paris, Letouzey et Ané: 1923), v. 1, cc. 962-86; L. Wegemer, *St. Bonaventure, The Seraphic Doctor*, (New York, J. F. Wagner: 1924), pp. 5-17. Callebaut's chronology was favoured as the more probable by É. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, (Paris, J. Vrin: 1924), pp. 9-22.

early in 1254 with the rank of master, though it was not recognized by the university before 1256-57.<sup>3</sup>

The Quaracchi Fathers presented a new chronology in 1934. They saw St. Bonaventure coming to Paris in his youth and, as a master of arts, starting his theological studies about 1240. He entered the Order there, as Callebaut showed, more probably in 1243: he was licenced to read the Bible publicly in 1248, as Salimbene said. Around 1250, St. Bonaventure began to read the *Sentences* and, as Pelster suggested, got his magistral chair in 1253-54, but it went unrecognized by some doctors in the university until 1256-57.<sup>4</sup> On the latter question, Ephrem Longpré drew attention both to the settlement made by John of Parma with the university, as Salimbene noted, and to documents in the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* showing that, in the conflict with the secular masters, the Franciscans were not mentioned from 1253 to 1255. Longpré could see no reason for dating the official recognition of St. Bonaventure's doctorate after 1253, even though some masters subsequently withdrew their recognition while the university excluded him from the college of masters (1255-56).<sup>5</sup>

By the year 1945, Callebaut's date of 1243 was the one more commonly accepted as the time of St. Bonaventure's entry into the

<sup>3</sup> "Literargeschichtliche Probleme im Anschluss an die Bonaventuraausgabe von Quaracchi," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, 48 (1924), pp. 516-32. Callebaut's chronology was accepted by J. F. Bonnefoy, *Le Saint-Esprit et ses dons selon saint Bonaventure*, (Paris, J. Vrin : 1929), pp. 1-4. It was supported by the work of P. Glorieux, "D'Alexandre de Halès à Pierre Auriol. La suite des maîtres franciscaines de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle", *Arch. fran. hist.*, 26 (1933), pp. 265-75, 280-81; *Répertoire de maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, (Paris, J. Vrin : 1933), v. 2, p. 37.

<sup>4</sup> *S. Bonaventurae opera theologica selecta*, editio minor, (Quaracchi : 1934), v. 1, pp. VII-IX. St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order at Paris was challenged by O. Righi, who insisted that he entered in his native region before going to Paris, where he completed the arts: "S. Bonaventura entrò nell'Ordine Franciscano in Paris o nella Provincia romana?", *Miscellanea francescana*, 36 (1936), pp. 505-11.

<sup>5</sup> Longpré suggested 1236-42 as St. Bonaventure's period in the arts at Paris, where he entered the Order most probably in 1243; see: "Bonaventure (saint)," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, (Paris, Letouzey et Ané : 1937), v. 9, cc. 741-51 & *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, (Paris, Beauchesne : 1937), v. 1, cc. 1768-69. Longpré wrote later that St. Bonaventure entered the Order about 1243-44: *Catholicisme [hier-aujourd'hui-demain] Encyclopédie*, (Paris, Letouzey et Ané : 1949), v. 2, cc. 122-24.

Order. The seventh centenary of the event was celebrated in 1943 at Paris.<sup>6</sup> In 1945, using the same documents as Longpré, the Spanish editors of St. Bonaventure's works reached the conclusion, independently of Longpré, that St. Bonaventure was in fact recognized as a master by the University of Paris in 1253.<sup>7</sup>

Giuseppe Abate reviewed at length in 1949 and 1950 the chronology of St. Bonaventure. In 1949, Abate cast doubt for the first time on 1221 as the year of St. Bonaventure's birth. Moreover, examining many documents from the 13th to the 17th centuries, Abate showed that none of them said anything about the place, while referring vaguely to the time, of St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order. Wadding was the first to affirm expressly that St. Bonaventure entered in the Roman Province and in 1243. But Abate did not accept Wadding's statement, both because he cited no sources for it and because he gave three different ages for St. Bonaventure in the year 1243. Abate indicated that no Franciscan convent taught the arts prior to 1250; so he accepted the statement by Francis of Fabriano that St. Bonaventure completed the arts at Paris before entering the Order. Consequently, Abate concurred with Callebaut in taking as valid the testimony by Francis of Fabriano that St. Bonaventure became a master in theology after he entered the Order. To establish the chronology of St. Bonaventure as a religious up to his election as Minister Generale, Abate chose as the most reliable sources the *Catalogus Gonsalvinus* (*C15G*) and the text of Salimbene. The other sources, namely, the *CV*, the *C24G* and the testimony of Bartholomew of Pisa, depended on the *Catalogus Gonsalvinus*. Abate noted that 1256 was given as the year of St. Bonaventure's election as Minister General solely according to the calendar of the Incarna-

<sup>6</sup> See the following: V. M. Breton, *Saint Bonaventure*, (Paris, Aubier: 1943), pp. 10-14; *Saint Bonaventure 1243-1943*. Cahier des Cordeliers, no. 1, (Paris Éditions franciscaines: 1944), pp. 7-31: A. Garreau, in particular, confirmed Callebaut's date of 1243 with a text from Mariano of Florence, who said that St. Bonaventure took the religious habit in 1243, when he was about 22 years of age (pp. 25-31).

<sup>7</sup> The Spanish editors dated St. Bonaventure's period in the arts at Paris from 1234 to 1240 and, after Callebaut, fixed his entry into the Order as 1243: *Obra de San Buenaventura*, edición bilingüe, (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos: 1945), v. I, pp. 4-12. E. Bettoni gave 1221 as the date of St. Bonaventure's birth and 1253-54 as the time that he got his licence to teach, but he did not get his doctorate until 1257: *S. Bonaventura*, (Brescia, "La Scuola": 1945), pp. 8-13.

tion in the Pisan mode. This mode computed the first of the year from the preceding March 25th, so that February 2, 1257 in the modern mode corresponded to the year 1256 in the Pisan mode used by the author of the *Catalogus Gonsalvinus*. Hence, taking 13 from 1256, Abate came to 1243 as the year of St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order, and it took place between March 25th and December 31st of that year, or when the two calendars coincided in 1243. Thereafter, licenced by John of Parma in 1248, St. Bonaventure began to read the Sentences in 1250 and received his magistral chair in 1253, though the secular college of the university did not recognize it officially at this time.<sup>8</sup> Handling the latter problem in 1950, Abate showed that St. Bonaventure held a chair legitimately from 1253 to 1257. If he were born in 1221, his age in 1253 would have been 3 years short of the 35 prescribed by the statutes of the university as the minimum to become a master in theology. This would have been a valid reason for the secular masters to oppose his admission to the society of masters. Because his age was never mentioned in the documents on the events of 1252-56, and no papal document has been found dispensing him from the minimum age, Abate concluded that St. Bonaventure's age was no obstacle to a chair in 1253. Thus, in 1257, the university simply recognized him as a regent master in the corporation of masters. Since he was at least 35 in 1253, he was born no later than 1217, a fact confirmed by Abate from the constant tradition of the Order that the Minister General was to be at least 40 years old; so St. Bonaventure was 40 at least in 1257, and 57 or more when he died in 1274. Though this went against the unbroken testimony from the 14th century that he died in his 53rd year, Abate documented many errors actually found in manuscripts to show that LIII could easily be an error (e.g. for LVI).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> "Per la storia e la cronologia di S. Bonaventura, O. Min. (c. 1217-1274)," (I) *Miscell. frances.*, 49 (1949), pp. 534-65.

<sup>9</sup> "Per la storia..." (II, fine) *Miscell. frances.*, 50 (1950), pp. 97-111. The Quaracchi Fathers were still uncertain at this time whether St. Bonaventure began to read as a bachelor or as a master in 1248: *Alexandri de Hales. Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum...*, (Quaracchi, 1951), v. I, pp. 19\*-21\* (n. 13); cf. p. 29\* (n. 26). L. Veuthey gave 1217 or 1221 as the year of St. Bonaventure's birth and 1253-54 as the beginnings of his licence to teach in his own right: "Bonaventura (s.)" *Enciclopedia filosofica*, (Roma, 1957), v. I, cc. 744-45. The main lines of Abate's chronology were followed by J. G. Bougerol, who assigned the Quaracchi texts of St. Bonaventure's commentaries on Scripture and the *Sentences* to his magistral period (1253-57): *Introduction à l'étude de saint*

## IMPORTANT DATES STILL UNCERTAIN

Only two years in the life of St. Bonaventure are undisputed: the year of his death, 1274; the year he was licenced by John of Parma, 1248. After Abate, however, it is morally certain that St. Bonaventure was born no later than 1217. Moreover, since Callebaut, it is reasonably certain that St. Bonaventure entered the Order at Paris following his studies there in the arts and before he became a master in theology. All the other dates in his early life as a Franciscan depend on the year of his election as Minister General. It is from this event that we must find the times of his entry into the Order, his reading of the *Sentences*, and his subsequent career as a master of theology. In establishing 1243 as the year of his entry into the Order, Callebaut subtracts 13 from 1256 in the year of the Incarnation. This has two difficulties: a) since the *C15G* says 12th or 13th year, as Pelster notes, a subtraction of 12 gives 1244; b) if 1256 of the Incarnation is 1257 in our calendar, then the 1243 derived from 1256 is 1244 in our calendar. Though Pelster subtracts both 12 and 13, he selects 1257 rather than 1256, and so he arrives at 1245 or 1244. Abate says that February 2, 1257 in the modern mode corresponds to 1256 of the Incarnation in the Pisan mode used by the *Catalogus Gonsalvinus* (*C15G*). Subtracting 13 from 1256, he gets 1243, provided St. Bonaventure entered the Order between March 25th and December 31st. Beside the two difficulties in Callebaut's calculation, there is one more with Abate's: February 2, 1257 in the modern mode corresponds to 1256 of the Incarnation in the Florentine mode, but not in the Pisan mode.

	Jan. 1	Mar. 25	Dec. 31	Mar. 24
Modern :	1257 (56)			
Pisan :	1257 (56)	1258 (57)		
Florentine :	1256 (55)	1257 (56)		

*Bonaventure*, (Tournai, Desclée : 1961), pp. 13, 35-47, 240-41 (102-04, 134-38, 142-43, 150); *St. Bonaventure et la sagesse chrétienne*, (Paris, Éditions du Seuil : 1963), pp. 21-31; *Saint Bonaventure. Un maître de sagesse*, (Paris, Éditions Franciscaines : 1966), pp. 8-71; *Saint Bonaventure. Breviloquium*, texte latin de Quaracchi et traduction française, (Paris, Éditions Franciscaines : 1966), v. 1, pp. 7-18. Accepting the principal points of Abate's chronology, I. Brady dated St. Bonaventure's arrival in Paris to 1234; though some authors claimed that

Because February 2, 1256 in the modern mode really corresponds to 1256 of the Incarnation in the Pisan mode, the year of St. Bonaventure's election as Minister General is 1256 in the modern mode, if the 1243 derived from the Pisan mode is accepted as the year of his entry into the Order. Furthermore, if he entered between March 25th and December 31st, 1243, the Pisan mode really corresponds to 1242 in the modern mode, unless 1243 is in the modern mode, but this corresponds to 1244 in the Pisan mode.

	Jan. 1	Mar. 25	Dec. 31	Mar. 24
Modern :	1243 (42)			
Pisan :	1243 (42)	1244 (43)		
Florentine :	1242 (41)	1243 (42)		

To maintain 1257 as the year of St. Bonaventure's election as Minister General, his entry into the Order could be 1243, modern and Pisan modes, only if he entered before March 25th. To put his election in 1256 of the Incarnation with a correspondence to 1257 in the modern mode, the year of the Incarnation would have to be in the Florentine mode. There is evidently, then, a need for another review of the documents containing the data on the early years of St. Bonaventure as a Franciscan.<sup>10</sup>

#### RECONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM

There are two documents giving the actual date of St. Bonaventure's election as Minister General :

(A) *Cronica fratris Salimbene.*

"Ultimum generale capitulum, quod sub eo (Ioanne de Parma) celebratum fuit... factum est Rome in festo purificationis anno Domini

the corporation of masters admitted him as a regent master on Oct. 23, 1257. Brady showed that St. Bonaventure had status in the university before then : "Bonaventure, St.," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, (New York, McGraw-Hill : 1967), v. 2, p. 658.

<sup>10</sup> On the difference between the various calendars see : Manuelli Hoepli & A. Cappelli, *Cronologia, Cronografia e Calendario Perpetuo*, (Milano, 1960), pp. 8-11; *Handbook of Dates for Students of English History*, ed. by C. R. Cheney. Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks, no. 4, (London, 1948), pp. 4-5.

M<sup>o</sup>CC<sup>o</sup>LVII... Et statim assignavit fratrem Bonaventuram de Bagnoreto et... omnes consenserunt in eum, et fuit electus... Et prefuit Bonaventura XVII annis et multa bona fecit. ”<sup>11</sup>

(B) *Chronica XXIV Generalium Ministrorum.*

“ Hic frater Ioannes Generalis, convocato Romae capitulo generali, anno ab incarnatione Domini computando MCCLVI, secundum illos vero, qui a Nativitate computant, anno MCCLVII in festo Purificationis beatae Mariae... ”<sup>12</sup>

Text A gives the year 1257; text B gives 1256 of the Incarnation, or 1257 of the Nativity. Thus, A follows the mode of the Nativity, which corresponds to the modern mode from January 1st to December 24th. Since B correlates 1257 of the Nativity to 1256 of the Incarnation, the C24G uses the Florentine, not the Pisan, mode of the Incarnation, as the following passage shows:

“ Octavus Generalis fuit praeclarissimus pater frater Bonaventura de Balneoregio Provinciae Romanae, electus in praedicto capitulo Romae anno ab incarnatione Domini MCCLVI in festo Purificationis beatae Mariae... Hic Generalis frater Bonaventura secundum chronicam fratris Peregrini de Bononia rexit Ordinem XVI annis vel circa. Sed communior opinio tenet, quod rexit XVIII annis vel circa, quia XVII completis et ultra, quantum est a Purificatione beatae Mariae usque ad Pentecosten. ”<sup>13</sup>

If the C24G depends on the *Catalogus Gonsalvinus* (C15G), as is commonly held, the chronology of the latter is in the Florentine mode:

“ Decem et octo annis rexit Ordinem, et in Lugduno tempore generalis concilii obiit Cardinalis... Hoc fratre ad cardinalatum asumpto et tempore concilii generalis capitulo Lugduni congregato 1274, frater Hieronymus... in Generalem Ministrum electus est. ”<sup>14</sup>

If the *Catalogus Gonsalvinus* (C15G) uses the Pisan mode, then 1274 is 1273 in the moderne mode according to which the year of

<sup>11</sup> *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, (Hannoverae et Lipsiae, 1912), Scriptorum, v. 32, p. 310. This publication will be noted henceforth as *MGH. Sc.* with vol. and page nos.

<sup>12</sup> *Analecta franciscana*, 3 (1897), p. 286.

<sup>13</sup> *Anal. fran.*, 3.323-24, 3.354.

<sup>14</sup> *Anal. fran.*, 3.699, 3.701; cf. *MGH. Sc.*, 32.664, 32.666.

St. Bonaventure's election is 1255. If the document uses the mode of the Nativity, the year of his election is 1256 in the modern mode; but 1256 and 1255 are both contrary to the living testimony of Salimbene (text A). The *Catalogus Gonsalvinus*, therefore, is following the Florentine mode of the Incarnation. This fact has to be taken into account in reckoning the year of St. Bonaventure's entry into the Order from that document :

“ Hinc factum est, ut in septimo anno post ingressum Ordinis Sententias legeret Parisius et in decimo reciperet cathedram magistralem, et in XII<sup>o</sup> vel XIII<sup>o</sup> ad regimen Ordinis est assumptus. ”<sup>15</sup>

Note the parallel text from the *C24G* :

“ Hinc factum est, ut in VII. anno post ingressum Ordinis Sententias Parisius legeret et in X. reciperet cathedram magistralem; in XII. vero vel XIII. ad regimen Ordinis est assumptus. ”<sup>16</sup>

Of the two choices offered by these texts for reckoning the year of St. Bonaventure's election after his entry into the Order, the 12th year is the logical one to take following the calendar used by the documents; the 13th year is the alternative to follow in the other calendar, or the year of the Nativity. In both instances, we arrive at the *same* year from which the election is timed : 1256 less 12 is 1244; 1257 less 13 is 1244.

Let us suppose that the alternatives 12 or 13 do not involve the difference between the two calendars. We must then subtract 12 & 13 from both 1256 and 1257 : a) 1256 less 12 & 13 gives 1244 & 1243; b) 1257 less 12 & 13 gives 1245 & 1244. Thus, 1244 alone is common not only to a & b, but also to this particular calculation and to the previous one based on the difference between the two calendars. Hence, the year indicated as the time of St. Bonaventure's entry is 1244, and after March 25th. It seems, then, that he began the *Sentences* in 1251 and got his magistral chair in 1254. This chronology appears to go against the testimony of Salimbene on the licencing of St. Bonaventure in 1248 :

“ Item frater Iohannes de Parma dedit licentiam fratri Bonaventure de Balneo-regis, ut Parisius legeret; quod nunquam alicubi fecerat, quia bacellarius erat nec adhuc cathedratus. Et tunc fecit lecturam super

<sup>15</sup> *Anal. fran.*, 3.699; cf. *MGH. Sc.*, 32.664.

<sup>16</sup> *Anal. fran.*, 3.324-25.

totum evangelium Luce... Et super Sententias IIII<sup>or</sup> libros fecit... Currebat tunc annus millesimus CCXLVIII. Nunc autem agitur annus Domini MCCLXXXIII. ”<sup>17</sup>

To be licenced as a bachelor in 1248, St. Bonaventure would have had to begin his theological studies at least 5 years earlier, in 1243, according to the statutes of the university; so he could have become a master of theology at least 8 years later, in 1251:

“ Circa statum theologorum statuimus, quod nullus Parisius legat citra tricesimum quintum etatis sue annum, et nisi studuerit per octo annos ad minus, et libros fideliter et in scolis audierit, et quinque audiat theologiam antequam privatas lectiones legat publice... ”<sup>18</sup>

Three points are to be noted in Salimbene's text above. The first is quite clear: 1248 is not correlated in any way with St. Bonaventure's time of entry into the Order; as the text stands, it looks back only to the beginning of his theological studies, which was 1243 according to the other text above. The second point is that he had never read anywhere before 1248 (*quod nunquam alicubi facerat*); for that reason, and because he was a bachelor still without a chair (*quia bacellarius erat nec adhuc cathedralis*), he got a licence in order to read at Paris (*ut Parisius legeret*). These facts show that St. Bonaventure was authorised as a bachelor to read publicly for his first time, and at Paris, so that he might qualify for a chair in theology. The third point is that “ *Currebat tunc annus millesimus CCXLVIII* ” refers to both “ *dedit licentiam* ” and “ *tunc fecit lecturam super totum evangelium Luce* ”, but not to “ *super Sententias IIII<sup>or</sup> libros fecit* ”. Thus, Salimbene assigns no date for the *Commentary on the Sentences*, while talking only in a very general way of 1248 as the year when St. Bonaventure was licenced and then read the whole of St. Luke. The following conclusions can be drawn from the three points: 1) St. Bonaventure began his theological studies no later than 1243; 2) he began to read publicly as a bachelor of the Bible at Paris sometime in 1248; 3) Salimbene's text is not enough to show what year St. Bonaventure entered the Order, or started to read the *Sentences*, or received his magistral chair. The chronology established on the basis of 1244 as the year of St. Bonaventure's

<sup>17</sup> *MGH. Sc.*, 32.299.

<sup>18</sup> *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle, O. P. & A. Chatelain, (Paris, Delalain: 1889), v. 1, n. 20, p. 79. This work will be indicated hereafter as *CUP*, followed by the document, vol. and page nos.

entry into the Order stands with the testimony of Salimbene. His text suggests simply that 1243 was the first year of St. Bonaventure's theological studies. The other documents indicate that the first year of this Franciscan life was 1244; so, from them, it appears that he began to read the *Sentences* in 1251 and was given his magisterial chair in 1254.<sup>19</sup>

The year 1244, however, would have been the year of St. Bonaventure's religious profession. As a novice in 1243, he began his theological studies, very likely under Alexander of Hales, who became a Franciscan in 1236 when St. Bonaventure was a student of the arts in Paris. Since he completed his studies of the arts there, as Francis of Fabriano says: "*conventatus in artibus apud Parisios*," it is most probable that St. Bonaventure came to Paris in 1235, because at least 8 years were required to become a master of arts (1235-43).<sup>20</sup>

To know whether he actually got his chair in theology is 1254,

<sup>19</sup> If he spent only two years, as was then the practice, reading the Bible, why did he begin to read the *Sentences* in 1251 and not in 1250? The answer to this question can be seen from the study of J. G. Bougerol, *Introduction... saint Bonaventure*, pp. 203-06. He suggests that St. Bonaventure preached from Oct. 2 to 23, 1250 (20th-23rd Sunday after Pentecost), Nov. 27 to Dec. 25, 1250 (1st Sunday of Advent to Christmas), Jan. 8 to April 30, 1250 (1st Sunday after Epiphany to 2nd Sunday after Easter), and from May 7 to Oct. 15, 1251 (3rd Sunday after Easter to 19th Sunday after Pentecost). This arrangement gives the dating of Easter in 1250 as April 16, which is correct for 1251, but not for 1250. Consequently, when the chronology is adjusted to the proper dating of Easter (April 16, 1251), it is obvious that St. Bonaventure prepared and delivered a sermon for each Sunday of the year beginning Nov. 27, 1250 (1st Sunday of Advent) and ending Nov. 19, 1251 (24th Sunday after Pentecost). Thus, during that period, he was undergoing formation as a preacher.

<sup>20</sup> "Nullus legat Parisius de artibus citra vicesimum primum etatis sue annum, et quod sex annis audierit de artibus ad minus, antequam ad legendum accedat, et quod protestetur se lecturum duobus annis ad minus..." — *CUP*, n. 20 (1.78). For the citation from Francis of Fabriano see: G. Abate, *Miscell. frances.*, 49 (1949), p. 560, n. 1. Abate notes that entry into an Order is normally reckoned from the year of profession, but the documents relating to St. Bonaventure seem to suggest that, in his case, the entry is reckoned from the year of his admission as a novice: *Op. cit.*, pp. 561-62, 565-68. This view might be supported by Salimbene, who says of himself: "...in novitiatu meo... habui doc-torem in theologia fratrem Humilem de Mediolano... Et audivi primo anno, quo intravi ordinem, in scolis theologiae Ysaiam et Matheum... possum et ego dicere, quod LX et sex anni sunt hodie... in quo hec scribo... quod ordinem fratrum Minorum intravi, et agitur annus Domini MCCLXXXIII." — *MGH. Sc.*, 32.277.

it is necessary to consider certain documents on the University of Paris from 1252 to 1254. The Faculty of Theology enacted a statute in February 1252 restricting each religious convent to a single regent master and to one school.<sup>21</sup> A statute drawn up by the University in April 1253 stated that the masters had stopped teaching in order to get satisfaction for crimes committed against some scholars by night watchmen of the city. Satisfaction was delayed by the refusal of the one Franciscan and the two Dominican masters to obey the decree to stop teaching :

“...fecimus juramentis vallatam de supradicta injuria... prosequenda, tribus magistri regularibus, videlicet duobus Predicatoribus et uno Minore, duntaxat exceptis, qui pro sue voluntatis arbitrio suum renuerunt prestare consensum diligencius requisiti... Propter quod negotium nostrum supradictum extitit protelatum...”

The three friars were then expelled from the society of masters.<sup>22</sup> A mandate from Innocent IV on July 1st to restore the friars was ignored by the University. A subsequent warning from the pope to the University not to promulgate the statute for a year, unless a settlement had been reached, came too late to prevent its promulgation on September 2, 1253.<sup>23</sup> On February 4, 1254, the secular masters of theology said that the Faculty forbade, in 1252, any religious convent from holding two chairs at once with actually regent masters. But the Dominican friars were opposing the statute, and they alone were still resisting it :

“...duximus statuendum ut nullus regularium conventus in collegio nostro duas simul sollempnes cathedras habere valeat actu regentium magistrorum... Cui statuto fratres Predicatores totis viribus restitunt, et adhuc soli quantum in ipsis est renituntur...”

The two Dominican masters had been expelled for not consenting to the statute, though it was revised to protect their rule and their conscience.<sup>24</sup>

Two things stand out from those documents : 1) the one Franciscan and the two Dominican masters were under expulsion on September 2, 1253, at the start of the academic year ; 2) the two

<sup>21</sup> *CUP*, n. 200 (1.226-27).

<sup>22</sup> *CUP*, n. 219 (1.242-44) ; citation taken from : p. 242.

<sup>23</sup> *CUP*, nn. 222-26 (1.247-51).

<sup>24</sup> *CUP*, n. 230 (1.252-58) ; citation taken from : p. 254.

Dominican masters had not yet come to terms with the University by February 4, 1254. It is evident, then, that the Franciscan Order had settled with the University between September 2, 1253 and February 4, 1254. This is confirmed by Salimbene, who records such a settlement made by John of Parma :

“ Expono me metipsum et fratres qui sunt sub manu mea discipline et correctioni vestre. Ecce in manibus vestris sumus. Facite de nobis quod rectum et bonum vobis videtur. Audientes hoc omnes accepterunt satisfactionem, et quievit spiritus eorum, quo tumescebant contra fratres. ”<sup>25</sup>

Salimbene records neither the time nor the terms of the settlement ; but they can be gleaned from the above documents and the work of P. Glorieux.<sup>26</sup> William of Meliton was the Franciscan master expelled by the University in April 1253 for refusing to obey its decree. His refusal was most probably connected with the disputed statute of February 1252 limiting the Order to one chair and one regent master ; so he was not in good standing with the University. Hence, the settlement involved : a) an agreement by the Order to hold only one chair ; b) the replacing of William of Meliton, who antagonized the University, by St. Bonaventure as regent master. Sufficient time would be needed to negotiate and finalize these arrangements, which came after John of Parma’s settlement, and it took place during the first term of the academic year. Moreover, as the secular masters said (Feb. 4, 1254), the University was then in a turmoil because of the intransigence of the Dominican friars. Furthermore, St. Bonaventure and his examiners would require some time to prepare for his inception as a master. For all those reasons, the early part of 1254 is the most likely time of his receiving the chair in theology, and so of his *principium* as a master. Now the installation of a master began in an afternoon ceremony with a public disputation of two of the four questions proposed by the candidate. The next morning he gave his *principium*, which was followed by a public disputation of the candidate’s 3rd and 4th questions. The installation was completed after the ceremony on the first suitable day allowing the new master to give his inaugural reading. This was a resumption of his *principium* and a re-presentation of the 2nd and 3rd questions. Called the *quaestio magistrorum*, the

<sup>25</sup> *MGH. Sc.*, 32.299-300.

<sup>26</sup> See above : n. 3.

4th was the principal one, and it was defended solely by the candidate against two masters. The superb quality of the 4th question in St. Bonaventure's *De scientia Christi* and its intrinsic relation, which is commonly accepted, to his sermon *Christus unus omnium magister* lead to the conclusion that this 4th question was the principal one disputed at his inauguration and, therefore, that the sermon related to the question constituted his *principium*.<sup>27</sup>

It seems, then, that questions 1-4 of the *De scientia Christi* are the ones prepared by St. Bonaventure for his magistral inauguration in 1254. The other three questions (5-7) would have been disputed by him as a master, either after or as part of his inaugural reading. These series of disputed questions were followed later by his *De mysterio Trinitatis*, as he says himself.<sup>28</sup>

#### ST. BONAVENTURE'S MAGISTRAL STATUS (1255-57)

The documents on the dissensions in the University of Paris (1255-57) show very clearly that St. Bonaventure maintained his status as regent master. The trouble began with the *Quasi lignum* of Alexander IV on April 14, 1255. He spoke only of the two Dominican friars as still excluded from the society of masters.<sup>29</sup> On October 2nd, the University mentioned only the two Dominicans and accused them of causing conflict for three years. Because of their false accusations against William of St. Amour, the University had again stopped teaching.<sup>30</sup> In December, Alexander referred to some maters and scholars, but named William of St. Amour, as having left Paris rather than admit the Dominicans into the society of masters.<sup>31</sup> The Pope referred again three times in March and April

<sup>27</sup> On the ceremony of installation consult: P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres...*, v. 1, pp. 19-20; J. G. Bougerol, *S. Bonaventure. Un maître de sagesse*, p. 52. E. Longpré has dated the *Christus unus omnium magister* to 1253-57: *Catholicisme... Encyclopédie*, v. 2, c. 124; J. G. Bougerol has suggested that it might well have been St. Bonaventure's inaugural address: *Introduction... saint Bonaventure*, p. 174.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *De myst. Trinit.*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 14 (*Op. omn.*, v. 5, p. 73). As they are now, the texts of the questions (1-7) of his *De scientia Christi* are in their final or redacted form, as are his commentaries on Scripture and the *Sentences*.

<sup>29</sup> *CUP*, n. 247 (1.279-85), n. 249 (1.286-87).

<sup>30</sup> *CUP*, n. 256 (1.292-96).

<sup>31</sup> *CUP*, nn. 259-62 (1.298-301); cf. nn. 263-64 (1.301-02).

1256 to *some* persons in the University moving against the Dominicans ; he also exhorted the University not to be misled by the malice of a few, who were corrupting the rest. He ordered the chancellor on March 3rd to give the licence to Thomas Aquinas and to arrange for his *principium*.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, on March 1st, the Dominicans and the University made a settlement, but it was nullified in June by Alexander. He spoke first of *some* masters claiming to have left the University while, in its name, they suspended teaching, molested the Dominicans and those wanting to attend the *principium* of Thomas. The pope then named the masters : William of St. Amour and Odo of Douai, both doctors of theology, Nicholas of Bar-sur-Aube and Christian of Beauvais. Alexander decreed that *all* the religious, who were at the time doctors in the Faculty of Theology, be received into the college or society of the other masters :

“ ...quod dilecti filii Predicatorum et Minorum Ordinum fratres ac alii religiosi, qui Parisius fuerint pro tempore doctores theologicæ facultatis, seu scolares ipsorum in consortium et collegium seu societatem aliorum magistrorum et scolarium Parisiensium recipiantur... ”

The pope also forbade the transfer of the studium from Paris.<sup>33</sup>

This is the first sign that the secular masters were opposing other religious beside the Dominicans. The widening of the conflict was caused by William of St. Amour, whose *De periculis* attacked the mendicant state of the Dominicans and Franciscans. The book was condemned by Alexander on October 5th.<sup>34</sup> Two weeks later, Odo of Douai and Christian of Beauvais took an oath at Anagni to observe *Quasi lignum* and to receive into the scholastic society at Paris the Dominican and Franciscan friars, naming especially Thomas and Bonaventure, doctors of theology, who were to be received expressly as masters :

“ ...quod fratres Predicatores et Minores Parisius degentes, magistros et auditores eorum et specialiter ac nominatim fratres Thomam de Aquino de Ordine Predicatorum et Bonaventuram de Ordine Minorum doctores theologie ex tunc quantum in eis esset in societatem scolasticam et ad Universitatem Parisiensem reciperent, et expresse doctores ipsos

<sup>32</sup> *CUP*, nn. 269-72 (1.305-09), n. 274 (1.314-15).

<sup>33</sup> *CUP*, n. 268 (1.304-05), nn. 280-82 (1.319-24), n. 284 (1.327) ; citation taken from : n. 281 (1.323).

<sup>34</sup> *CUP*, nn. 287-88 (1.329-33) ; cf. nn. 289-92 (1.333-38), nn. 294-95 (1.340-42).

reciperent ut magistros, et quod cum Parisius fuerint faciant publice illud idem, ipsosque juxta ordinationem predictam ab Universitate seu magistris et scolaribus Parisius commorantibus procurent recipi bona fide, et contra predicta numquam prestant consilium vel assensum.”

Odo and Christian also swore to denounce the *De periculis* and not to take any part in transferring the studium from Paris.<sup>35</sup>

Alexander notified the University on November 10th of his condemnation of the *De periculis*; at the same time, forbidding the transfer of the studium, he cautioned the University to accept the Dominicans.<sup>36</sup> But peace was not restored: on January 7, 1257, the pope spoke of *some* masters not observing his *Quasi lignum*, which must be obeyed to get the *licentia regendi*; he mentioned only the Dominicans as suffering opposition in the University. Alexander returned to the subject eight more times from January 13th to March 30th.<sup>37</sup> Then, on May 12th, he repeated verbatim his mandate of June 27, 1256. He referred to the deception of the many by a few, who claimed not to belong any more to the University, yet remained there teaching. Their fault was increased by their infectious example, which caused opposition throughout the Church against the Dominicans.<sup>38</sup> This mandate was reiterated on July 14th, when the pope decreed specifically that the Dominicans be received as regent masters. On July 31st, preventing a new spread of the conflict, he commended the Dominican and Franciscan friars to the protection of Louis IX and the bishop of Paris.<sup>39</sup>

Christian Beauvais proclaimed his oath publicly on August 12th in the Franciscan house at Paris, repeating exactly what he had sworn at Anagni on October 18/23, 1256. He said also that he was falsely accused of not receiving the brothers, for he had associated with them after their separation from the University:

“*Immo postquam separati ab Universitate, fui cum ipsis in scolis... et apposui cum ipsis.*”

<sup>35</sup> *CUP*, n. 293 (1.338-40); citation taken from: p. 339. The oath was sworn on Oct. 18th and notarized on Oct. 23rd.

<sup>36</sup> *CUP*, nn. 296-97 (1.342-46).

<sup>37</sup> *CUP*, n. 298 (1.346-47); cf. nn. 300-01 (1.347-48), nn. 303-08 (1.350-53).

<sup>38</sup> *CUP*, n. 309 (1.354-56).

<sup>39</sup> *CUP*, nn. 312-13 (1.359-62). On Aug. 9th, Alexander notified William of St. Amour that he was excommunicated and to be exiled from France: n. 314 (1.362); cf. nn. 315-16 (1.363-64), n. 318 (1.367-68), n. 321 (1.369-70).

In addition, as the bishop of Paris stressed in his report to the pope, Christian said that his words on the mendicant state had been misunderstood.<sup>40</sup> On October 2nd, replying to the bishop's report, Alexander insisted that Christian and Odo proclaim their oath without fiction, while the restitution of Odo to his benefices was to be revoked.<sup>41</sup> The pope had already lifted, on September 27th, the excommunications of those taking part in the conflicts or possessing the condemned *De periculis*. Thus, by that date, peace was restored in the University of Paris.<sup>42</sup>

Three conclusions flow from the evidence in these documents. First, before March-April 1256, the opposition of the secular masters was directed solely against the Dominicans. Secondly, for the rest of 1256, the Franciscans were also separated from the University as as a result of the *De periculis*, to which St. Bonaventure responded early that year in his *De perfectione evangelica*. Thirdly, from January 1257, the Franciscans were again accepted in the University. The point to be fixed is the way in which the Franciscans were separated from the University in 1256. Now Alexander said many times that some masters claimed to have left the University, yet remained there without teaching while refusing to obey his *Quasi lignum*. Hence, in the first analysis, the Franciscans were not separated from the University, but from the secular masters who had left it. Moreover, the departure of those masters and the dissension caused by the *De periculis* did not allow the college of masters to carry on its normal functions. This fact is shown both by the absence from the University of documents dealing with the crisis and by the opposition of the secular masters of theology to all the religious then in the studium. Thus, in the second analysis, the Franciscans were not separated from the University by any official act on its part, as otherwise Christian of Beauvais could not say that he had associated with them after their separation. Furthermore, the trouble caused by the *De periculis* between the seculars and the mendicants at Paris spread to many parts of the Church, especially in France. As a consequence, relations were strained between the mendicants, particularly the Dominicans, and the seculars on the pastoral level. This situation

<sup>40</sup> *CUP*, n. 317 (1.364-67); citation taken from: p. 365.

<sup>41</sup> *CUP*, n. 320 (1.368-69).

<sup>42</sup> *CUP*, n. 319 (1.368). On April 5, 1259, Alexander ordered the bishop of Paris, now that peace reigned, to publish all the documents relating to the dissensions: n. 331 (1.381-82).

had inevitable repercussions in Paris, so that the pastoral conflict added a new dimension to the dissension there on the scholastic level. Accordingly, in the final analysis, the separation of the Franciscans from the University was the scholastic side of a more general disassociation from the mendicant religious on the part of the secular clergy.<sup>43</sup>

The decree of Alexander on June 27, 1256 is to be seen according to the refusal of the secular masters to associate with the mendicants. This is the decree ordering *all* the religious who were then doctors in the Faculty of Theology to be received into the college or society of masters. The repetition of the decree on May, 12, 1257 was a reminder, with the Dominicans in view, that no exceptions to it were to be made. This is clear from its reiteration on July 14th, when the pope decreed specifically that the Dominicans were to be received as regent masters. The wording of the decrees leaves no doubt that the religious concerned were in fact doctors in the Faculty of Theology. The decrees simply order the secular masters to restore their association with the religious, especially the Dominicans, in the college or society of the masters. The oath taken at Anagni in October 1256 by Odo of Douai and Christian of Beauvais was not sworn in the name of the University. The oath was imposed on them personally because of their own refusal to associate with the mendicants. Odo and Christian undertook personal obligations to renew their association with the Dominicans and Franciscans in Paris, and to accept what was already a fact, namely, that Thomas and Bonaventure were doctors and masters in the Faculty of Theology. When Christian proclaimed his oath publicly in Paris, he did so in the Franciscan house and not in a plenary or solemn session of the University. Even then, because of his attempt to excuse himself, he was ordered to repeat it by Alexander, who also ordered Odo's restitution to be revoked. Consequently, neither the oath at Anagni in October 1256 nor its proclamation at Paris in August 1257 constituted an official recognition by the University of the magistral status of either St. Thomas or St. Bonaventure. They had status with official recognition prior to October 1256: St. Thomas

<sup>43</sup> For the pastoral side of the conflicts and its influence on the dissension in the University of Paris see: Yves M. J. Congar, "Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre Mendians et Séculiers dans le seconde moitié du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et le début du XIV<sup>e</sup>", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 36 (1961), pp. 35-151; see in particular: pp. 43-114.

had it from about March 1256; St. Bonaventure had it early in 1254, and he never lost it.<sup>44</sup>

\* \* \*

ca 1217 – Born at Balneoregis.

1235 – Came to Paris and studied the arts.

1243 – Became a master of arts and began his theological studies as a novice in the Franciscan Order at Paris.

1244 – His profession and official entry into the Order.

1248–50 – As a *baccalarius biblicus*, licenced by John of Parma and read the Bible beginning with St. Luke's Gospel.

1250–51 – Probably had his formation as a preacher.

1251–53 – As a *baccalarius Sententiarius*, read the *Sentences*.

1254 – Doctor of theology, regent master of the Franciscan school with official recognition by the University; time of his *Christus unus omnium magister*, *De scientia Christi* and *De mysterio Trinitatis*.

1257 – Still acting officially as regent master, elected Minister General of the Order of February 2nd.

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<sup>44</sup> "Iste frater Bonaventura, antequam esset Generalis, dum teneret Parisius cathedram, veritatem evangelicam clarissimis disputationibus et determinationibus defensavit." – *C24G* : *Anal. fran.*, 3.326; cf. *C15G* : *Anal. fran.*, 3.699. The *C24G* says that St. Bonaventure got his magistral chair in 1254: "Anno vero Domini MCCLIV vel circa... Eodem tempore frater Bonaventura... Parisius assecutus est cathedram magistralem. Eodem anno MCCLIIII." – *Anal. fran.*, 3.277–78. If the 1254, in those texts, corresponds to the modern calendar, then St. Bonaventure got his chair after March 25th; if the year does not correspond to 1254 in the modern mode, then, because the year is in the Florentine mode of the Incarnation, the time would be between January 1st and March 24th, 1255, in the modern mode, which is most unlikely. Consequently, St. Bonaventure got his magistral chair in 1254, probably around Easter, which fell on April 12th in that year.

## SOME ASPECTS OF MEDIAEVAL MUSIC THEORY AND PRAXIS: THE *ORDO MINORUM* AND ITS PLACE IN CULTURAL HISTORY

One of the perplexing paradoxes of musical scholarship seems to be that, despite the significance and wealth of materials relating to the musical activities of the Franciscan friars since their founding in the thirteenth century, to date no comprehensive study of this important segment of music history has been made.<sup>1</sup> The history of music abounds with the names of friars who have been outstanding music theorists, composers, and historians. Some of the more significant figures, readily recognizable by the ordinary musicologist, include the Renaissance composer, Costanzo Porta and his famous pupil L. da Viadana, the theorist J. Bermudo, the dean of Renaissance music theorists, G. Zarlino with his pupil G. Diruta, the composer M. A. Cesti (long active in Innsbruck), and the great Baroque theorist, M. Mersenne, friend of R. Descartes.<sup>2</sup> Friars were thus active in all facets of music. And with the person of G. Martini, friend and teacher of J. C. Bach and W. A. Mozart, one reaches the climax in a long list of outstanding friar musicians. For not only was Padre Martini, as he was called, a composer and performer in the school of Bologna, he is also known as a great teacher and one of the first major music historians of the modern era.<sup>3</sup> It seems paradoxical

<sup>1</sup> H. Hüsch, "Franziskaner", in *Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, IV, pp. 823-841. This encyclopedia article is the only comprehensive essay on the subject known to the author. Scattered references can be found in general music history texts and in special studies. A comprehensive work was planned by the late Sigismund Cleven O.F.M. (Münster/W.) but all his materials were destroyed in an air raid in World War II. Individual friars have made studies on specific topics in the area, but to date no truly extensive coverage exists.

<sup>2</sup> In breaking with Zarlino's ideology, Descartes set the stage for the theory of affects in the Baroque era, as also for the reinterpretation of certain musical phenomena in modern terms, e.g. syncopation, the beat, etc. The two books that are crucial for music theory in the Baroque era are *Les passions de l'ame* (1649) and the *Compendium musicae* (1650). His influence on his friend M. Mersenne was significant for the latter.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Martini's *Storia della musica* (Bologna, 1757-81).

that this important history is known mostly to musicologists, rather than to the friars themselves. Be that as it may, our present purpose is to trace several cogent themes in the history of medieval music; for the friars' influence was felt from the first, though it seems to have surfaced in music history mostly in the Renaissance and in the Baroque eras. The present contribution is thus meant to fill in a gap in historical awareness by pointing out certain facts and by risking certain interpretations of known musical compositions.

I. ROBERT KILWARDBY  
AND THE *NUMERUS ARMONICUS CONCRETUS CUM REBUS*

We have mentioned Franciscan musicians thus far and shall interpret Franciscan music in the following sections of this essay; but it should be pointed out from the first that the friar philosophers were also important in the theory of music, specifically as exemplified in their indirect influence through Robert Kilwardby, the Dominican friar, on the greatest musicological document of the late Middle Ages, the *Speculum Musicae* of Jacques de Liège.<sup>4</sup> This late medieval encyclopedist and mathematician-philosopher may well have come into contact with friars in Paris, since he himself most likely taught at the Collège de Navarre. In his monumental opus the theorist from Liège defines music in terms of the entire medieval tradition, reaching back to Boethius and Guido d'Arezzo, and from there through the Christian Platonic and Aristotelian thinkers to such anti-Thomistic philosophers as Robert Kilwardby, who is expressly quoted in the extensive treatise. M. Mersenne seems to have been the first musicologist to make mention of the *Speculum Musicae* in his work,

<sup>4</sup> Cf. F. J. Smith, *Jacobi Leodiensis Speculum Musicae, a Commentary*, (hereafter: *Commentary*), I, 1966, II, 1970 (III forthcoming) (Institute of Medieval Music, Brooklyn). Also F. J. Smith, Jacques de Liège, an Anti-modernist? in *Revue belge de musicologie*, 1963; "Ars Nova - a Re-definition?" in *Musica Disciplina*, 1965 (part I), 1964 (Part. II); "Une philosophie du nombre: Jacques de Liège et le *Speculum Musicae*" in *Le moyen âge, revue d'histoire et de philologie*, 1968; "The Division and Meaning of the *Speculum Musicae*" in *Tijdschrift van de vereniging voor nederlandse muziekgeschiedenis*, 1968; "A Philosophy of Number: Jacques de Liège and the *Speculum Musicae*" in *Arts liberaux et philosophie au moyen âge*, (Montréal/Paris) 1969. Concerning the Franciscans and Robert Kilwardby cf. E. Brehier, *The Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Chicago, 1965) transl. W. Baskin, p. 161f. P. Vignaux's *Philosophie au moyen âge* is disappointing in this regard.

*Des consonances* (Paris, 1635). From there the work of Jacques de Liège seems to have gained entrance into the modern world of scholarship. However, it is doubtful that the friar, M. Mersenne, was aware of any indirect Franciscan influences present in the *Speculum* (which he had ascribed to another theorist of the fourteenth century, Johannes de Muris, mathematician and music theorist at Paris). Because of the explicit mention of Robert Kilwardby the musicologist, J. Grossmann, had tried to demonstrate that the *Speculum Musicae* had been written in Oxford. This has been disproved. Yet it is obvious that Jacques de Liège was cognizant of the anti-Thomistic leanings of Robert Kilwardby, even though he is not interested in this particular controversy and quotes him only in a musical context. Robert Kilwardby, as is common philosophical knowledge, was greatly influenced by the thinking of St. Bonaventure, and he has been linked by scholars with Franciscan philosophy. But it is not our present purpose to launch any historical arguments demonstrating the nature of such a link. Rather we shall be content to show the indirect Franciscan influences that may have come to bear on Jacques de Liège's definition of music, a definition that was important for this medieval compiler of the greatest musical *summa* of the *Ars Antiqua*. He did this in the midst of the *Ars Nova*, over three quarters of a century too late, as it were; for the *Speculum Musicae*, written between 1330-1340, came at a time when the world of thirteenth century thought and culture was coming to an end and in a century that witnessed the Black Death, the Hundred Years' War, the Great Western Schism, and also internal divisions within the *Ordo Minorum*.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless this last and greatest of the musical treatises of the Middle Ages tells us a good deal about both the *Ars Antiqua* and the *Ars Nova*, as well as about the position of both philosophy and theology in this century of transition.

In Liber I of the *Speculum Musicae*, cap. 2, "Quid sit musica," Jacques de Liège deals with the meaning of music. After citing Boethius and Isidore of Seville, he also quotes Robert Kilwardby and comments at some length on his definition of music.<sup>6</sup> Contrary to

<sup>5</sup> Ch. Dawson, *Medieval Essays* (1959), pp. 101-105; cf. also K. Hampe, *Das Hochmittelalter* (Münster/Köln, 1953), pp. 364-366.

<sup>6</sup> *Jacobi Leodiensis Speculum Musicae*, I (Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, 3) ed. R. Bragard (American Institute of Musicology, Rome, 1955) pp. 14-16; cf. also "Le Speculum Musicae du compilateur Jacques de Liège" in *Musica Disciplina*, VII, 1953, pp. 88-91.

R. Bragard, the editor of the critical edition, this is not a case merely of assembling quotations in the manner of the usual medieval "compiler"; for Jacques not only employs the conceptuality and terminology of Boethius and others, whom he freely quotes to his advantage, he also improves and updates their thinking.<sup>7</sup> Without a doubt his mention of Robert Kilwardby should be understood in this sense. In addition, at the very beginning of the *Speculum Musicae* Jacques employs the concept of *modulatio* in the definition of music; and thus, contrary to H. Hüschen, both intellect and the senses are recognized as belonging to the definition of music in the *Speculum Musicae*.<sup>8</sup> He doubtless had this in mind also in his quotation from Isidore of Seville, who stressed *modulatio*. The importance of making this point is understood, only when we realize that with *modulatio* the testimony of the senses as well as of the intellect is brought to bear on the definition of music. Jacques de Liège was not a mere intellectualist, even though the testimony of the senses is made to play a role subordinate to intellect. The crowning concept of the *Speculum Musicae* is *harmonica modulatio* with its complex involvement in the worlds of both mind and senses. It is interesting that from the start Jacques builds a case for the inclusion of the *judicium sensus*; and, if after many years of working with the thought of this musical theorist the present writer has learned anything, one can at least suspect that Robert Kilwardby's emphasis on *numerus armonicus* and *modulatio* played a role in the formulation of the concept of *harmonica modulatio* which makes the concept of *musica proprie dicta* possible.<sup>9</sup> Whether and to what degree the philosophical thought of St. Bonaventure concerning form and matter with its "seminal reasons" may have been mediated in the musical thought of Kilwardby is a topic that lies beyond the present scope of this essay. However, since form is important in the concept of harmonic modulation, it would be interesting to pursue this line of research at some future time. Whatever the case may be, it is apparent that Jacques de Liège reveals a good bit of indirect Franciscan influence in his choice of sources and in his commentaries on them.

<sup>7</sup> *Speculum Musicae*, II (1961), p. 308.

<sup>8</sup> H. Hüschen, "Jakob von Lüttich" in *MGG*, VI, pp. 1626-31; "Ars musica" in *MGG*, I, pp. 698-702.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Speculum Musicae*, II, cap. 3, pp. 12-16, "De harmonica modulatione amplior expositio."

Robert Kilwardby's definition of music, as quoted by Jacques de Liège, is as follows :

Musica est scientialis animae perfectio, quoad cognitionem armoniae modulationis rerum quarumcumque aliqua modulatione invicem coaptarum.<sup>10</sup>

In his commentary on this definition Jacques points out with considerable care and detail that musical science has to do principally with cognition and that its primary aim is to perfect the mind. Music, too, has to do first and foremost with intellective truth and only secondarily with what modern musicology calls "musical ethos." The latter is hinted at, it seems, when Jacques writes of *moralis virtus*. In music history and in medieval music treatises this has to do primarily with musical ethos (known in the Baroque era as "affectivity") rather than with moral virtue or ethics, although the latter is not entirely excluded.<sup>11</sup> Now though cognition gains the upper hand, musical praxis and the senses are hardly left out. For the speculative intellect can become practical, we are told. The model used to demonstrate this is the art of calculation known as *algorismus* (after Al-Kuwarizmi, ninth century Arabic philosopher). In this case theoretical number is applied to practical things, so practical that it becomes useful in the market place. This is the case also with musical number. Though it has to do primarily with the perfection of the mind, it also is related to the body and to the practical level of things. In this manner the body, too, is perfected, he writes. Yet *scientia* is essentially only in the intellective faculty of man and "not in any sensitive potency, though there are some who have maintained this."<sup>12</sup> We might well detect some disagreement at this point with the general position of Bonaventure and Kilwardby, as known in the history of philosophy. But for lack of further comment by Jacques de Liège one must unfortunately leave it at that. Jacques was not a mere compiler. He felt he had the right to improve on his sources for his own intellectual ends. And in being influenced by Kilwardby at this juncture, it was not at all out of place for him to

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, I, cap. 2, p. 15.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 61, where Jacques de Liège calls music an intellectual virtue, which can become moral, however, if done "bono fine in honorem et laudem Dei ex caritate." Cf. F. J. Smith, *Commentary*, I, pp. 43-45.

<sup>12</sup> *Speculum Musicae*, I, cap. 2, p. 16, "Scientia enim quaelibet in anima est, intellectu mediante, non in potentia aliqua sensitiva, licet aliqui dixerint hoc."

disagree with him at the same time. One wonders, however, whether Franciscans are meant in the phrase, "...licet aliqui dixerint hoc." This would lead us into a study of whatever relation exists between *scientia* and *ratio seminalis*. Whatever the case may be, we see that Jacques de Liège does more than simply let his sources "influence" him.

At this juncture one must recall that the music of which Jacques de Liège writes in cap. 2 is *musica generalissime sumpta*, which extends itself to *musica mundana* (the well-ordered universe or macrocosm), *musica humana* (the relationship between man's mind and body or the microcosm), and *musica sonora* which is *musica proprie dicta* (because physical sounds literally "mix together" in harmonic modulation, i.e. in mathematical proportions which are the form of musical consonances). *Musica sonora* has to do not with the sheer sonorities of musical sound on the perceptual level but only with *sonus numeratus*, i.e., with the mathematico-metaphysical basis of sound as such. Music therefore has to do with everything that exists: "...se extendit ad omnia." For there is "music" in whatever has order, concord, proportion and relation. Whatever lacks proportion and order is essentially unmusical.<sup>13</sup> This metaphysical ideality of order and proportion is then applied to the reality of the musical world. However, since the *Speculum Musicae* is the last great metaphysical statement of medieval music theory — and even goes against the more "scientific" trend evidenced in such musical treatises as the *Ars novae musicae* of the mathematician, Johannes de Muris — this magnificent theory of musical sound falls on deaf ears in the *Ars Nova*, when an entirely new artistic ideology was already in the ascendancy. Had our theorist written his *summa* even half a century earlier, it could well have ranked him along with some of his philosophical sources, like Kilwardby, in the history of thought.<sup>14</sup> Coming in the fourteenth century, the *Speculum Musicae* (1330-40) is at worst a reactionary speculative statement, at best a magnificent document even in its tragic irrelevance. And, as it stands, it is always a very informative source on the music and thought of both the *Ars Antiqua* and the *Ars Nova*.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, "Et ideo, si inter res aliquas simul collatas nullus innascitur habitudo, nullus ordo, nulla connectio, nulla concordia, nulla proportio non pertinent tales res, etiam simul comparatae, ad musicam... Et secundum hoc musica ad omnia extendere se videtur."

<sup>14</sup> Cf. F. J. Smith, *Commentary*, II, pp. 124-125.

In *Liber I*, cap. 7, "De modo inventionis musicae," Kilwardby is again cited as stressing the importance of sound as the object of hearing. For according to this, as against intellectualists, music is discoverable only through the sense of hearing. But here, too, Jacques de Liège disagrees with his source in emphasizing the crucial importance of visualizing sound in proper mathematical and proportional symbols. Sight and insight are essentially more significant than the sense of hearing. In this view science is best served by sight rather than by hearing, he avers. And though hearing is indispensable for music, as goes without saying, it is insufficient of itself. For, music as one of the mathematical sciences is concerned not merely with audial perception but with cognitional certitude. Hence, what is heard must also be visualized and made manifest "in debitibus configurationibus."<sup>15</sup> This Jacques proceeds to do especially in the proportional graphs of *Libri I* and *IIb*. The *debitae configurationes* refer primarily to mathematical symbols and only secondarily to actual musical notation.

This leads us logically to cap. 8, "Cui parti philosophiae musica supponatur," where Kilwardby's ideas on the *numerus armonicus* become crucial to Jacques' system.<sup>16</sup> Once again it is stressed that music is a theoretical rather than a practical science. Theoretical science is classified as natural, mathematical, and metaphysical in accord with Aristotle's *Metaphysica*. In Jacques' mind music belongs to all three categories but especially to mathematical science. *Multitudo discreta* or *numerus* is classified under the category of quantity, and thus the quadrivial science of *arithmetica* (which is not our "arithmetic") is made philosophically comprehensible. Now in *De ortu et divisione philosophiae* (which Jacques de Liège always quotes as *De ortu scientiarum*) Robert Kilwardby makes the following observations:

Mathematica... cum sit de quantitate aut est de multitudine vel numero aut de magnitudine. Et si de multitudine vel numero vel sim-

<sup>15</sup> *Speculum Musicae*, I, cap. 7, p. 28, 2 "Nec tamen sufficit solus auditus ad inventionem musicae... sed valet ad hoc visus... quia quod audit quis per auditum sibi in debitibus configurationibus manifestatur per visum." Cf. the present writer's "Vers une phénoménologie du son" in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1968 and "Further Insights leading to a Phenomenology of Sound" in *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 1969, for further critique of visual metaphor in music.

<sup>16</sup> *Speculum Musicae*, I, pp. 28-32.

pliciter non concernendo aliquam naturam, et sic est de arithmeticā, aut de numero armonico, qui est numerus concretus cum rebus (italics mine), quae cum numerali modulatione concurrunt ad aliquod unum apte comprehendendum, et sic est musica.<sup>17</sup>

In his exegesis of Kilwardby Jacque de Liège stresses the fact that music has to do with multitude " which has been concretized with or contracted to some special matter."<sup>18</sup> The conclusion of the chapter in question is that music is the subalternate of mathematics and thus is a part of philosophy. But what interests us most at this point is the use of the phrase, " *concreta vel contracta ad...*" This phraseology was to become of great importance in the link between Scotus and Cusanus in the following century.<sup>19</sup> What the exact relationship between Kilwardby and Scotus might be is to be reserved for further investigation. We simply call attention to this " Franciscan " notion in the *Speculum Musicae*, I. Jacques de Liège seems to improve on the concept, though without making it a key term (as Cusanus was to do in the fifteenth century) by showing how this *contractio* or *concretio* takes place. For in subsequent chapters (cap. 33 through 35) he specifies that *numerus ad aliquid* means either a *contractio* or a *relatio* with a number. In the *contractio ad sonos* number is said to " descend " to particular things, whereas absolute number does not do so. One sees here a distinct resemblance to the conceptuality of Cusanus in the following century. Number is important in music also with regard to the *relatio ad alium numerum*, for from this relationship arises proportionality, which is at the heart of medieval consonances in use in the *Ars Antiqua* (as seen best in the motets of the *Codex Bamberg*). What is the meaning of this " descent " of absolute number to the concrete level of musical reality ? (The word, *descensus*, is used in other contexts, but no light is shed on the present usage.) A phenomenologist is liable to interpret the descent of number, i.e., its " contraction " to things, as the concretization of a

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31, " Quod igitur dixit Boethius arithmeticam esse de multitudine absolute et per se sumpta, potest intelligi dupliciter, vel quia non est de multitudine concreta vel contracta ad aliquam materiam speciale, ut expressius dicit Robertus. " " Eodem modo exponatur musicam esse de numero vel multitudine ad aliquid, vel quia est de multitudine concreta vel contracta ad alias res speciales, ut ad sonos, quantum ad musicam sonoram... "

<sup>19</sup> For this I am indebted to Prof. I. Leclerc of Emory University who has been working in this area recently.

metaphysical ideality of number with material things. And indeed this interpretation would not militate against Jacques' description of the workings of proportional form and audial matter with regard to the formation of musical consonances. However, since no further clues are given, it is probably best to leave matters where they are, pending further studies. There is an earlier use of the word, *contractio*, taken from Guido d'Arezzo (eleventh century), quoted in Liber II of the *Speculum Musicae*, where he deals with the minor semitone or *diesis* and its proportionality. This consonant is called "omnium contractior."<sup>20</sup> But this is a specifically musical and pre-philosophical usage of the word, Guido d'Arezzo not having had much use for Boethius and abstract theorists. But when Guidonian thought is now reconstituted in the work of Jacque de Liège three hundred years later, to serve the purposes of a speculative thinker, one can surmise that the philosophical moment is not altogether lacking, particularly since Jacque de Liège deals with microtones, in this case the *diesis*, from the viewpoint of their mathematical proportionality, which is a kind of concretization of ideal number in material things. This is a subtle matter indeed, as the theorist himself writes from time to time in his lengthy treatise.<sup>21</sup>

## 2. THE *ARS SUBTILIOR* IN FOURTEENTH CENTURY MUSIC

Apparently the word, *subtilis*, had a significance in the fourteenth century that it lacked previously. It would be proving too much to attempt linking the *ars subtilior* in music history with the *scientia subtilis* of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century philosophy of John Duns Scotus. Suffice it to say that this term was simply "in the air" during the century, and that it could be used of people and things, where it seemed to fit, so that one could speak of a *doctor subtilis* and also of the *Ars nova* which was considered by Jacques de Liège to be "subtilior quam antiqua." In several places Jacques also speaks of mathematical arguments with regard to con-

<sup>20</sup> *Speculum Musicae*, II, p. 131, "...Guido, qui de minore semitonio loquens, dicit quod est consonantia omnium contractior."

<sup>21</sup> II, p. 197, concerning the semitritone, "Ideo non est mirum si rarus est eius usus qui praxim respicit. Ipsius tamen theoria (CSM: theorica) subtilis est et pulchra."

sonantal proportionalities as being "subtle." In philosophy and music theory (as speculative) the word seems to have mostly an intellectualistic meaning. But when it is employed to describe the musical practice of the late fourteenth century, which U. Günther calls *Ars subtilior* in contradistinction to the *Ars Nova*, the word seems to have less intellectual a meaning and probably is related to the "finely woven" texture of the motet.<sup>22</sup> A case in point would be motet no. 6 of the *Codex Chantilly*, the *Alpha-Coetus-Amicum* isorhythmic motet, which makes use of three Franciscan texts and one Franciscan plainsong source for the *tenor* (i.e., the bass part). In the *Ars subtilior* notational and rhythmic complexities abound, and in this case the isorhythmic structure is quite complex, justifying the use of the word, *subtilior*, in the comparative form. Some comment on this motet might make this clearer.

The *tenor* is taken note for note from the plainchant *Amicum quaerit* of the Office for the Feast of St. Francis of Assisi.<sup>23</sup> The chant follows *Lectio V* from St. Bonaventure's *Legenda Major*:

A- mi- cum quaerit pri- sti-num, Qui spretum in [coenobio...]

This particular plainsong is in Mode V, though at some points, like at the words, "Tunica contexit," it dips toward the lower or plagal range of the tritus. More important for our present purposes is the fact that the chant can be analyzed hexachordally, and that this hexachordal framework seems to come through intact in the *tenor* of the motet, though not without some problems, as shall be seen shortly. The *hexachordum durum* seems to be in evidence in the *triplum* and the *motetus* voices, while the *contratenor* seems to fall


<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Speculum Musicae*, VII, in Coussemaker, *Scriptorum de musica medii aevi novam seriem...* (Paris, 1864-76), II, p. 428a. Also U. Günther, "Das Ende der ars nova" in *Die Musikforschung*, XVI, 1963, esp. pp. 111ff. The word, *subtilis*, is from the Latin *sub tela* and has to do with the texture (*textura*: weaving) of cloth; hence it is aptly translated as "finely woven." Musically, the motets of the late fourteenth century are certainly subtle in that their basic texture is finely structured, esp. the *Codex Chantilly*!

<sup>23</sup> *Officium ac missa de festo S.P.N. Francisci*, ed. E. Bruning O.F.M. (Paris 1926), p. 40.


easily into the range of the *hexachordum naturale*. Of course, there are some variations and mutations in evidence, but the hexachordal interpretation seems more germane to the motet than trying to analyze it in terms of some pseudo-tonality (with the false problem of "accidentalism"), as does W. Apel in his presentation of fourteenth century secular music.<sup>24</sup>

While the hexachordal interpretation cannot be presented in any dogmatic manner, it seems to be more plausible than a strict modal or a false tonal framework. The modal interpretation of the motet (perhaps even of the chant) seems as implausible at this time as a tonal analysis; for the medieval modes had begun to break down before this time, and Renaissance modes, it goes without saying, had not yet taken their place. The fourteenth century is an age of transition in general culture and in music as well. The thought modes of the *Ars Antiqua* had broken down and nothing as systematic had yet taken their place. The *Speculum Musicae* was a vain attempt to remedy the situation. It is, as it were, both a post-modal and a pre-tonal era. The hexachord system, having always been more musical and less intellectualistic, seems to have perdured, and it seems that this and no other framework is the best way by which to judge music of this century, unless we allow every musical genre to be literally *sui generis*, or we call such music simply ambiguous. The hexachordal structure perdured more or less intact from the Middle Ages all the way through to the Renaissance and early Baroque, if we are to believe Jacques de Liège on the one hand and friar G. Zarlino and early Baroque theorists on the other. It is not our present purpose to present a case against interpreting fourteenth century music in terms of tonal accidentalisms. Yet in referring to the hexachordal structure in the plainsong, *Amicum quaerit*, we run into some difficulties. The melody type seems more important than either mode or hexachord in an analysis of the chant, faithfully reproduced in the *tenor* of the motet. An example will suffice to demonstrate both the plainsong source in the melodic type of Mode V as well as the hexachordal range. The special problem of how to reconcile the melodic type with the hexachordal becomes immediately apparent:

<sup>24</sup> W. Apel, *French Secular Music of the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge 1950), esp. p. 21 on the "problems" of *musica ficta*.



One notices that like in the plainsong source there is a  $\natural b$  rather than a  $b\flat$ . The *hexachordum molle* ordinarily demands the  $b\flat$ . Both Guido d'Arezzo and Aribi maintained that  $\natural b$  belonged to the normal cadence of all modes; and, of course, the usual form of Mode V always employs the  $\natural b$ . The  $b\flat$  is introduced in the above case only to avoid the range of a tritone that would result at the second part of the word, *amicum*:




A-mi- cum

or to avoid the semitritone that would come about at the word, *pristinum*:



pri- sti-num

The motet faithfully follows the plainsong source in these matters, and accordingly a  $b\flat$  is introduced in the second section of the *tenor*:



It is interesting to note that either the *Codex Chantilly* itself or the editor of the motets, U. Günther, uses a  $\natural b$  at bars 29 and 34 instead of the plainsong  $b\flat$  probably to avoid a *falsa relatio* with the  $\natural b$  in the motetus voice.<sup>25</sup> Yet such a cross relationship fits quite naturally in the music of the *ars subtilior*, though it is illicit for us in

<sup>25</sup> *The Motets of the Manuscripts Chantilly, musée condé, 564 (olim 1047) and Modena, Biblioteca estense, a. M. 5, 24 (olim. lat. 568)*, ed. U. Günther (Corpus Mensurabilis Musicae, 39) (1965), p. 24.

the tonal period. Moreover, while avoiding the false relationship between voices, one introduces the range of a tritone in the tenor, thus making it more faithful to the primitive plainsong melodic types known to Guido:



It is obvious that this motet is quite complex and "subtle" from various viewpoints, not the least of which is the difficult problem concerning hexachordal and/or melodic-type interpretations of the plainsong and the *tenor*. Focusing on this problem without being able to proffer any definite solution is the sole contribution this essay makes to the pertinent literature. The complex isorhythmic structure of the motet itself, which consists of one *color* (the plainsong source itself) and two multi-structured *taleae* (including retrograde and forward diminution, notational problems, some imitation technique, and instrumental interludes that use hocketing), has already been expertly elucidated by U. Günther. (Lacking the possibility of examining the *Codex Chantilly* first hand, the author had to rely on the editor's transcriptions). Whatever the merits or demerits of the hexachordal interpretation may be, it must be granted that a valid problem has been raised, to make the *ars subtilior* even more complex and subtle.

This motet is, as mentioned, polytextual. The upper two voices sing two different texts simultaneously, the apocalyptic *Alpha vibrans monumentum* (connected with the *Spirituals* and Petrus Olivi), and the *Coetus venit heroicus* (related to St. Bonaventure's writings), which portrays the heroic lives of the friars, whether *claustrales* or *regales*.<sup>26</sup> The latter word is doubtless a corruption of *regulares* and does not refer to "members of the nobility who decided to join the third Franciscan order," as U. Günther theorizes in her excellent exegesis of the texts. U. Günther is correct in linking the *Amicum quaerit* with the symbolism of the cloak of Elias. But she fails to point out that the text of *Lectio V*, which immediately precedes the responsory (not the "respond"), speaks clearly of the "vir hierarchicus curru igneo sursum vectus... venisse in spiritu et virtute Eliae."

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. XXXIII.


The text of the *tenor* was probably not sung, however, but was played on instruments, perhaps the vielle or a portative organ; thus also the contratenor.<sup>27</sup> The vielle is specifically mentioned, of course, in the *Speculum Musicae* as one of the principal medieval instruments in use. This motet, the *Alpha-Coetus-Amicum*, was written in a most subtle manner indeed, and it is meant to be performed with subtlety as chamber music with perhaps two or more singers and instrumentalists, but never with a massed choir and large organ. One cannot exclude the possibility that bassovoices might also have sung the lower parts along with the vielle or portative organ. There are no prescriptions as to exactly how this piece must be performed. The *ars subtilior*, now in the sense of subtle good taste, must dictate the aesthetic norms that govern actual performance of this Franciscan motet. One might imagine several friars thus entertaining themselves or others of an evening in the last decades of the fourteenth century. But the entertainment was meant to be both audial and visual for those involved in the performance. Not the "mannered" but rather the subtle notation of late fourteenth century motets, especially of the *Codices Modena* and *Chantilly* are sufficient proof of that. But such may be the case also with Franciscan plainsong of the preceding century, though in a different sense.

### 3. THE *CAPUT DRACONIS*: VISUALIZATION IN NOTATION OF SYMBOLIC TEXTS

In the *Speculum Musicae*, *cantus planus* means primarily the theoretical study of consonantal proportionalities; secondarily it also means plainsong or plainchant. But plainchant was not only a sort of ideal model of the medieval consonances espoused by Jacques de Liège — along with the motets of the *Ars Antiqua*, as best exemplified in the *Codices Bamberg* and *Torino*. Chant was also meant to be visualized in notation, primarily so that the ideal consonances might be seen as well as heard, since sight and insight improve on hearing according to our theorist. The primacy of the visual is obvious in the *Speculum Musicae*, itself a "mirror" of musical reality

<sup>27</sup> Cf. C. Sachs, *The History of Musical Instruments* (New York, 1940) p. 276, for the tuning of the vielle.

and mathematico-metaphysical ideality. But it seems to this writer that in the case of such a composition as the *Caput draconis* visualization has an even broader meaning than the mere graphing of figures and proportions, in the sense already described above. Apparently it has a larger significance than visualization of notation as such. There may well be such a thing as *Augenmusik* also in plain-song, not just in "mannered" notation, though obviously in a different sense. The Franciscan sequence, *Caput draconis*, seems to be a case in point. For not only does it exemplify the complete range of modal tritus (which seems characteristic of a good many such Franciscan chants of the period), not only does it serve as an interesting example of the concatenation of neume figures and consonantal intervals, the sequence (composed for the friars by St. Francis' friend, Gregory IX), *Caput draconis*, actually looks like a dragon with head, body, tail and all. The neumes, particularly the *porrecti*, the *torculi* and the *climaci*, literally outline a dragon's head and tail:



Here the *caput* leaps up in the range of a ninth stretching the upper reaches of authentic Mode V, while the tail literally falls, i.e., it becomes quite plagal and cadences with the help of a rather descriptive *climacus subbipunctis*. This visualization must have been part of the imaginative composer's own intent, in that the dragon would be graphically illustrated for the friars in the notation itself. In fact, this visualization may well have dictated the somewhat sporadic figuration of the neumes and the rather unclassical style witnessed to in the unrestrained ascents and descents so typical of many Franciscan chants of the era. This, too, is but a hypothesis but seems plausible as an explanation of the wild and luxuriant growth represented in such new chants. This sequence was known from the beginnings of the order and has been mentioned by early writers from Salimbene to Wadding. Further research might demonstrate whether this chant was ever used as a *tenor* of a subsequent motet.

<sup>28</sup> *Cantusale Romano-Seraphicum*, ed. E. Bruning O.F.M. (Paris, 1951), pp. 160-162.

This is to be doubted because of the excessive leaps and instability of the chant. The motets at least of the *Ars Antiqua* required more staid tenors to stabilize the upper voices and serve as a sonorous basis for the consonants that occurred at certain focal points among the various individually conceived voices. This is so, even though the *Codex Bamberg* is noted for leaps of up to an eleventh in the upper voices.<sup>29</sup> Apparently the plainchant, *Amicum quaerit*, was felt to be more stable; and thus, as has been shown, it could and did serve as the *tenor* for an isorhythmic motet of the fourteenth century.

It is now evident just from these few examples, that the history of music is replete with *Franciscana*. What this essay has tried to show by means of these several samplings is what could be done, nay what should have been done already, so that the story of Franciscan music might take its proper place within the general history of music.

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<sup>29</sup> F. J. Smith, *Commentary*, II, p. 71.

## THE UNITY OF A SCIENCE ACCORDING TO PETER AURIOL

Between the time of Thomas Aquinas and that of William of Ockham, a radical change took place in the philosophical notion of a science and of the unity of a science. Vor Aquinas, each science is a single, simple habit in the intellect. Although this habit may extend to many things, each of these things must share in a *ratio* which is the formal object of the habit.<sup>1</sup> The unity of a science is thus insured by the unity of its formal object.<sup>2</sup> For Ockham, on the other hand, a science is "a collection of many things pertaining to the knowledge of one object or many objects having a definite order."<sup>3</sup> For Ockham, science is not necessarily to be considered only in terms of habits in the intellect. We may, for example, rightly speak of a book, such as Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as being itself the science of metaphysics.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, science *can* be considered in terms of habits in the intellect. As such, Ockham says, the sciences are not each a *single* habit, but rather a collection of numerically distinct habits corresponding to the numerically distinct conclusions demonstrated in the science.<sup>5</sup>

Ockham was perhaps the most significant, and certainly the most

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (Ottawa ed., 1941), I-II, 54, 2, ad 1: "Dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter, sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere. Quamvis autem contraria specie differant diversitate rerum, tamen eadem ratio est cognoscendi utrumque, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Et ideo in quantum conveniunt in una ratione cognoscibilis, pertinent ad unum habitum cognoscitivum." Cf. Armand Maurer, "Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science," *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958), 104-106; and Armand Maurer, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, 3rd rev. ed., (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), p. xvi.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aquinas, *op. cit.*, I, 1, 3; and Maurer, "Ockham's Conception...," 104 & n. 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 100f. & n. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 101 & n. 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 100f. & n. 11.

influential, of the exponents of this new way of thinking. Yet, as might be expected, he was not without his antecedents. Godfrey of Fontaines,<sup>6</sup> for instance, had already upset the notion of science as a single habit by maintaining that the science of theology was composed of *two* habits, practical and speculative, constituting a single science because of their orientation to a common end, namely, to beatitude.<sup>7</sup> Bernard of Auvergne<sup>8</sup> had apparently also developed a novel position, according to which a science is the *order* of species in the intellect.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Godfrey of Fontaines, b. before 1250 – d. 1306 (1309?). On Godfrey, cf. J. F. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines", in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia* VI, 577f., with the bibliography there.

<sup>7</sup> Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet XIII*, 1, in J. Hoffmans, ed., *Les philosophes belges : Textes et études*, t. V (Louvain : Éditions de l'institut supérieur de philosophie, 1932), 169–187, especially p. 175 : "Et ideo ad huius evidentiam est intelligendum quod non videtur inconveniens quod theologia non sic sit scientia una proprie sicut aliae. Nec tamen est simpliciter plures sicut moralis et metaphysica humana. Immo est una unitate quae congruit scientiae ordinata ad perfectionem hominis fidelis secundum quod huiusmodi, secundum scientias in hac vita." Also p. 176 : "Per praedicta patet quid est dicendum ad quaestionem. Quia non recedendo totaliter ab his quae communiter dicuntur, videtur esse dicendum quod theologia est aliquo modo et speculativa et practica; non sic quod est speculativa simpliciter, practica vero secundum quid, aut e converso; sed sic quod est dicenda aliquo modo utrumque simpliciter, scilicet speculativa et practica, ut expositum est."

John Duns Scotus argued against Godfrey on this point. Cf. his *Reportata Parisiensia*, Prol. q. 3, Vivès ed., XXII, 51f. Bernard of Auvergne (cf. next note) likewise rejected Godfrey's view. Cf. A. Pelzer, "Godefroid de Fontaines : les manuscrits de ses quolibets conservés à la Vaticane et dans quelques autres bibliothèques," *Revue neo-scholastique de philosophie* 20 (1913), 520.

In setting out arguments for the position of Henry of Harclay, Peter Auriol refers to an argument that runs as follows : "Quamvis enim theologia sit tres habitus, scilicet scientia, fides et notia eorum quae deducit lumine naturali,..." Cf. Peter Auriol, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, I, Eligius M. Buytaert, ed., (*Franciscan Institute Publications*, Text Series no. 3; St. Bonaventure, N.Y. : The Franciscan Institute, 1952), 254, no. 17.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard of Auvergne, fl. 1294–1307. On Bernard, cf. P. Glorieux, "Bernard of Auvergne (Alvernia)," in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia* II, 334f., with the bibliography there.

<sup>9</sup> At least according to the exposition of Bernard's position given by Peter Auriol (*op. cit.*, 260, no. 34) : "Scientia non est una simplex forma indivisibilis, nec tamen est quasi acervus ex habitibus specificis constitutus, sed habet partes ex quibus constituitur, quoniam scientia non est aliud quam ordinatio specierum esistens in intellectu, secundum quam prompte intelligimus quando volumus." The works of Bernard remain largely unedited (cf. Maurer, "Ockham's Con-

It was perhaps Peter Auriol,<sup>10</sup> however, who most directly influenced Ockham's notion of the unity of a science.<sup>11</sup> Auriol discusses the matter at some length in Question Four of the "Prologue" to his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*.<sup>12</sup> The discussion there is of peculiar interest, not only for the understanding of Auriol's own doctrine, but also for his anticipation of Ockham's view, as well as for the rather thorough discussion he devotes to the views of his predecessors.

Auriol's discussion of the unity of a science is brought up in the context of a more particular problem, namely that of the unity of *theology* as a scientific habit. Indeed, the title of his *Quaestio* is "Whether the habit acquired from theological study be one or many?"<sup>13</sup>

The notion of science as habitual knowledge is an Aristotelian one, stemming from a passage in the *Categories*.<sup>14</sup> There, habit is said to come under the category of quality. It differs from mere disposition in that a habit is more permanent and difficult to change. Knowledge, Aristotle says, is a habit, "for knowledge, even when

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ception...," 112, n. 62). Auriol (*loc. cit.*), however, refers to Bernard's position as "opinio Bernardi in impugnationibus Henrici Quolibeto IX quaestione 4." There is extant in MS a work of Bernard's entitled *Contra Henricum de Gandavo*. Cf. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Würzburg : Ferdinand Schöningh, 1947), I, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Peter Auriol, b. c. 1280 – d. 1322. On Auriol, cf. J. J. Przezdziecki, "Peter Aurioli," in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia*, XI, 210f., with bibliography there. On his life, *ibid.*; and also N. Valois, "Pierre Auriol, Frère Mineur," in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, 33 (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1906), 479–489; A. Teetaert, "Pierre Auriol ou Oriol," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, XII, 2, cols. 1810–17; and P. Raymundus Dreiling, *Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre der Franziskanererbischöfs Petrus Aureoli...*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XI, h. 6, pp. 1–47. On his philosophy, cf. Teetaert, *op. cit.*, cols. 1846–1857; Dreiling, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–207; Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York : Random House, 1955), 476–80 and 777–79 (notes); and Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* III, 1 (Garden City, N.Y. : Image Books, 1963), 41–52. For a discussion of the unity of the concept of being and the unity of the science of metaphysics in Auriol's writings, see Stephen F. Brown, "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being," in *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), 117–150.

<sup>11</sup> Maurer, "Ockham's Conception...," 110.

<sup>12</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 250–284.

<sup>13</sup> "Utrum habitus ex theologico studio acquisitus sit unus vel plures."

*Ibid.*, 250.

<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, *Categories* 8, 8b25–34; 9a3–9.

acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace..."<sup>15</sup>

The problem facing Auriol was this: does a science consist of one single habit of knowledge or not? If a science — natural science, for example — consisted of a single habit in the intellect, how could one account for the fact that natural science extends to the knowledge of many things? Again, how would it be possible that a person could know only *some* of the conclusions of a science, while remaining ignorant of or even mistaken about the rest, if science were a habit numerically one in the intellect?

On the other hand, if a science — natural science, for instance — were *not* a single habit numerically one in the intellect, how could one account for the fact of the unity of the science? What would distinguish natural science from any other science? Would a science, then, be simply an aggregate, a "heap" of habits corresponding to the many conclusions demonstrated in the science? If so, what would account for the unity of this heap? Why would some conclusions belong to the science of nature, for example, while others would not?

Auriol, like Ockham, was not the first to consider the problem. Indeed, in the course of his *Quaestio*, he considers and rejects nine previous opinions: those of Henry of Ghent,<sup>16</sup> Thomas Aquinas,<sup>17</sup> Hervaeus Natalis,<sup>18</sup> two (!) of Duns Scotus,<sup>19</sup> one from an anonymous

<sup>15</sup> Tr. by E. M. Edghill in *The Works of Aristotle Translated into English*, I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).

<sup>16</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 251, nos. 3-5; 256-258, nos. 25-28; 280f., nos. 90-92. Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet IX*, 4 (*Quodlibeta Magistri Herici* (sic) *Goethals a Gandavo doctoris Solemnis...*, Paris: Iodocus Badius Ascensius, 1518), ff. 354r-356r.

<sup>17</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 251f., nos. 6-8; 270f., nos. 58-62; 281, nos. 93-95. Cf. Aquinas, *op. cit.*, I, 1, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 252f., nos. 9-11; 272f., nos. 66-68; 281f., nos. 96-98. Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Defensa doctrinae Fratris Thomae*, I, 14, ad 3, in Engelbert Krebs, *Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik...*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* XI, h. 3-4, p. 65.

<sup>19</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 253, nos. 12-14; 273f., nos. 69-72; and 282f., nos. 99-101; for the first opinion. For the second opinion, *ibid.*, 255, nos. 19-21; 258-260, nos. 29-33; 284, no. 105. For the first opinion, that sciences take their unity from the formal object, cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, Prol., pars 3, q. 3, ed. Scotus Commission (Vatican City: Polyglot Press, 1950), 96-98. For the second opinion, that a scientific habit has the unity only of a genus, cf. *ibid.*, pars 5, qq. 1-2, p. 163. Auriol's use of Scotus' position here is rather free. He presents Scotus' position as follows: "unitas habitus scientifici est unitas cuiusdam ge-

author,<sup>20</sup> and those of Henry of Harclay,<sup>21</sup> Godfrey of Fontaines<sup>22</sup> and Bernard of Auvergne.<sup>23</sup>

It will not be our purpose in this paper to examine Auriol's discussion and criticism of his predecessors, important though this aspect of his *Quaestio* may be. Nor shall we be able to give an account of his influence on Ockham, nor of the points of convergence and divergence of their respective solutions to the problem. Rather, our purpose is primarily expository: to set out as clearly as possible Auriol's position on the unity of a science, as that position appears in his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*, "Prologue", Question Four.

For Auriol, there are certain facts that must be accounted for in any adequate explanation of science and of its unity. At one point in his *Quaestio*,<sup>24</sup> he lists some of these:

(1) It is possible for one to know the first conclusion of a science, and at the same time to be in error (or ignorance) regarding some other (e.g., the hundredth) conclusion.

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neris, quia quot sunt conclusiones, tot oportet ponere habitus partiales; quia vero sunt de eadem materia, idcirco habent generis unitatem." (Auriol, *op. cit.*, 258, no. 29). In fact, however, Scotus is saying something quite different (Scotus, *loco cit.*): "patet quod practicum et speculativum non sunt differentiae essentiales habitus vel scientiae vel notitiae in communi, quia practicum dicit respectum duplum aptitudinalem notitiae, quae est quasi quoddam absolutum, ad primum ut ad terminum, et speculativum privat illum respectum duplum; sed nec respectus nec eius privatio est de essentia absoluti, sed est quasi divisio generis per proprias passiones specierum, sicut si divideretur numerus per par et impar, et linea per rectum et curvum."

<sup>20</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 254, nos. 15f.; 274, nos. 73-75; 283, no. 102.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 254f., nos. 17f.; 271f., nos. 63-65; 283f., nos. 103-104. The opinion is said to be "opinio Henrici Anglici in primo suo, quaestione 3." (*Ibid.*, 271).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 255 f., nos. 22f.; 274-276, nos. 76-81; 284, no. 106. *Vide supra*, n. 7.

<sup>23</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 260f., nos. 34-39. *Vide supra*, n. 9.

<sup>24</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 269, no. 57: "Secundo vero, quia tali posita unitate, salvantur omnia quae de scientia dicuntur, quia et appareat quomodo stat error conclusionis centesimae cum scientia primae, et quomodo successive acquiratur scientia; et quomodo non sunt tot scientiae naturales, quot sunt conclusiones cognoscibiles per eandem; et quomodo habens notitiam I libri *Physicorum* non dicitur perfectus physicus, sed imperfectus, quoniam omnes conclusiones naturales scientiae habent rationem unius perfecti cognoscibilis, et illuminant se mutuo, declarant et innuant, iuxta quod Philosophi I *Ethicorum*: 'Unusquisque bene iudicat quae novit, et horum est bonus iudex'; cuius intellectus est quod unusquisque bene iudicat in materia, in qua nutritus est et notus, etiam de conclusionibus quae noviter proponuntur, ut iurista de casibus; et sic de aliis artificibus."

(2) Related to this is the fact that science is acquired "successively"; we do not become adept at the entire science all at once. Rather, we progress from one conclusion to another; we learn the science by stages, as it were.

(3) It cannot be said that there are as many natural sciences as there are conclusions in natural science. This would make a science nothing but an aggregate, a "heap" of habits, a notion which Auriol emphatically rejects.

(4) One who knows only some of the conclusions of a science — e.g., one who knows only the first book of the *Physics* — has that science only *imperfectly*, for each of the conclusions of the science sheds light on the others. This notion is a crucial one for Auriol's understanding of the unity of a science.

In addition to these facts, which he explicitly lists as having to be "saved" in an adequate account of science, there are others which Auriol uses again and again throughout his *Quaestio*. In particular, he insists that science is not had as soon as the species involved are imprinted on the intellect. This amounts to saying that the science is not the species itself. For, otherwise, he argues,<sup>25</sup> he who had the species of a triangle and the species of having three sides would immediately know scientifically that a triangle has three sides. The point of this apparently is that science is *habitual* knowledge. Auriol argues in similar fashion when he says<sup>26</sup> that, when one is said to know scientifically (*scire*) by *remembering* a demonstration, the term 'science' is used improperly. For scientific knowledge is, properly speaking, *habitual* knowledge generated by the demonstration. But a demonstration that is remembered is not *generated* by the demonstration. Rather it is that demonstration itself, retained in the memory.

Again, Auriol maintains, science is said to be had only of the *conclusions* of demonstrations. This is a matter of terminology. For, he says,<sup>27</sup> to know (*nosse*) that something is true simply and of

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 262, no. 40.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 268, no. 55: "Demonstrationes namque memoriter retentae totius unius scientiae, ut puta geometriae, communi nomine et proprio dicitur scientia. Clarum enim est quod non est scientia proprie dicta, cum non sit habitus conclusionis, sed totius deductionis; nec generetur ex demonstratione, sed sit ipsa demonstratio memoriter retenta."

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 265, no. 46: "...nosse quod hoc est simpliciter et ex se non est scire, sed principium intelligere."

itself — i.e., not as the conclusion of some demonstration — is not to know scientifically (*scire*), but rather “to understand a principle”. This does not mean that science ignores principles or the process of demonstration. Quite the contrary. The scientific knowledge of conclusions must take into account the principles and the demonstration by which the conclusions are reached. Otherwise, a conclusion could hardly be known as a conclusion, but would rather be known through itself, and this is not science but the understanding of principles.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, while the principles, the demonstration and the conclusion itself are all grasped in science, it is only the conclusion that is said to be known scientifically.<sup>29</sup>

What does all this mean? It means that certain conceptions of what a science is will simply not do. Thus, for instance, the unity of the scientific habit of a whole science cannot be thought of as a unity of “simplicity and individuality” — this against Henry of Ghent.<sup>30</sup> For, otherwise, when that habit was reduced to act, the entire science would be known at once. But, as we have seen, a science is not acquired all at once.<sup>31</sup>

Again, it means that the unity of a science cannot consist of the unity of a “heap”, an aggregate of the habits of the various conclusions of the science. For this would mean that one who knew one conclusion of a science would know it perfectly, thus ignoring the very important fact that each of the conclusions of a science sheds light on the others, perfecting them and in turn being perfected by them.<sup>32</sup>

Yet again, it means that the unity of a science is not the unity of the ordering of the species. Auriol argues this point at length against the opinion of Bernard of Auvergne.<sup>33</sup> For, among other impossibilities, the ordering of species refers to the whole of the demonstration. But science, as Auriol insists, is of the conclusion only.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 264, no. 44.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 261, no. 37: “...scientia est habitus conclusionum, non praemissarum et principiorum,...” Also *ibid.*, 262, no. 40: “Certum est autem quod memorari non est scire nec memoria scientia... Recordamur namque de tota demonstratione; certum est autem, quod scire est tantum de conclusione.”

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 267, no. 54. On Henry of Ghent’s position, and on Auriol’s treatment of it, cf. the references above, n. 16.

<sup>31</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 257, no. 26.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 260, no. 33.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 260f., nos. 34–39. Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 261, no. 37: “...sed ordo specierum respicit non solam conclusio-

On the basis of these and other considerations, Auriol proceeds to describe what a science is. There are in the intellect three acts of differing natures (*rationum*). One of these "falls" upon a simple object absolutely — i.e., upon a term, as opposed to a proposition, which is a complex of such simple terms. This act argues the existence of a corresponding intellectual habit, which we might call the "habit of terms".<sup>35</sup>

A second act of the intellect — arguing a second habit — falls upon a complex truth, as onto that which has its formal reason (*rationem*) *qua* the knowledge (*notitiam*) of the terms.<sup>36</sup> The habit corresponding to this act determines the intellect to the seeing of the complex truth of a principle from its terms. This is the "habit of principles".<sup>37</sup>

The third act of the intellect — arguing a third habit — falls upon a complex truth, and has its formal reason<sup>38</sup> *qua* another complex truth. The habit corresponding to this act determines the intellect to the truth of the conclusion from the truth of the principle. It is with this third habit that science is concerned. For science is "something by which the intellect is determined to a simple intellection<sup>39</sup> which falls upon some truth because of another first truth. This 'something', which is science, is abiding (*immansivum*) in the intellect, and is other than demonstration retained by memory."<sup>40</sup>

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nem, sed totam demonstrationem, cum sit ordo maioris extremitatis ad medium et mediis ad minorem, et per consequens totius discursus."

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 262, no. 41. The phrase "habit of terms" is mine, not Auriol's. I have used it by analogy with the habit argued by the second act of the intellect, which habit Auriol explicitly calls "habitus principiorum." Cf *infra*, n. 37.

<sup>36</sup> On this "formal reason," cf. *infra*, n. 38.

<sup>37</sup> Auriol, *loc. cit.* & 263, no. 41: "est vero aliis, qui cadit super veritatem complexam tanquam super id quod et habet rationem formalem qua notitiam ipsorum terminorum... actus secundus arguit in intellectu quemdam habitum, quo determinetur ad videndum veritatem principii complexam ex terminis — qui quidem est habitus principiorum..."

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 265, no. 47: "Et confirmatur quia formalis ratio bonitatis, in eo quod est ad finem, est bonitas finis, ut sic id, quod est ad finem, sit tantum materialiter volitum; et consimiliter formalis causa, quod conclusio sit, est entitas principii, ut entitas conclusionis materialiter sit cognita, propter hoc quod principium est, cuius entitas est formaliter cognita..."

<sup>39</sup> Each of these three acts of the intellect is really and formally a simple intellection. Cf. *ibid.*, 262, no. 41: « Unusquisque autem istorum trium actuum est quidem simplex intellectio realiter et formaliter. »

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 263, no. 41: "...ut secundum hoc scientia sit aliquid, quo intel-

Auriol expands on this description of science in a series of five explanatory “conditions”. First, “an intellection does not fall upon the truth of a conclusion, except insofar as it falls upon the truth of the principle.”<sup>41</sup> This assures that the principles and demonstrations of a science have their role to play in scientific knowledge, even though only the conclusion is properly said to be scientifically known. Auriol argues that the truth and knowability of the conclusion come from the knowability of the principle.<sup>42</sup> Again, arguing — as he often does — a parallel between scientific knowledge and the activities of the will, the end and the means are to the good and to the desired as the principle and the conclusion are to truth and to the understood. But the end has the good from itself ; the means, however, have their good from the end. So too, therefore, the conclusion does not have truth except from the principle. Just as the means are not desired unless the end is desired, so too the conclusion is not known unless the principle be known. If a means had good through itself, it would not be a means but an end.<sup>43</sup> So too, if the conclusion had truth of itself — if it were known through itself — it would be a principle and not a conclusion.

The second “condition” is this : “an intellection of this sort, falling upon either truth, is unique and simple.”<sup>44</sup> That is, it is the *same* act of intellection that grasps simultaneously the truth of the principle and the truth of the conclusion, even though only the truth of the conclusion is said to be known scientifically. If there were *two* distinct acts of intellection, which fell upon the truth of the principle and that of the conclusion respectively, then the latter act would find the truth of the conclusion *in* the conclusion itself *ex se*. But, as we have seen, the truth of the conclusion is simply not there *ex se*, but rather comes from the truth of the principle.<sup>45</sup> Otherwise, the conclusion would not be a conclusion but rather a principle.

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lectus determinetur ad intellectionem simplicem, cadentem super veritatem aliquam propter aliam primam veritatem, aliud a demonstratione memoriter tenta inmansivum in intellectu.”

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 42: “...intellectio non cadit super veritatem conclusionis, nisi quatenus cadit super veritatem principii...”

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 43.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 264, no. 45: “...huiusmodi intellectio, cadens super utramque veritatem, est unica et simplex.”

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

Again, in the will, the act of choosing falls upon the means because of the end. It falls upon both at once. Likewise, the act of scientific knowing falls at once on the truth of both the principle and the conclusion.<sup>46</sup>

The third explanatory "condition" is that there be something in the intellect by which it is determined to this conclusion. For where error is possible — as in science — the intellect needs something to determine it to the correct act.<sup>47</sup>

Again, the will is to choosing as the intellect is to scientific knowing. But the will needs something to determine it to choose rightly. Therefore, etc.<sup>48</sup>

The fourth "condition" is that this something in the intellect be other than a demonstration retained in the memory. Indeed, demonstration does elicit an act of the sort involved in science — i.e., a simple act which falls simultaneously upon the truth of both the principle and the conclusion. Yet, a habit is left behind by this demonstration,<sup>49</sup> and science is *habitual* knowledge.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, sometimes we see the truth of the conclusion in the principles, even when we do not actually work out the demonstration. This happens especially with one who is adept at a science. A similar phenomenon occurs in the arts as well.<sup>51</sup>

The fifth and last "condition" explains why this "something" which is science is said to be abiding in the intellect. The reason is simply that science is a habit that is difficult to change.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, we see that for Auriol, science is a habit abiding in the intellect, determining the intellect to single acts of intellection which fall simultaneously upon the truth of both the principle and the conclusion of demonstration. In what sense can this habit be said to be one? Auriol discusses this in three propositions, with appropriate explanation. First, he says, this sort of unity is the unity of

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 265, no. 47.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 48: "...in intellectu est aliquid quo determinatur ad istam conclusinem..."

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 49.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* f., no. 50: "...illud tale est aliud a demonstratione memoriter re-tenta..."

<sup>50</sup> As pointed out in the fifth "conclusion," *q.v.*

<sup>51</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 266, no. 52.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* f., no. 53: "...illud tale est mansivum et permanens..."

a certain totality.<sup>53</sup> No other unity is acceptable.<sup>54</sup> The habit of science is one by the unity of a certain totality, just as a house is one by reason of one form, and just as a linear figure is one by reason of the total form resulting from the lines that make it up.<sup>55</sup>

The second proposition discusses how 'science' can be said properly and improperly. Improperly, as we have seen, one is said to know scientifically when he remembers a demonstration.<sup>56</sup> It is in this improper sense, Auriol seems to say, that Bernard of Auvergne's notion, of the unity of a science as the order of the species, is applicable.<sup>57</sup>

In the third proposition, Auriol discusses science taken properly. Properly speaking, he says, science "is nothing other than the cognitive habit of all the conclusions of one science, the acts of which habit are the intellections passing over the truths of all the conclusions." This science has the unity of a certain totality, and of one form.<sup>58</sup>

Note well that Auriol is speaking here of a science as *one* habit. Science is not merely a collection, a "set", of all the habits of the various conclusions of the science. These habits of conclusions are involved, to be sure, but science is something over and above these habits taken collectively. A science is itself *one* habit, and is not to be confused with the habits of the conclusions.

The various conclusions do indeed have their respective habits. Auriol says that the "totality (*universitas*) of the habits by which conclusions of this sort are known will be connected in themselves..."<sup>59</sup>

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 267, no. 54: "...unitas huiusmodi est cuiusdam totalitatis."

<sup>54</sup> Auriol discusses and rejects three other ways in which a habit can be understood to be one. (*Ibid.*).

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Vide supra*, n. 26.

<sup>57</sup> Auriol, *op. cit.*, 268, no. 55: "Loquendo ergo hoc modo de scientia, dici potest quod habet unitatem cuiusdam ordinis et totius, sicut oratio vel syllogismus, cum non sit aliud quam species maioris extremitatis et medii et copulae utriusque, necnon et minoris extremitatis et copulae ipsius cum medio; et demum, copulae maioris extremitatis cum minori in intellectu tenaciter remanentes; ex speciebus enim istorum habens eas, potest cum vult in demonstrationibus actualem memoriam devenire." Even in this sense, however, not all of Auriol's objections against Bernard are resolved. Cf. *ibid.*, 261, no. 36.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 268, no. 56: "...scientia proprie dicta, quae non est aliud quam habitus cognitivus omnium conclusionum unius scientiae, cuius quidem habitus actus sunt intellections super veritates conclusionum omnium transeuntes. Haec quidem scientia unitatem habet, non simplicitatis et indivisibilitatis omnimodae, sed cuiusdam totalitatis et unius formae."

But these habits of conclusions are not to be considered as "partial sciences", as it were, which collectively constitute one "whole" science which is nothing but their aggregate. In setting out one of Scotus' opinions on the matter — an opinion which Auriol unequivocally rejects — he says that it would imply that "many partial physics are in an intellect having natural science".<sup>60</sup> For Auriol, this notion of science simply will not do. For it ignores the fact that each of these habits of conclusions is not complete or perfect in itself, but stands in need of being perfected by the other conclusions of the science.

This is one of the fundamental notions involved in Auriol's conception of a science. Each of the conclusions of a science sheds light on the other, allowing it to be known more perfectly. It is *this* connection, a connection by which one conclusion perfects the others, a "perfective order",<sup>61</sup> that binds all the partial and incomplete habits of conclusions together into one science. It is this connection, this one form and a certain whole, that constitutes the unity of the habit of science, a unity which is something quite other than the unity of a mere aggregate or "heap".

This unity comes about in two ways for Auriol. That is, the conclusions of a science are related as perfecting one another in two ways: according to "length" and according to "breadth". When one conclusions is inferred from another demonstratively, the two are said to be related according to "length". When several conclusions are concluded about the subject from the same "middle", the conclusions are said to be related according to "breadth". In these two ways, therefore, all the conclusions of a science mutually contribute to one another.<sup>62</sup> As Auriol puts it<sup>63</sup>:

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* : "...universitas habituum quibus conclusiones huiusmodi cognoscuntur connexa erit in se...."

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 258f., no. 29: "Unde multae partiales physicae sunt in intellectu habenti scientiam naturalem..."

<sup>61</sup> "ordinis perfectivi": *ibid.*, 269, no. 56.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 268, no. 56: "Est autem illa forma connexio omnium partialium habituum, vel secundum longum, vel secundum [latum]: ...demonstraciones densantur dupliciter, uno modo in post assumendo, ut cum ex una conclusione inferatur alia demonstrativa; et istarum conclusionum connexio est secundum longum; ...Alio modo densantur secundum latum, ut cum ex eodem medio plures passiones concluduntur de subiecto, non ad invicem ordinatae. Ista quidem conclusiones sunt secundum latum connexae."

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem.*, 269: "Secundus enim perficitur per primum, et e converso;

For the second is perfected through the first, and conversely ; for the cognition of the second conclusion is through the first, and again, the first is known more perfectly, when it is seen how the second follows from it. Two conclusions also, produced (*reductae*) from the same middle, perfect one another ; for when it is seen that from the middle one conclusion follows, that middle is known more perfectly ; but when the middle is more perfectly known, it is necessary that the rest be known more perfectly. Therefore, according to this, all these conclusions in knowing will be linked together, so that they have, as it were, the nature (*rationem*) of one integral and total knowable ; and consequently, the habits of them will have the nature (*rationem*) of one total cognitive habit.

It is this one total cognitive habit that is science. But where does the science acquire such a unity ? How is this "perfective order" among the conclusions of a science determined ?

Auriol discusses this matter in Article Four of his *Quaestio*. First, he says, every scientific habit takes its unity from a specific mode of knowing (*cognoscendi*) and a mode of scientific knowing (*sciendi*) of one nature (*eiusdem rationis*).<sup>64</sup> He argues this first from the nature of a cause. For agents that differ in nature (*rationem*) induce specifically distinct effects. But principles and demonstration are like agents with respect to the knowledge of the conclusions and to the scientific habit. Now principles are of differing natures because of different ways of knowing them. For instance, in moral science the principles are taken from "reasonable custom" ; in natural science and medicine they are taken from sense experience, etc.

Likewise, demonstrations differ in nature according to the mode of demonstrating : by computation in arithmetic ; by the four causes in physics ; by the final and formal causes in metaphysics, etc.<sup>65</sup>

Again, arguing from the side of the intellect, Auriol points out that scientific habits, since they are perfections of the intellect, must

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nam cognitio secundae conclusionis est per primam, et iterum prima perfectius cognoscitur, viso quomodo ex ea sequitur secunda. Duae etiam, ex eodem medio reductae, perficiunt se invicem ; viso enim, quod ex medio sequitur una conclusio, medium illud perfectius cognoscitur ; medio autem perfectius cognito, necesse est reliqua perfectius cognoscatur. Ergo secundum hoc, omnes istae conclusiones in cognoscendo erunt concatenatae, ut quasi habent rationem unius integri cognoscibilis et totalis ; et per consequens habitus earundem habebunt rationem unius totalis habitus cognitivi. "

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 276, no. 82 : "...omnis habitus scientifici unitas sumitur ex uno modo specifico cognoscendi, et modo sciendi eiusdem rationis."

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 276f., no. 83.

be distinguished according to the different ways that the intellect finds itself (*se habendi*). But these different ways come about by the different ways of knowing principles and of demonstrating conclusions. Sometimes, he says, the intellect knows, when it is extended to sensibles, as in natural science ; sometimes it is extended to imaginable things as situated in space, as in geometry ; sometimes it turns back on itself, as in metaphysics ; sometimes it is extended to both sense and imagination, as in optics (*perspectivis*) and astronomy (*astrologis*), which are midway between natural and mathematical science.<sup>66</sup>

Each science has its own proper “logic” — i.e., its own mode of demonstration — and its own proper mode of knowing (*sciendi*). Science therefore clearly has its specific unity from a uniform mode of knowing scientifically, which consists of a uniform taking of principles and of a uniform way of demonstrating.<sup>67</sup>

It is for this reason, then, that not all conclusions fall into one science. It is for this reason also that not every conclusion inferred from others falls into the same science as those others. For they require another “logic” and another way of knowing. Thus, the conclusions of optics follow from the conclusions of geometry, and yet they are not included in the science of geometry. This is generally true of subalternate sciences.<sup>68</sup>

It is as a result of all this that Auriol concludes that theology is one habit — which is what was asked at the beginning of the question. For the habit of theology has a uniform way of taking principles and of deducing conclusions. Furthermore, the conclusions are connected according to length and breadth. Thus, the habit of theology qualifies on all counts as one scientific habit.<sup>69</sup>

Let us turn now from an expository account of Auriol's doctrine to a consideration of a certain obscurity which, at least to this writer, it seems to contain. In the Fourth Article of his *Quaestio*, Auriol proposes to tell us whence a scientific habit takes its unity. That is, given the notion of the unity of a scientific habit which he develops at length in the Second Article, where does the habit get this unity : how is the “perfective order” among the habits of the various conclusions of the science determined ?

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 277, no. 84.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 279, no. 87.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 88.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* f., no. 89.

As Auriol proceeds through his Fourth Article, however, it becomes clear that he is telling us how one science is distinguished from another. "Therefore, according to different modes of knowing, from which it arises that the intellect finds itself first in one state and then in another (*aliter et aliter*), it is necessary that sciences be specifically distinguished."<sup>70</sup> Again, "therefore science is distinguished specifically through this..."<sup>71</sup>

Now, the question "How is one science distinguished from another?" and the question "Whence does a science take its unity?" are clearly closely connected. In this case, however, it is not clear, at least to this writer, that Auriol's answer to the first question will suffice to answer the second.

If the unity of a science is the unity of one form, of a "perfective order", then, presumably, two different sciences will have two different perfective orders obtaining among their respective conclusions. Auriol's notion of the differing "logics" for the different sciences is clearly relevant here. The conclusions of a science that demonstrates by computation will evidently be related to one another with a different "perfective order" than will the conclusions of a science that demonstrates by the four causes.

But it is not so obvious that the different modes of taking principles also contribute to determining the different perfective orders of the various sciences. For the order in question is one among the habits of *conclusions* only. Habits of principles are presumably not involved in this perfective order. Nor will it do simply to say that if one takes different principles, one will have different conclusions, and therefore different sciences. Auriol explicitly denies that, except where the *mode* of taking the principles is different.<sup>72</sup>

What Auriol needs to explain further is precisely how the particular mode of taking one's principles contributes to determining the particular connection by which the conclusions of the science will perfect one another.

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 277, no. 84: "Ergo secundum modum cognoscendi alterius rationis, ex quo oritur quod intellectus se habeat aliter et aliter, necesse est scientias specifice distingui."

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 278, no. 85: "Ergo scientia specifice distinguetur per hoc..."

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 281, no. 94: "...principia non variant scientiam, nisi ratione alterius modi sumendi ea; plura enim principia concurrunt in eadem scientia, propter unum modum et uniformem quo sumuntur."

## MICHELANGELO'S *LAST JUDGMENT* AND ITS AESTHETIC IMPLICATIONS

Though Michelangelo's painting of the *Last Judgment*, in the Sistine Chapel, might be considered the last paradigm monument of Renaissance humanistic Christianity, it is heavily indebted to a predecessor, equal in greatness. It borrows from Dante the highest characteristics of his poetry; the objectivity of the representation and the consistency in the narrative of the event of the souls who rise or fall at the final behest of Christ as Judge-Redeemer. Here too, as in the case of the *Divina Comedia*, the *Last Judgment* remains an epic, the most objective and realistic one that the viewer can possibly imagine for the situation the artist had to deal with. The painting is the epic of terrestrial and cosmic finality; the artist's attention is entirely concentrated on embodiment, and on the faithful rendition of something objective and real; there is no place for lyrical effusion.

Michelangelo cannot be, along with most of the great artists of fifteenth and sixteenth century endeavor, ludicrously included in the "entourage" who were called upon to meet the demands "of human reason."<sup>1</sup> The most significant trends of fifteenth and sixteenth century culture are sharply in contrast to such theories. Rather, it was believed that the revival of the ancient authors, and through them, the spiritual values of the Christian world could be defended and re-established. "To Petrarch and to all those who followed him and exalted with him the studies that they called *studia humanitatis* or *humanae litterae*, these same studies were by no means a way of breaking away from the world of religion."<sup>2</sup> These studies were pursued with unequalled passion as a means of perfecting the soul — aiding it in a more certain path toward the goal of the Christian

<sup>1</sup> Anthony Blunt, *Artistic Theories in Italy: 1450-1600* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Rocco Montano, "The Renaissance?", *Umanesimo*, 1 (1967), 5.

life. This is made most clear in Petrarch's introduction to his *De remediis utriusque fortunae*:

How grateful should we be to those writers who lived so many centuries before us and who were endowed with divine minds and saintly customs and now live, dwell, talk with us ! Among the perpetual storms of our souls, like propitious and caressing zephyrs, like expert and industrious pilots, not only do they point out for us the harbour of peace, but toward it they stimulate the weak strings of our will and hold the helm of our wavering soul so that it may be steady and moderate among so many windstorms. This is the true philosophy ; not the one which the fallacious wings and arrogance swollen with sterile arguments whirls into the void, but the one which with firm and modest steps lends help to our salvation. <sup>3</sup>

In *De sui ipsius ignorantia*, Petrarch re-asserted the main constant theme of his spiritual career :

The Latin poets — shake those who are lazy, raise the fallen ones, awake those who are sleeping, sustain those who are uncertain and lift them to pure desires and elevated thoughts. To those who are directed to these sacred things the authors whom I mentioned are great help and assistance... Although our goal is not virtue as the ancient philosophers thought, nevertheless the straight road which leads to our true goal passes through virtue ; through virtue, I mean, not because we know it, but because we love it. <sup>4</sup>

Humanism, it must be stressed, was, in essence, a movement of ideas opposed to science. In *Dei sui ipsius ignorantia*, the poet expresses an overt pride of ignoring science ; because it is quite spiritually destructive knowledge. Instead, "man is led in the arbor of salvation" through the writings of the Church Fathers. "They are called human because they lead man to perfection," said Bruni.

Michelangelo's *Last Judgment* is not only the "great exemplar of the grand manner of painting" as Vasari tells us, but is equally directed toward giving man a knowledge of himself and his human and divine goals. It is true that Michelangelo's treatment of the subject is different from any previously done. One has only to read Vasari's masterful *ekphrasis* of this great work <sup>5</sup> and to "look" at

<sup>3</sup> Francesco Petrarca, *Prose* ed. by C. Martellotti et al. (Milano-Napoli, 1955), p. 650.

<sup>4</sup> *Prose* (Milano-Napoli, 1955), p. 747.

<sup>5</sup> Svetlana L. Alpers, "Ekphrasis and Aesthetic Attitudes in Vasari's Lives," *Journal Of The Warburg And Courtauld Institutes*, 23 (1960).

it, in order to find that it is truly a manifestation of pure Christian humanism and not mere *invenzione* for its own sake. It is neither a programmatic representation of a Neo-Platonic doctrine nor a personal polemic against the world. It has also erroneously been suggested that Michelangelo followed certain Platonic ideas in his arrangement of the succession of scenes in the Sistine Ceiling. As has been argued, this is not even probable. It is more likely that, "the whole mental substratum of his work descends from the Holy Scriptures and their interpretation by himself and his theological advisers at the court of Julius II."<sup>6</sup> The latter would have been based upon the old commentators commonly known and used at the time, St. Jerome and Nicholas of Lyra.<sup>7</sup> The fact that some slight indications from old philosophical ideas might appear may be explained by the fact that both these ancient authors took into consideration and quoted other ancients such as Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, who themselves constitute one of the sources of Christian doctrine. In addition, Michelangelo quoted formal ideas taken over from ancient monuments as in the case of Christ in the Last Judgment, whose head and facial aspects are quoted from the Apollo Belvedere and His over-taut body clearly refers to the Hercules Farnese. Such references preoccupied Michelangelo and entailed bringing with them an acceptance of ancient ideas connected with such representations. Instead of discovering a direct influence from Pico or Ficino, one sees that Michelangelo has brought together all mankind into a single objective moment, portraying all the emotions that man can experience. Harmony is brought to bear on the entire work not because it is a composition involving "a sort of cosmic whirlpool," as Tolnay puts it, but because it is the realization of a single objective moment in the universe.

The seven Revelation angels (Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, Uriel, Raguel, Saraqael, and Remiel or Camael) sound their *tuba mirum*, signalling the dead to rise, not by their own volition, but by God's alone. These angels are wingless and as such the fullest possible realization of what are essentially incorporeal or, in the words of the Angelic Doctor, *substantiae separatae*: blowing with titanic strength

<sup>6</sup> Harry B. Gutman, "Jonah and Zachariah on the Sistine Ceiling," *Franciscan Studies*, (1945), p. 162.

<sup>7</sup> "Nicholas of Lyra and Michelangelo's Ancestors of Christ," *Franciscan Studies*, (1944), 223-228.

into the slender tubes that emit a sound so tumultuous that even the viewer becomes a listener as he is forced to hear the blast. The dead souls rise, only partially alive with blackened eyes, though still pointedly in the direction of the trumpet blasts.

The blessed rise and the damned fall back into oblivious pits of awaiting demons. The blessed souls struggle towards the heavenly realm with the help of other souls already fully revivified by Christ. A large angel, with a gesture of pure compassion and charity, lifts two swarthy looking souls as they clutch on to a golden rosary.

Souls from all corners of the universe rush into sight. Some can be seen still at tremendous distances and traveling at great speeds. The blessed are seen embracing one another and expressing the greatest joy that they are once again alive through God's redeeming Grace.

Encircled about Christ are countless numbers of apostles and prophets, many with raised hand and extended forefinger in a final act of intercession. Each seems to be trying to capture Christ's attention in order that they might make a final interceding bid for another soul. The father of the human race, Adam, along with St. Peter, who represents the foundation of the Church, flank Christ at either side.

Among the saints, one sees St. Bartholomew at the feet of Christ, holding the instrument of his martyrdom in one hand and his flayed skin in the other. Likewise, we see St. Sebastian, kneeling and shaking loose from a cloth, the many darts that pierced his naked body. At the same time, he mimics the gesture of an archer, as if to insure the memory of his horrendous murder. He is an emphatic reminder of man's inhumanity as he displays *all* the darts in order to make a specific iteration; that instead of just one dart effectively shot into his body, an excessive number was launched, as well. In addition, an almost countless number of male and female saints and other figures surround Christ at near and far distances.

At the very top of the whole scene, the entire Passion of Christ is recalled. Several angels carry the Cross with great difficulty as they bring to the mind of the viewer the sinful weight Christ bore with His crucifixion. A small group of angels precede the latter and mime a game of dice, the reference to which is obvious. Likewise, another group of struggling angels carry the Pillar of Christ's flagellation, as well as the lance, the sponge, the nails, and the Crown of Thorns. The angel carrying the Crown holds it so all may see it clearly and the fingers of his hand stick out as a kind of echo of its thorniness.

Within the representation of Christ as a Herculean type — at once the Judge and full of Grace — and the figures of the damned, expressing fear of eternal punishment, Michelangelo has portrayed the full scale of human emotion and response, equalled only by Dante.

Here, as in almost all of his works, Michelangelo has celebrated the dignity and divinity of mankind. Many have ignored the fact that the exaltation of divinity of man was a characteristic manifestation of the humanistic Christianity of the Renaissance, which at the same time remained faithful to the evident pessimism of Christian philosophy and drew many new lessons from the ancients concerning the miseries of life and the fragility of the human condition. In fact, Classicism means first of all knowledge of man and awareness of his limitations. Petrarch's *De remediis* is precisely a series of consolations about the many calamities and weaknesses of human life. Even Marsilio Ficino, who wrote some of the most exalted celebrations of man's divinity, often remarked: "homo dicitur ab humo" (man is named after soil); "how can anything be true in this world when the world itself is as false as filthy... ? As Hesiodus says, the earth is full of evils so are all the seas... for this reason, although we cannot share completely the views of the Manicheans about this world, be it permitted at least to inveigh with them against it."<sup>8</sup>

At the same time Michelangelo celebrates the divinity of man, he does not include his immortality *simpliciter*. This is not possible in such an objective representation as the *Last Judgment*. Here, the souls, blessed or damned, are not Platonic souls using a body. They are truly mortal souls and the knowledge of this mortality is in fact a great gain. Michelangelo's souls are shown as forms in matter, but they are not capable of operating or existing without the body, in this life. However, these souls are shown to at least participate in immortality by their ability to grasp the universal which is Christ, *esse tantum*. The souls are able to rise above the limitations of the human body in order to partake of what is universal and truth. The blessed souls have already revelled in the reward of virtue itself and the damned have already been punished by vice itself. Michelangelo, as Christian humanist, has made no concession, here, by not attempting to make any formal contention concerning the immortality of the soul. As in the case of the eternity of the world, neither its affirmation or its denial can be demonstrated by natural reason

<sup>8</sup> Marsilio Ficino, *Opera* (Basileae, 1561), p. 836.

alone, but only accepted through faith. If anything, the *Last Judgment* testifies to the mortality of the soul and opposes the Platonic idea of its natural immortality. If the latter were the case, the artist need not have even painted the scene, for it shows, above all, that grace is a merit and that only with the resurrection of the body, with supernatural grace and redemption, is immortality consistently conceivable.

Alaready, Michelangelo's *Last Judgment* and the Sistine ceiling, as well, point to the same direction the Church took in its return to the assumption of St. Thomas Aquinas: that man is neither spirit nor mind at odds, but a unique and indivisible reality of flesh and soul, the former being essential to any progress towards perfection. Thus, Platonism was to end due to its extreme form of spiritualism by establishing a separasion between body and soul and asserting the body as the prison of the soul. The latter was unacceptable to the Church as well as the more untenable (from a Christian point of view) theory of love and beauty as a ladder to God, established by Ficino. Because of his spiritualism in addition to the delusion that beauty can be disembodied and sought in its spirituality, Ficino, in fact, ignored the basic Christian tenet according to which all attachment to the world is a motive of alienation from God. Nevertheless, his theories were more than fashionable at a certain point in the Renaissance — a point when Christianity was veritably rescued from its feeble state that had erupted during the late Middle Ages.

Then Pico della Mirandola became a member and whole-hearted follower of Ficino's academy and gave greater emphasis to the principle that the body is but a prison for the soul. For Pico, it is man's task to free himself from bodily and worldly chains and ties in order to ascend to the sphere of the angels. Given what has already been said, this was a dangerous deviation from the firmly realistic premises of the humanistic movement. Humanism was essentially concerned with the cultivation of virtue as well as a firm awareness of human limitations, as was previously mentioned. It also meant consciousness of man's commitment to the world and not easy Platonic flights in the direction of the world of beauty and intelligence.

Pico, however, despite his extreme spirituality, gave a most eloquent and beatiful expression, in his *De dignitate hominis*, to the fundamental humanistic faith in man as a being capable of freeing himself from worldly chains and elevating himself to the divine

spheres. This was humanistic polemic *par excellence* against the Aristotelian naturalism that flourished in the school of Padua under the powerful aegis of Pietro Pomponazzi, and which asserted the complete dependence of man on natural causes, as is manifested in the latter's *De Fato*. Pico also defended the same essential Christian doctrine concerning the independence of human spirit from astrological and naturalistic causes in his treatise, *In astrologiam*.

Thus, Humanism was a movement of confidence in human means, moral strength, philosophy, and learning as the most certain means and approach to Christ. Likewise, it was a distrust in personal inspiration, in utter abandonment to God and in all belief liable to evolve into self-delusion. It is now, in the realm of Christianity, to improve whatever is worthy in man, to gain higher and better knowledge, and to proceed "with firm and modest steps" as Petrarch had endeavored to do, on the way to perfection.

Humanism is manifested in beauty and clarity, as well as the reconciliation between man and the divine, and the confidence in man as that expressed so uniquely in Michelangelo's representation of God's animation of Adam, or the dynamic but beneficent Christ-Judge in the *Last Judgment*. It has been truly and sensitively stated by one of my past mentors that, "Michelangelo's Creation is the revelation of the human world which comes to celebrated God."

Just as Michelangelo gave us his next to last great monument in fresco, in the *Last Judgment*, the Renaissance was coming to an end. At the head of the miseries and falls of men and the shortcomings of the age, as well, God's wrath seems to rise, but if the world seems to be pushed back into perdition, it is not by the hand of a wrathful or vindictive God. Here, Christ is man, as well. He applies the justice which is still of the world. The Madonna is at Christ's right side and not cringing at His feet; she is at the same time humble and high, but not in fearful awe.

## THE PRESENT STATE OF SALIMBENE STUDIES WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX OF THE MAJOR WORKS

The *Cronica* of Fra Salimbene of Parma (1221-1290) is one of the major sources of information about thirteenth-century Europe. The good friar traveled extensively in Italy and France, met important people, and saw many interesting events. Fra Salimbene's anecdotes are famous and for that reason the *Cronica* has been a source for the popular enjoyment of medieval history.<sup>1</sup> More importantly, the chronicle has served as a storehouse of information for the early Ministers-General of the Order Elias and John of Parma. Even though the *Cronica* has been quoted frequently by modern-day scholars, and a multitude of descriptive translations of events and persons have been made from the chronicle, it has barely been studied historiographically. In recent years the renewed interest in Joachim of Fiore's influence upon the thirteenth century, particularly upon the Mendicant Orders, has caused an abundant use of Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*. The *Cronica* has become a primary source for these studies. Unfortunately, as in the past, Fra Salimbene's merits as a recorder of events and his own views regarding those events have been ignored.

The chronicle has only been available for general use during the last century. The fortune of Fra Salimbene's *Cronica* was to lie unused in a few private and public libraries for several centuries with curious readers occasionally scanning the folios.<sup>2</sup> In 1857, the city of Parma, Italy, commissioned the first modern edition of the manuscript which was titled *Chronica Fratris Salimbene Ordinis Minorum ex codice*

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<sup>1</sup> Numerous popular narratives taken from Fra Salimbene's *Cronica* were listed in F. Bernini, "Bibliografia Salimbeniana," *Studi Francescani*, ser. iii, (1932) pp. 81-85.

<sup>2</sup> A fascinating account of the occasional reader's comments concerning the *Cronica* is by F. Bernini, "Noterella in margine a Salimbene," *Archivio storico per le province Parmensi*, XXVIII (1928) pp. 35-43.

*Bibliothecae Vaticanae nunc primum edita.*<sup>3</sup> This publication proved to have many errors and was extremely difficult to use. From 1857 until the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* edition of the *Cronica* appeared under the care of O. Holder-Egger in 1913, the academic world concerned itself with the technical and paleographic aspects of the extant manuscript. These manuscript studies were done initially by O. Holder-Egger, L. Clédat, F. Bernini, F. Novati, and A. Cerlini. The fruits of their labors were summarized in O. Holder-Egger's "Preface" to the MGH edition of the *Cronica*.<sup>4</sup> These experts attempted to locate the most accurate and complete manuscript of the *Cronica*, date the work, and find contemporary influences which affected the writer. Particular attention was given by Holder-Egger, Cerlini, F. Chiri, and A. Dove to comparisons with Albert Milioli of Reggio nell'Emilia and Bishop Sicard of Cremona. Cerlini and Dove identified many passages in Milioli's works that were similar, and at times identical, to those in Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*. They finally concluded that Fra Salimbene and Albert Milioli were acquainted and probably influenced each other. Clédat did the most complete manuscript study in his monograph, *De Fratre Salimbene et de eius Chronicae auctoritate*.<sup>5</sup> His findings led him to believe that Fra Salimbene actually recorded the paragraph condemning Obizzo de Este's election as Podestà of Reggio nell'Emilia in 1290. This meant that Fra Salimbene could not have died until 1290, and that the cod. Vat. 7260, which contained this passage, was most likely the original manuscript. This contention was generally upheld by other scholars at the time, and Holder-Egger displayed Clédat's proof in the "Preface" of the MGH edition of the *Cronica*.

Since the very prestigious Holder-Egger edition of the *Cronica*, historical interests have mostly concentrated in two areas: the production of a more manageable modern edition of the chronicle, and the separation from the *Cronica* of descriptive material relevant to various disciplines. In 1942, F. Bernini produced an edition for the *Scrittori d'Italia*, and in 1966, G. Scalia organized the manuscript into the most workable form. Scalia's work is easy to use and it is

<sup>3</sup> *Chronica Fratris Salimbene Ordinis Minorum ex codice Bibliothecae Vaticanae nunc primum edita*, ed. C. Cantarelli (*Monumenta Historica ad provincias Parmensem et Placentinam pertinentia*, III, Parma, 1857).

<sup>4</sup> *Cronica*, ed. O. Holder-Egger (*Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, XXXII, Hanover and Leipzig, 1913).

<sup>5</sup> L. Clédat, *De Fratre Salimbene et de eius Chronicae auctoritate*, (Paris, 1878).

particularly important for its most prodigious "Note" section. Scalia presents a summary of paleographic knowledge concerning Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*, some recent bibliography, and he has identified almost every author quoted by Fra Salimbene (several hundred). Scalia has labeled each scripture reference used by Salimbene, even though the friar preferred to paraphrase Scripture in many instances. Scalia also compiled an extensive index for the *Cronica* with cross references to the Holder-Egger edition. In the past fifty years the chronicle has been translated entirely or in part into Italian, German, French, and English. The translations, unfortunately, are repetitious and deal almost entirely with Fra Salimbene's autobiographical sections or his travels.

A number of descriptive and anecdotic religious studies have been produced, based upon Fra Salimbene's observations. Among others, P. Pelliot, L. Cellucci, N. Scivoletto, E. Emerton and M. Laureille have greatly added details to our knowledge of the Church and Christianity in the thirteenth century from their portrayals based on Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*.<sup>6</sup> Many of these religious studies are simply translations from the *Cronica*. Others have hoped to justify a point of view by presenting Fra Salimbene's descriptions. Father Michael in the late nineteenth century, for example, devoted a monograph to Salimbene trying to justify those passages offensive to Victorian moral standards, and thus promote the Roman Catholic Church as a Christian institution in the Middle Ages.<sup>7</sup> Few authors have attempted to analyse the thirteenth century religious scene found in Fra Salimbene's chronicle.

R. Brentano: *The Two Churches: England and Italy in the Thirteenth Century*, has presented Fra Salimbene and the Italian Church *vis-à-vis* Matthew Paris and the English Church as typical in the thirteenth century. Brentano has done the best general study beyond mere description and he draws conclusions about the Italian Church based upon Fra Salimbene's observations. By comparing Fra Salimbene and Matthew Paris, Brentano has shown the vast differences between the Italian and English Churches during the thirteenth century. Three excellent studies of specific religious topics have been

<sup>6</sup> For specific references for the above scholars see the bibliographic listings following this article under title of "Religious Studies."

<sup>7</sup> E. Michael, *Salimbene und seine Chronik: Eine Studie zur Geschichtsschreibung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts* (Innsbruck, 1889).

produced from reading Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*. D'Alençon's article, "Hyères Franciscain, Hugues de Digne et Salimbene", has clearly shown the establishment of Joachite studies near Aix-en-Provence, and Callebaut has done a similar study of the convent outside of Pisa.<sup>8</sup> The recent article by E. Daniel convincingly shows an intellectual shift during the late thirteenth century from crusade to conversion of non-Christian peoples. His article, "Apocalyptic Conversion: The Joachite Alternative to the Crusades," effectively and exhaustively relies upon Fra Salimbene's observations as a primary source.

One of the most publicized aspects of the *Cronica* is Fra Salimbene's catalogue of his travels. His trips have been studied and his geographic comments analyzed by G. Bertolini, P. M. d'Aincreville, and F. Pacifico. The friar's descriptions of France and Italy have added to our knowledge of medieval geographic lore.<sup>9</sup>

In a class by itself is L. Messedaglia's essay, "Leggendo la *Cronica* di frate Salimbene da Parma. Note per la storia della vita economica e del costume nel secolo."<sup>10</sup> This most profitable study painstakingly builds an interesting and useful picture of thirteenth-century urban life, clothing, and manners based upon Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*. Messedaglia's article is a first-rate example of what may be accomplished from a critical reading of medieval chronicles.

The *Cronica* is important in the study of Italian Latin literature because it bridges the Medieval and Renaissance periods. Fra Salimbene's eloquent and colorful narrative, his lively digressions and his sense of humor have encouraged scholars to study his style and literary form in comparison to other great Italian writers. G. Scalia concluded that Salimbene's true talent was literary rather than historical.<sup>11</sup> F. Bernini, in a number of essays, compared Fra Salimbene's style and artistry to that of Dante and Petrarch. In his "Pe-

<sup>8</sup> P. d'Alençon, "Hyères Franciscain, Hugues de Digne et Salimbene," *Etudes Franciscaines*, XXXIV (1922), pp. 232-258; A. Callebaut, "Le Joachimite Benoît, abbé de Camajore et Fra Salimbene," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* XX (1927) pp. 219-262; E. Daniel, "Apocalyptic Conversion: The Joachite Alternative to the Crusades," *Traditio*, XXV (1969) pp. 127-154.

<sup>9</sup> See the bibliographic listings following this article under the title of "Geographic Studies."

<sup>10</sup> L. Messedaglia, "Leggendo la *Cronica* di frate Salimbene da Parma. Note per la storia della vita economica e del costume nel secolo XIII," *Atti dell'Istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti*, CIII, pt. ii (1943) pp. 352-426.

<sup>11</sup> *Cronica*, (ed. G. Scalia, Bari, 1966) p. 967.

trarca e Frate Salimbene alla spelonca della Sainte-Baume," Bernini contrasted the friar and Petrarch in this way, "Petrarca trasfigura poeticamente il reale, Salimbene lo delinea con cura sincera ed evidenza."<sup>12</sup> Other literary studies of Fra Salimbene's *Cronica* include an excellent chapter devoted to the friar by M. Apollonio, *Uomini e forme nella cultura italiana delle Origini—Storia letteraria del Duecento*; and the old but useful article by F. Novati, "La Cronaca di Salimbene." Novati was the first to fully realize Fra Salimbene's place in Italian Latin literature. Fra Salimbene also rated a prominent place in L. Russo, *Storia della letteratura italiana* and by the *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*.<sup>13</sup>

The most significant literary investigation, however, was made by A. Momigliano in his book, *Cinque Saggi*. His essay, "Motivi e forme della 'Cronica' di Salimbene," is a short, accurate, and critical analysis of the chronicle with special attention given to stylistic questions. Comparing the *Cronica* with other works produced in the Italian city-states in the thirteenth century, he found Fra Salimbene's style to be "domestico," and that in the structure of his syntax, the friar imitated "il carattere di modesta rievocazione famigliare o municipale."<sup>14</sup>

For a chronicle which has been quoted and used extensively, there are few studies of Salimbene's historiography. The relationship of his *Cronica* to Italian chronicles of the same period, especially those of Bishop Siccard of Cremona and the two scripts of the so-called "double chronicle" of Albert Milioli of Reggio nell'Emilia, has been investigated by A. Dove, *Die Doppelchronick von Reggio und die Quellen Salimbene's*, A. Cerlini, "Fra Salimbene e le cronache attribuite ad Alberto Milioli," and O. Holder-Egger, "Preface" to the MGII edition.<sup>15</sup> Holder-Egger found that Fra Salimbene relied on

<sup>12</sup> F. Bernini, "Petrarca e Frate Salimbene alla spelonca della Sainte-Baume," *Archivio storico per le Province Parmensi*, ns, XXXIV (1934) p. 277. For Bernini's comparison of Fra Salimbene with Dante see his article, "Dante e Salimbene," *Convivium* (1936) pp. 103-114.

<sup>13</sup> A. Apollonio, *Uomini e forme nella cultura italiana delle origini; saggio di storiografia letteraria* (Firenze, 1934), F. Novati, "La Cronaca di Salimbene," *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, I (1883) pp. 381-414; L. Russo, *Storia della letteratura italiana, Dizionario bibliografico degli Italiani* (Roma, 1960- ).

<sup>14</sup> A. Momigliano, *Cinque Saggi* (Firenze, 1943) p. 589.

<sup>15</sup> A. Dove, *Die Doppelchronick von Reggio und die Quellen Salimbene's* (Leipzig, 1873); A. Cerlini, "Fra Salimbene e le cronache attribuite ad Alberto Milioli," *Archivio muratoriano*, I (1910) pp. 383-409.

Siccard's chronicle for historical data in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. The similarities between the friar and the notary Milioli probably sprang from two sources. They may well have collaborated at times, and they could have used the same documents located at Reggio. One of the best copies of Joachim of Fiore's *Liber Figurarum*, was at Reggio and both quoted from this source.<sup>16</sup>

The principle examination of the historical concepts and judgment made by Fra Salimbene is by C. Violante, "Motivi e caratteri della *Cronica di Salimbene*."<sup>17</sup> Violante, in this superb study, found no guiding historical theory or "philosophy" in the *Cronica* and concluded that the friar's interpretation of events was colored by his background which was "aristocratica, cortese, mondana e laica."<sup>18</sup> It is certainly true, as Violante says, that "vagheggia l'ideale cortese e si refugia nella sua arte," but this may well have been a major bias and human flaw in the author, not the overall guiding principle of the *Cronica*. Violante has interpreted Salimbene's motivation and inspiration as "amore e cortesia" in a chivalric sense. Fundamentally, then, the *Cronica* was meant to be a narrative of valor and addresses itself to the question of whether this ancient spirit could be sustained in the author's contemporary world.<sup>19</sup> Violante uses as examples the many knight-heroes of Salimbene who demonstrated the aristocratic characteristics of prudence and valor. Violante compared descriptions of individuals in the chronicle and concluded that Salimbene's highest praise went to military leaders like Nicholas, Bishop of Reggio, "...quasi vir militaris nobili genere ortus de Mathaversis... cum clericis clericus, cum religiosis religiosus, cum militibus miles, cum baronibus baro."<sup>20</sup> Bernardo Rolandi showed the highest ideals of valor. Salimbene described him as a man, "qui melius personam magni principis representaret."<sup>21</sup> Many of Fra Salimbene's comments con-

<sup>16</sup> L. Tondelli, *Il Libro delle Figure dell'abate Gioachino da Fiore* (Torino, 1941). Introduction by Reeves and Hirsch-Reich in volume II gives a complete account of the Reggio manuscript.

<sup>17</sup> C. Violante, "Motivi e caratteri della *Cronica di Salimbene*," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. - Lettere, storia e filosofia*, ser. ii, XXII (1953) pp. 108-154.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120.

cerning the social and political transformations of his lifetime clearly show that his sympathy lay with the *grandi* as a social class. Violante finds in this justification for Salimbene's attempt to find a coherent intellectual base for Italian government in the thirteenth century. The friar observed the state and found that the *grandi* were being replaced in roles of leadership by the *popolo*. Thus, the chronicler condemns the statutes of Bologna passed by the influential guilds of that city in 1287 as oppressive to the *grandi*. These statutes, which Salimbene thoroughly disliked, were so harsh and far-reaching (according to the chronicler) that Salimbene declared that the *grandi* of Bologna were henceforth comparable to the nobility of France in that the nobles of Bologna left the city and returned to live on their estates. They did this, Salimbene claimed, "out of fear for the persecution of the furious communality."<sup>22</sup>

Fra Salimbene's vain attempt to find a coherent intellectual base for Italian government and society in the thirteenth century may have sprung from his religious and Joachite beliefs as well. The friar felt that it was crucial to his salvation to repudiate his worldly origins upon entering the Order. He abrogated his family ties and his aristocratic background completely and consciously, an action which accorded with the *penitentia* preached and shown by the Seraphic Founder of the Order.<sup>23</sup> What Violante ignored was Fra Salimbene's spiritual and intellectual training and beliefs. As I have shown elsewhere, Fra Salimbene considered himself a priest and friar first, and, as such, he held definite ideas about the Order to which he had dedicated his life.<sup>24</sup> Taking a moderate Joachite position, the chronicler fully explained that the role of the Franciscans

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>23</sup> *Cronica*, pp. 40-41. (References to Fra Salimbene's *Cronica* are from the MGH edition by O. Holder-Egger.) For St. Francis' concept of *penitentia* see G. Ladner, "Reformatio," *Ecumenical Dialogue at Harvard: The Roman Catholic-Protestant Colloquium* (Cambridge, 1965) p. 189. Fra Salimbene's early years in the Order were continually threatened by his father's attempts to have him kidnapped or expelled. The friar was finally rewarded for his steadfastness by a miracle where a statue of the Virgin came to life and allowed him to hold the Christ child. But he always held that his true reward was that promised in Psalm 26:10, "Pater meus et mater mea dereliquerunt me, Dominus autem asupsit me."

<sup>24</sup> My article, "The Re-formed Church and the Friars Minor: The Moderate Joachite Position of Fra Salimbene," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, no. 3-4 (1971) pp. 273-284.

was to re-form the Church through the teachings of St. Francis. Fra Salimbene was especially taken with the desire to partake in the restoration of the Church as prophesied in Isaiah 54:11-15. Using complicated concordances and exegeses, Fra Salimbene proclaimed that to the Friars Minor had been given the "knowledge and understanding" promised in Matthew 11:15 and Jeremiah 3:15. Thus, through this *spiritualis intelligentia*, the revelation to the Third Age would emerge and the "New Jerusalem" of Isaiah would gradually become a reality. In the *Cronica*, Fra Salimbene strove to distinguish between the ideal of *ecclesia* and its realization in history.

Civil irresponsibility had to be cleared away for the new age, because it produced the violence, lawlessness, ambition, and other vicious passions that characterized the men of Salimbene's time in history. Because of his absorption in the instability of society and in its contrast to the age to come, Salimbene gave to his readers an insight into social and political developments in northern Italy in the thirteenth century. Certain events had to wait until the end of time, but they might be anticipated by a careful scrutiny of the present. For Salimbene an accurate eschatological inquiry into events presented a destination, and destination served the individual in preparation for the future time. Temporal society was visibly changing, and change was central to Salimbene's understanding of Joachim of Fiore's predictions. Violante has accurately held that Salimbene was more interested in the *grandi* than other classes. He was a member of that class and he knew the members intimately. Violante has also correctly concluded that Salimbene believed them to be the proper leaders of temporal society, a position that they were rapidly losing by default in the thirteenth century. In his commentary following the statutes passed at Bologna which limited the power of the *grandi* and elevated the importance of the bourgeoisie, Salimbene felt it necessary to warn the world of the dangers inherent to such acts on the part of men.<sup>25</sup> In the first place, such statutes were in violation

<sup>25</sup> *Cronica*, p. 643-644. Salimbene exaggerated the result of these laws due to his sympathies with the *grandi*. See *Statuti delle società del popolo di Bologna* (Rome, 1896) p. 165ff. A series of statutes were passed in 1287-88 to encourage commerce and to allow commercial interests to dominate the city. Except for the insistence upon control of the city's politics, these statutes do not appear as terrible as Salimbene would have his readers believe. Also, see G. Orlandelli's comments in *Gli uffici economici e finanziari del comune dal XII al XV secolo* (Archivio di stato di Bologna) p. xx-xxii. The rights and privileges of the

of Leviticus 19:15-18. He continued, "moreover the men of the people and country folk are the ones through whom the world is ruined, but through knights and nobles it is saved." He concluded by warning that holy Scripture speaks of the dominion of certain types of people as most undesirable as rulers (e.g. women, children, servants, fools, enemies, and worthless people).

The political position of the *grandi* had to be restored, and they had to be redeemed as individuals in order to accept and to fulfill their position of leadership adequately. It was essential that the nobility reassume their political responsibility so that peace, order, good leadership, hard work, and honesty could be brought about in temporal society. With the Friars Minor as prototypes, the nobility could improve their own and other people's lives in obedience to the demands of God. For this reason, Salimbene found some good in some of the most vile men of his time. They were receptive to the friars and their message. They were responding to God's revelation, ever so slightly to be sure, but nevertheless, their eyes were occasionally turned upward to the message of St. Francis.

As early as 1927, A. Callebaut pointed to the deep Joachite strain in Fra Salimbene's historical training. In an article, "Le Joachimite Benoît, abbé de Camajore et Fra Salimbene," Callebaut tied the friar to early Joachite studies at the convent at Pisa.<sup>26</sup> In 1943, G. Toffanin in a short chapter titled, "Da l'altro gioachimismo," in his book, *Il secolo senza Roma*, stated that Joachim of Fiore had influenced Fra Salimbene's *Cronica*.<sup>27</sup> Toffanin pointed to various Joachite passages and to quotations from Joachim and pseudo-Joachite sources in the *Cronica*, but he did not demonstrate the importance of this. Recent scholars, among them E. Benz, M. Reeves, M. Bloomfield, and E. Daniel, have found Fra Salimbene's *Cronica* to be invaluable in the study of Joachimism.<sup>28</sup> They have recognized the

*popolo* and the *grandi* were summarized in 1288. In these statutes the *popolo* certainly had the advantage in the courts and for elected office. See *Statuti di Bologna dell'anno 1288* (ed. G. Fasoli and P. Sella, Città del Vaticano, 1937) "Liber quartus" and "Liber quintus." Also of interest is the article by G. Fasoli, "La legislazione antimagnatizia a Bologna fino al 1292," *Rivista storica del diritto italiano*, VI (1933) p. 374ff.

<sup>26</sup> A. Callebaut, "Le Joachimite Benoît, abbé de Camajore et Fra Salimbene," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XX (1927) pp. 219-222.

<sup>27</sup> G. Toffanin, *Il secolo senza Roma (Il Rinascimento del secolo XIII)*, (Bologna, 1943).

<sup>28</sup> E. Benz, *Ecclesia Spiritualis. Kirchenidee und Geschichts-theologie der*

influence of Joachimism in the thinking of the friar. Benz, particularly, has compared Salimbene's Joachite attitudes concerning the Order of Friars Minor and Salimbene's condemnation of the emperor Frederick II with the concepts of other Franciscans in the thirteenth century. Daniel has made detailed studies of certain passages in the *Cronica* which deal with the crusades and crusade-minded popes. Daniel has found Salimbene to be an early advocate of what he labels Apocalyptic conversion. Nevertheless, the depth of Fra Salimbene's Joachite beliefs has not been fully investigated. Yet it was primarily from this source that Fra Salimbene perceived a pattern and a meaning in history. The composition of a major chronicle was a part of Salimbene's mission as a Friar Minor. The *Cronica* was intended to edify and instruct. In part this meant that Salimbene the friar and preacher expounded the personal renewal taught by St. Francis. It was also Salimbene's motive to promote the revelation of God to the thirteenth century. This revelation was that seen by the Order of St. Francis through their special insight into the meaning of Scripture. The chronicler eventually tells his readers that he is guided by the principle of noting carefully the appearance into the world of those things prefigured in "both Testaments," and in the "writings of Joachim of Fiore."<sup>29</sup>

Written in the 1280's, the *Cronica* was the end product of Fra Salimbene's thinking. He had suffered traumatic disenchantment with early Joachimism with its naive "dated" apocalypse and instead began to formulate a new kind of Joachimism which was gradualistic rather than catastrophic. The friar was very much a member of the crowd of Joachites surrounding Fra Hugh of Digne at Hyères to listen to Joachimist discussions.<sup>30</sup> As a student of prophecies and as an

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franziskanischen Reformation (Stuttgart, 1934). M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1969). M. Bloomfield, "Joachim of Flora: A Critical Survey of his Canon, Teachings, Sources, Biography, and Influence," *Traditio*, XIII (1957) pp. 249-311. E. Daniel, "A Re-Examination of the Origins of Franciscan Joachimism," *Speculum*, XLIII (1968) pp. 671-676, and his article, "Apocalyptic Conversion: The Joachite Alternative to the Crusades," *Traditio*, XXV (1969) pp. 127-154. Although these studies do not deal specifically with Fra Salimbene or his *Cronica*, they are invaluable to understanding the friar and author.

<sup>29</sup> *Cronica*, p. 293.

<sup>30</sup> Fra Salimbene was ordered to the University of Paris to study theology in 1247. He remained at Paris two weeks and left before enrolling at the university. Instead, he went directly from Paris to Hyères, near Aix-en-Provence,

astute observer of society, he was led to logical application of Joachimist studies, the production of a chronicle of his times: a chronicle with a Joachimist interpretation of history which inspired a rudimentary social and moral conscience.<sup>31</sup> G. Scalia in a short analysis of Salimbene's historiography, found the friar to have been a "passive" Joachite and Scalia concluded that Salimbene's use and recognition of Joachim's writings (or supposed Joachim writings) were formal and exterior. Scalia does concede, however, that the best explanation for Salimbene's frequent reliance upon Scripture as historical evidence was likely due to his Joachite studies.<sup>32</sup>

It would seem, then, that modern scholarship should address itself to Fra Salimbene's spiritual and intellectual motivations for history writing. Fra Salimbene's interest in history grew out of his Joachimist studies. This preoccupation was recognized and encouraged by his superiors. In 1249, he was assigned to the convent at Ferrara with the specific task of correcting and editing chronicles in the convent's library.<sup>33</sup> In the next year, he began his first historical work, a chronicle which he said began with the words: "Octavianus Caesar Augustus." This manuscript is now lost. T. L. Olyphant, "The Life of Fra Salimbene, 1221-1290," thought that the anonymous chronicle in L. A. Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, VIII (titled, *Memoriale Potestatum Regiensium*) might be this lost chronicle.<sup>34</sup> Olyphant gives no reason for his speculation. The first part of the extant chronicle is missing also. The *Cronica* begins in the twelfth century and ends in 1290. Fra Salimbene also refers to a "Prologue"

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to listen to the discourses of Fra Hughes of Digne. Fra Hugh was no stranger to Fra Salimbene. He had met the Joachite-Friar at Siena (*Cronica*, p. 233) and he had heard him preach at both Lucca and Tarascon (*Cronica*, p. 234.)

<sup>31</sup> Fra Salimbene attributed authority to the prophets Joachim of Fiore, Merlin, the Sibyls, Michael Scot, Pseudo-Methodius, and the Prophetic Scriptures (*Cronica*, p. 512). The friar admitted to having read the following of Joachim of Fiore's works: *Liber Concordiae Novi ac Veteris Testamenti*, *Expositio in Apocalypsim*, *Tractatus super quatuor Evangelia*, *super Esaiam*, *Liber Figurarum*, and the pseudo-Joachim, *super Hieremiam*. He also read, and condemned, Gerard of Borgo San Donnino's, *Introductorium in Evangelium Aeternum*.

<sup>32</sup> Scalia, *op. cit.*, p. 964.

<sup>33</sup> *Cronica*, p. 332. We can only guess what effect his hand had on these manuscripts. In a general way, he tells us of his work: "...ex quibus resecavi superfluitates, abusiones, falsitates et contrarietates."

<sup>34</sup> T. Olyphant, "The Life of Fra Salimbene, 1221-1290," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, I (1872), p. 278.

in which he outlined his "philosophy" of history. H. Denifle, *Archiv für literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters*, felt that Fra Salimbene may have written three more shorter chronicles which are now lost.<sup>35</sup>

Besides chronicle writing, the friar wrote a number of essays which were theological and Joachite in nature. In 1266, he wrote the *Tractatus pape Gregorii X*. Sometime later he composed a poem, *Liber Tediorum*, imitating, he said, the style of the early thirteenth-century Cremonese poet, Patecchio. His two prophetic essays were the *Tractatus de Helyseo* and the *Cronica de similitudine et exemplis, de signis et figuris et de mysteriis Veteris et Novi Testamenti*.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately, all of these works are lost. He included two non-historical treatises in the *Cronica*. The friar inserted the *Liber de Prelato*, which was a violent attack on the Minister-General Elias and exemplifies the problems of the Order in the 1240's. The *Liber de Prelato* presented many of Fra Salimbene's religious beliefs such as the role of the Friars Minor in Church history.<sup>37</sup> The *Tractatus de corpore Domini* was included near the middle of the *Cronica* and is liturgical in nature.

Such a list of theological and historical writings would suggest that the friar Salimbene was more than a simple Franciscan recording everything that caught his fancy. It is also evident that more than secular and mundane forces motivated his historical interpretation. Students of historiography need to investigate further the *Cronica*, Salimbene's education, and the depth of Fra Salimbene's Joachite beliefs. A full investigation of Fra Salimbene's historiography would prove fruitful to the understanding of the *Cronica*, the early Franciscan movement, and the developments of Joachimist thought in the thirteenth century.

<sup>35</sup> H. Denifle, *Archiv für literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* (Graz, 1885-1900) I, p. 50. Fra Salimbene's *Tractatus pape Gregorii X* may have been one of these according to Denifle. Also, see *Cronica*, pp. 217 and 293.

<sup>36</sup> *Cronica*, pp. 238, 293, 465, 472.

<sup>37</sup> See especially *Cronica*, p. 100-101.

APPENDIX: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR WORKS  
RELATING TO FRA SALIMBENE AND HIS CRONICA

EDITIONS

1. *Chronica Fratris Salimbene Parmensis Ordinis Minorum ex codice Bibliothecae Vaticanae nunc primum edita*, ed. C. Cantarelli (Monumenta Historica ad provincias Parmensem et Placentinam pertinentia, III) Parma, 1857.
2. *Cronica*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, XXXII) Hanover and Leipzig, 1913.
3. *Cronica*, ed. F. Bernini (Scrittori d'Italia, 187-188) Bari, 1942.
4. *Cronica*, ed. G. Scalia (Scrittori d'Italia, 232-233) Bari, 1966.

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3. *Cronaca di Fra Salimbene Parmigiano*, tr. C. Cantarelli, Parma, 1882-1883.
4. *Jourdain de Giano, Thomas d'Eccleston et Salimbene d'Adam, sur les routes d'Europe au XIIIe siècle - Chroniques*, tr. M.-Th. Laureilhe, Paris, 1959, pp. 161-218. A translation of Fra Salimbene's major trip into France.
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# DIE MITTELALTERLICHEN DEUTSCHEN ÜBERSETZUNGEN DER BULLE *EXIIT QUI SEMINAT* VON PAPST NIKOLAUS III.

Obwohl das Dekretale *Exiit qui seminat* von Papst Nikolaus III. (15. August 1279) bis zum 2. Februar 1970 in Kraft war, steht eine Monographie darüber immer noch aus. Lediglich in den Handbüchern wird die große Bedeutung dieses Dokuments für den Franziskanerorden gewürdigt.<sup>1</sup> Wie wichtig dieses Dekretale, zusammen mit *Exihi de paradiso* von Clemens V. (6. Mai 1312), für den Orden schon im Mittelalter empfunden wurde, geht aus der Tatsache hervor, daß aus dem 14./16. Jahrhundert in fünf Handschriften Übersetzungen erhalten sind:

A : Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München cgm 86.<sup>2</sup>

Diese Handschrift wurde von Fr. Christoph Keck für das Franziskanerkloster in Amberg, Oberpfalz, 1523 geschrieben, vgl. fol. 69<sup>r</sup>: *Geschriben von bruder cristoferus keck vnd gehört fur die gemein zu amberg zu dem anderen tisch zu lesen 1523.* Sie kam dann in den Besitz des Konvents in Ingolstadt in Bayern und schließlich nach München.<sup>3</sup> Die Handschrift ist eine Sammlung der wichtigsten franziskanischen Regeltexte in deutscher Übersetzung:

1<sup>r</sup> – 8<sup>r</sup> : *Regula bullata*

8<sup>r</sup> – 11<sup>v</sup> : *Testamentum*

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<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Heribert Holzapfel, *Handbuch der Geschichte des Franziskanerordens* (Freiburg/Breisgau, 1909), S. 46–49. Josef Terschlüsen, "Die Regel des Franziskanerordens im Licht der geltenden päpstlichen Regelerklärungen," *Werkbuch zur Regel des heiligen Franziskus* (Werl/Westfalen, 1955), S. 96–111. Ferner: F. Elizondo, "De Evangelii et Regulae Franciscanae obligatione usque ad bullam *Exihi de paradiso* Clementis V," *Laurentianum* II (1960), 226–260.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. die kurze Beschreibung in Erich Petzet, *Die deutschen Pergament-Handschriften Nr. 1 – 200 der Staatsbibliothek in München*, Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum Bibliothecae Monacensis V, 1 (München, 1920), S. 153–155.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. Paul Ruf, *Säkularisation und Bayerische Staatsbibliothek* (Wiesbaden, 1962), Bd. 1, S. 206.

11<sup>v</sup> – 47<sup>v</sup> : *Exiit qui seminat*  
 47<sup>v</sup> – 69<sup>r</sup> : *Exivi de paradiso*

B : Universitätsbibliothek München 8° Cod. ms. 142.<sup>4</sup>

Diese Handschrift enthält zahlreiche lateinische Texte (*regula bullata*, grammatische Regeln, ein lateinisches Hymnar mit lateinischen und deutschen Glossen), ferner die deutschen Texte :

30<sup>r</sup> – 32<sup>r</sup> : lateinisch-deutsches Glossar zu den Bullen *Exiit qui seminat* und *Exivi de paradiso*  
 38<sup>r</sup> – 67<sup>v</sup> : *Exiit qui seminat*  
 68<sup>r</sup> – 84<sup>r</sup> : *Exivi de paradiso*  
 180<sup>r</sup> – 183<sup>v</sup> : Medizinische Rezepte

Die beiden Bullen stammen von einem Schreiber und wurden am 4. November 1482 vollendet, vgl. 84<sup>r</sup> : *Explicit anno domini 1482 feria 2a post festum omnium sanctorum*. Die Handschrift befand sich ursprünglich im Franziskanerkloster Landshut, kam dann an die Bibliothek der dortigen Universität und schließlich nach München.<sup>5</sup>

C : Universitätsbibliothek München 8° Cod. ms. 144.<sup>6</sup>

Diese Handschrift wurde in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts von einer Hand geschrieben und befand sich ursprünglich wie B im Franziskanerkloster in Landshut,<sup>7</sup> vgl. 1<sup>r</sup> : *Diesße regel vnd declaracion Nicolai vnd Clementis gehoern zu dem conuent lanczhuot sant franciscen ordens*. In C finden sich die wichtigsten franziskanischen Regeln in deutscher Übersetzung :

2<sup>r</sup> – 16<sup>r</sup> : *Regula bullata*  
 16<sup>r</sup> – 71<sup>v</sup> : *Exiit qui seminat*  
 72<sup>r</sup> – 105<sup>r</sup> : *Exivi de paradiso*

D : Universitätsbibliothek München 8° Cod. ms. 146.<sup>8</sup>

D wurde von H. H. im Franziskanerkloster in Nürnberg 1498/99

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. die Beschreibung in Gisela Kornrumpf und Paul-Gerhard Völker, *Die deutschen mittelalterlichen Handschriften in der Universitätsbibliothek München*, Die Handschriften der Universitätsbibliotjek München 1 (Wiesbaden, 1968), S. 224 f. Eine aufführliche Beschreibung von B ist für den Katalog der lateinischen Handschriften angekündigt.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. Ruf, *Säkularisation* (Anm. 3), S. 244.

<sup>6</sup> Vgl. die Beschreibung in Kornrumpf-Völker (Anm. 4), S. 225 f.

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. Ruf, *Säkularisation* (Anm. 3), S. 244.

<sup>8</sup> Vgl. die Beschreibung in Kornrumpf-Völker (Anm. 4), S. 226 f. Eine

geschrieben, vgl. 199<sup>r</sup>: *A. d. 1498 feria 3<sup>a</sup> ante festum thome apostoly* (= 18. Dezember) *per me fratrem .H.H. ordinis minorum sacri Jn conuentu nurembergensj*, und 221<sup>r</sup>: *Anno redempcio- nis humane 1499 in festo sancti anthony abbatis* (= 17. Jänner) *per me fratrem .H.H. sacri ordinis monorum Jn conuentu nurembergensi*. M. Bihl glaubt, als Schreiber Heinrich Hintermeyer (gest. 1523) identifizieren zu können;<sup>9</sup> Hintermeyer war dann Guardian in Landshut, durch ihn könnte diese Handschrift von Nürnberg dorthin gekommen sein, worauf sie ein ähnliches Schicksal wie B und C erfahren hat.<sup>10</sup> Neben der lateinischen *Regula bullata* und den *Statuta Barchinonensis* nebst vielen Erläuterungen enthält D folgende deutsche Texte:

157<sup>r</sup> – 162<sup>v</sup>: Lateinisch-deutsches Glossar zu *Exiit qui seminat* und *Exivi de paradiso* (vgl. B 30<sup>r</sup> – 32<sup>r</sup>)

163<sup>r</sup> – 199<sup>r</sup>: *Exiit qui seminat*

199<sup>r</sup> – 221<sup>r</sup>: *Exivi de paradiso*

E: Universitätsbibliothek Amsterdam Cod. I. E. 29.

E ist eine "Buchbindereinheit," neun ursprünglich selbständige Teile sind zusammengebunden worden, sodaß der Codex heute aus 158 Blätter besteht, deren durchgehende Foliation sich rechts unten befindet, während rechts oben die Blätter nach ihren ursprünglichen Teilen gezählt sind.

E stellt eine Sammlung von lateinischen und deutschen Regeln und Statuten dar, der Inhalt der einzelnen Teile ist:<sup>11</sup>

1. *Statuta generalia in capitulo generali Tolosano, anno 1532, etc.*  
*Scripta a.d. 1536, de nuovo emendata a. 1732.* Handschr.,

ausführliche Beschreibung von D ist ebenfalls für den Katalog der lateinischen Handschriften angekündigt.

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. Kornrumpf-Völker (Anm. 4), S. 226. Der Aufsatz von M. Bihl in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* XXXVIII (1945) war mir leider nicht zugänglich.

<sup>10</sup> Vgl. Ruf, *Säkularisation* (Anm. 3), S. 244.

<sup>11</sup> Diese kurze Inhaltsangabe wurde mir von der Universitätsbibliothek Amsterdam brieflich zur Verfügung gestellt. Die einzelnen Teile enthalten Texte, die man aufgrund dieser Angaben nicht vermuten würde. Vgl. die ausführliche Beschreibung von Bonaventura Kruitwagen, "Descriptio Codicis Amstelodamensis," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* I (1908), p. 108–115. Zu Teil 4 vgl. auch Norbert Richard Wolf, "A Fifteenth Century Middle German Translation of the Testament of St. Francis of Assisi," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* LXX (1971), p. 451–457.

- Papier, 35 Bll., rechts oben 1 – 34 (1 – 14, 14\*, 15 – 34), rechts unten 1 – 35.
2. *Acta capituli generalissimi divini ordinis sancti Francisci...* a.d. 1517, Gedruckt, Papier, 7 Bll., rechts oben 1 – 7, rechts unten 37 – 43.
  3. *Statuta provincialia edita a. d. 1467 in capitulo brandenburgensi et iam aliqualiter inmutata a. d. 1494 in capitulo luenburgensi*, geschr. 1494, Papier, 11 Bll., rechts oben 1 – 11, rechts unten 44 – 54.
  4. *Dy regel vnd daz leben der kleynen bruder*. Geschr. 1496, Papier, 8 Bll., rechts oben 1 – 8, rechts unten 55 – 62.
  5. *Dy vorclerung des hern des babstes Nicolay des dritten über dy regel der minor oder barfussen bruder*. *Di declaracio des babstes Clementis des funfften über die regel der minor bruder*. Geschr., Papier, 25 Bll., rechts oben 9 – 33, rechts unten 63 – 87.
  6. *Piana bulla concordie fratrum minorum conventionalium*. *Declaracio domini pape Nicolai tertii*. *Declaracio domini pape Clementis quinti*. *Declaraciones fratris Nicolai de Ausimo*. Geschr. 1497, Papier, 26 Bll., rechts oben 35 – 60, rechts unten 89 – 114.
  7. *Ordinarium divini officij*. Geschr. 1498, Pergament, 9 Bll., rechts oben 61 – 69, rechts unten 115 – 124.
  8. *Regula et modus vivendi fratrum et sororum ordinis continencium*. Handschr., Papier, 8 Bll., rechts oben 70 – 77, rechts unten 125 – 132.
  9. *Privilegia et indulgentie fratrum minorum*. Gedruckt 1495, 20 Bll., rechts unten 135 – 154, keine Foliation rechts oben.

Wie wir sehen, wurden in allen Handschriften beide päpstlichen Bullen zusammen, jeweils von derselben Hand geschrieben; sie wurden also als zusammengehörend empfunden. In A, C und E sind sie integrierender Bestandteil anderer franziskanischer Regeltexte in deutschen Übersetzungen,<sup>12</sup> in B und D finden sie sich zusammen

<sup>12</sup> Einige dieser Texte sind bereits veröffentlicht: Die ersten sechs Kapitel der *Regula bullata* in Kurt Ruh, *Franziskanisches Schrifttum im deutschen Mittelalter*, Münchener Texte und Untersuchungen 11 (München, 1965), S. 117–121 (Übersetzung von A und anderen Handschriften); drei Übersetzungen des Testaments (A und zwei weitere Handschriften) eben falls in Ruh, *Franziskanisches Schrifttum*, S. 2–15; die Übersetzung des Testaments in E ist abgedruckt in Wolf, "A Fifteenth Century Middle German Translation of the Testament of St. Francis of Assisi" (Anm. 11).

mit lateinischen Regeln. Daraus wird offenbar, daß diese beiden Dekretalien als Teile des "Grundgesetzes" des Ordens angesehen wurden, was ja auch der Intention der Verfasser entspricht.

Weiters wird klar, daß der Süden Deutschlands ein Zentrum für Übersetzungen dieser Texte war. Dies wird auch aus den Mundarten der Übersetzungen ersichtlich: B, C und D sind bairisch, A ist ostfränkisch mit bairischen Einschlägen und E ostmitteldeutsch; ähnlich auch die Übersetzungen der *Regula bullata*, von denen drei bairisch, eine schwäbisch und eine ostmitteldeutsch ist. Bestärkt wird die Annahme einer regen Übersetzertätigkeit im deutschen Süden durch die Tatsache, daß von dort auch ein Glossar zu den Bullen (in B und D) überliefert ist.

Die Übersetzungen in den Münchener Codices sind miteinander verwandt, wenn auch nicht identisch. Während einzelne Passagen miteinander übereinstimmen, weicht ein Großteil stark von einander ab. Es ist nicht möglich, hier einen Archetypus oder eine Handschrift, die dem Archetypus am nächsten kommt, festzustellen. Vielmehr dürften diese vier Übersetzungen auf ein Original zurückgehen, sind aber in der vorliegenden Form selbständige Weiterbearbeitungen, wahrscheinlich mit mehreren Zwischenstufen. Die Übersetzungen wurden ja für den praktischen Gebrauch, für Tischlesungen (vgl. A. 69<sup>r</sup>: ...vnd gehört fur die gemein zu amberg zu dem anderen tisch zu lesen), verfaßt, sodaß sie dem jeweiligen Sprachzustand angepaßt wurden und sich deshalb verschieden weiter entwickelten. Demgegenüber ist E eine eigenständige Übersetzung.

Im folgenden wird der vollständige Text von *Exiit qui seminat* aus A und E als Beispiele für die mittelalterlichen Übersetzungen abgedruckt,<sup>13</sup> wobei die Interpunktions behutsam modernisiert wird. A wurde deshalb ausgewählt, weil der Text durch rote Zwischenüberschriften (im folgenden gesperrt gedruckt) und lateinische Zitate klar gegliedert ist und so deutlich zeigt, wie der Aufbau im Mittelalter verstanden wurde. Ähnlich, durch lateinische Zitate, ist auch E gegliedert. Von den übrigen Handschriften wären die einzelnen Abschnitte nur in D durch lateinische Zitate gekennzeichnet. Da, wie schon erwähnt, die Fassungen von B, C und D sich unabhängig voneinander weiter entwickelt haben, sodaß sie als beinahe selbstän-

<sup>13</sup> Das lateinische Original findet sich in *Seraphicae Legislationis Textus Originales* (Ad Claras Aquas, 1897), p. 181-227. Eine moderne deutsche Übersetzung enthält *Thuringia Franciscana* IX (1947), S. 1-14.

dig anzusehen sind, ist es nicht möglich, deren Varianten in einem textkritischen Apparat zu bieten, weil dies jeden Rahmen sprengen und außerdem sehr unübersichtlich würde; im Apparat sind nur die wenigen notwendigen Bemerkungen zu A und E enthalten, es handelt sich hier um sehr sorgfältige Redaktionen. Doch A und E allein bieten schon einen guten Einblick in die franziskanische Übersetzungstätigkeit des Mittelalters sowie in Probleme der Begriffsgeschichte. Ebenfalls einem späteren Zeitpunkt muß eine Ausgabe der deutschen Übersetzungen von *Exiit de paradiso* vorbehalten bleiben.

## TEXT

A

E

[11<sup>v</sup>] Hye hebt sich an die erklerung pabst nicolau des dritten vber die regel der mynder bruder auß dem geistlichem recht.

5 [12<sup>r</sup>] von der bedeutnuß der wort.

Njcolaus pischoff, ein knecht der knecht gottes, zu ewiger des djngs gedechtnus.

10 von den samen. Exiit qui semi-nat seminare semen suum.

15 Er is auß gangen, der do seet, zu seen seynnen samen von der schos des vaters in die welt, mit dem kleidt der menschen ange-thon, gottes sun jhesus cristus, das ewangelisch wort zu seen in alle frum vnd pöß, unweiß vnd weiß, fleissig vnd vnfleissig oder treg, vnd noch des propheten wort ist er gewesen vnd solt sein ein zu kunfftiger ackerman auff erden zu seen seynnen samen, die ewangelich lerr, vnd an 20 vnterscheid hat gestreuet in all, der alle zu ym czihen wolt, vnd

[63<sup>r</sup>] Hye heben sich an dy vor clerung des hern des babstes Nicolay des dritten vber dy regel der minor oder barfussen bruder.

Nicolaus bischoff, ein knecht der knecht gotes zu ewiger gedechnisse des geschefftis.

Der ist außgegangen, der ackerman oder seher, zu seben seinen samen auß dem schösse des vaters in die werlt, bedeckt mit cleyde der menschait, gotis son Ihesus cristus, das wort des ewangely seben in eyнем yczlichen menschen, from vnd bose, thümme vnd snode, fleissige vnd trege, vnd nach dem propheten ein zu kunfftiger ackerman, zu seben in der erden, hat seinen samen, dy lere des hilgen ewangely, ge-sträütet an fortheil oder an geferde in alle menschen, der dar vmb

## A

ist kumen, all heilsam czu machen, der sich selber oppfert zum leczten got dem vater, ein lon menschlicher erlosunge für das  
 30 hail aller menschen.

wie d e r s a m e n a u f f v i e r-  
 35 l e y h e r c z e n i s t g e f a l-  
 l e n. Licet autem hoc semen.

Vnd wi wol der sam in all gestreutt ist von außgeteylter lieb gottes, etlicher vill [x2v] doch bey  
 40 dem weg, das ist in die herczen, die mit tewffischen zu plosung sein durch gangen, vnd etlicher sam vill auff den fels, das ist in die herczen, die nit durchpfluget  
 45 sein mit dem schar eysen des glaubens, vnd etlicher sam vill vnter die doren, das ist in die herczen, die mit sorgfeltigkeit des reichtumß zu rissen sein, vnd dar  
 50 vmb list man, das der ein sam vnter getruckt ward vnd zu treten mit pösen begirden. Der ander ward dür, wan er het nit die feuchtigkeit der gnaden, Eynnen  
 55 anderen list man samen, das er sey ersteckt worden mit vnordentlichen sorgen, doch den anderen samen hat in sich genümen ein  
 60 senfczt vnd lernhaftiges hercz, ein gut erd.

d i e b r e y s u n g d e r r e g e l  
 v n d d e s o r d e n s. Hec est  
 fratum minorum mitis et docilis.

Das ist der senfftmutig vnd gelirnick orden der minder bruder,  
 65 der do woll gewurczelt ist in armut vnd in demütigkeit vnd durch den heyligen bekänner

## E

gekommen was, das er alle dingk zu ym czoge, Alle menschen selig machte vnd der do zu leczet sich selber got, seinem hymelischen vater, zu einem lon der menschlichen erlosung opferte vor aller menschen hayl.

Vnd wye wol der samen also von der gemeinschafflichen libe gotis in alle gesträuet, ein thayl gefallen ist bey den weg, also uff dy herczen, der do dy bosen gayste vber wandern mit jren bosen in gebung, Das ander uff den stein, Also uff dy herczen vngepfluget mit dem heilgen glauben, Ein theyl vnder dy dorner, also mit dorner zu rissen sint, Vnd hir vmb so list man den eynen samen mit bosen begerunghen vnder die fusse getreden, den andern vor dorret, wan er hat kein feuchtigkeit der gnaden, Den dritten mit vnordentlichen sorgfledickheiten vor dempfet. Ydoch hat ein theil disses sames ein senfft mütiges und lerehaftig hercze, ein gute erde, entphangen.

Disse gute erde ist der minor bruder senfftmüttige vnd lernhaftige gaistlichkeit in armüt vnd demütigkeit, Durch den heiligen bekänner ader confessor cristi ge-

## A

- 70 cristi franciscum gegruntfestigkt,  
[13<sup>v</sup>] der auß dem waren samen  
geplüet hat die pluee, vnd durch  
die regel hat er sy zustreut in die  
sün, die er im vnd got durch  
75 sein dinst in gehorsamkeit des  
ewangely geporen hat.

Isti sunt fly.

- 80 Das sein die sün, die, als iacob  
lernet, haben auff genümen in  
senftmütigkeit das ewig wort, den  
sün gottes in gepflanczt mensch-  
licher natur im garten des  
iunckfraulichen leibs, der do mag  
selig machen die selen in senft-  
mütigkeit.

- 85 Hy sunt illius sancte regule pro-  
fessores.

- 90 Das sein dieser heyligen regel  
verieher oder bekennen, die do  
wirt gegrünt auff das ewange-  
95 lisch ausprechen, die auch wirt  
gesterckt in dem ebenpild des  
lebens cristi vnd wirt gefestigt  
auff die wort vnd werck seynner  
apostolen, die paüer sein gewe-  
wen der ritterlichen vnd streit-  
parlichen kirchen.

Hec est apud deum et patrem.

- 100 Das ist bey got vnd dem vater  
ein reynner vnd vnbefletter or-  
den, der abgestigen ist vom va-  
ter der lichter vnd ist geben  
worden den czwölffpoten durch  
seynnen sün [13<sup>v</sup>] ewanpildlich  
vnd wortlich, Vnd czum leczten  
105 durch den heyligen geist, den  
seligen francisco vnd seynnen  
noch volgeren, vnd ynnen helt  
in ym die geczeugnuß der ganczen  
driueltigkeit.

## E

- worczeilt, Der do auß waren sa-  
men pluhende was vnd fort an  
seine frucht durch dy regele  
sträuhet in dy sône oder kinder,  
die er ym vnd got durch sein  
dinst in haldung des hilgen ewan-  
gely gebar.

- Diß sint dy sône, dar Jacob von  
schreibet, [63<sup>v</sup>] Die das ewige  
wort, den son gotes, in gepflanc-  
zet der menschlichen natur in  
dem garthen des iuncfraulichen  
leichnams, des do machting ist,  
salig zu machen die sellen sanft-  
mütigkeit haben entphangen.

- Disse sint bekinner ader gelober  
diser hilgen regel, die do gegrün-  
det ist mit dem auß sproch des  
heilgen ewangely, Gesterket ist  
mit exemplel des lebens cristi,  
fündirer der streytlichen kirchen,  
seiner apostel worten vnd wer-  
cken befestiget.

- Disse regel ist bey got, dem vater,  
die reyne vnbefleckte gaistlicheit,  
di do ist nider steygent von dem  
vater der lichten, Durch seinen  
son pildlich vnd außsprechlich  
den aposteln gegeben vnd zu leczt  
durch dein hilgen gaist, den sel-  
gen francisco vnd seinen nach  
folgern in gegaistet, die do in ir  
heldet ein geczeuknisse schire der  
ganczen hilgen drifaldikeit.

## A

## E

110 Hec est cui attestante paulo.

Das ist die regel, als paulus  
geczeuget, nyemancz sol sein  
bekumerlich oder schwerr, Wel-  
che cristus hat bestettigk mit den  
115 funff wunden seynnes leydens  
vnd wolt den auff seczer der  
regel mercklichen verczeichen mit  
den czeichen seynnes leydens.

120 von den noch rederen  
wider den orden. Sed  
nec sic contra ipsos fratres mi-  
niores.

125 Aber es hat nit auff gehört die  
listigkeit des alten feinds wider  
die minder bruder vnd irr regel,  
Ja vnd offt versucht, wi er dar  
vber möcht seen vn kraut vnd  
130 czu czeiten wider sy bewegt hat  
vnd gereiczt neyder mit neyd,  
czoren vnd mit vnb escheidener  
gerechtigkeit, die sie haben ge-  
pissen vnd zu rissen mit pellen  
vnd geschrei, die bruder vnd  
irer regel, gleich als sy vnczimlich  
135 sey vnd vnhaltlich vnd sorglich,  
vnd sehen nit an, daz diese  
heylige regel, als vor gesprochen  
ist, mit haylsamen gepoten vnd  
vermonüng auff geseczt ist vnd  
140 gesterckt mit cezwölffpotischer  
haltüng vnd bewert durch vill  
romische pebst vnd auch be-  
stettigkt durch den römischen vnd  
pebstlich stull, mit so vill got-  
145 lichen geczeugnußen vmb ge-  
ben, die all gar mit enander  
geleublich worden sein vnd offen-  
bar in so vill heyligen menne-  
150 ren, die gelebt haben in der  
behaltung dieser regel vnd haben  
ire tag also geendt, auß den etlich

Diß ist die regel, als sanctus pau-  
lus beczeuget, der nymant fort  
mere sal vordrislich sein, die do  
cristus mit den narben seynes  
leydens bestetiget hat, in dem  
als er wolde den auff seczer diser  
regel mit den zaychen seines  
leydens mercklichen geczaichen-  
werden.

Sünder des alden feyndes listikeit  
hat also noch nit abgelassen jegen  
dy minor bruder vnd jre regel,  
Aber vil mere arbeyteden  
jegen si, auff zu seben vn kraut  
oder rathen, hat gerayset der  
pruder vnd der regeln feynde,  
das si bewogen sint zu beczeiten  
von vnb escheidelicher gerechtigkeit,  
dy bruder zu beyssende vnd  
jre regel mit hündischen bellun-  
ghen zu reyssende, gleich als ab  
sy vnczimlich sey vnd vnmöglich  
zu halden, vnd vol lasters oder  
ferlich oder schedlich, vnd dochting,  
also vor berurt ist, das disse hilge  
regel uff gesaczt ist von seligen  
gebothen vnd vor manunghen,  
mit der apostol haldung ges-  
terckt, durch vil romische bis-  
schoff bewert vnd zu gelassen vnd  
auch durch den pabstlichen ro-  
mischen stul bestetiget ist, mit  
so vilen gotlichen geczeucknisse  
gefestiget, die do gancz sere sint  
zu glauben, In so vil heyligen  
mennern, die ire tag haben zu  
gebracht vnd geendet in haldung  
diser regel, der do auch ein theyl

## A

## E

155 der selv stull hat lassen anschreiben in das puch der heyligen auß irem leben vnd wunder czeichen halben. Vnd zu dem aller leczten in diesen tagen ist dieses leben vnd regel bestettigkt von wegen mercklichs nücz, den die gemein kirch wirt vnd ist erlangen von ir, durch vnseren vorfaderen gutter gedechtnuß Gregorium den neundt vnd ist erkert worden in dem gemein Concily zu lugdun.

160 auch merck wir nit des min-[14<sup>v</sup>] ders, sunder tiffer gedenck wir, als sullen thon subtilicher ander bekener des cristenliches glaubens, das got selbs den vorgesprochen orden vnd sein halter hat angesehen, vnd hat sy also bewart mit heylsamer hilff von dem auff stendigen vngunstikeiten wider sy, das sy nit haben nider gewoffen die wietenden vnd vngestümigen vinden der wider wertigkeit, auch hat sy nit verzagt gemacht die gemüt der, die do waren in dem orden, sunder vill mer namen sy czu in der religischen krafft vnd werden auß gebrait in der behaltung ire gepot.

165 170 175 180 185 Verumtamen vt ordo predictus.

190 Vnd auff das das der obgenandt orden gekrefftig werd mit vnterscheidlicher vnd lauterer klarheit vnd abgeschniten werden allerley widerbrauch vmbschleg, als es des selben ordens bruder nechtst

der selbe stul hat lassen anschreiben [64<sup>r</sup>] der gemeinen czal der hiligen auß irem leben vnd wonder czaychen, Vnd zu leczt also in disen tagen also gut zu gelassen ist Durch den pabst gregorium den nonden, vnserem vorfarn guter gedechtnisse, also jn dem gemaynen concilio zu lügdün vorclart ist auß offenbarer nüczbarkeit, die dy gemeine kirch von ir erfolget ader erkrieget.

Vnd nit mynner sint wir an dechtig, sündер vor war vil tyffer dencken wir, als die gelober des gemaynen glauben behender vnd scherffer betrachten sollen vor andern, Das der libe got selber den vor genanten orden vnd sein halder ane sehende si also bewart hat mit seliger hulffe von aller vorfolgung vnd gramschefften, die do wider sy auff gestan sin, Das si auch kein stormpulge zu riben hat noch versencket noch die selen der, die do in dem orden ire leben elendichlichen vorfuret haben, betrubt oder vorstorczit, sünder vil mere wachsen sy in irer regel plühend vnd werden gemeret vnde gepraytet in hal dung irer geboth.

Verumtamen ut ordo predictus.

Besundern doch uff das der vorgenant orden plühen möge in purer vnd in rayner clarhayt vnd abgeschniten werde alles, das ym schedlich ist, also das di pruder des selben ordens, nü in deen

187 obgenadt A

189 lauterer für purer am Rand E

## A

gesamelt in dem gemein Capitel  
fur sahen, das die liben sün der  
215 gemein vnd etlich ander landt  
minister, die zu samen kommen ym  
capitell, für vnser gegen wür[15<sup>v</sup>]-  
tigkeit waren gesaczt, seindt das  
man erkennet ire manüng, Das  
200 sy hiczing sein in der krafft ires  
geistes zu voller behaltung der  
selben regel. So duncket unß gut,  
das wir verschlissen die weg zu  
peissen solchen widersprecheren,  
205 vnd wollen erkleren vnd außlegen  
etlich artikel, die man möcht  
czweiffelhaftig machen in der  
regel, Wir wollen auch klerlicher  
auß legen etlich sin, die auch von  
210 vnseren vor foderen sein ver-  
klerrt, Auch wollen wir fürsehen  
iren lautteren gewissen in etli-  
chen sinnen, die an geen die regel.

215 Nos autem qui a teneris annis ad  
ordinem ipsum.

Wir aber, die von iungen iaren  
haben auff gericht vnser begird  
zu dem orden vnd sein in den  
220 auffgewachsen mit etlichen, die  
sein gewessen gesellen sandt franci-  
scen, den sein leben vnd wan-  
del bekandt was, haben wir mit  
in gehabt vill gesprechs von der  
regel vnd der heyligen maynung  
225 des selben seligen francisen, Vnd  
dar nach wurden wir ein Cardinal,  
vnd dar nach wurden wir [15<sup>v</sup>] durch den vorgenanten stull  
230 des selben ordens beschuczer,  
beschirmer vnd straffer, do we-  
geten wir lindlich die eygen-  
schaft des ordens von zu fellichger  
sorg wegen, die vnß zu stund in  
235 dem pebstlichen ampt, als von  
der guttigen maynünng des obge-

## E

gemayn capitel gesammet, besor-  
get haben vnd der gemayn mi-  
nister ader dyner mit etlichen  
andern landes minster des selben  
ordens vnsern liben sônen in  
dem capitel versamhet weren in  
vnser jegenwertikeit, Sint dem  
mal das dan ire andacht bekant  
ist zu foller haldung der selben  
regel in crafft jres gaistes bôrnde,  
so gehort vns zu den selben beyssi-  
gen vnd hassigen menschen, die  
wege der beyssung zu beslissen,  
Etliche stücke, die do in der  
regel mogen cweyfelhaftig schei-  
nen zu uercleren, Etliche, die  
vnser vorfarn gereit vor cleret  
haben, mit volkommer clarheit auß  
legen, In etlichen stucken, die  
die regel an treten, der selben  
pruder conscientiam reynickeit  
zu besorgen.

Nos autem a teneris qui annis etc.

Als wir dan warlichen vnser be-  
gerung haben gekort zu dem vor-  
gesprochen orden von vnsern  
claynlichen jaren, dar junc auff  
gewachsen, So haben wir ge-  
tractirt vnd uns bekommert in  
steter zu samen kostüng von  
der regel vnd von der andacht  
vnd synne des seligen francisci  
mit etlichen gesellen des selben  
peichtigers gotes, den do sein le-  
ben vnd wandelung köndig was,  
vnd dar nach, als wir sint worden  
cardinal vnd dar nach des selben  
ordens durch den vor genanten  
stul regirer vnd straffer, die  
schicklicheyt vnd weyse des e-  
genanten [64<sup>v</sup>] ordens auß vnser  
an gelegter sorg haben wir ge-  
griffen vnd gefult, Nu in dem

## A

## E

240 nanten francisci Vnd auch von den dingen, die do beruren die regel vnd ir behaltung auß den vorgesprochen sachen. Wir sein mit langer erfahrung vnter weist worden, dar vmb kerent wir vnser gedancken zu dem orden, vnd nit allein die von vnseren vor foderen bewert vnd auß gelegt sein, sunder wir haben durch forst mit aller tapferkeit die regel vnd was sy an gett vnd an treff, Etlich haben wir hie in dieser bull geseczt, außgelegt sicherlich, bewert vnd die bewerten haben wir gefestigt gemacht vnd verlyhen, auch haben wir vill geordent ernstlicher vnd klarlicher, die volkumlicher werden begriffen in der her noch geschriben artickelenn.

260

[16'] Von den reten zu halten. In primis sicut intelleximus ab aliquibus hesitatur.

265 Czu dem ersten wan als wir haben verstanden, so cezweiffelen etlich, Ob die bruder des selben ordens sein verpunden zu den reten vnd zu den gepoten des ewangely, die weil an dem anfangk der vor gesprochen regel stet: Das ist die regel vnd das leben der mynder bruder, das ist vnser herren ihesu cristi das heilig ewangelium zu halten, zu leben in gehorsamkeit, an eygenschafft vnd in keuscheit. Auch auß dem das in der selbigen wirt begriffen, Wan das iar der bewerung auß ist, so sol man

245 babstlichen ampt vnser gedancken gekeret czu dem e genanten orden, als wir geleret sint auß den vor berürten vnd auch von langher erfahrung beyds von der milden andacht der vor genannten bekennner gotes vnd von den dinghen, die di regel vnd jre haldung an treten, vnd haben mit folkomen bedachtem müte durchgeganghen beyde die stuck, di durch vnsern vorfarn also gut bewert vnd vor cleret sin, vnd auch di regel vnd was sy an trit, vnd haben in diser gegenwärtigen schickung etliche stuck gesaczt, vor cleret gewisser, also gut bewert vnd zu gelassen vnd die fort bestetiget, Auch haben wir gebothen etlichen vnd völihen vnd gesaczt, Auch mere stuck ernstlicher vnd clerer zu schickende vnd zu seczende, dy do in den nachgeschriben artickeln folkommlicher auß gedruckt werden.

255 260 In primis quia sicut.

270 275 280 Im ersten als wir vor stand haben, so ist von etlichen geczweifolt, ob die bruder des selben orden vor pünden sint beyde zu den rethen vnd auch zu den gebothen des hilgen ewangely, Czum ersten hyrvmb wan in dem anbegyn der vor genannten regel hat man also: die regel vnd das leben der minor bruder ist Diß, also zu halden das hilge ewangelium ihesu cristi, zu leben in gehorsam, ane eygenschafft vnd in keuscheit. Auch dar vmb das in der selben regel also stet, wan das pruffe jar geendet ist, so

## A

## E

285 sy zy der gehorsam nemen, Vnd  
sollen geloben, das leben vnd  
die regel all zeitt zu halten. Auch  
von dem das an dem endt der  
regel steen vnd werden begriffen  
diese wort: armut vnd demütig  
vnd das heylig ewangelium vnsers  
herren ihesu cristi wir festigli-  
chen gelobt haben, sollen wir  
290 halten.

Licet autem felicis recordacionis  
Gregoriis papa nonus.

295 Wie wol seligere gedechtnuß Gre-  
gorius der neundt, vn[16v]ser  
vorfader, den artikel vnd ander  
mer der regel hat auß gelegt, ye  
doch die weil sein außlegung  
durch etlich wider beissige anfall  
etlicher, die do wider reden den  
300 bruderen vnd der regel, vnd auch  
zu mercken vill fell vnd ge-  
schichte, die herr noch möchten  
ersteen, so wirt sy vermerckt  
vnd verstanden die regel in  
etlichen synnen vnverstentlich  
305 vnd verporgen, in etliche halb  
verstentlich vnd in vill stücken  
vngenugsam. So wollen wir hin  
nemen solche verborgenheit vnd  
vngenugsamkeit mit volkommer  
310 außlegung vnd erklerung, wir  
wollen auch abschneiden mit  
sicherheit ganczer offenwarung  
von allen herczen die nagung  
allerley czweiflüng in der regel.

315 die antwurt von den  
reten zu halten. Dicimus  
320 quod cum in principio regule non  
absolute.

So sprechen wir, die weil an dem  
anfangk der regel in allem schlecht

sollen si genomen werden zu dem  
gehorsam, geloben diß leben vnd  
disse regel alle zeit zu halden.  
Auch dar vmb wan in dem ende  
der regel stan disse wort: Das wir  
den armuth vnd demütikeit vnd  
das hilge ewangelium vnsers hern  
jhesu cristi, das wir festigklich  
gelobt haben, mogen halden.

wy wol der babst gregorius der  
ix, vnser vorfarn seliger gede-  
chtnisse, vorcleret hat dissen  
artikel vnd etliche andere mere  
der selben regel hat vor cleret,  
Ydoch nach dem als sein vor cle-  
rung schynet in etlichen stücken  
dünckel, in etlichen halpfolkommen,  
Auch in etlichen stücken in der  
selben regel beslossen vnd behal-  
den vngenügsam vmb hönlicher  
vor werffung etlicher, die sich  
jegen dye prüder vnd regel se-  
czen, vnd vil andere [657] dinck,  
die hir nach komen mogen, also  
wir mercken. wir wollen ein sul-  
che dünckelheit vnd vngenügsam-  
keit mit vorclerung volkomme-  
ner außlegung abkeren vnd eines  
yczlichens ceweifals angstikeit  
oder geczwenknisse in den sel-  
ben stücken von eins iczlichen  
herczen mit gewisseheit volkomli-  
cher auß legung abhawen.

so sagen wir also, Sint dem  
mal das in dem an begyn

## A

325 hinsunder mit etlicher möß oder zu legung oder besunderheit ist geseczt, alzo die regel vnd das leben der mynder bruder ist die, zu halten [17<sup>v</sup>] das heylig ewangelium vnsers herren ihesu cristi, leben in gehorsam, an eygens vnd in keuscheit, die drey volfurt vnd noch volgt vill vnd streng oder hert, bequemlich die selb regel, vnd nit mynder seczt sy etlich ander in der weiß der ge-  
330 pietüng, verpitüng, ratgebung, vermonüng, pittend vnd vnter anderen worten, die man mag den vorgesprochen worten gleichen, so mag klerlich offenwar  
335 werden von der manüng der regel, das der sin, der do in der ver-  
340 heyssung oder gelubt gleichsam als in der gemein ist, zu geseczt diesem 'Vir geloben das leben vnd die regel all weg zu halten' vnd das an dem endt dieser wort  
345 wirt zu geseczt 'vnd das heylig ewangelium vnsers herren Ihesu cristi, das wir vestiglich haben gelobt, sollen wir halten.'

355 Die wort gancz werden geczogen zu der regel bescheydenheit oder mesigkeit oder zu eynnem besunderen anfangk der selben, als zu der behaltung des ewangely, als vor[17<sup>v</sup>]gesprochen ist durch die regel, in den dreyen gemessiget, geendert vnd besundert, Wan es  
360 nit der warheit gleich ist, das der heylig hab wollen gewölt, das das wort, das von ym ein mall mit etlicher messigkeit oder mit bescheidner sicherheit oder besunderung gesprochen ist worden, Wie wol das kurczlich verneut ist vnd gewegen, solt in seynner verendrung beraubt sein an

## E

der regel nicht so schlecht, sunder mit einer sunderlicher messig machung gesaczt ist, die regel vnd das leben der mynner bruder ist diß, also zu halden das hilge ewangelium vnsers hern ihesu cristi, zu leben in gehorsam, ane aygenthum vnd in keuscheit, welche dry die selbe regel sere ge-  
365 strenglich vor folget vnd noch glich wol etliche andere, hir nach an knüpfte gepitende vnd vorpytende, rathende vnd vormandende, anehaltende vnd vnder andern worten, dy man zu dissen weysen etlicher maß zyhen magk, So kan offenberlich auß der andacht des stifters der regel herkommen vnd offenbar werden das, das do in dem gelobde also schlecht scheynet gesaczt, gelobende diß leben vnd die regel allezeit zu halden, vnd das do in dem end wirt zu gefuget, vnd das wir das hilge ewangelium vnsers hern ihesu cristi, das wir festiglich gelobt haben, mogen halden.

Das alle sal geczogen zu der regel an begin messig gemacht ader bescheiden gemacht ader gewiß geinacht, also zu der behaldung des hilgen ewangely, also vor gesprochen ist durch die regel, In adder mit dissen dreyen messig gemacht oder bescheiden gemacht oder gewiß gemacht, wan es ist nit der warheit gleich, den hilgen franciscum ein wort von ym eyns gesprochen mit sün-  
365 derlicher messig machung oder gewiß machung ader beschaidung, wy wol er es so kurczlich nach eyns vor anderst wolle, das wort in seyner vor anderung ader

## A

mercklich sach der bescheidenheit  
durch in gegeben oder auch der  
bescheidung oder besundrung.  
370 Wan vnd die argument oder  
bewerung beyder recht lernen  
vnß, das man offt czeucht zu dem  
mittel und zu dem endt die ding,  
die an dem anfangk steen, die  
375 aber im mittel sten, zum endt vnd  
zum anfangk, vnd die am endt  
zu beyden teylen oder zu eynnem  
vnter in werden geczogen.

380

Et dato quod absolute diceretur  
omnino promitto sanctum euan-  
gelium observare.

385 Vnd wer es auch das also das  
gancz schlechtlich stund, also  
genczlich gelob ich zu halten das  
heylig ewangelium, es wer [181]  
den, das der gehorsamer meinet  
390 sich zu verbinden zu der behal-  
tung aller rett, das er doch kaum  
odernymmer möcht halten, als  
der text seczt aber noch dem  
puchstaben, von welches gelubs  
395 wegen beschwert möcht werden  
oder bestricht das gemüt des  
gehorsamers. Dar vmb so wirt  
klerlicher beschlossen, das man  
das gelubt nit sol czwingen zu  
eynner anderen verstentnuß an  
400 die maynung des, der do gelobt  
nar allein das, das die behaltung  
des ewangely sey, als sy von cri-  
sto gegeben ist, also das die gepot  
als die gepot vnd die rett als die  
rett vnd das von den, die das  
geloben.

Quem intellectum eciam in eis-  
dem verbis.

## E

wider holung ane sünderliche ge-  
wisse sach entpern der messig  
machung oder gewiß machung  
oder bescheidung, die er dem  
selben wort zum ersten hat ge-  
geben, vnd dy geczwanc sach  
beyder geschriben recht leren vns  
dicke die dinck, die do in dem  
anbegin steen, zu dem mitte  
vnd zu dem ende, vnd die do in  
dem mittel steen, zu dem [65v]  
ende vnd anbegin, vnd die do in  
dem ende steen, zu beyden ader  
zu örem einem zu zihende.

Vnd ab es geschee, das do gencz-  
lich schlecht gesprochen worde:  
Ich gelobe, das hilge ewangelium  
zu halden, es ist clerlichen war,  
das ein sulch gelobende nicht  
sal binden zu einer ander vor-  
stentnissen, wan also dy haldung  
des hilgen ewangely ist von cri-  
sto gegeben, das in dem hilgen  
ewangelio gepoth als gepoth vnd  
rethe also reth von sulchen gelo-  
bern gehalden werden an sun-  
derlich andacht vnd meynhund  
des gelobers, Als ob ein sulcher  
gelober gedencket sich zu vor-  
pinden zu halden alle rethe, das  
er doch kaüme adernymmer  
mocht gehalden nach der schrift,  
war vmb ein sulche gelobde des  
gelobers synn vnd sele bestrickte.

## A

## E

410 Welchen syn der selv heilig franciscus auch in den selben worten hat gehabt, noch dem er das beweist öffentlich in der regel in der ordenüng des texts, so er etlich ewangelisch rett verkundt oder fürgibt als rett vnter den worten der vermonüng, der pitiung vnd des raczs, Etlich aber vnter der verpitung vnd mit dem wort des gepots. [18v] Dar vmb so wirt vermerckt, das nit die maynung ist gewesen des auß spreches sandt franciscen, das die bruder verpunden wurden auß der profession dieser regel zu allen ewangelischen reten als zu den gepoten, sunder allein zu den reten, die in der selbigen regel sein geseczt pöttlich oder verpintlich oder mit worten, die den zu gleichen.

435 Von den reten in der regel begriffen der beschluß. Vnde nos ad fratum eiusdem ordinis.

440 Dar vmb zu verlauteren volkumlichen die gewissen der bruder des selben ordens, so sprechen wir, das die bruder sein allein verpunden auß profession der regel, zu halten die euangelischen rett, die in der regel werden geseczt pöttlich oder verpittlich oder vnter den worten werden begriffen oder auß gesprochen, das sy den gleichen.

450 von den reten, die nit in der regel begriffen werden. Ad non nulla vero alia per euangelium data consilia.

welchen vnd vor stentnisse auch der hilge franciscus hat in den selben worten gehabt, also offenbar beweiset in der schickung seines vort ganges in der regeln, wan etliche reth des ewangely seczet er als rethe vnder worten der vor manung, anweysung vnd rathes, Etliche aber vnder eyner vor pytung ader mit einem worte der vor pytung. Do durch so wirt offenpar, das di andecht des seczers, anseczers nit enwas, das die pruder aus dem gelobde disser gelobde diser regel vor pflichtet sollen sein zu allen rethen als zu gepoten des ewangely, Sunder allein zu den rethen, die do in der selben regel gepitlich ader vnder gleich scheynenden worten sint auß gesprochen.

Hyr vmb zu vor leüthern genczlich die conscientia oder samwiczkiet der pruder des selben ordens sprechen wir clerlich, das die pruder auß den gelobte der selbigen regel allein vorpünden sint, zu halden die rethe des ewangely, die do in der selben regel werd auß gedrückt gepitlich oder vor pitlich ader vnder gleich scheynenden worten.

## A

455 Aber sy sein mer verpunden zu etlichen anderen reten, von euan[19<sup>v</sup>]geli gegeben, vill merr noch gelegenheit ires standts den die anderen cristen menschen, so vill sy merr durch den standt der volkumenheit, den sy durch solche gehorsam haben auff genumen, geoppfert haben dem herren ein inniges oppfer durch die verschmehung aller irdischen ding.

460

465 von den reten vnd anderen in der regel begriffen. Ad omnia autem que in regula ipsa continentur.

470 Aber zu allen, die in der regel stend, gepott vnd rett vnd zu den anderen auß gelub solcher profession sein sy nit ander verpunden den in der weiß, als sy in der regel steen, das ist, sy sein verpunden zu behaltung der ding, die in der regel werden berurt vnd gevteilt vnter den verpintlichen worten.

475

480 Ceterom vero obseruanciam que sub verbis monitorys.

485 Aber zu behaltung der anderen, die do stend vnter vermonlichen wortenn, pittlichen, vnterweisßlichen, lernlichen worten oder in etlichen anderen, die sollen sy dar vmb czimlich von gutten willigen vnd rech[19<sup>v</sup>]ten herczen halten, so vill sy in merr herczlicher haben auß erwelt, noch volger zu sein den fußstaffen cristi, eins so grossen vaters.

490

## E

Aber zu etlichen andern rethen, durch das hilge ewanglium gegeben, sint sy nach der hayschung ires states so vil mere vorpunden wan ander cristen menschen, also si vor mittelst dem stat der folkommenheit, den si durch ein sulch gelobte an genomen haben, sich haben geopfert ein gancz marcklich opfer dem hern vor mittelst vorsmehung aller werntlichen dingk.

Aber zu allen andern, di do in der regel behalden sind, beyde die geboth vnd rethe vnde andere alle stuck von des gelaubens wegen eines sulchen gelobnisse sint si nicht anders vor pflicht wan in sulcher weyse, also sy in der regel werden gegeben oder steen, also das si zu jrer haldung [66<sup>v</sup>] schuldig sint, di do sint in der selben regel vnder vor bintlichen worten yn vor poten werden.

Aber der andern haldung, de do vnder vor manlichen worten, an reyczenden worten oder in welcher ander weyse gesaczet sint, zymet sich yn also vil mere von gutikeit vnd rechtheit zu vor folgen, also si nachfolger eines so grossen vaters worden sint vnd die steyge cristi herter vnd engher auß gekoren haben.

## A

## E

495 von dem artickel der armut. Porro cum regula ipsa expresse contineat quod fratres nichil sibi approprient nec domum nec locum nec aliquam rem.

500 Sindt ein mall das die regel offenlich in helt, das die bruder in nichts sollen zu eygen wider hauß noch stat noch kein ding oder gut, Vnd auch erkliert ist durch den selben vnseren vorfaderen Gregorium den neunden vnd durch etlich ander merr, das sy das sollen halten in besunderheit vnd auch in der gemein vnd die hert vbergebung oder absagüng aller ding, welcher vbergebung etlicher vnsinniger listigkeit hat vernicht mit gifftigen hinder reden, Dar vmb das die klarheit der volkumenheit der selben bruder nit wer zu rissen mit vnweissen, vnerfaren worten solcher klaffer.

515 520 von der absagung der eygenschafft in gemein vnd in besunderheit. Dicimus quod abdicacio proprietatis [20<sup>r</sup>] huiusmodi omnium rerum.

525 530 535 So sprechen wir, das die vbergebung der eygenschafft aller gutter in besunderheit vnd auch in der gemein durch gottes willen ist verdinstlich vnd heilig, die auch cristus als ein weg der volkumenheit hat mit worten gelert vnd geoffenwart vnd mit ebenpild bestettigkt, vnd auch die ersten grüntleger der ritterlichen kirchen, noch dem als sy von dem selben brunnen hetten geschöppft haben in die, die do

Porro cum regula ipsa expresse contineat etc. Articula de pauperitate sequitur.

Vort mere sint dem male das die selbe regel offenpar in ir hat, das die pruder yn nichtis nit zu aygen sollen weder huß noch stet noch jrgen kein dinck, vnd es ist vor cleret durch den selben vnsern vor farn gregorium den nönden vnd etliche andere, das das solle gehalden werden beyde in besundern vnd auch in gemayn, welche sulche harte entplossung etliche vnsinnliche ader thumme listikeit mit vor gifftigen beclaffungen vor nichtiget hat, das der selben folkomen clarheit mit sulcher menschen vnweyslichen reden nicht zu rissen werden.

So sprechen wir, das sulche entplossung eygenthumes aller dinghe beyde in besundern vnd auch in gemein vmb gotes willen ist vordinstlich vnd heilg, Vnd sulche armuth hat cristus, der den wegk der volkomenheit weyset, mit worten gelart vnd mit pilden oder exemplel gesterket, vnd die erstten grüntleger ader fundirer der streitenden kirchen habe den selben armuth gegossen in die jenen, die do folkomlich leben

## A

## E

volkummelichen wolten leben  
durch die pech ir lerr vnd irs le-  
bens geczogen oder lassen flissen.

540 von den peutelen cri-  
sti. Nec hys quisquam putet  
obsistere.

545 Auch sol nymandt wenen, das  
cristus, als piß weylen gespro-  
chen ist, hab seckel oder peütel  
gehabt, wan cristus, des weg  
volkumen sein, in seinem leben  
550 den weck der volkummenheit  
also hat geubt, das er czu czei-  
ten der krancken vnvolkummen-  
heit hat nach gegeben vnd den  
wegk der volkummenheit hat er-  
höcht vnd doch nit verdampt die  
[207] vnvolkumen.

555 Sic infirmorum personam cristus  
suscepit in loculis.

560 Alzo hat cristus auff genümen  
oder gehalten die kranckmütigen  
person in den seckelen oder peu-  
telen, gleich als er in etlichen  
anderen die krancken werkt des  
meschlichen leibs oder lebens an  
565 sich nam, als das beczeugt die  
ewangelisch histori, das er nit  
allein mit dem leib, sunder auch  
mit dem herczen hat nach geben  
den krancken.

570 die krancken presten  
in cristo sein volku-  
menheit. Sic enim humanam  
naturam assumpsit.

575 Wan also hat er an sich genümen  
meschliche natur, das er in seyn-  
nen werken volkumen belaib,  
vnd in vnseren war er demütigk,

wolden mit irer lere vnd leben in  
solcher weise, also si von dem  
born geschepft haben.

Nec hys quisquam.

Auch sal nymant wenen, dissen  
wider zu steen, das man zu zei-  
then spricht, das cristus habe  
hüte winckel oder beüthel ge-  
habt, wan also cristus, des werck  
folkommen sint, hat in seinen wer-  
cken den weck der folkommenheit  
also geübet, das er zu zeiten der  
krancken vnfolkommenheit sich hat  
gegleichet, uff das er den weck  
der folkommenheit erhübe vnde  
der vnfolkommen krancken steyge  
nicht vor thümte.

Sic infirmorum etc.

Also hat cristus zu ym genomen  
die person der krancken in den  
hute winckeln ader peutheln vnd  
des gleichen in etlichen andern  
dinghen, an nemde die kranck-  
heit des menschlichen fleischs, als  
die ewanglischen hystorien be-  
czeugt, sich nicht allein an dem  
lichnam, sunder auch an dem  
herczen gegleichet den krancken.

Wan also hat er di menschliche  
natur an sich genommen, das er in  
seinen werken folkommen were vnd  
in vnsern dinghen genidert vnd

## A

580 vnd in seyner eigenschafft belaib  
er hochwirdigk, vnd also wirt er  
gefürt mit gnad höher lieb zu  
etlichen wercken, die vnser vnvolk-  
umenheit gleichformig sein, das  
er doch nit nider gepogen wirt  
von der gerechtigkeit seiner hö-  
chen volkummenheit.

585 cristus hat gewurckt  
vnd gelert volkummenheit.  
Egit namque cristus et  
docuit perfecionis [217] opera.

590 Wan cristus hat verbracht vnd  
gelerd die werck der volkumen-  
heit, er hat auch krancke werck  
gethon, als zu czeiten in der flucht  
als offenbar ist vnd in den secken-  
len vnd peütelen. Aber in baiden  
was er volligklich volkumen, das  
er sich den volkumen vnd vnvolk-  
umen bewiß ein weg des hails,  
Wan er was kumen beid heylsam  
zu machen, vnd zu dem leczten  
wolt er sterben für sy baid.

600

605 Absagen aller eygen-  
schafft ist kein irsall.  
Nec quisquam ex hy insurgat  
erronee.

610 Niemandt aber sol auß diesen  
worten kumen in irsall, das sy  
sich lassen in die vnsicherheit,  
also zu leben, die also durch got  
absagen, vbergeben die eygen-  
schafft aller guter, gleich als sy  
morder weren irr selbs aber  
gottes versucher, Wan also ent-  
pfellen sy sich der gottlichen  
fürsehung im leben, das sy den

## E

gedemütiget, vnd in seinen aygen  
dinghen pleib er hoch, vnde also  
von seyner aller hochsten lib we-  
gen wart er gepeütget zu etlichen  
werken vnser vnfolkomenheit, al-  
so das er nicht gekrommet wart  
von der gerechtigkeit der aller  
hoechsten folkomenheit.

wan cristus hat getan vnd gelart  
werck der folkomenheit, vnd er  
hat auch getan krancke werck,  
also es zu geczeiten offenbar ist  
in seyner flucht vnd in den huet-  
winckeln oder peutheln. [66v]  
Sunder in bayden wegen ist er  
folkomen gewest, folkomen zu  
wesen, hat et folkomlicher getan  
uff das er sich beweist einen wegk  
der selicheit beide den folkomen  
vnd den vnfolkomen, der do ko-  
men was beyde salig zu machen,  
der do zu leczt sterben wolde for  
si bayde.

Nec quisquam insurgat etc.

Vnd auß disem vorgeschriven sal-  
nymant jrrende hir kegen seczen,  
das di, die do sich also vmb gotes  
willen entplossen vnd von yn  
werffen den aygenthum aller din-  
gher, sich seczen in ferlicheit  
yres lebens gleich also der tod  
sleger jrer selbest oder bekörer  
vnd vor sucher gotes, was sy be-  
feln sich selbs also der gotlichen

## A

weg nit verschmehen der menschlichen fursehung.

620

von der driffeltigen  
weiß zu leben. Quin de his  
que offeruntur liberaliter.

625 Wan sy mugen freymutiglich leben von den [21<sup>v</sup>] gaben, die man in oppfert, Oder von den gaben, die man pettelt demütiglich, oder von den, die man gewint durch erbeit, Welche dryueltige weiß zu leben für sehen wirt in der regel offenlich.

635 werck der barmherczigkeit werden nit zugeen,  
die weill der glaub stet.  
Profecto si iuxta promissum sa-  
luatoris.

640 Wan noch der verheissung vnsers heilmachers der glaub der kirche nymmer ab wirt nemen, volgelt hernoch, das auch die werck der barmherczigkeit in nymmer werden entczogen, seindt das den armen cristi all sach der mistraüng allenthalben ist hin genomen, vnd wo die ding alle entczogen wurden oder abnemen, das man doch nymmer soll gedencken, das den der weg verschlossen sey, den die do sein in der leczten nottuft oder sich nit versehen zu auffenthaltung der natur im artickel der leczten notturfft vom recht, welche fursehung weder den anderen noch auch in verpoten ist, [22<sup>r</sup>] so doch

## E

zu uorsicht vnd besorgung in jrem leben, das si doch nicht vorsmehen dy weyse der menschlichen besorgung.

Also das jr leben werde uff enthalde mit den dinghen oder almosen, di yn frey geopfert oder dy si demutiklichen pitten oder di si erwerben mit jrer arbait, welche dryfaldige weyse zu lebende wirt in der regel öffentlich besorgt oder außgedruckt.

Vnd vor war ist das es nach dem sproch vnsers salig machers, das der glaube der hilgen kirche nymmer mere sal geprochsam werden ader vor gehen, so werden auch die werck der barmherczigkeit nymmer entzogen. Hir vmb so ist den armen cristi alle sach aller mistrauhung benomen ader ab gelegt. Auch vor war wördnen disse alle geprechen, das sich doch nit zu vor muthen ist, Also dan ander allen andern menschen in dem artickel der äussersten noth nach dem wärlichen recht ist, nit beslossen der weck zu besorgen jrer naturlicher enthaldeung. So ist auch den prudern der wegk nit beslossen, der

## A

die leczt auß genumen wirt von  
allem geseczt.

660 **k e i n p r o f e s s i o n m a g**  
steen an schlechten  
brauch. Non autem talis ab-  
dicacio proprietatis.

665 Das aber solche genczlich vberge-  
bung der eygenschafft nymandt  
möcht ein furen in die verpitung  
der prauchüng, das nit gesehen  
wirt, wan in allen czeitlichen  
gutteren sol man mercken zu  
670 dem ersten die eygenschafft, die  
besiczung der frucht brauchung,  
das recht zu brauchüng vnd ein  
schlechten nücz der brauchüng  
vnd zu dem leczten, das er ir  
675 von notdurff bedurff, vnd wi wol  
des ersten mangelen mag, das  
leben der todlichen, so mag doch  
kein profession nit sein oder  
besteien, die auß schlecht die braü-  
680 chüng der notdurfftigen enthal-  
tung.

Verum concedens fuit ei profes-  
sioni.

685 Fur war es was gancz czimlich  
solcher gehorsam, die williglich  
hat gelobt, noch zu volgen den  
armen cristy, in grosser armüt  
hin zu werffen die herschafft  
aller verlihener gutter, die vnd  
690 allein genugsam sein der not-  
türf[22v]tigen gebrauchung.

695 Hin werffen aller ding  
herschafft vnd not-  
turfftiger ding brauch  
genügigk sein ist czim-  
lich. Nec per hoc proprieta-  
tem vsus.

## E

do allen ist zu gelassen, wan si  
sint in der äussersten noth ader  
geseczt auß genomen.

Non autem talis abdicacio etc.

Auch fort mere sal nymant mey-  
nen, das sulche vor sachung des  
aeygenthumes auch solle pringen  
vor lassung der dinger geprau-  
chung, wan nach dem male das in  
den zeitlichen dinghen vor nem-  
lich disse fünffe zu merckende sint  
äygenthum, besiczung, frucht  
prauchung oder recht zu ge-  
prauchende vnd slecht geprau-  
chung des werks oder dinghes,  
vnd des leczsten glich von noth  
wegen bedarff der sterblichen le-  
ben, wye wol es der ersten vyer  
entpern kan, So mag doch kein  
gelobde gesein, das do von jm  
auß slisse dy geprauchung der  
nothdorfftigen auff enthalzung.

besundern zu vor sachen die her-  
schaffunge aller dingher was zym-  
lich sulcher [67r] gelobung, die  
do williklich gancz vorbaut, zu  
folgen dem armen cristum, vnd  
zu fride wolde sein in nothdorfftig-  
er geprauchung der gelyhen  
dingher.

## A

Auch sol man nit meynnen, das die eygenschafft der brauchung vnd die herschafft eins iczlichen dings von ir hab geworffen die einfeltige vnd schlechte gebrauchung oder die absagung eyns iczlichen dings, Wan die gebrauchung hat allein den no men nit des rechts, sünd der wercks, das dar vmb gibt es allein das thun den, die es gebrauchen, nit des rechts. Dar vmb ist den bruderen erlaubt auß regel vnd noch der ganczen warheit notturft aller ding, die do gehoren zu des leibs auffenthaltung Vnd zu volbringüng ires wesens zu den ampten ires stants, auß genümen als vnd stett vnd herr noch volgt, das ein messige gebrauchung von gelt ist erlaubt noch ir regel vnd ganczer warheit, welcher gütter vnd ding sy auch czimlich mügen [23r] gebrauchen, die weil das vrlaub wert des, der das verlyhen oder geben hat, noch dem 725 gegriffen wirt in dieser geschrift.

Brauch oder brauch  
730 niessung mag ab geschiden werden von ewiger herschafft. Nec hys obuiare dinoscitur.

Auch mag dieser lerr nit wider  
735 sein, das die burgerlich fursehung in meschlichen dingen meschlich hat geseczt, also das die brauchung oder die frucht niesung nit müg ewiglichen obgeschiden werden von der herlichkeit oder herschafft, die do hat erkandt

## E

Vnd dar mit das ein sulche leyhung hat von yr geworffen äygenthum der geprauchung vnd herschaffing alles dinghes, wart nicht geacht, das si auch dy geprauchung alles dinghes vor sachen habe, welche geprauchung hat allein ein namen des werkes vnd keinen namen des rechtes, Vnd das vor czeyhen des werkes oder des gescheen oder des gethanen ist so vil gesprochen, die schlechte geprauchung gibt in der geprauchung den geprauchern kein recht. Aber das do mere ist messige geprauchung der nothdorfftigen dingk beyde zu der auffhaldung des lebens vnd auch zu folbrengung der ampt ires states ane gelt, als hir nach folget, ist den prudern zu gelassen nach irer regel vnd ganczer warheit, Vnde der notdorfftigen dinghe mogen die pruder zymlichen geprauchen, so lang des leyhers oder leheners orlaub wert, Vnd nach der weyse, also es in disser kegenwertigen seczung gesaczt ist, weret des erlawbers vrlaub, als dan auch jn disser geschrift begriffen wirt.

Auch so ist kunth, das dissen vor geschrieben nicht entkegen sein, das die wertliche besorgung in den menschlichen dinghen gesaczt hat, Also das geprauchung oder fruchtprauchung nicht moge geschaiden werden von dem herren zu ewigen geczeiten, wan die

## A

## E

745 das die herlichkeit den herren allzeit. Wen die gebrauchüng ab geht, wird das czeitlich vnnücz, vnd also der nücz wirt an gesehen in der saczung solcher recht, Wan die behaltung der herschafft der ding mit verleyhung der gebrauchüng, die do geschicht den armen, ist nit vnfruchtbar dem herren, so sy verdienstlich ist zu den ewigen gaben vnd der profession der armen bequemlich vnd gar nott, vnd ist ir alzo vil mer nuczlicher, so vill sy mer verwandelt die [23<sup>v</sup>] czeittlichen ding vmb die ewigen.

wertliche besorgung ist allein an sehende den czeitlichen nücz in der seczung, hat sulche dinck bekant oder gerichtet, uff das den herren nit vnnücz wörde ire herschafft, wan die geprauchung yn alle zeit ab ging. Aber die behaltung der herschafft sulcher dingher mit vorleyhung der geprauchung, gethan den armen, ist nit vnfruchtpar den herren, Sint dem male das sy ist vordinstlich zu den ewigen gutern vnd dem gelobde der armen noth dorftig, dy also vil dem herren wirt nüczter geachtet, also sie dy zeitlichen dinghe mehr vorwechseln vor dy ewigen.

760 Bewerung des brauchs den bruderen verlyhen. Profecto non fuit confessoris cristi regula instituentis intencio.

Profecto non.

765 Auch was nit die maynung des bekenners cristi, des auff seczers der regel, Wan er anders geschriben hat vnd wider das sein leben gehalten, seindt das er selber gebraucht hat der czeittlichen ding zu nottdufftigkeit, vnd an vill steten der regel offenbart der, das die brauchüng zimplich sey den bruderen, wan er spricht in der regel, die gelerten sollen das götlich ampt verpringen, dar auß sy mugen haben breuir, auß dem wort err offenlich meindt, das sein bruder würden oder möchten haben die brauchüng des breuirs vnd ander pucher, die nott weren zu dem dinst gottes. In eynnem anderen capitel wirt gesprochen, das die minister vnd custer vmb notturfft der krancken vnd zu kleyden die

Vorwar es ist nicht gewest des bekenners cristi andacht, der dy regel gesaczt hat, zu uorsachen aller dingk oder auch der schlechten geprauchung, sündер warlicher hat er in der regel dar wider geschriben, in seinem leben dar kegen gehalden, Sint dem male [67<sup>v</sup>] das er selber zu seiner nothdorftigkeit zeitlicher dingk gepraucht hat Vnd in vilen steten in der regeln kunth thut, sulche geprauchung czymlich zu sein, Wan er spricht in der regeln, das die bruder sollen thün das götlich ambacht, dar auß so mugen sy breuir haben, hyr auß gibt her offenberlich zu vorstan, das seine pruder worden sein habende die geprauchung der bucher vnd breuir, die do zu dem gotlichen ambacht noth sint. Auch so wirt

## A

790 anderen bruder sollen sy sorgfältigen fleiß haben durch geistlich freundt noch steten vnd czeiten vnd [24<sup>r</sup>] noch kalten landen, als sy werden erkennen bequemlich vnd versteen ir notturfft.

795

800 An eynnem anderen endt der regel vermondt er auch die bruder, durch ein bequemliche vbung der erbeit zu vermeyden die musigkeit, vnd spricht, das sy sollen nemen notturfft des leibs für sich vnd ir bruder vom lon er erbeit. In eynnem anderen capitel stet also, das die bruder sollen 805 getreulich geen noch dem almüsen. Es stett auch in der selben regel, das in den predigen, die di bruder thun, sollen sein versamelt vnd keusch ire wort zu nücz vnd zu besserung dem volck, vnd sollen in verkunden die laster vnd tugendt, die pein vnd freud; Nun ist es offenbar, das man muß 810 kunst haben, kunst sucht die lernung, aber die vbung der lernüng mag man bequemlich not haben an die brauchung der pucher. Dar vmb auß den dingen allen czeucht man auß der regel 815 klerlich, das den bruderen ist verlyhen zu speyß, kleyderen, gots dinst vnd zu weißheit der lernüng notturfftige [24<sup>v</sup>] gebrauchung der dinger. Also ist es offenbar auß den yecz gesprochen 820 dingen den, die es weißlich versteen, das die regel nit allein zu halten sey, möglich vnd czimlich auß solcher verschmehung halben der eygenschafft, sunder sy ist 825 830

## E

in eynem andern capitel gesprochen, das di minister vnd custodes sollen sorgfeldige sorgen tragen Durch gaystlich frunde vor die noth der krancken vnd uor die andern bruder zu clayden noch steten vnd nach zeyten vnd nach kalden landen, als sye erkennen, das jrer nothdorffkeit bequemsey.

Auch in eyner andern stet anhal dende die bruder zu bequemer vbung der arbeit, zu vor meyden müssig gangk, Spricht er, das vor sich vnd jre pruder leibes noth von dem vordinst jrer arbeit mogem sy nemen. Auch in einem andern capitel steet also, das die bruder sollen zu vorsichtlichen gan nach dem almosen. Auch so hat man in der selben regel, das die bruder in der predigat, die sy thun, sollen sein keusch vnd wol vorhort jre rede, zu nuczikeit vnd besserung des folkes zu vorkundigen yn die laster, togent, peyn vnd ere; Sundern es ist offenbar, das disse dinck vor seczen kunst, Die kunst wil fleyß haben zu lernen, aber die vbüng des fleisses zu lernende kan bequemlich nit gescheen ane gepräuchung der bucher. Auß dissen allen ist offenbar vnd clar genügk auß der regel, zu narung, claydung, zu dem gotlich ampacht vnd zu weyßlichen fleyß der lerung sint die gebrauchung nottorfftiger dinger den brudern zu gelassen. Also wird kund vnd offenbar aus disen vor geschrieben stucken allen den jenen, die do recht uorstentnisse haben, das disse regel also vil, als es gehoret zu sulchen plossen armüth, ist nicht allein möglich

## A

## E

835 auch verdinstlich vnd volkumen vnd so vill merr verdinstlich, als mer die gehorsammer der regel durch sy mer werden entpfremdt von czeitlichen gutteren durch gots willen.

zu haldene vnd czymlich, sun-  
dern auch vordinstlich vnd fol-  
kommen vnd so vil mere uordinst-  
lich, also vil ir gelöber durch  
den selben armüth vmb gotes  
willen, also vorgesprochen ist,  
mere geferret werden von den  
czeitlichen dinghern.

840 Weß die eygenschaft  
der ding sey. Ad hec cum  
fratres ipsi nichil sibi in speciali.

Ad hec cum fratres ipsi.

845 Item seindt einmal das die bruder in nichts in besunderheit noch in der gemein oder irem orden mügen gewinnen, vnd wen man in etwas durch gots willen oppfert, verleicht oder gibt, so ist ye die manung des gebers, er sprech den andere wort, das die gab, die  
850 durch in geoppfert, verlyhen oder gegeben werden, volkumlich verley, geb vnd oppfer, vom ym ab sag vnd vber geb vnd beger, das die selbigen ding in anderen nucz verwandelt werden vmb gots wil-  
855 len. Es ist [257] auch kein person nit, in die bequemlicher die herschafft des dings müg kumen den der vorgenandt stull oder person des romischen pabst, der gottes stathalter ist, der ein vater ist aller menschen vnd nit mynder ein besunder vater der mynder  
860 bruder, vnd das nit der dinger herschafft werd gesehen vnsicher, wan mit solcher weiß der sun dem vater, der knecht dem herren vnd der münch dem kloster mag suchen oder gewinnen die gütter, die in werden geoppfert, verlyhen vnd geben, so ist zimlich dem orden vnd den bruder, zu haben gebrauch alles haußracz vnd pucher vnd ir farender din-

Nach dem das di bruder nicht erwerben mogen yn selber in besundern oder jrem orden auch in das gemayn, vnd wan yn eczwas vmb gotes willen geopfert oder gegeben wirt ader gelyhen wirt, so ist das zu gelauben warhaftiglich, das das sey gewest des vorleyhers ader gebers andacht, ist es [687] sache das es anders nicht auß gesprochen ist, Das er ein sulch dingk, geopfert, gelyhen oder gegeben, folkomlich leyhet, gibt vnd opfert vnd von ym vor weyset vnde ab sündert vnd begert es in ander herschafft zu wandeln vnd zu prenghen vmb gotes willen. Vnde so ist kain person, in die do in der stete gottes bequemlicher die herschafft eines sulchen dinghes gewandelt moge werden, wan der genante pebstliche stül oder die person des römischen pischoffs, der do ist ein stat halder cristi, der do ist aller menschen vater vnd gleich wol ein sunderlicher vater der minor bruder, vff das das sulcher dingher herschafft nicht gesehen werde vnder einem vngewissen herren, Nach dem das der son dem vater, der knecht dem hern, der monich seinem closter

## A

## E

875 ger, gegenwurtiger vnd auch zu-  
kunfftiger, welche sy haben vnd  
gebrauchen mügen aber die ey-  
genschafft, das auch seliger ge-  
dechtnuß Innocencius der vierd  
880 pabst, vnser vorfar hat gethon,  
nemen wir in vnß vnd in die  
römischen kirchen, vnd das zu  
unß vnd der kirchen volliglich  
885 gehören vnd freylich, vnd das  
bestetigen wir mit dieser [25<sup>v</sup>] ge-  
genwürtigen saczung, die ewiglich  
soll weren.

900

905 Preterea loca empta de elemosinis  
diuersis.

Dar vmb die gekäufften heuser  
von mancherley almüsen vnd  
geoppfert vnd verlyhen vnter  
910 welcherley forem der wort, Wie  
wol die bruder sich sollen hü-  
ten, das sy in solchen gaben sich  
nit gebrauchen wort, die irem  
standt unbequemlich weren oder  
915 sein, die von vill person oder die  
es fur vngteylt besiczen oder  
etlich teyl an den heuseren ha-  
ben, in welchen sy die besiczer  
fur vngteylt oder die etlich teyll  
920 dar an haben, in nichts in solcher  
oppfrung oder in solcher ver-  
leyhung haben behalten oder  
auß genumen in gleicher weiß  
die herschafft vnd purd, als vor  
925 gemelt ist, nemen wir auff in  
unser eygenschafft vnd der vor-  
gesprochen kirchen.

die dinck, di ym geopfert, ge-  
lyhen oder gegeben werden, er-  
werben, nemen wir mit babstli-  
cher gewalt an vnd in die ro-  
mischen kirchen den äygenthum  
vnd herschafft alles hauß gere-  
thes vnd der pücher vnd alle be-  
wegliche dingk der kegenwerti-  
gen vnd der zukomenden, welche  
vnd welcher slecht geprauchung  
also dem orden ader den brudern  
zymet zu haben. Vnd wir be-  
festigen mit disser kegenwertiger  
seczung ewiglichen zu werende  
sulcher dingh herschafft vns vnd  
der vorberurten kirchen zu ge-  
hörende frey vnd folkomlich,  
das do auch bapst Innocencius  
der firde, vnser vor farer seliger  
gedechniß, gethan hat.

Preterea loca empta etc.

Dar vmb die stete, die do ge-  
kaufft sind von mancherley al-  
mosen vnd geopfert ader gelyhen  
den brudern von vil besiczern,  
besündern ander zu samen ader  
di do besunder theil in den steten  
haben sin, Vff welcher weyse zu  
sprechende das geschee, wy wol  
die bruder sich bewaren sollen,  
das si nit geprauchen wort, die  
yrem stat vnczymlich sint, In  
welchen steten die besiczer yn  
nichtes behalden haben in sulcher  
opferung oder leyhung, die nemen  
wir mit der selben pabstlichen  
gewalt gleycher weyse in das  
recht vnd in die herschafft vnd  
die äygenthum vnser vnde der  
vor genanten kirchen nach der  
selben weyse vor geschriben.

A

E

welcher ding eygenschafft dem pabst nit zu gehör̄t. Loca vero seu domus pro habitacio fratrum.

Loca vero seu etc.

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Aber die closter oder heuser zu in wonüng der bruder, die von besunderen personen oder von eynner gemein [26<sup>v</sup>] den bruderen gancz werden verlyhen oder geoppfert, ist das die bruder von willen des gebers dar ynnen wurden wonen, das mügen sy thon, die weill der will des gebers oder des verleiher beleibt stet vnd verhart. Vnd die dasigen mügen sy freylich lassen, außgenomen kirchen, betheusser, zu der kirchen gegeben, vnd kirchoff, diese ge- genwärtige vnd zu künftige ding in gleicher weiß vnd gewalt nehmen wir auff in vnser gerechtigkeit vnd eygenschafft vnd der vorgenanten römischen kirchen. So aber der will des verleyhers verwandelt wirt vnd das den bruderen geoffenbart, so sollen sy es verlassen, an welchen steten oder heuseren wir vnß gancz nichts behalten oder der vorgenanten kirchen herschafft noch eigenschafft, auß genümen die do weren auff genümen sunderlich von unsern vnd der selbigen römischen kirchen verwillingung vnd günst, vnd ist es sach das in den selbigen steten der verleyher ym [26<sup>v</sup>] behalten ist die herschafft in der verleyhung oder gebüng zu in wonüng der bruder, sollich herschafft oder gerechtigkeit der oft genannten kirchen nith heym geth, sunder vill mer soll er frey bleyben dem verleyher oder geber.

Sünder stete ader heüser zu der wonung ader herbrig der pruder, von eyner sünderlichen person ader von einer sampnung den brudern folkomende zu leyhende ader zu opfern gancz, ist das die bruder, die do in den steten wonen, auß dem willen des gebers dar jnne wonen, so mogen si dar jnne wonen allein [68<sup>v</sup>] also lange, als des gebers wille wert, vnd wan des gebers ader leyhers wille gewandelt wird vnd den prudern kuntlich wirt, so sollen si die stet frey vorlassen, In welcher stet herschschaffung ader aygenthum wir vns noch der vorgerürthen kirchen genczlich nichtis nicht behalden, Es enwere dan das ein sulche stete sunderlichen an genomen worde von vnser oder der romischen kirchen folbort; Vnd ist es das in sulchen steten ym beheldet die herschafft der leyher jn der leyhung, so sal sulche herschafft nicht ghen in das recht der oft genannten kirchen von der in wonung wegen der bruder, Sunder vil mere vnd moglicher sal es dem leyher folkomlichen frey pleiben, Auß genomen die kirche geschickt vnd kirchoffe, die wir beyde kegenwertigen vnd vnd zu küfftigen in das recht vnd in das aygenthum vnser vnd der vor berurthen romischen kirchen nemen in der leben weyse vnd macht.

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## A

## E

975 vberflussigkeit, reichtum, schaczsameling vnd der gleichen sollen die bruder vermeydenden. Insuper nec vtensilia nec alia quorum vsum.

980 Noch auch nit hauß rot noch ander ding, der gebrauchung zu notturfft in dienet vnd volprinngung der emptierers standts, wann sy sollen nit haben die gebrauchung aller ding, als gesprochen ist, zu keynnerley vberflussigkeit in grosser menig oder zu grosser hab oder mit manigfelligkeit oder schecz zu samelen, die wider die armuth sein, Auch sollen sy diese ding nit nemen in 990 der manung, das sy die möchten hingeben oder verkauffen, auch nit vnter der gestalt sich für zu sehen zu zukunfftigen czeiten noch vmb ander vrsach wegen oder suchen. Sunder in allen dingen sol an in gesehen [27r] werden der herschafft gancze verschmehüng vnd in der gebrauchung die nottuftigkeit.

1000 In der herschafft sol erscheynen absagung vnd im geprauch notturfft. Hec autem secundum exigenciam personarum et locorum.

1010 Auch die vorgesprochen artikel sollen die ministri vnd custer noch haischüng der person vnd stet mit enander oder getylt in iren diisten vnd custodien mit bescheidenheit schicken oder verrichten, Wan von solchen dingen zu zeiten der person gelegenheit, der zeit verendrung, der stet

Insuper nec vtensilia etc.

Fort mere also vor gesprochen ist, aller dingher sollen die pruder nit haben, hir vmb haüß gereth ader andere dingk, welcher dinck geprauchung den pruder zymlich ist zu der nothdorffteit vnd ampt öres states zu follenbrengung, sollen die pruder nicht entphaen zu irkeiner oberflussigkeit, richtummer ader fölle, die do dem armuth wider ist, ader schaczlegung ader in sulcher andacht, das man sie entfremden wölle ader vorkauffen ader vnder einer gestalt sich zu besorgen uff zukufftige not ader jrkein anderley vrsach. Aber vor war in allen dinghen sal scheynen in yn nach der herschafft zu mercken folkomene entplossung vnd nathdorfftdicheit in der geprauchung.

Hec autem secundum exigenciam etc.

Aber disse dinck sollen di ministri vnd custodes mit einander zu samen ader besundern in jren diisten vnd bewarunghen schicken mit beschaidenheit noch der hayschung der person vnd stete, Sint dem male zu zeiten von sulchen dinghen den personen schicklichkeit, der czeit wandalbar-

## A

## E

1015 eygenschafft vnd etlich ander vmbstendigkeit mer oder minder anderst haischt zu versehen.

keit ader stete gewonheit ader schicklichkeit vnd etliche andere beystendickeit mere ander mynder vnd anders haischen zu besorgen.

1020 In allen dingen sol erscheynnen armüt. Ista tamen sic faciant quod semper in eis.

1025 Aber diese ding alle sollen sy alzo thon, das allzeit in yn vnd iren wercken erschein die heylig armüt, als man findet, das es in auß ir regel auff geseczt ist.

Idoch sollen si die dinck also thun, das alle zeit in yn vnd in jren wercken offenbar erscheine der hilge armuth, also es yn in jrer regel, also man findet, gepotet ist.

1030 Von dem gelt. Ceterum cum in eadem regula sit sub precepti districcione prohibitum.

Ceterum cum in eadem regula etc.

1035 Nun furpas die weill in der selben regel ist verpoten mit strengigkeit des gepocs, das die bruder nit durch [27<sup>v</sup>] sich selbs oder durch ein ander person pfenning nemen oder gelt in keynnerley weiß, vnd die bruder das begeren ewiglich zu halten vnd thut not, das sy es verprengen als ein auf saczung vnd als vom geheiß vnd gepot der regel, das aber ir lauterkeit in haltung des gepocs nit werd vermackelt in etwan oder die gewissen der bruder nit werden gestochen mit etlichen stichen. So nemen wir diesen artickel von wegen der peissenden wort der hinder rede tiffer, den vnser vorfoderen haben gethon, vnd in wollen verfuren mit klerlicher außlegüng.

1040 Fort mere nach dem das in der selben regel verpothen ist, das di pruder in kainerley weyse pfennig ader gelt nemen sollen durch sich selber ader [69<sup>r</sup>] durch ein gesaczt person, vnd diß sollen die bruder begeren ewiglich zu halden, vnd also ein geboth haben si, es von noth wegen zu vor fullen vff der pruder ranicheit in in sulcher haldung des gebotes in yrkeinem dinghe befleckt werde ader yer conscienzia ader samwiczekeit mit yrkeinem angel ader stiftt gepeyniget werde. So nemen wir dissen artickel dyeffer an, wan vnser vor farn gethan han, vmb der affterkoser beyssung vnd wollen yn mit gewisser vor clerung vorfolgen,

1055 von dem hynleyhen. Dicimus in primis quod fratres ipsi

## A

## E

a mutuis contrahendis abstinent.

Vnd zu dem ersten sprechen wir,  
das die bruder sich sollen enczihen  
1060 von hynleyhen oder wegßelen,  
Wan es czimpt nit irem standt  
leyhen oder wider geben.

1065 von den vergangenen notturfft  
turfft. Possint tamen fratres ipsi pro satisfaccione pro  
eorum necessitatibus.

1070 Doch mügen sy vmb genütgung  
fur ir notturfft zu thun, die zu  
czeiten kumpf, [28r] so die almüßen  
auff hören, von welchen dan  
bequemlichen nit genüg geschehen  
mag vmb ir notturfft, vber  
alle bandt der verpindung mu  
gen sy sprechen, das sy durch  
1075 allmüslen vnd ander gut freundt  
der bruder getreülich wollen  
erbeyten solcher schuld zu beczallen.

1080 In dem ny der legung  
des almuse n zu beczallen,  
wie man sich halten sol. Quo casu procuretur  
a fratribus.

1085 Vnd in dem vall sollen die bruder  
bestellen, das der, der do gibt  
das allmüslen durch sich selber  
oder durch ein anderen, der do  
nit genendt soll werden von in,  
das ist durch die bruder, so es  
1090 gesein mag, sunder mer von ym  
noch seyn nem woll gefallen auff  
genomen vnd durch den selben  
solche genugthun thu gancz oder  
ein theyll, als im der herr ein gibt.

1095 Si tamen ipse hoc nollet facere.

vnd sprechen zu dem ersten, das  
die bruder nicht sollen borgen,  
wan so man yren stant wol  
mercket, so ist es yn zymlich,  
vortracht zu machen uff borgung.

Idoch wan do almosen geprechen,  
vor die nothdorffkeit der pruder  
zu vor genügende, die do nach  
der gelegenheit der zeit entke  
gen lauffen ader zu fallen von den,  
den bequemlich nicht genüg gescheen  
mag, So mogen sie sprechen  
an vor pindung, das si ged  
dencken, getraulich dar nach zu  
arbayten, das sulche beczalung  
geschee mit almosen durch dy  
freünd der pruder.

Vnd wan ein sulches also gefellt,  
so schaffen vnd bestellen dy bruder,  
das der jhene, der do di almosen  
gibt sulcher beczalung  
gancz ader ein tayl, als ym dan  
der herre in gaystet, selber thu  
ader durch einen andern, nicht  
zu nennen von den prudern, ab  
es gescheen magk, Sünder vil  
mere nach seinem wolbehagen  
von ym selber ane zu nemende.

## A

## E

1100 So aber er das nit wolt thon oder nit möcht thon oder das er müst weg czihen vnd nit het kundtschaft getreuer person, den er das wolt befallen, oder in welcherley ander vrsach oder sach das wer, So erkleren wir vnd sprechen, das yn [28v] keynem die lauterkeit der regel wirt zu prochen oder in keynnerley weiß ir behaltung vermasett. Ist das die bruder eynnen oder czwen ym geben zu erkennen oder etlich nennen den oder den vnd die auch stellen oder weissen, gefelt es dem, der das almüsen gibt, so mag man dem entpfellen die beczalüng der vor gesprochen schuld, vnd man sol haben seynnen willen vber die vnder geschrieben bittüng.

1125 **B**ey wem die herschafft  
bleiben soll in der le-  
gung des gelczs. Ita ta-  
men quod penes ipsum dantem  
dominio proprietate.

1130 Alzo doch das bey dem geber  
völlicklichen frey bleib die her-  
schaft, eygenschafft vnd die be-  
sitzung des gelczs mit freyen ge-  
walt, ym wider zu ruffen vnd fo-  
deren das selbig gelt allezeit biß  
zu der kerüng oder verwandlung  
in das ding, dar zu es gemeyndt  
ist.

1135 **d**ie bruder sollen keyn  
recht haben zu dem  
gellt oder wider die  
person, die es dar gibt.

Ist es aber sach das er das nicht thun wil ader nicht kan ader dar vmb das er als pald müß wegk raysen ader er kennt keine getrawhe person, den er es mocht befallen, ader von yrkeiner andern orsach, So vor cleren wir vnd sprechen, das in keinen dinghen di reynicheit der regel wirt gebrochen ader jre haldung etlicher maß befleckt. Ist das di bruder schicken vnd schaffen ym etlicher hab etliches bekentlichkeit aber etliche nennen, aber auch etliche kegenwertig pringhen ader antworten, welchem ader welchen der vorfolgung der vor genanten beczalung befolen mag werden, Ist das es dem almosen geber werdet behagen, Auch so sal man haben sein folborth zu den fort bestellungen hir nach geschriben.

Also doch das do bey dem geber  
des geldes die herschafft des  
aygenthum Vnd besiczung fol-  
komlichen frey vnd genczlich  
pleib bey dem geber mit freyer  
macht, ym wider zu haischende  
alle zeit so lang, wiß das das gelt  
gewandelt sey in das dinck, do es  
zu geben ist.

1106 vor clerung E

## A

## E

1140 In ipsa pecunia nichil omnino  
fratres iuris habeant.

1145 Aber die bruder sollen auch kein  
gerechtigkeit [29<sup>v</sup>] an diesem gelt  
haben noch hin geben oder ein  
zu nemen, auch nit wider die  
person, von yn genandt, welcher-  
ley eygenschafft sy wer im rech-  
ten oder außerhalbs rechten au-  
sprach oder volfuren oder ander  
recht zu in haben oder wie sy  
sich wur halten die obgenandt  
person in diser entpfelnüß.

1155 was den bruderen czimpt  
bey dem gelt. Liceat ta-  
men fratribus suas necessitates  
insinüare.

1160 Doch ist es czimlich den brude-  
ren, ir notturft zu offenbaren  
vnd zu besunderen oder außlegen  
der vorgesprochen person vnd sy  
pitten, das sy es bezall. Sie mü-  
gen auch die selben personen  
vermonen vnd ein furen, das sy  
sich getreulich hattt in dem ent-  
pfollen ding vnd für sehee ir seel-  
seligkeit in der volfurung ir ent-  
pfellung. Alzo doch das die bru-  
der genczlich sich sollen abczihen  
von aller hingebung oder außge-  
büng des selben gelcz. vnd auch  
wider die obgenanten person sol-  
len sy sich hutten die bruder,  
auspruch oder rechung in dem  
recht, als vor gesprochen ist, an  
zu fahen.

1175 Wie man vnter seczen  
mag mer den ein per-  
son. Si vero personam huius-

In dem gelde sollen die pruder  
genczlichen nichtz rechtes haben  
noch [69<sup>v</sup>] bestellung noch schickung,  
Auch so sollen sy kein  
recht haben, sachen zu uorfol-  
gende, an zu clagende ader jrgen-  
kein ander recht in dem gericht  
ader auß wendig dem gericht wi-  
der die person, er sey von yn ge-  
nandt oder nicht, Er sey welcher-  
ley stantes das ser sey, er hab  
sich in diser befelung, wy er  
sich habe.

Idoch so sal sein den brudern  
zymlich, dem vorgenanten per-  
son jre notdorffteit offenbaren  
vnd bescheiden vnd bedeuthen  
vnd auch yn bythen, das er beczal.  
Auch so mogent si dy person  
anhalden oder anrayssen vnd an-  
prenghen, das er sich getraulich  
habe in dem, das jm befoln ist,  
vnd seiner sele salikeit in fol-  
brengung seiner befelung vorsorg.  
So doch also vor gesprochen ist,  
das sich di bruder genczlich  
enthalden vor aller besiczung,  
handelung ader schickung vnd  
von aller an clagung ader vor  
folgung des selben geldes wider  
dy vor berurte person, also vor-  
gesprochen ist.

1180 Si vero personam huiusmodi etc.

A

E

modi [29<sup>v</sup>] nominatam vel non  
nominatam.

1185 Wer aber sach, das die person,  
genandt von den bruderen oder  
nit genandt, die diese ding nit  
möcht selber woll außrichten oder  
vorenden, als vorgesprochen ist,  
gehindert wurd durch ir abwesen,  
kranckheit oder not wolt thon  
oder von weit der stat oder ge-  
gent nit möcht aber wolt thon,  
in welchen die beczalüng oder  
genugthuung solt gescheen, oder  
durch ander vrsach wurd gehind-  
ert, so ist czimlich den bruderen  
mit lauterkeit der gewissen, zu  
bestellen ein ander person vnd  
zu seczen zu der vorgesprochen  
in der benennüng oder in ande-  
ren. Ist sach das sy zu dem ersten  
geber nit möchten oder wolten zu  
flucht haben, mit der person thon,  
als oben wir nechst verklert ha-  
ben, ist in czimlich als mit dem  
ersten.

1205

Quem es aber das ein sulche per-  
son, von den brudern genant ader  
nicht genant, gehindert worde,  
also das dorch yn nicht konde vol-  
lenbracht werden das vorgenante  
vmb seines abwesendes willen  
ader kranckheit ader vñwillen-  
heit ader vmb der ferrenheit der  
stete, zu er her nicht wolde  
ghen, jn der do die beczalung ader  
genugthüunge gescheen solde aber  
vmb ander vrsach, So sey den  
brudern zymlich mit raynickeit  
jrer consciencien fort zu pytende  
ein ander person, zu den vor auß  
gedruckten dinghen jn der be-  
noemung vnd in andern stucken  
zu thünde mit der person, als  
wir nechst hye vor vorclert ha-  
ben, yn zymlich, zu wesende mit  
der ersten person, Ist es sach das  
die nicht konnen ader nicht wol-  
len zu flucht haben zu dem ersten  
geber.

Duarum enim personarum.

1210 Wan czweier person handt rei-  
chung oder dinstberkeit durch  
den weg der vnterseczung oder  
vnterschickung, als gesprochen  
ist, gemeinickglicher wirt gese-  
hen, mag genugsam sein in  
der vorgesprochen vo[30<sup>r</sup>]lendüng  
oder außrichtüng, Wan die vor-  
gesprochen genugthüung mag de-  
ster schneller verricht werden.

1215

1220 von vilen person vñ-  
der seczung. Si tamen in-  
terdum propter locorum distan-  
ciam.

wan wir lassen vns düncken, das  
das dinst der czweyer person eyns  
nach den andern, also vor berurt  
ist, moge yn genüg sein nach  
der gelegenheit der vorgenanten  
dinck zu folbrengende, also der  
mayste lauft ist, Nach dem das  
dy vorgenante beczalung wirt ge-  
achtet, das si snelle möge geen-  
det werden.

## A

Ist aber das zu czeiten von weyt  
wegen der stett, in welchen die  
genügthüing solt gescheen, oder  
ander eygenschafft vnd vmbstend  
solch fell entstunden, in welchen  
gesehen wurd bequemlichen nott  
zu sein die distberkeyt vill  
vnterseczter person, so czimpt  
den bruder in dem fall noch  
der gestalt des gescheffts, alzo  
doch das behalten werd die vor-  
gesprochen weiß, mer person auff  
nemen, bestymmen oder antwur-  
ten zu der distberkeyt, vor en-  
dung vnd außrichtung.

1240 von der gegenwärtigen  
vnd ynstanten noturften. Et quia oportet et expedit  
fratrum necessitatibus.

1245 Vnd dar vmb es nott ist vnd nücz  
der bruder notturftigkeit nit al-  
lein in der notturft, in der  
iczungt die beczalung oder ge-  
nungthuung solt gescheen, als  
negst oben gesprochen ist, sun-  
der auch in czu felligen oder zu  
steen[30v]den, ob solch notlich  
zu fell entstunden, die man in  
kurczer zeit mocht auß richten  
oder solch, wie wol ier wenig  
weren, gen den andern zu rechen  
oder zu geleichen, Welcher ver-  
sehung notlich müst verczihen  
haben, als in pücheren zu schrei-  
ben, kirchen zu pauen oder ander  
gepeu brauchung ir in wonüng,  
In bucheren, tucheren, in ferren  
steten zu kauffen vnd in andern  
der gleichen. Wer es sach das  
sich solchs begegnet mit messig-  
keit, als oben gesprochen ist,

## E

Ist es aber zu geczeiten, das vmb  
ferrikeit der stete, in den do die  
beczalung gescheen sal, ader vmb  
andere [70r] gefert ader schickli-  
cheit ader vmbstende, anfalle  
jrgen heer ein andere weyse auff  
stunde, in welcher weyse gemer-  
cket worde, das mere personen  
eyns nach dem andern dist  
noth were, so sey den brudern  
zymlich nach des geschefftes  
schicklichkeit ader gelegenheit,  
mere personen an zu nemen, zu  
nennen ader zu antworten ader  
kegenwertig zu pringhen, das  
dinst zu vor fullent, also doch das  
die vor gesprochen weyse gehal-  
den werde.

Et quia oportet et expedit etc.

Fort mere ist es noth vnde nücz  
ader bequem mit der vorgespro-  
chen messikeit, seliglichen zu be-  
sorgen der pruder nothdorftigkeit,  
nicht allein der, vor dye do yczün-  
de die beczalung oder vor ge-  
nugung vor geschehen solde, Sün-  
der auch der notdorftikeiten, die  
do schire ader snell an kommen  
ader an fallende sint. Sy sint dan-  
sulche, wen si an fallent, das man  
si in korczer zeit konne geenden,  
Ader sulche, wie wol das si nicht  
vil sint zu dem ersten zu schac-  
zen, das ire bestellung vnd schick-  
ung vor zock hat, Also in bu-  
chern zu schreiben, kirchen ader  
gepaw zu jrer geprauchung ader  
wonung zu paühende, pucher  
vnd gewant in ferren steten zu  
kauffen vnd in andern an fellen  
disen gleich. Ist das was sulchs

## A

mag man heylsamlichen versehen  
die bruder. Alzo vrteyl wir cler-  
lichen in den nottlichen dingen,  
alzo mügen in den die bruder  
sicherlich vnd mit gesunther ge-  
wissen thon noch vnser außle-  
gung.

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Alzo das in der czu kumenden  
oder zu stenden not, die man in  
kurczer zeit oder die etlicher  
vmbstendt halben nit alzo kurcz-  
lich, als oben in dem nechsten  
fall gesagt ist, mag außgericht  
werden des halben, der das al-  
musen gibt, oder des genanten  
oder vndersaczen halben in al-  
len din[31r]gen vnd durch alle  
ding, als im artickel der beca-  
lünig, die man thun solt für die  
vergangen notturfftigkeit, sol man  
thon, als wir oben nechst haben  
verkliert vnd geseczt.

von der notturfft, die  
do hat verczihung der  
czeitt. In ea vero necessitate  
quamquamque presencialiter in-  
gruenti.

Aber in der notturfft, wie die  
selbig gegenwurtiglichen erstet,  
die doch auß ier gestallt, als vor  
gesagt ist, hat verczihung der  
czeitt. Wan in solchen fellen ist  
ist der warheit gleich der stet  
weyt halben, die do fodert die

## E

entkegen laufft, so vnder schei-  
den wir clerlichen in sulchen  
nothdorfftikeiten vnd vor cleren  
dy bruder in den nōthen ader  
bedorffunghen, also mogen si-  
cherlichen vnd mit vnvorschri-  
ckener consciencien fort ghen,  
Also sycherlich vnd mit gutter  
gewyssen thun vnd ston.

Declaramus videlicet vt in in-  
gruenti.

Das ist das jn der zw kommen-  
den oder zw stenden nott, die man  
in kurczer, wan die nothdorffti-  
keit an fellet, die do in korczer  
zeit oder di do zu zeiten auß  
etlichen vmbstendickheiten nicht  
in so korczer zeit, also in der  
nechsten weyse vor gesprochen  
ist, kan auß gericht ader geendet  
werden, so sal man da mit fort  
ghen beyde zu dem almosen ge-  
ber vnd auch der do genant  
wart ader nach ym geschicket  
wart, In allen dinghen vnd gencz-  
lichen, also wir vor cleret ha-  
ben in dem nechsten vor ge-  
schriben artickel von der beca-  
lzung der vorganghen notdorffdi-  
cheit.

Aber in der nothdorfftigkeit ader  
bedorffung, wie gegenwertigli-  
chen sy sey anfallen, dy do doch  
auß jrer schicklichkeit ader we-  
sende ader einen an hanghenden  
vor zogk der zeit hat, einen an  
geknüpften vorczogk der zeit,

## A

außrichtüng der notturfft noch  
 ier eygenschafft, oder auch der  
 vmbstendt halben der selben  
 notturfft, offt kumen *casus*, in den  
 zu außrichtung der notturfft durch  
 vill hendt vnd person must geen  
 das gelt, das geben ist zu sol-  
 cher notturfft vnd zu geeygent,  
 Welchen allen personen gleichsam  
 vnmuglich wer, den sunderlichen  
 herren dar vmb die notturfft ge-  
 ben ist oder zu eygen das gelt,  
 oder auch der gesaczt von ym  
 vnd der dritt von ym, Wo ein  
 solcher [31<sup>v</sup>] fall zu viell, das man  
 dar nach hett geczeügnuß des  
 subrogacz oder des vntergesac-  
 ten,

1330

Declaramus et dicimus.

So erkleren wir vnd sprechen,  
 das in dem artikel an die czwu  
 gesprochen weiß in den vorgan-  
 gen notturfftēn oder czu kumen-  
 den, die auß gericht mügen wer-  
 den in kurczer czeit oder zu  
 czeiten nit in kurczer czeit, als  
 oben ist gesprochen, zu behalten  
 gancze lauterkeit der regel vnd  
 der, die di regel gelobt haben. Ist  
 es aber sach das des almüsen  
 geber ist bereyt oder sein pot,  
 der das mag thon, so sag man ym  
 offenlich von den bruderēn, das  
 es ym gefall, das die herschafft  
 des selben gelcz mit freyen ge-  
 walt, wider czu ruffen ym das

## E

also gesprochen ist, vnd es danne  
 der warhait gleich ist, das ein  
 thayl vmb der ferrenheit der ste-  
 te, welche dy auß [70<sup>v</sup>] richtung  
 der nothdorfft von Irer gelegen-  
 haít hayschet auch ein thayl vmb  
 der vmbstendicheit der nothdorfft,  
 wan man die sache wol be-  
 trachten wil, offt vnd dicke zu  
 felle quemen ader gescheen, In  
 welchen zu fallen zu der auß  
 richtung sulcher not müst es sein,  
 das durch mancherley hende vnd  
 personen ging das gelt, das do  
 zu sulchen nothdorfftēn dinghen  
 were gedacht ader depu-  
 tiert, welcher personen alzu male  
 bekentnisse zu haben were schire  
 vnmoglich dem rechten herren,  
 der das gelt vor sulch notdorfft  
 geben ist ader auch dem er es  
 auch befolen hat vnd auch dem,  
 von dem andern gebethen,

wir vor cleren vnde sprechen, das  
 in dissem artickel vber die vor  
 gesprochen weyse in den vorgan-  
 gen nothdorfftēn vnd in den  
 an fallenden, den, di do zu zei-  
 ten in korczer zeit ader zu zeiten  
 nicht in korczer zeit kaüm geend-  
 et ader follenpracht werden, also  
 hy uor auß gedruckt ist, sollen  
 gehalden werden, also wir vor  
 gesprochen haben, zu bewarende  
 folkomen vnd genczliche rayni-  
 cheit der regel vnd jrer gelober.  
 Idoch ist es sach das ein sulcher  
 milder almosen geber bereyth  
 ader sein bot, der do mechtig sey,  
 das zu thun, So sullen ym die

## A

1350 selb gelt allzeit biß zu seynner bekertiung in das geacht ding, frey bleib, als in den anderen czweyen sachen gesprochen ist.

1355

1360 mit gunst des gebers sol gescheen all han- delung des gelczs.

1365 Durch wie vill hendt das gelt oder das almüsen wirt gehandelt, ob die person von ym [327] aber von den bruderen wer genandt worden, gancz vnd gar geschee noch seynner verwilligung, gunst vnd gewalt.

1370 Quo assensum suum prebente.

1375 Vnd so er seynnen willen, gunst gibt zu den obgesprochen dingen, so mügen die bruder sicherlich gebrauchen das ding, das gekauft oder gewinnen ist von dem gelt, von welcherley person das gescheen ist noch weiß, als oben ver- czeichet ist.

1380 Die bruder nemen nit gelt, so sy die geseczten weiß halten. Ad maiorem autem predictorum omnium.

1385 Aber czu eynner grosseren klar- heit aller vorgesprochen ding in dieser bull der fursehung, die

## E

pruder auß gedruckt oder offen- berlichen predigen vnd sagen, das ym behagk ader sein wille sey, das di herschaffung des gel- des frey bey jm pleib mit freyher macht, das gelt ym wider zu hayschen alle zeit, biß so langhe das es gewandelt sey in das dinck, do es zu gegeben ist, Also in den andern czwen weysen hy vor gesprochen ist.

Durch wy vil hende das gelt ader almoß gehandelt werde, Es sey di person von ym ader von den prudern genant, das sal alles von seinem folborth, willen vnd macht fort ghen.

Vnd ist es das er zu disen vor ge- schriben puncten seine folbort gibt, so mogen die pruder si- cherlich geprächen des dinghes, das do gekauft ader erworben ist vor diß gelt, durch wene es auch gescheen sey nach der wey- se, hye oben berurt.

Ad maiorem autem predictorum omnium etc.

Zu grosser clarheit disser vorge- sprochen stücke so vor clerent wir ader beweysen mit diser schi-

## A

ewiglich weren soll, das die bruder in den weissen, als oben gesprochen wirt, bey dem oder mit dem gelt zu halten sich in iren notturfftēn, die vorgangen sein oder noch ein sten möchten, werden sy nicht verstanden noch gesprochen mügen werden, gelt nemen wider die regel oder ir profession oder lauterkeyt irs ordens durch sich selbs oder durch mittel der person, [32v] Wan doch offenbar ist durch die obgesprochen ding, das die bruder gancz entpfremdt sollen seyn nit allein von der nemung eygenschafft, herschafft oder gebrauchung des gelcz, Sunder auch von aller anrürung vnd greiffung.

1410 So der geber stirbt, von der kerung in czimlich ding, wie man sich halten soll. In eo vero casu quando antequam ipsa pecunia in licitum rei habende vel vtende commercium sit conuersa.

1420 Aber in dem fall, ee das gelt wirt gekert in czimlich verwandlung eyns dings, das man müß haben oder gebrauchen, der verleyher des gelcz wurd sterben, ist das der selbig verleyher ym leyhen het geredt oder auß gesprochen, das die geseczt person das gelt solt auß geben zu den nottlichen gebrauchung der bruder, vnd was von dem hynleyhenden geschech im leben oder im sterben, oder ein solcher verleyher eynnen erben ließ oder nit, mü-

## E

ckung [71r] der besorgung, zu ewigen zeiten werende, Ist es das dy vor gesprochene weyse bey dem gelde in der pruder vorgen gen nothdorfft vnd an fallenden bewart werden, so werden dye pruder nicht gericht ader bekant, vnd auch sal man nit sprechen, das sy sint gelt nemer durch sich selber ader eine angesaczte person wider die regel ader wider die reinicheit des gelöbdes jres ordens, Sint dem mal das es offenpar kunth ist auß disen vor gesprochen stücken, das die bruder nicht allein von der nemung oder entphaung aygenthumme, herschaffung ader geprau chung des geldes, sondern auch von dem gelde vnd von aller hanthyrung ader an rurünge des geldes vnd von ym gancz fremde ader geferret sein.

In eo vero casu etc.

Besundern in sulcher weyse, wan der geber des geldes sturbe, eher das gelt gewandelt worde in ein zymliche wandelung des dinghes zu habende ader zu geprau chende, Ist es das der geber in dem geben gesprochen ader auß gesprochen hat ader auß gedruckt hat, das die gesaczte ader be stalte person das gut solde ke ren in nothdorfftige geprau chung der pruder, Also wi der geber feret lebende ader sterbende, vnd ab der selbe gebe einen er-

## A

## E

- 1435 gen die brüder geen vnd lauffen zu der gesaczten person an hindernüß des tods des hynleyhers oder [33<sup>r</sup>] des erben widersprechung, vmb das gelt auß zu geben, als sy möchten zu dem herren vnd verleyher des almüsen.
- 1440 Von der gemeynnen weiß bey dem gelt, das dorber bleibt. Quia vero puritatem ipsius ordinis intima affecione zelamus.
- 1445 Die weill wir aber die lauterkeyt des ordens mit inbrünstigen begirlichen herczen lieb haben, Wan so in den gesprochen sachen verlyhen wurd das gelt durch ymandt zu mercklicher notturfft, so mag der verleyher des gelcz gepeten werden von den bruderen, Ist das etwas vbrig bleibt, wen mercklich notturfft do ist, Ist das der hynleyher verwilligt, das das vbrig gelt gekert werd in anderen nücz oder ander notturfft der bruder, verwilligt er aber das nit, das vbrig gelt, das vorhanden ist, sol man ym wider geben. Doch sollen sich die bruder hutten, das sy sich fleissiglich schicken, das sy nit mer wissiglich verwilligen zu geben leyhen, wan noch der warheit zu schaczen [33<sup>v</sup>] das notturftig ding wert ist, vmb des willen das gelt wirt verlyhen.
- 1450 1455 1460 1465 1470
- ben nach Im lasse nicht, So mögen di pruder zu flucht haben zu der bestalten personen, eben also wol also si mochten zu dem geber, do sal nicht an hindern des gebers tod aber des nachgelassen erben widersprüche.
- Quia vero puritatem ipsius ordinis etc.
- Sundern nach dem male das wir dy reynickeit des ordens mit jnwendigem begerung vnsers herczen beliben, wan es geschyt in disen vorgesprochen weysen, das ymandes gelt gibt zu einer sündlerlichen nothdorftikeit, so mögen die pruder den geber pyten, das es sein wille sey, ab von dem gelde eczwas ober plibe, wan die sündlerliche noth geschicket ist, das es moge werden gekart in ander dinck vor ander nothdorftikeit der pruder, vnd ist es sach das er es nicht folbortet, so sal man ym wider geben, was do vber pleibt, Idoch so sollen sich die pruder bewaren ader vor sehen, das si sich sorgfeldiglichen fugen, das si wissentlichen nit folworten mere lassen auß zu legen, wan man magk bey der warheit achten das dinck, das do noth ist, werth sey, do das gelt vor auß gelegt wirt.
- von gemeynner weiß, so das gelt an bestymmung nyder gelegt wirt. Et quia in predictorum seriosa

## A

exposicione a dante vel recipiente  
de facili posset errare.

1475 Vnd dar vmb das man leichtlich  
mag irren von dem geber oder  
nemer in der ernstlichen vor  
gesprochen außlegung vnd das  
man sicherlich mag raten der  
lauterkeyt des ordens vnd der  
eynfeltigkeit etlicher einfeltigen  
menschen hin vnd her zu hail  
ier selen vnd zu merer erklerung  
vnd zu nucz der geber, so seczen  
wir an das licht dieser geschrift  
vnser constitucion oder saczung,  
die ymmer vnd allweg weren soll,  
vnd der syn, der genugsamlich  
in dem fall wirt begriffen von  
dem, der in woll verstet, den  
wollen wir furen zu gemeynner  
erkennung, alzo das alle zeit, wen  
das gelt wirt gesandt oder geop-  
fert den bruderen, es sey den das  
offenlich durch den sender oder  
geber anderst auß gesprochen  
werd, so sol noch der vor [34<sup>r</sup>] ges-  
prochen weiß genczlich das gelt  
geoppfert verstanden werden vnd  
gesendt.

1505 Non enim verisimile est aliquem  
elemosine sue sine expressione  
modum illum prefigere.

1510 Wan es ist der warheit nit gleich,  
das ymandt an ausprechung seyn-  
nes almusen die weiß wolt fur  
seczen, durch die der geber bil-  
lich oder die, der notturfft er  
durch die gab vermeindt zu  
versehen, wolt berauben die lau-

## E

Vnde nach dem male das in dis-  
ser vorgesprochen ernstschaftli-  
ger außlegung leichtlichen mochte  
jrrung gescheen von dem geber  
ader von dem entphanger des  
geldes, vff das das dester cler-  
licher nüczikeit der geber, reyni-  
cheit des ordens, etlicher schlechter  
menschen simpelheit ader ayn-  
fal[71<sup>v</sup>]dichkeit von jrer selen sa-  
likeit allenthalben sicherlicher ge-  
rathen werden, so prenghen wir in  
das licht dissen syn ader vor-  
stentnisse, den do ein icklich  
vernüfftig mensch genüglich vor-  
nymmet, mit disser schickung  
dissen kegenwertigen seczen ge-  
crefftigk, zu ewigen czeiten we-  
rende, vor clerent wir vnd willen  
den selben zu der gemaynen  
kuntheit vnd bekenntnisse ge-  
furt werden, also das alle zeit,  
wan gelt den pruder gegeben,  
gesant ader gepoten wirt, so sal  
man vornemen ader vorsteen, das  
es gesant vnd gegeben sey gencz-  
lichen in der vor gesprochen  
weysen, es sey dan das durch  
den geber ader sender anders  
was auß gedruckt werde.

wan es ist nit der warheit glich,  
das ymandt wolle seyner alma-  
son ane sunderlich außdruckung  
sulche weyse seczen, mit welcher  
weyse der geber seines vordinstes  
ader der jene, der er jrer noth-  
dorffteiken mit seiner gabe ge-

## A

## E

1515 terkeit ier gewissen oder des nücz oder wurckung der gaben.

dencket zu besorgen, sullen der gaben nucz ader jrer consciencien raynickheit beraubt werden.

1520 von seczen im testament. Ad hec quia fratribus ipsis interdum in vltimis voluntatibus sub diuersis modis non nulla legantur.

Ad hec quia fratribus ipsis etc.

1525 Czu diesen vorgesprochen seinten mal das zu czeiten den bruderen werden etlich ding geschaffen yn dem leczten willen mit mancherley weiß vnd nichts offenlich in der regel oder in den auß legüng vnser vorfoderen von den, waß zu thun sey, wirt begriffen, vnd auff das das icht her noch mals czeiffel in den dingen kommen, so wollen wir versehen die schaffer vnd bewaren vnd für sehen [34<sup>v</sup>] die gewissen der bruder.

Nach dem als den brudern zu gezeiten in den leczden willen vnder mancherley weyse etliche dinck werden beschaiden vnd ist in der regel noch in der vorclerung vnser vorfarn nicht auß gedruckt, was do mit zu thünde sey, Vff das das in zu komenden czeiden kain czweifel dar von auff stee, zu vorsorgende den bescheidern vnde der bruder consciencia zu bewarende,

von testament in besunderheyt. Declaramus, ordinamus et dicimus.

1540 So sprechen wir vnd ordnen vnd erkleren, Ist das der schaffer auß spricht in dem geschefft die weiß, noch der oder welcher den bruderen angesehen ir eygenschafft zu nemen nit czimlich wer, alzo er seczt den bruderen ein weingarten oder ein acher zu pauen, ein hauß hin zu lassen oder ander wort, die den gleich werden gesprochen, oder hilt weiß gleich den in der verlassung, so sollen die bruder gancz sich abczihen von dem geschefft vnd nichts do von zu nemen.

So vorcleren wir, schicken ader ordiniren vnd sprechen, Ist es sach, das der testament macher in seiner beschaydung auß druckt ein weyse, nach welcher weyse es den prudern vnczymlich wer zu entphaen, an zu sehen jren stant, Also aber den prudern einen weingarten ader acker zu baühen-de ader zu pflugende, ein hauß zu vornüczende ader sulche wort der glichen sprech ader sulche weyse in der verlassung hilde von einer beschaidung vnd von seiner auff nemung, sollen sich die pruder in aller weise enthalten.

A

F

1555 Si vero modum licitum fratribus  
in legendo testator expresserit.

Ist aber das der schaffer auß spricht ein czimliche weiß den bruderen in dem geschefft, als wen er sprech, Ich schaff zu notturfft der bruder auß zu geben das gelt oder zu hauß, acker, weingarten oder der gleichen zu dem, das durch ein person oder mer, die tuglich sein vnd geschickt, die ding werden außgericht oder verkaufft vnd das gelt, genümen von den dingen, werd gekert zu den ge[35r] peuen oder ander notturfft der bruder, oder in dem geschefft wert der gleich weiß gebraucht in dem fall, so erkennen wir das zu halten der bruder halben in allen dingen allenthalben, so man mercket ier notturft vnd noch den oben gesprochen bescheidenheiten, als wir haben außgelegt selber in dyser verleyhung der gelt almußen, erkleret ist worden.

die testamentary vnd  
prelaten sollen auß rich-  
ten die testament. Ad  
que legata soluenda tam heredes  
testator quam executores.

Vnd zu bezcalen die geschaffen ding sollen sych miltiglich erczeygen die erben der geschefft herren vnd auch die auß richter, sy sein prelaten oder weltlich, den die versehung zu stet von recht oder von entphelchung, vnd sy sollen sich von irs ampts wegen bereit erczeygen, zu erfüllen den

Ist es aber das der testament seczer in der bescheidung auß spricht ein zimliche weyse, Also wan er sprech, ich bescheide gelt vor der pruder notdorfftikeit auß zu legende ader ein hauß, acker, weingarten vnd des gleichen dar zu, das durch ein gewisse person ader durch bequeme person die dinck werden entfremdet ader vor dan, vnd das gelt, von den dinghen genomen, sollen werden gekart in die gebawhe adder ander notdorfftige dinghe der pruder ader in dem beschaiden gleicher weyse ader wort geprachet, In dyser weyse erkennen ader richten wir, das di pruder das halden sollen in allen dinghen vnd oberall genczlich wol zu mercken jren nothdorfftickeyten vnd mesigkeiten, oben berurt, das do durch vns hye forne in den gegeben geltalmosen ist vor cleret.

zu welchen bescheideten dinghen zu beczalende sollen sich milde beweysen beyde die erben der testament seczer vnd jre auß richter vnd die prelaten vnd auch wertlichen, den do sulche besorgung von rechtiß wegen ader von gewonheit wegen zu gehort, wan es sich begibt ader nücz ist, so

## A

## E

1595 guttigen willen der sterbenden oder totten, Wan auch wir durch czimlich weiß wollen der bruder regel bequemlich alzo versehen, das guttige maynünig der totten nit [35<sup>v</sup>] werd gekrienckt vnd die geittigkeit der erben mit rechtfertigen staffung werd geschlagen vnd das die armen bruder nit werden beraubt ir notturfftigen hilff.

1610 Ein gemeyn weiß von dem testament. Si vero fratribus ipsis generaliter aliquid absque modi expressione legatur.

1615 Ist aber das den bruderen etwas gemeynnigklich wirt geschickt oder geschafft an meldüng der weiß, so wollen wir das in dem geschefft ader gesaczten ding, das alzo vnuersichert oder vngeendt vnd vngestimpt bleibt in allen vnd durch alle ding, alzo versten vnd halten vnd heyssen, das ewiglich zu halten durch diese saczung, das wir oben wolten vnd haben auß gesprochen zu halten ym gelt amüsen, das den bruderen an vnterschidlich geoppfert wirt oder gesendet, das ist das man sol versten, das diß gelt vnter der czimlichen weiß vnd forem den bruderen sey gelassen oder verlassen vnd gegeben, alzo das noch weder der schaffer oder geber seins [36<sup>r</sup>] verdinst noch die bruder beraubt werden der würckung oder des nücz des erbs oder verlassen gelczs oder gaben.

sollen si sich von jres amptes wegen willig vnd beraith dar [72<sup>r</sup>] zu erbyeten vnd beweisen, dye milden willen der vorscheidenden meschen zu erfüllen, wan wir auch gedencken, durch zymliche weyse vnd der regel der bruder bequeme zu besorgen, das nicht der milde wille der toden zu rucke ghe vnd die geyricheit der erben mit rechten slegen geslagen werde vnd di selben armen bruder not dorfftiger hulffe nit beraubet werden.

Wer es aber sach das den prudern gemeinlich oder in das gemein ane sunderliche auß sprechung einer weyse worde eczwas beschaiden, so wollen vnd gepithen mit dissem kegenwertigen gesecze, das man das halden sal vnd vorsteen zu ewigen geczeiten in allen dinghen vnd gleicher weiß vberal in sulchem bescheid ader bescheidunghe, also vnnemlich ader ane auß druckung einer sunderlichen weise vorlassen, das wir hye forne haben ausgesprochen, vnde wolden, das es solde gehalden werden in dem gelde ader almosen, den brudern vnenlich ader ane auß druckung geben ader gesant, Also das man das vor neme, das es den prudern vnder einer zymlichen weyse sey vorlassen, Also das der bescheider nicht seines lones noch dy bruder des vorlassen dinghes noth vnd gebrauchung nicht beraubt werden.

## A

## E

1640 von wem geschehen soll  
die verwandelung der  
ding. Quia vero dominium li-  
brorum et aliorum mobilium qui-  
bus tam ordo quam fratres utun-  
tur.

1645 Vnd seindt des mals das zu der  
vorgesprochen kirchen sunderlich  
wirt erkandt zu gehoren die her-  
ligkeit oder herschafft der pücher  
vnd ander fremder hab, der der  
orden vnd bruder gebrauchen,  
alzo das sy nit seyn eynner an-  
deren herschafft, welche pucher  
oder farende hab zu czeiten  
geschicht vnd nücz ist zu ver-  
kauffen vnd zu verwandelen von  
notturfftigkeit wegen der bruder,  
so wollen wir fürsehen den ge-  
wissen der bruder vnd verleyhen  
mit dem gewalt, das die verwan-  
delung solcher ding in die dinger  
der gebrauchung czimlich ist den  
bruderen zu haben, geschech mit  
gewalt des generals oder provin-  
cials ministers in ir dinstbarkeit  
geteylt oder gesammelt, den  
1655 [36<sup>v</sup>] wir auch verleyhen, zu  
ordnen von der geschicklichkeit  
der gebrauchung solcher ding.

1670 von wem geschehen soll  
die verkauffung der  
ding. Si vero res huius modi  
estimato precio vendi contingat.

1675 Ist das ein solch ding mit ge-  
schaczen lon verkauft wird vnd  
so den brudern nit zimlich ist,  
noch dem die regel verpeüt, durch  
sich oder durch ein andre person  
gelt zu nemen, So orden wir vnd

Quia vero dominium librorum etc.

Besundern den also es da vor war  
bekant ist, das die herschafft der  
bucher vnd der andern bewegli-  
chen dinck, der do beyde der  
orden vnde di bruder geprau-  
che, di do nicht sein vnder an-  
der herschaft gehortet, sunderlich  
zu der egenanten kirchen, welcher  
bucher vnd bewegliche  
dingk zu ziten geschiet ader  
nücz vnd bequem ist, zu uorkauf-  
fen oder zu uor wandeln ader zu  
vorwechseln, als wir dan wollen  
der pruder nüczigkeit vnd con-  
sciencien besorgen, so vor lihen  
wir vnd geben zu in der selben  
crafft vnd macht, das die vor  
wechselung sulcher dinck zu den  
dinghen, welcher gebrauchung  
den prudern zymt zu haben, ge-  
schee von krafft vnd macht des  
gemaynen vnd der provincial  
minstern in jren dinsten zu sa-  
men ader besundern vnd den  
selben vorleyhen wir auch, zu  
schicken, wie man sulche dingk  
geprauchen sal.

Were es aber das man sulche  
dinck vor kauffen müste vor ein  
genant gelt, sint dem male des  
den brudern nicht zymt, gelt zu  
nemen, als dye regel vor beüth,  
durch sich ader durch einen an-

## A

## E

1685 wollen, das das gelt oder lon  
werd genümen oder auß gegeben  
zu czimlichen dingen, der gebrau-  
chüng czimlich ist den bruderen  
zu haben, durch den schaffer oder  
procuratoren, der geseczt ist vom  
stull zu rom, ader vom Cardinal,  
der ein beschirmer ist des selben  
ordens, noch weiß, als oben geor-  
dnet ist in den gegenwurtigen  
vnd zu künftigen notturfftēn.

dern, So ordiniren wir vnd schi-  
cken vnd wollen, das sulche gelt  
ader lon genomen werde vnd auß  
gegeben werde in ein zymlich  
dinck, des gepräuchung den pru-  
dern zymet zu haben durch einen  
procurator vnd schaffer, von dem  
vor genannten stul gesaczt, ader  
von dem cardinal, der do des  
selben ordens regirung hat durch  
den selben stul, noch der weise,  
hie forne geschickt in den vorgan-  
gen vnd anfallenden notdorffti-  
keiten.

1695 von den geringen dingen,  
wie man sy geben  
mag. De vilibus autem mobilibus etc.

De vilibus autem mobilibus etc.

1700 Aber von den geringen dingen  
farender hab aber die wenig  
etwas wert sein, sol czimlich sein  
auß [37r] dieser vnser erlaubüng  
den bruderen, ir guttigkeit vnd  
andacht angesehen oder vmb an-  
der erlich vnd vernuftige sach  
auß dem orden, den anderen zu  
geben, doch sollen sy vor hin  
vrlaub haben ier obersten von  
des wegen, als den vnter den  
bruderen yn gemeynnen oder  
provincialen capitellen nit allein  
von geringen oder wenig tugli-  
chen oder von irem wert oder  
schaczung, sunder auch von der  
gesprochen erlaubung wirt geord-  
net, das ist von welchen oder wi  
sy zu haben seyn im orden vnd  
außerhalb des ordens den ande-  
ren zu geben.

Besundern von snoden bewegli-  
chen dinghen ader die do wenig  
ichtes wert sint, sal den prudern  
zymlich sein auß vnser kegenwer-  
tigen vorleyhung vnd zü gebung,  
den andern zu gebende, inwen-  
ding vnd außwendig den orden  
an zu sehent, milidickeit ader  
vmb ander etliche vnd vornüfftige  
sach, wan man zu dem ersten  
behalden hat orlaub der obersten  
nach der weyse, als di pruder in  
dem gemaynen ader provincial  
capitel schicken beyde von den  
snoden dinghen ader di do nicht  
vil wert sin, vnd wy theüre si sin  
sollen vnd auch von welchen  
obersten vnd in welcher weyse  
man den vor genannten orlaub  
haben sal.

1720 Piß hiher von der ar-  
mut. von den rocken  
zu haben. Licet autem con-  
tineatur in regula quod fratres

Licet autem contineatur in re-  
gulam.

## A

## E

1725 habeant vnam tunicam cum capucio et aliam sine capucio.

1730 Vnd wie wol in der regel wirt be-  
griffen, das die bruder sollen ha-  
ben ein rock mit der cappen vnd  
ein anderen an die cappen, vnd  
es wirt gesehen, das die maynüng  
des stifters ist gewesen, das sy an  
notturfft nit mer sollen gebrau-  
chen, so erkleren [37<sup>v</sup>] wir, das  
sy mer rock mügen brauchen mit  
vrlaub der minister vnd custer  
gesampt oder geteylt in ier ad-  
ministracion oder dinstbarkeyt, wen  
es sy gut dünckt noch merckung  
der notturfft vnd ander vmbsten-  
digkeit, die man wegen soll mit  
got vnd der regel, vnd in dem  
treten sy nit auß dem weg der  
regel, Wan in der regel offenlich  
stet, das die minister vnd custer  
sollen fleissig sorg haben noch  
stetten oder gegent vnd der czeit  
vnd kalten landen vmb die not-  
turftigkeit der krancken vnd zu  
kleyden die bruder.

1750

1755 nit allein die ministri,  
sunder auch die ande-  
ren mugen sorg tragen  
für notturfft der bru-  
der. Et quamquam regula pre-  
dicta contineat quod de fratribus  
induendis et necessitatibus infir-  
morum ministri tantum et custo-  
des sollicitam curam gerant.

1765 Vnd wie woll das ist, das die regel  
inhelt, das vmb die kleydung der  
bruder vnd notturftigkeit der  
krancken allein die ministri vnd  
custer fleissig sorg sollen tragen

Wie wol die regel in ir hat beslos-  
sen, das di bruder sollen haben  
einen rock mit der kogel vnd den  
andern ane kogel, vnd es mag sein  
das di andacht des in seczer sey  
gewest, wan di not worde uff  
horend, das si nit mere rocke  
geprauchen sollen, wir vor cleren,  
das di pruder mogen mere rock  
geprauchen mit orlaub der mi-  
nister vnd koster zu saman vnd  
besundern in jren dinsten, di do  
yn befolen sint, wan yn es be-  
düncket zu thun, wen si betracht  
haben di nothdorfftheit vnd  
ander beystendickeit, di do nach  
got vnd nach der regel an zu  
sehen sint, vnd vmb des willen  
sint si nicht gesehen zu jrrende  
von der regel, Nach dem das  
auch in der regel offenberlich  
wirt gesprochen, das dy ministri  
vnd custodes sollen sorgfeldig-  
liche sorg tragen vor di not der  
krancken vnd vor di bruder zu  
claiden nach steten vnd zeiten  
vnd kalden landen.

Vnd wie wol di vor genant regel  
in jr beslossen hat, das vor di  
pruder zu clayden vnd vor di not  
der krancken allein di ministri  
vnd custer solle sorgfellige sorg

## A

1770 vnd diß wort allein die ministri vnd custer in der sorg verstrickt vnd verbindt, gleichsam [38r] das von der sorg die anderen bruder außgeschlossen in dem ersten angesicht gesehen werden, die weyl doch fleissiglich zu mercken vnß zu stet, vnd die zeit der auff gesaczten regel, in der die bruder noch gegenwurtiger scheczung an der czall wenigk waren vnd villeicht die ministri vnd custer waren gesehen genugsam zu sein, die ding auß zu richten vnd czu versehen, vnd doch nit mynder mercken wir merüng der bruder vnd dieser czeit gelegenheit; auch ist es nit der warheit gleich, das der selig franciscus, der regel auff seczer, hat wollen den ministeren vnd custeren ein ioch der vnmöglichkeit auff seczen oder auß der nochfolgung der vnmöglich hat wöllen, das die bruder solten mangelen ir notturfft.

1795 Erlauben wir, das die ministri vnd custer mügen durch ander den fleiß der sorgfertigkeit haben vnd thon. Auch sollen die bruder diese sorg, die allein den ministeren vnd custeren zu gehort auß der regel, so in dy befollen wirt durch die selben, tragen fleissiglich.

1805 von der arbeyt. [38v] Contineatur quoque in regula quod fratres quibus graziam dominus dedit laborandi laborent fideliter et deuote.

Auch wirt begriffen in der regel,

## E

tragen, vnd das wort alleine scheinet in dem ersten an sehen di ministri vnd custer zu uorbinden in diser sorge, das alle andere da von der sorgen außgeslossen sein. Idoch gehort vns zu, sorgfeldichlichen zu mercken bey dy zeit der an gesaczten regel, in welcher zeit der pruder wenig was in der zal, kegen disen kegenwertigen zu schaczen, vnd villeicht di ministri vnd custer worden gemerckt uff die zeit zu den dinghen zu besorgen vnd zu schaffen, das si mochten genügsam sein. Auch gleich wol vormerung der pruder vnd di schicklichkeit ader gelegenheit diser kegenwertigen zeit; es ist nicht der warheit glich, das der selbe franciscus, der anseczer der regel, [73r] wolde den minstern vnd custern ein ioch ader eine borde der vnmöglichkeit auff legen ader auß der nach folgung der vnmöglichkeit wolle di pruder entpern lassen jrer notdorfftheit.

Also vor leyhen wir, das di minister vnd kuster mogem auch durch ander pruder sulche sorgfeldichkeit der sorgen vben. Auch sollen die andern pruder sulche sorge, di do vor nemlichen ader sunderlichen auß der regel di vor genanten minister vnd kuster an trid, fleissiglich tragen vnd vben, wan es befohlen wirt.

Contineatur quoque in regula.

Auch so wirt beslossen in der re-

## A

1810 das die bruder, den der herr geben hat gnad zu arbeiten, sollen erbeiten getreulich vnd andechtiglich, alzo so auß geschlossen ist die mussigkeit, der feindt der seel,  
 1815 das nit auß gelescht werd der geist des heyligen gepeczs vnd der andacht, die weyl nün aber auß dem wort die bruder von müssigkeit des lebens vnd von der regel vbertretung so vnfrumlich sein vermerckt, so begeren wir, solche schalckhaftige peiß wort, die sich zu czeitten biß herr etlich vnterstanden haben, hinter sich zu trucken, Erklären wir das, so man mercket die vorgesprochen wort vnd gestalt vnd weiß zu reden, vnter den die bruder zu solcher vbung geczogen  
 1820 vnd gereiczt werden.

1825 welche bruder nit verpunden sein zu der handt arbeyt. Non videtur ea fuisse instituentis intencio.

1830 So wirt nit gesehen, das das sey gewesen des auff seczers meynung, [39'] das die, dy do an hangen der lernung oder den gotlichen empteren vnd dinsten zu verbringen, das er die selbenn der handt arbeyt oder der würckung will vnter werffen oder die dar zu czwingen, wan auß dem ebenpild cristi vnd vill ander heyliger vetter diese geistliche arbeit merr gewegen vnd grosser geschecht wirt vor ander arbeit leiplicher alzo vill, als den dy ding der selen sein, den leiplichen dingen für geseczt werden.

welch verpunden sein

## E

gel, das di pruder, den do got gnade gegeben hat zu arbeyten, di sollen getraulich arbeyten vnd jnicklich, als das do werde auß geslossen missig gangk, der selen feynt, vnd also das si nicht auß lesschen den gaist des hilgen gebecz vnd der jnickeit. Aber nach dem das etliche zu zeiten piß hy her dar noch gestanden sein, das si dye bruder böslichen mercken mochten von müssigkeiten ader ledikheiten jres lebens vnd von über trethung der regel auß dissem wort, Sulche böse bisse ader beyssung zu uortreiben, vorcleren wir das also, wen do wol gemerkt werden di vorgesprochen wort vnd forme ader weyse zu sprechende, vnder welchen di pruder zu sulcher übung werden geczogen.

so ist es nit vorsehelich, das es gewest sey des anseczers andacht, das di, die do sich lidiklichen geben zu dem fleiß der lere ader zu den gotlichen ampten vnd dinsten zu uorfolgende, der leiblichen arbeit ader einer hant wirkung vnder wörffe ader das er si dar zu cwinge ader dringhe, Nach dem das nach dem pilde ader exemplel cristi vnd viler heilger veter disse gaistliche arbeit wirt also vil höher gewegen, als vil als die dinck, die der seln sint, den leiplichen werden vor gesaczt.

A

A

1855 zu h a n d t a r b e y t. Ad alios  
vero qui se in predictis spiritua-  
libus operibus non exercent.

1860 Czu den anderen aber, die sich  
nit vben in diesen vor gesprochen  
geistlichen wercken, vnd das solch  
geübet werden mit czimlichen  
dinsten der anderen bruder, auff  
das sy nit mussiglichen leben,  
sollen dy wort noch vnser außle-  
gung auß gebrayt vnd verstan-  
den werden, Es wer dan das sy  
solcher vbertrefflicher vnd merck-  
licher bescheüligkeit vnd gepeczs  
werden, das sy pillichen durch  
des willen von solcher gutter  
vbung vnd nuczlicher weren ab  
czu [39<sup>v</sup>] czihen.

1875 die bruder, dy do dy-  
nen den, dy sich in  
geistlichen vben, ver-  
dinen mit auffenthal-  
ten werden. Fratres enim  
quantumque studio vel diuinis  
ministerys non vacantes.

1880 Aber die bruder, die nit lernen  
oder der lerr an hangen noch in  
gottlichen ampten oder dinsten  
sich vben, sunder den anderen  
bruder, die studiren oder ler-  
nen oder in anderen gotlichen  
ampten vnd dinsten sich vben  
vnd den selben anhangen zu dy-  
nen, mit den selbigen, den sy  
dinen, verdinen sy, auff gehalten  
czu werden. Vnd das wirt bewert  
vnd bestettigt von dem gleichen  
gesecz oder recht, mit dem herr

Czu den anderen aber, di sich in  
sulchen vorgesprochen gaistlichen  
wercken nit uben, es en sey dan  
sach das di selben mit zymlichen  
dinsten der andern bruder sich  
beködmern, das [73<sup>v</sup>] sy icht  
mussiglich leben ader müssigk  
ghen, vorcleren wir, das sich die  
vorgesprochen wort sollen auß  
preiten ader geczogen werden, Es  
enwere dan das sulche pruder  
also hocher vnd also vor merck-  
licher beschäühung vnd gebetis  
werén, das si billich nicht von so  
grossen gut vnd so milder vbung  
geczogen solden werden.

Fratres enim quantumque studio.

Aber di pruder, also vil als sye  
nicht waren uff di lere der schriftt  
ader sint sich ledigen den dinsten  
der gotlichen ampacht, suntern  
si warten uff dy dinst der an-  
dern bruder, di sich ledigen zu  
dem fleisse der lere ader zu den  
gotlichen ampten vnd dinsten, die  
vor dinen, das si hernert werden  
mit den selben, den si dinen, vnd  
des sint sy wirdigk, vnd das ist  
also helig befestiget mit dem  
rechten gesecz, do der gestrenge

## A

1895 dauid, der gestreng kempfer,  
rechtinglich erkandt, das die, die  
in den streit czogen, vnd die, die  
do bleiben bey der hutt der wat-  
seck, solten nemen ein gleichen  
teyl oder lon.

1900 von der zulasung, ver-  
hörung vnd bewerung  
der prediger. Verum quia  
expresse continetur in regula  
quod fratres non predicent in epi-  
scopatu alicuius episcopi.

1905 Auch dar vmb das in der regel  
offenlich stet, das die bruder nit  
sollen predigen ym bis[40<sup>r</sup>]tumb  
eins bischoffs, so es ym versacht  
wirt vnd widersprochen von ym,  
Vnd in dem wir noch lassen oder  
noch geben der regel, vnd nit  
mynner behalten wir vnß den  
gewalt der pebstlichen volkum-  
menheit vnd sprechen, das yecz  
vorgesprochen wort sol behalten  
werden noch dem puchstaben,  
als die regel yn helt vnd au-  
spricht, biß der der pebstlich stul  
in dem etwa anders zu nucz dem  
cristlichem volck verleicht oder  
ordnet oder herr noch verleicht  
oder ordnet.

1925 Wer verhören vnd be-  
weren mag die predi-  
ger. Et quia in eodem capitulo  
regule immediate subiungitur.  
Quod nullus fratrum populo pe-  
nitus audeat predicare nisi a  
ministro generali fuit examinatus  
et approbatus.

Vnd seindt dem mall das in dem

## E

fechter dauid rechtlich hat ge-  
richtet vnd erkant hat, also das  
jenen, di do zu streiten ghen, vnd  
di do bey den borden pleiben, den  
sal gleich thail sein.

Verum quia expresse continetur  
in regula.

1910 Fort mere also offenberlich in der  
regel wirt beslossen vnd auß ge-  
druckt, das di pruder nit sollen  
predigen in einem pisthum Ir-  
keines bischoffs, wan es yn von ym  
vor boten wirt, wir wollen hir  
jnne der regel folgen ader ere ge-  
ben vnd noch gleich wol di ge-  
walt der pebstlichen folkomen-  
heit behalden vnd sprechen, das  
das vor berürte wort sal gehalden  
werden nach der schrifft, also es  
di regel gesprochen hat, Es en  
sey dan das durch den selben  
pebstlichen stul dar bey vmb der  
nückeit des cristlichen folkes  
sey ander vor lihen ader ge-  
schicket ader in zu kufftigen  
zeiten hir nach werde vorlihen  
oder auch geschickt ader geor-  
dinirt.

Vnd auch in dem selben capitell

## A

## E

- 1935      selbigen capitel der regel her noch volgt, das kein bruder dem volck soll thuren predigen, er sey den verhört vnd bewert von dem gemeynnen minister vnd das predig ampt von ym verlyhen sey. Aber so wir mercken den vergangen standt des ordens yn wenigk person vnd in der czeit icz die groß czal der bruder, vnd auch [40<sup>v</sup>] sehen wir an den nücz der selen, als sich woll czimpt, so verleyhen wir vnd geben vrlaub, das nit allein der general soll verhören, die in dem volck sollen predigen, vnd das vrlaub geben zu predigen, gleich als ob das selbig vrlaub an ging die tugentlichkeit der person vnd das predig ampt, als die regel ynnen helt.
- 1940
- 1945
- 1950
- 1955
- 1960      wie die provincial mügen verhören, bewerben vnd zu lassen die bruder czum predig ampt. Verum eciam provinciales ministri hoc possint in capitulis provinciibus cum diffinitoribus.
- 1965      Sunder auch die provincial ministri das thon mügen in iren provincial capitelen mit den diffinitorum, das auch noch heüt beytag behalten wird, als man spricht vnd ist begriffen in der brüder freyheit, vnd solcher erlaubung die vorgesprochen ministri mügen wider ruffen, auff czihen vnd verpitzen, wen vnd wi sy dunckt, das es not vnd nücz sey.
- 1970
- 1975
- der regel volget alpald her nach, das keiner von den prudern sal in keinerley weise torstig sein, dem folk zu predigen, er sey dan von dem gemeinen minister vorhort vnd auch zu gelassen vnd das ampt der predigung sey ym von öme vor lihen, wir nemen zu samen peide den vorganghen standt des ordens in seiner clainheit vnd den kegenwertigen in der auß gepraiten zal der pruder vnd der selen nüczikeit, also es sich zymet, vnd vorleyhen, das nit allein der gemein minister moge vorhören vnd zu lassen die pruder zu predigen vnder dem folk vnd yn vrlaub zu uorleihen zu predigen, [74<sup>r</sup>] Also der orlaub gehört zu merkende ader an zu sehende beider person bequemlichkeit vnd der predigung ampt.

## A

1980      *wer do mag auff nemen,  
die den orden begeren  
zu beweren. Et quoniam in  
desiderys nostris [41<sup>r</sup>] hoc geri-  
tur vt ad dei gloriam salus profi-  
ciat animarum.*

1985      *Aber seindt dem mal in vnseren  
begiren das getragen wirt, das  
got zu eren das heyl der selen zu  
nem vnd wer gemert vnd das  
der vorgesprochen orden ym ver-  
dinst vnd in der czal wer gemert,  
durch welchen stettiglich die be-  
gird cristenlicher geistlichkeit wirt  
erczund zu gotlicher lieb, so  
verleyhen wir vnd bestetigen das  
mit dysem statut, das nit allein  
czimlich sey dem general, sunder  
auch den provinciall ministeren,  
das sy mügen nemen zu bruderen  
die person, die do flihen von der  
welt, welches vrlaub der provincialen  
ministeren mag verbunden  
vnd geczungen werden durch den  
general als es not vnd nücz wirt  
sein.*

1990      *welche nit mügen auff  
nemen czum orden. Vicary vero provincialium ministrorum ex officio vicarie licenciam hanc sibi nouerint interdictam.*

1995      *Aber die vicary oder stathalter der provinciall minister oder diner auß dem ampt des vicariaczs sollen wissen, das in diß urlaub zu auff nemen ist verpoten, es sey den das in durch [41<sup>v</sup>] die selben minister das besunder werd verlyhen, so mügen sy das entpfellen den vicarien vnd anderen, als wir erkennen.*

## E

*Et quoniam in desiderys nostris  
hoc geritur.*

*Besundern sint dem male das diß  
in vnser begerünge wirt getragen,  
das zu der eren gotis der selen  
salikeit fort ghe vnd zu neme der  
genante orden, durch welchen an  
vnderlaßder cristlichen gaistlichkeit  
begerunghe wirt zu der gotlichen  
libe encziendet, gemert werde in  
der zal vnd in dem vor dinst,  
So vor leyhen wir vnd dis-  
sem kegenwertigen statuto vnd  
gesecz bestetigen wir vnd be-  
festigen, das es zymlich sein sal  
nicht allein dem gemeinen mi-  
nistern, di person, di do flihen  
von der werlt, auff zu nemen ader  
zu entphaen in pruder, welchen  
orlaub der landes minister magk  
durch den gemaynen minister,  
jst das es yn nücze vnd bequeme  
dünckt, geczwungen, verkorczt  
ader gemyndert werden.*

*Aber di vicary ader di stathalter  
der landis ministern von des  
amptes wegen der vicarien sollen  
wissen, das yn diser vrlaub vor  
poten sey, es wer yn dan sun-  
derlichen von den landes minister  
befoln, das czymen sal, das si das  
jren stat heldern ader vicarien  
vnd andern befelen mogen, das  
richten wir, seczen vnd erkennen.*

## A

## E

2020 Cuaeant tamen ipsi provinciales  
quod hoc non indiscrete non pas-  
sim.

2025 Idoch sollen sich hütten die pro-  
vincial, das sy das nit vnbe-  
scheidenlich noch lancksam, sun-  
der gancz mercklich entpfellen,  
vnd die selben, den es wirt  
entphollen, sollen sy cziren oder  
steueren mit getreuen reten, das  
alle ding weißlich vnd beschei-  
denlich geschehenn.

2030 **wer czu gelassen sol  
werden zu dem orden.  
Nec omnes indifferenter admit-  
tantur ad ordinem.**

2035 Auch sol man nit an vnterscheid  
all entphahen zu dem orden, sun-  
der die allein, die dem orden mü-  
gen nucz sein mit nuczlicher  
kunst vnd bequemlich gelert sein  
oder ander vmbstendt haben vnd  
die in selbs durch das verdinen  
des lebens vnd den anderen  
ewenpildlich vorgesein mit gut-  
ten ewenpild.

2045 2050 **wer vnd wie vill k u-  
men sollen zu dem ge-  
neral oder gemeynnen  
capitel. In super dubitantibus  
fratribus predicti ordinis an  
pro eo quod in regula dicitur  
quod decadente ministro generali.**

2055 Dar [42<sup>o</sup>] noch als geczweifelt  
haben die bruder des vorge-  
sprochen ordens des halben, das  
in der regel gesprochen wirt, das,  
wen do gestorben ist der general  
minister, sol geschehen die erwe-

Idoch sollen sich bewaren di lan-  
des minister, das si das nicht  
vnbescheidlich nicht einem iczli-  
chen, sundern so mercklich befeln  
vnd also mit getraulichen rethen  
cziren vnd sterken die jenen, den  
si das befelen, das alle dinck  
bescheidlich mogen fort ghen.

Auch sollen nit alle zu gelassen  
werden zu dem orden gemeinlich  
ader an vnder scheit, sundern di  
allein, dy yn behulfflich sein moch-  
ten auß der bequemlichkeit ader  
gefeliciteit der schrift ader an-  
der vmbstendikeiten mogen dem  
orden nucz sein vnd ym selber  
durch vordinst jres lebens vnd  
den andern durch gute pilde.

In super dubitantibus fratribus  
predicti ordinis.

Fort mere haben di pruder des  
vorgenanten ordens czweifel dar  
an des halben, das in der regel  
wirt gesprochen, wan der ge-  
meyn minister von hynnen schei-  
det, so sal des nachfolgers kysung

## A

2060 lüng des noch kumenden von den provincialen ministern vnd custeren in dem capitell zu pfingsten, ob dar ein die meng aller custer müß zu dem general capitell zu samen kumen oder auff das, das alle ding werden verbracht mit grosser stilligkeit, genug sey, das etlich von allen provincen, die der anderen stim haben, gegen wertig sein.

2065

Taliter respondemus.

2070 Dar vber antwurten wir alzo, das die custer eynner igczlichen provincz eynnen auß in seczen, den sy mit irem provincial minister fur sich selber senden zu dem capitell, ier stim oder ampt dem selbigen bephellen, vnd wen sy den haben geseczt, so müigen sy in selber mit dysem statut oder saczung bestetigen, vnd wir beweren das vnd das auch mit antwurt vnser vorfar gregorius der ix. in dem fall, als man sagt, hat erkandt [42<sup>v</sup>] vnd geantwürt vnd bestetigkt.

2075

2080 2085 von dem ein gang der frawen Closter. Denique quia continetur in regula supradicta quod fratres non ingrediantur monasteria monacharum.

2090 Auch die weill auch in der vorgesprochen regel begriffen wirt, das die bruder nit sollen ein geen in die closter der frawen an die, den es mit sunderlichen vrlaub vergunst ist vnd verlyhen von dem pebstlichen stull, ob woll die bruder das haben verstanden biß herr von armen closter frawen, die verschlossen sein, Seindt

2095

## E

gescheen in dem capitel zu pfingsten von den landes ministern [74<sup>v</sup>] vnd custern, Ab es noth sey, das alle koster sollen zu samen komen in das gemein capitel ader ab es mocht genügk sein, das uß iglichem lande etlich dar jnne sint, dy do di stym haben der andern, vff das das do alle dinck mit grosser stillichkeit gehandelt werden,

Antworten wir den prudern also, das di koster einer icklichen provincien einen auß jn kisen ader seczen, welchen si mit jren landes minister vor sich selbs zu capitel senden, dem selben jre stym vnd stete zu befelende, das wir auch haben gedacht zu beweren vnd zu zulassen, wen si ein sulche gesecz durch sich selber seczen worden, das do auch der selbe vnser vorfare gregorius der ix. in sulcher weise, als man spricht, geantworde solde haben.

Denique quia continetur in regula.

wan dar nach wirt beslossen in der vor genanten regel, das di bruder nit sollen ghen in frauhen cloester ane di, den do von dem vorgenanten pebstlichen stul wirt sunderlich orlaub vor lyhen ader befohlen, Wie wol die pruder biß hy her gemeint haben, das man das vornemen solle von den clostern der armen beslossen nonnen,

## A

2100 das ir der vorgenandt stull sun-  
derlich sorg hat vnd der selv syn  
durch ein saczung in der czeit,  
do die regel wart geben, do noch  
lebet der selig franciscus, durch  
2105 die provinciall minister, als man  
glaubt in dem generall capitell  
sey erkert worden, Vnd die sel-  
ben bruder nicht mynder haben  
gepeten, sy zu versichern, ob  
2110 das gemeinlich von allen frawen  
clöstern sey zu versteen, seindt  
das die regel keynß außnympt,  
aber ob man es allein versten  
soll von den closteren der vor-  
gesprochen frawen, [43<sup>r</sup>] Wir ant-  
wurten, das es verpoten ist ge-  
meinlich von allen frawen clo-  
steren.

2120 was verstanden wirt  
bey dem wort closter.  
Et nomine monasteri volumus  
claustrum domos et officinas inte-  
riores intelligi.

2125 Vnd bey dem wort closter wollen  
wir versteen die inwendig heuser  
oder wonung oder gemach, dar  
vmb das czu den anderen steten,  
do die weltlichen menschen zu  
2130 saman kumen, mügen die brüder  
ein czu ganck haben von sach  
wegen der predig oder almüsen  
zu piten, den es von iren öber-  
sten von ier tappferkeit oder tüg-  
lichkeit wegen zu geben ist,  
2135 Allezit auß genomen die closter  
der vorgesprochen eyngeschlossen  
frawen, zu welchen zu geen keyn-  
nem vrlaub wirt gegeben an  
sunderlich vrlaub des selben stuls,  
vnd hat auch in dem fall alzo  
2140 geantwurt pabst gregorius der  
neündt.

## E

dar vmb das der selbe vorge-  
melte stul der selben nonnen  
sunderlich sorge hat vnd man  
meynet vnd glaubt, das das selbe  
vorstentnissey vor clert mit  
einem gesecze durch di landes  
minister in dem gemeinen capitell  
in der czeit, als di regel gegeben  
ist, do der salige franciscus noch  
lebte, Noch gleich wol haben di  
selben pruder gepeten ader geha-  
ischet, das si mochten vorsich-  
tig werden, ab man das solle  
vornemen gemeinlich von allen  
clostern, Nach dem das di regel  
keins außnympt ader allein von  
den clostern der vor genannten  
nonnen, wir anworten, das es  
jo vorpoten ist von den sampa-  
nungen aller nonnen.

Vnd wir wollen, das by dem na-  
men eines closters ader mönsters  
vornomen werde oder vor stan-  
den das closter vnd die jnwendi-  
gen heüser vnd amptheüser, Dar  
vmb das zu den andern steten,  
da die werntlichen zu saman  
komen, mogem die brüder hine  
ghen vmb sache willen zu predi-  
gen ader almosen zu bithen,  
[75<sup>r</sup>] welchen prödern diß von  
jren öbersten vmb jre swer-  
müthdicheit, bequemlichkeit oder  
vnstrefflichkeit werde erlaubt, Auß  
genommen alle zeit der vor ge-  
nannten ein geslossen armen mön-  
ster ader clöster, zu welchen  
nymant wirt macht gegeben, dar  
zu ghen, an sunderlich orlaub des

A

2145

2150 von dem testament. Ceterum sancte memorie confessor cristi sanctus franciscus mandasse dicitur circa vltimum vite sue cuius mandatum ipsius dicitur testamentum.

2155 [43<sup>v</sup>] Furter der heyligen gedecktnuß der bekinner vnd peichinger cristi franciscus hat gepotten, als man spricht, am endt seines lebens, welches gepot geheissen wirt ein testament, das man die wort de regel nit sol glozieren vnd das wir brauchen seynner wort, das man nit sol sprechen, das sol man alzo versten oder alzo, vnd seczt dar zu, das die bruder mit nichte sollen briif piten von dem romischen stull, vnd etlich ander ding seczt er vnter anderen worten, die man nicht möcht halten an grosse beschwerung.

2170 Propter quod fratres hesitantes.

2175 Dar vmb so haben geczweifelt die bruder, ob sy verpunden sein zu halten das vorgesprochen testament, vnd sy haben gepeten durch den selben vnseren vorforderen gregorium deneunden, das man die selben czewieflung solt ab nemen von iren gewissen, der es hat gethon, wan er merckt die sorglichkeit des selben testaments vnd beschwermutigkeit, in die sy sorglichkeit des selben testaments vnd veschwermutigkeit, in die sy möchten von des wil[44<sup>r</sup>]len fallen, vnd sprach, das die bruder

E

selben stules, das do vnser for fare gregorius nonus in diser sach hat geantwert.

Ceterum sancte memorie.

Fort mere der bekinner cristi franciscus heilger gedecktnisse hat geboten, als man spricht, an dem leczten seines lebens, vnd das gebot ist genant sein testament, das di wort seiner regel nit glosirt werden vnd das wir der selben wort geprauchen, Man sal nicht sprechen, das sal also ader also vor standen werden, vnd do seczet er zu das, das di pruder in keynerley weise sollen jrkeyne briiffe bitten von dem pebstlichen stul, vnd menghet etliche ander stuck mit eyn, di nicht ane grosse swerheit ader ferlichkeit gehalden konden werden.

Hyr vmb so sint di pruder czweifeln, ob si auch vorfligt weren zu der haldung des forigen testametes, Vnd haben gepeten, das sulche czweifelung von jren consciencien genomen werde durch den selben vnsern vorfarn gregorium nonum, Vnd er, also man vor war sagt, was an sehen der selen ferlichkeit vnd swerheit, do di bruder vmb des willen ein kommen mochten vnd sulche czweifal von jren herczen zu nemende sprach her, das die pruder nit vorpünden ader pflichtig sein zu

## A

nit verpunden weren zu der hal-  
tung des gepots, wan er möcht  
nit verpinden an willen vnd gunst  
der bruder vnd besunder der  
ministern, die es all an ging.  
Auch hat er nit sein nochkumen  
verpunden, wan gleich in glei-  
chat hat nit gewalt oder zu pin-  
den. Aber wir haben nichts wollen  
2190 verneuen bey dem artickell.

2200 von der haltung dieser  
erklärung. Ad hec a non-  
nullis predecessoribus nostris ro-  
manis pontificibus circa declara-  
cionem ipsius regule.

2205 Czu dem als wir haben verstan-  
den, so sein vill brieff aus gege-  
ben von etlichen vnseren vor-  
faderen, romischen pischoffen, zu  
auß legung der regel von der  
ding, die die regel an giengen,  
noch hat nit gernet die wider spre-  
chung der vorgesprochen peysser  
wider die egel, auch durch die  
2210 brieff wirt nit gancz versehen  
der standt der bruder in vill  
sachen, in den man sy von  
neuen versehen muß oder anderst  
von vill sachen wegen, die sich  
2215 her noch ver[44v]liffen, als das  
die erfariung hat beweist, Dar vmb  
das nit die mancherley weiß des  
selben brieff vnd mancherley  
saczüng oder die verstendnuß  
2220 der widerbirtigkeit oder wider-  
sprechung in der obseruancz  
betrubet die gemut der bruder,  
Vnd auff das vollicklicher, klerli-  
cher vnd sicherlicher wer gera-  
ten irem wesen vnd zu behalten  
2225 die selben regel in allen vnd iczli-  
che, besunder der artikelen, die  
die saczung ynnen helt, ob wol

## E

der haldung seines gebotes, das  
ere an folbort der pruder vnd zu  
fort an der ministern, di das  
gepoth alle an trad ader an ging,  
nicht konde vor pinden. Auch  
mocht er seinen nachfolger in  
keinerley weyse vorpinden, sint  
dem mal das gleich kein gepoth  
hat in seinen gleichen. Aber wir  
haben gedacht bey dissem artickel  
nichcz zu vor naven.

Ad hec a nonnullis predecessori-  
bus nostris.

Dar zu haben wir vorstanden,  
das vil brieffe gemacht sein von  
etlichen vnsern forfarn, römi-  
schen bischoffen, bey vorclerung  
der regel vnd bey den stucken,  
di sy an treten. [75v] Besundern  
die hönlich verspottung vnd be-  
lachung der vor berürten beyssen-  
den menschen wider di regel vnd  
di pruder, di dar durch noth nit  
gestillet ist, Auch ist den stat der  
pruder vor mittelst den prifen  
vnd vil stucken nicht besorgt, In  
welchen stucken von naühes auff  
ader anders von notis wegen zu  
besorgen ist, also di erfariung  
mancherley zu fallender sachen  
dar nach hat beweiset, Vnd uff  
das sulcher prife vnd diser ke-  
genwertigen vnser seczung ma-  
nigfeldickeit ader der vorstent-  
nisse wederwertigkeit In der hal-  
dung der vor genanten stuck der  
bruder gemüth nicht betrube vnd  
auch das jrem stat vnd der be-  
warung der genanten regel dester  
folkomlicher, clerer vnd gewisser  
gerathen werde,

## A

## E

2230 die artikel oder etlich auß in werden begriffen in anderen gesprochen pebstlichen briffen.

allein diese erklerung soll gehalten werden.  
2235 Hanc nostram institutionem declaracionem seu ordinacionem tantum a fratribus ipsis precise ac in violabiter decernimus perpetuis temporibus obseruandam.

2240 So erkennen wir vnd seczen, das diese vnser saczung, außlegung vnd erklerung, ordenirung allein von den brudern zu halten sey zy ewigen czeiten, gleich als 2245 sy stet vnd vnverruckt oder vnzustörlich.

2250

von der bewerung der regel in dieser erklerung. [45r] Cum igitur ex predictis et alys per nos cum multa maturitate discussis regula ipsa licita sancta perfecta et obseruabilis.

2260 Dar vmb die weill das wir auß den vnd anderen haben selber durch forst mit grosser tappferkeit, so ist die regel czimlich heylig, volkumen vnd heltlich, vnd als offenbar ist, so ist sy vnschedlich oder vnuerlastert, vnd wir wollen, das die regel vnd alle obgeschrieben ding durch vnser statut, saczung, ordnung, verleihung geschickt, erkandt, erklert vnd auch erfult, von des

So haben wir georteilt, das disse vnser seczung, vor clerung oder schickung allein schlecht, eben ader gerade vnd vnuorserlich sal zu ewigen zeiten von den prudern gehalden werden In allen den vnd igklichen artickeln, di disse seczung ader constitution in ir heldorf, wi wol sulche ader di selben artickel ader Irer ein theil Auch sten oder sint beslossen in andern vor genanten pebstlichen brifen.

Hir vmb sint dem male das es gancz offenberlich ader zu sehenlich offenpar ist auß diesen vorgenannten stucken vnde andern, durch vns mit viler swermütikeit entrichtet, Disse regel ist zymlich, heilig, folkomen vnd bequem zu halden vnd keiner ferlichkeit bekant, so beweren wir ader lassen si zu vnd bestetigen si von foller pebstlicher gewalt, disse regele vnd alle obgeschri-

## A

## E

pebstlichen gewaltes volkummenheit beweren, bestetigen wir vnd wollen, das die sollen bleiben in ewiger festigkeit vnd gepieten ernstlich in der krafft der gehorsam, das die saczung als ander saczung oder geistlich recht ader epistel sollen in den schulen gelesen werden.

bene stuck, durch vns gesacz, geschickt, vor lyhen, geordinirt, georteilt, vor cleret vnd auch vor fullet, Vnd wir wollen, das disse alle sollen sein ewiger festigkeit, Vnd in der craft des hilgen gehorsams gepieten wir strenglich, das disse seczung also ander gesacz, constituciones ader di auß gelegten sende priffe werden gelesen in den schulen.

Et qui sub colore liciti.

Et qui sub colore liciti nonulli contra.

2285 Vnd seindt dem mall das etlich vnter der gestallt eyns czimlichen dings wider die bruder vnd die regel mit lesen, außlegen oder glozirung möchten auß giessen ir gift der bößheit vnd möchten den [45<sup>v</sup>] syn dieser saczung yn mancherley vnd widerbertieg maynung oder syn mit iren funden zu stören bößlich, vnd die 2290 manigfeltigkeit der wenenden vnd die vill krummung des syns mocht verwickelen vill gütiger menschen gemüt, vnd ier hercz villeicht abgezogen möchten werden von dem ein ganck des ordens, so czwingt vnß die neidlich schalckheit solcher hinter reder, das wir in den weg der 2295 schedligkeit verschlossen vnd das wir yn ein sichere weiß fürczügen zu geben den, die do lesen diese 2300 saczung.

wan nach dem das vnder einer farbe einer zymlichkeit etlichen mochten wider di pruder vnd regel inlesende, außlegende ader vor clerende vnd glosirende di vorgifft irer bosheit auß gissen vnd di vorstentnisß [76<sup>r</sup>] diser seczung vor snoden, vor terben ader vor ergern, mit naühen fünden die vorstentnisse zu zihende in mancherley synne vnd in synne, der ein dem andern wider were, vnd vor der vorstentnisse misseldikeit mochte viler milden menschen gemüth in welcken adder zweifelhaftig machen vnd von dem in ghan diser gaistlikeit vil herczen zihen. Sölcher affterkoser ader zu ruckeziher vor meidende vorkartheit czwingk vns, yn den weck zu den vor genanten bosen werken zu beslissen vnd den lestern disser schikhung eine gewisse weise des fortganges for schreiben ader vor zu ghen zu beschreiben.

2310

die pen der, die do anders auß legen oder glosiren die erklerung, wan verlyhen wirt. Ita-

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2315 que sub pena excommunicacionis  
et priuacionis officy et beneficy  
districte precipimus.

2320 Dar vmb so gepiten wir heftiglich  
bey der pen des panß vnd bey  
der beraubüng iers ampts vnd  
der pfrund, das diese saczung,  
wan man sy list, als sy gesaczt  
ist, alzo getreulich werd sy auß  
gelegt noch dem text, vnd mit  
nichte von den leseren oder  
außlegeren sollen ein ge[46']fürt  
werden concordanz widerspre-  
chende oder mancherley wider-  
wertige manung.

2330

2335 das sy gelesen wirt,  
als sy gesaczt wirt.

2340 Vnd vber diese saczung sol kein  
gloß gemacht werden noch ge-  
schehen, es wer den das ein wort  
oder des worts syn oder rechts  
ordenung oder die selv saczung  
werd wortlich noch der grama-  
tica oder verständlicher werd  
auß gelegt, noch auch die ver-  
ständtnüß der selbigen saczung  
sol nit durch den leser yn etwan  
verkurcz werden oder bößlich zu  
stört oder geczogen werden zu  
eynem anderen syn, den der  
text laut.

2350

2355 Et ne predictam sedem contra de-  
tractores huiusmodi opporeat  
vlterius laborare.

Vnd das nit der vorgesprochen

Also gepiten wir gestrenglich bey  
der pen des bannes vnd berau-  
bung des amptes vnd lehens, wan  
es geschiet, das man disse gesecz  
ader constitucion list, das man  
so, also si gesprochen ist, das man  
si getraülichen außlege, also die  
buchstaben ader wort laüthen, Dy  
leser ader lesemaister ader die  
außleger sollen in keynerley weise  
hie bey prenghen ander schrift,  
die do nicht mit diser über ein  
trage ader di do hie entkegen sey  
ader keynerley wane, di sich vor  
andern ader diser seczung wider  
sein.

Auch sollen kein glosen gemacht  
werden vber disse seczung, es en  
were danne vil licht etliche glosa,  
do man ein wort ader sin eines  
wortes ader di constructio, das  
ist di zu samen seczung, Adder  
dise seczung glicher weiß als di  
kunst, di do sprechen leret, nach  
den buchstaben ader wortern  
dester vorstentlicher auß gelegt  
werde, als das die vorstentnisß  
disser seczung in keinen stucken  
vorkart werde durch den leser  
ader werde geweldichlichen ge-  
czogen anders wozn, wan der  
buchstab zu laüth.

Vnd uff das das dem vorgenan-

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- 2360 stull muß furpaß wider die hinder klaffer oder noch reder arbeiten, so gepiten wir gestrengicklichen allen vnd iczlichen besunder, welcher ley höch wirdigkeit, geschlechts, eygenschafft oder standts sy sein, das sy nit sollen leren, lesen, schreiben, beschlossen, predigen oder bößlich reden offenlich oder heymlich wider die re[46<sup>v</sup>]gel vnd den standt der vor genanten bruder, Noch auch wider diese vnser vorgesprochen saczung, ordenuung, verleyhung, schickung, erkandt, erklerung, erfullung, bewerung vnd auch bestetigung, saczung.
- 2365 Sed si quid penes aliquem in hys ambiguitatis emerserit.
- 2370 Sunder ist das bey ymandt etwas czweifelhaftiges auff erstet, das sol gebracht werden für die höch des pebstlichen stulls, auff das das auß pebstlichen gewalt die maynung des werd geoffenbart, welchem stull allein ist verlyhen, in den dingen saczung zu machen vnd die gemachten auß zu legen.
- 2375 Glozantes vero in scriptis ipsam constitucionem aliter quam eo modo quem diximus.
- 2380 Die aber glosiren mit geschrifft diese saczung anders, den in der weiß, als wir gesprochen haben, vnd die lerer oder leßmeister, so sy offenlich lernen, wissenlich vnd bedechtlich vnd verkeren den syn diser saczung oder geschrifft, machen gloß bucher wissenlich vnd beschlossen in offen
- 2385 then stul nit sey, forder zu arbaiten kegen sulche affterkōser vnd zu ruckeziher, So gepithen wir gestrenglichen allen vnd icklichen, si sint wie hoch ader was states si sint, das si wider di vorgenmelte regel vnd der vorgenannten pruder stat ader wider di vor geschriben, durch vns gesaczt stück, geordinirt, vorlihen, geschickt, geortheilt, vorcleret, vor fullet, also gut zu gelassen ader bewert vnd auch bestetiget, nicht leren, nicht schriben noch ortheiln noch predigen noch etwas arges sprechen offenberlich oder haimlich.
- 2390 Sündern ist das etwas bey ymande in dissen dinghen was czweifels zu kome, das sal man prenghen zu der [76<sup>v</sup>] höhe des vorgenannten pebstlichen stuls, vff das das auß der pebstlichen gewalt sein andacht in dem czweifel geoffenbart werde, dem do allein vorlihen ist, vnd sulchen dinghen gesecz ader statuta zu seczen vnd di gesaczten zu uor cleren.
- 2395 Sundern di do glosiren in schrifften disse seczung ader constitucion anders, wan in diser weise, also wir gesprochen haben, Dar über die lerer ader lese maister, wan si in offenpar lere vnd sint, disse seczung ader constitucion vor ergern ader vor keren auß gewissen wissenheit mit bedach-

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2400 schulen oder predigen wider [47<sup>v</sup>] die vorgesprochen oder wider etlich auß in, die selben sollen nit hinderen keynnerley freyhat noch sunder gab oder pebstlich brieff, welcherley wurdigkeit, person, ordens ader standts, geistlich oder weltlich sy waren gemeynlich oder besunderlich, vnter welcherley weiß oder wort saczung verlyhen sein worden, dy wir wollen, das sy nichts nit hie helffen sollen oder zu hilff kumen dem vrteil. Die allesamt sollen erkennen vnd wissen, das sy sein gefallen in den hochsten pän, den wir iczundt wider sy geben vnd aussprechen, von dem sy nyemandt entpinden mag oder absoluiren den allein der romisch pischoff.

2420

2425

2430 In super tam istos contra quos per nos excommunicacionis pro-  
lata est sentencia.

2435 Vnd wider dy wir iczundt selber haben das vrteyl des pans auß gesprochen oder ander, die do wurden sein vnd kumen wider die vorgesprochen ding oder wider etlich auß den, wollen wir, das sy zu gebracht sollen werden zu der erkendtnuß des romischen stuls vnd zu vnß, auff das die diese fürsichti[47<sup>v</sup>] ge weißheit nit ist, straffen vnd czwingen vmb die vnczimlichkeit, das sy doch

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tem muth, di do wider disse vor genante stuck, alle ader etliche ader wider eins von dissen, auß legung machen, schriftt ader nähe gedicht, schendbucher vnd die in den schulen auß praithen, vor cleren ader folenden ader predigen auß gewissen wissenheit mit wol bedachtem müth, Disse alle sollen wissen, das si lygen vnder dem ortheil de bannes, welch ortheil wir nü von diser zeit an wider si auß sprechen, von welchem ortheil si durch nymant sollen gelost werden wan durch den romischen bischoff, Hir wider sollen kein sunderliche begiftünge ader priuilegia ader aplas ader pabstliche prife sein gegeben, welcherley wurdikeiten, personen, orden, staten, gaistlichen ader wertlichen leuthen gemainlichen ader besunderlich, Auch vnder welchem ymmer forme ader auß sprechung der wort si gegeben sint, so willen wir nicht, das si irkeinen in keynnerley weise in den vor geschrieben stucken sollen si zu hulf kommen.

Hir nach so wollen wir, das payde di, wider welche durch vns das ortheil des bannes auß gesprochen ist, vnd andern, ab noch etliche weren sich seczende wider di vorgeschriften stuck ader wider irgen eins vnder yn, wollen wir, das si sollen gebracht werden zu vnser vnd des vor gedachten stules erkenhung, Vff das das di, do di dy vorsichtige weyse der gerechtikeit von den vor bothen

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## E

stillen die verpoten schuld des  
pebstlichen rachsals.

dinghen nicht dringhen ader  
czwingen kan, stille die gestren-  
keit vnd czwangk der pebstliche  
rachung.

2445 Nulli ergo omnino hominum li-  
ceat hanc paginam nostre decla-  
racionis ordinacionis.

2450 Dar vmb keynnen menschen sol  
czimlich sein, zu brechen diese  
vnser brieff der erklerung, ord-  
nung, verleyhung, schickung, er-  
füllung, bewerung, bestetigunge  
vnd saczung noch ir mit freueli-  
cher durstigkeit wider streben.  
Ist aber das ymandt das dar ver-  
suchen, der soll wissen, das er  
felt in die vngurst des almech-  
tigen gots Vnd seynner heyligen  
xijpoten sandt peters vnd sandt  
pauls. Gegeben zu surian am  
neunczehenden kalendes herbst  
monaecz vnser pebstlichen wir-  
digkeit am anderen jar, Anno do-  
mini 1279.

Hir vmb sal in keynerley weise  
keinem menschen zymlich sein,  
dissen priff ader schrift vnser  
vorclerung, schickung, vorleu-  
bung, vorfullung, also gut zu  
gelassung ader bewer[77r]ung vnd  
bestethung vnd seczung zu pre-  
chen ader ir mit freueler künheit  
wider streben ader entkegen gen.  
Ist aber das sich das ymant thar  
vor messen, der sal wissen, das  
in falle in di vngünst des almech-  
tigen gotes vnd seiner selligen  
apostol peter vnd pauli. Gege-  
ben zu surian in dem xvij tag  
vor den kalenden des monden  
septembers in dem andern jar  
vnßers pabsthummes.

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## THEOPHANIC COSMIC ORDER IN SAINT BONAVENTURE

### I. INTRODUCTION

The Augustinian of the 13th Century was not the Augustine of Hippo, but rather was a neo-platonist modified by the challenges posed by various historical incidents. In Bonaventure we cannot expect to see an Augustine reincarnate; instead we find traces of the Greek Fathers mediated through John Scotus Eriugena, as well as the logical categories of the budding and challenging Aristotelianism. The philosophy of the Arabic commentators posed a threat to the faith of medieval Christendom and thus evoked much counteraction in the West not the least of which was from the Franciscan School. An English friar, Alexander of Hales, was a dominant figure at the University of Paris — the highest center of learning in the 13th Century. Under his influence Bonaventure developed an Augustinianism that retained the essential Augustinian approach to reality as well as incorporating and adapting to various ideological challenges since.

The mystical tradition of the Greek Fathers was introduced to the West by Eriugena — born in Ireland around the year 810 and soon invited by Charles the Bald to head the Palatine School. While Alcuin was busy with latin manuscripts in an attempt at liturgical revival, Eriugena undertook the task of translating the Greek Fathers, among whom was Pseudo-Dionysius who was until then unknown to the latin West. It was through Eriugena's translation and commentary that Pseudo-Dionysius began his extensive and lasting influence on the latin West. In fact, he is often classified as one of the founders of the neo-platonic school together with Plotinus.

Besides Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena translated the *Ambigua* of Maximus the Confessor and the *De Hominis Opificio* of Gregory of Nyssa.<sup>1</sup> In much of Bonaventure's writings we find not Augustin-

<sup>1</sup> See A. Brilliantov, *The Influence of Eastern Theology upon Western Thought in the Works of John Scotus Eriugena*. St. Petersburg, Russia, 1898,

ianism pure and simple but a neo-platonism infiltrated by Greek elements. This is especially true in his use of the emanation model for the trinity which is more proper to the East. While for the latin West the Augustinian model of constitutive relations reigned supreme.<sup>2</sup>

In the emanation tradition of the Greek Fathers, the Father in the trinity is seen as the 'fontalis plenitudo'<sup>3</sup> from which all being proceeds. The Son and Word process from the Father not so much as relating to the Father but more in the dyamic aspect of generation. Thus God is infinitely dynamic. The Pseudo-Dionysian axiom "*omne bonum est diffusivum sui*" popularized by Alexander of Hales in Paris is applied by Bonaventure principally to the Trinity.<sup>4</sup> Goodness here does not mean moral goodness; it refers primarily to the goodness of being. The Father as the source of all goodness is therefore infinitely dynamic — in the generation and diffusion of being. The logic of coincidence of opposites renders the unbegotten Father supremely generative. From him proceeds the Son and the Holy Spirit as well as creation. "Paradoxically Bonaventure bases his dynamic concept of God on the very Greek concept of unbegottenness, which is at the heart of the Greek concept of perfection, as denying all becoming."<sup>5</sup> The *ἐντελεχεία* is the supreme Actuality that had never become. It does not have the dynamism of the *ἐνέργεια* that has become. Unbegotten and unbecome in itself, it is supremely begotten and becoming in others.

Finite creation for Bonaventure is not an adequate term for the infinitely dynamic and diffusive good—contrary to what Abelard

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where he claims that in the Augustinian West, the divine ideas remain static and unmoving perfections of God whereas in eastern sophiology the essence of God itself becomes dynamic in the generation of the trinity and the eternal ideas from which the temporal world proceeds.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia, QQ. 28–29.

<sup>3</sup> Bonaventure, *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* in *S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia* (10 vols., Quaracchi, Italy, 1882–1902) Vol. V, 195–313. Translation by George Boas, Library of Liberal Arts Edition, Ch. 5. Cf. Ewert Cousins, "Truth in St. Bonaventure" *ACPA* 1969, p. 11. Bonaventure develops the concept of "fontalis plenitudo" in length in I Sent., d. 27, a. un., q. 2, ad 3 (I, 470–72).

<sup>4</sup> Bonaventure, *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*, Ch. 6, § 2: "For the good is said to be self-diffusive. The highest good is therefore the most diffusive. The greatest diffusion, however, can exist only if it is actual and intrinsic, substantial and hypostatic, natural and voluntary, free and necessary, lacking nothing and perfect."

<sup>5</sup> Ewert Cousins, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

would hold. The dynamic and yet eternal process of generation and spiration in the trinity is seen by Bonaventure as intrinsically necessary.

The highest good is therefore the most self-diffusive. The greatest diffusion, however, can exist only if it is actual and intrinsic, substantial and hypostatic, natural and voluntary, free and necessary, lacking nothing and perfect. Unless, then, there be eternally in the highest good a production which is actual and consubstantial, and an hypostasis as noble as the producer through generation and spiration, so that it would be from the eternal principle eternally co-producing and would be beloved (*dilectus*) in itself and co-loved (*co-dilectus*) generated, and spirated as are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in no way would it be the highest good, for it would not diffuse itself most highly.<sup>6</sup>

This is the first level of emanation. In the trinity is rooted the fullness of creation as well as the archetype of order in creation.

The eternal creation of ideas in the mind of God is a topic much glossed over in theological and philosophical speculations and yet plays a radical role in determining one's vision of the world. If the eternal ideas have denser reality than their temporal counterparts as the neo-platonic tradition would tend to hold, then emanation from the divine realm would contain the connotation of a fall to a lesser degree of being. There would then be a built-in essential dynamism of return to the higher reality of eternal ideas after a temporal sojourn in a cosmic cycle. If on the other hand, as in the Thomistic tradition, the eternal ideas are regarded as pure potency in the realm of essences awaiting actualization in temporal and "real" existence, the dynamism of creation is not so cyclic then as a direct linear procession from potency of the eternal possible to the actual and temporal. The hierarchy of the real is reversed, and the world becomes the terminus of creation -- static maybe, but containing the fullness of the perfection of being. The Aristotelian God is the removed eternal introvert<sup>7</sup> who is defined as "thought thinking on thought"<sup>8</sup> because self-contemplation (*θεωρία*) without any extrinsic end is considered the highest of perfections. The objects of God's thought therefore cannot be the real ideas of the world.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*, Ch. 6, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, Harper Torchbook, N.Y. 1960, p. 156.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book A.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Book A.

Closely allied to this is the dispute which boiled hot in the 13th century between the Aristotelians and the neo-platonists at the university of Paris over the question of the eternity of the world. Aristotle was coming into Europe for the first time, and with him the interpretation of the Arabian translators. It is to Alfarabi through Avicenna<sup>10</sup> that Thomas owes his basic doctrine which has its roots in Aristotle's logical distinction between essence ( $\tauὸ τὸ ἡν εἰναι$ ) and separate existence ( $\chiωριστός$ ) of a distinct essence.<sup>11</sup> The essences are eternal since no novelty can emerge for God to whom whatever can be good must be actually and eternally good. Against Alfarabi and Avicenna's doctrine of creation of the world, Averroes followed Aristotle closely. So highly esteemed was he in the 13th century that he was termed simply "the commentator". Despite Thomas' massive efforts to stem out Averroism in the Christian West, he nevertheless admits that philosophy alone cannot demonstrate against the eternity of the world.<sup>12</sup> With this brief sketch of the historical milieu, we can proceed better to understand what cosmic order means for Bonaventure.

## II. TEMPORAL CREATION

There are "three main themes in St. Bonaventure's metaphysics (*nostra metaphysica*) : creation, or the procession of creatures from God ; exemplarism, or God as the exemplar of his creation ; consummation, or the journey of man back to God by means of divine illumination".<sup>13</sup> These are the three stages of a cosmic cycle with an order of its own in each of the stages and a dynamic order that bursts out forcefully from the plenitude of the Godhead, through a temporal world fashioned after the image of the logos and rushing towards a return to the source. The plenitude of Godhead is attributed to the Father as the source of all being. In the dynamic generation of the Son is simultaneously generated (created) the eternal ideas of the temporal world. In the temporal world can be intuited the eternal ideas which "proclaim that in them as in a mirror can be seen the eternal generation of the Word, the Image, and the Son, eternally

<sup>10</sup> Armand Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*, Random House, N.Y. 1962, p. 97.

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Z.

<sup>12</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Chs. 32-38.

<sup>13</sup> Maurer, *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

emanating from God the Father.”<sup>14</sup> In the dynamic generation of the Son can be seen the dynamic order (ordination) of the world in temporal succession.

There are two kinds of dynamism: eternal and yet still happening though not in temporal succession, and temporal involving change, development and succession. The world is vitally dynamic for Bonaventure since it takes after the pattern of generation in the trinity. The dynamism of the world finds its source first in the emanation of the Son and the Spirit, and secondly from the emanation of eternal ideas in God. And because the neo-platonic hierarchy of values places the ideas higher than their temporal concretization, there is thirdly a dynamism of return to the realm of eternal ideas.

This triple dynamism divides the cosmic drama into four acts somewhat parallel to the four divisions of nature in Eriugena. The emanating trinity is the dynamic divine essence which is uncreated and creates. The second stage of dynamic emanation is the eternal ideas which are created and create.<sup>15</sup> The third act is temporal creation which is created and does not create. It does not have the dynamism of generation and diffusion of good because it is material and therefore the lowest rung in the neo-platonic hierarchy. Yet there is here for Bonaventure a third dynamism — viz. return to the eternal ideas in the trinity. When all is consummated, there will be Eriugena’s fourth division of the “neither created nor creates”.<sup>16</sup> When the world is returned to the divine origin, it is in a sense uncreated and there is no more drama in the cosmic cycle. Emanation comes to a grand finale.

An eternal world is impossible for Bonaventure not only because it is contrary to Scripture but because it jeopardizes the theory of separate eternal creation of ideas and necessitates an admission of eternal matter. For Thomas the forms of things in the mind of God are truly existents when they are either separate substances or the

<sup>14</sup> Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*, Ch. 2, § 7.

<sup>15</sup> Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, James Clarke & Co. London, 1957, p. 96: “It is interesting to note that John Scotus Eriugena (whose theological system is a curious amalgam of Eastern and Western elements, a transposition of the doctrine of the Greek fathers upon a basis of Augustinian thought), represents the divine ideas as creatures, the first created principles by means of which God creates the universe.”

<sup>16</sup> Herman Shapiro, *Medieval Philosophy*, Modern Library, N.Y., 1964, pp. 84-103.

forms of a hylomorphic entity. And prime matter for the Aristotelians is pure potency whose eternity is not unconceivable as it is for Bonaventure who understands matter to be concrete sensible matter. Thus, "by saying in time, we exclude the false theory of an eternal material principle."<sup>17</sup> Creation ex nihilo is not from anything that is nothing but rather from the sheer potentiality in God himself. As Jean Paul Sartre says, "nothingness is like a worm that coils in the heart of being" and not outside of it.

### III. THE TRIPLE ORDER OF EXISTENCE

Bonaventure tends to see everything in terms of a triple division not so much because this is a mystical number as there is the necessity for creation to reflect the supreme archetypal reality of the trinity. When three aspects of a thing are discovered, there is a higher likelihood of its accuracy than a mere dialectic or monolithic approach. Creation being a product of the creating trinity necessarily carries traces of triple aspects in all things.

The word "order" is an ambivalent term that has a variety of meanings. By cosmic order one can mean the orderliness, the pattern or the ordination of the universe. For Bonaventure there are three ways to conceive of cosmic order, and there are three orders within each of these orders. We find the following division :

1. existence : nature, wisdom, goodness.
2. causality : efficient, exemplary, final.
3. essence : being, beauty, return.

First of all there is a triple existence of all things. "While things have an objective existence, they exist also in the soul, by (innate or) acquired knowledge, or by grace or by glory; and they exist in the Eternal Art,"<sup>18</sup> which is the Son.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, Translation by Jose de Vinck, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J. 1963, p. 69.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12. Cf. *Itinerarium*, Ch. I, § 2.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12 footnote: "In Bonaventure's writings, Eternal Art means the wisdom of God as existing in the Word and applying to creation: or again, the perfect representative reason, within the Son, of all that the Father can bring forth, and particularly, of all that He proposes to bring forth by His action *ad extra*."

According to these three modes of existence of things, there is a three-fold order. "Because in the first Principle, who is the object of Scripture, there is the order of nature by virtue of His existence, the order of Wisdom by virtue of His providence, and the order of goodness by virtue of His operation."<sup>20</sup> The objective existence of things corresponds to the order of nature, the subjective existence of things in the soul corresponds to both orders of Wisdom (by innate or acquired knowledge) and goodness (by grace or glory). And the existence of things in the Eternal Art corresponds to all three orders by virtue of the exemplarity of the Eternal Art in creature, in wisdom and in goodness.

#### a. *The Order of Nature*

The objective existence of things presents an orderly and well structured hierarchy of creatures. "To indicate the *order of nature*, Scripture makes clear how God was to operate. In the beginning, before time was, the luminous, translucent, and opaque natures were brought from non-being into being."<sup>21</sup> It is a great chain of being or great pyramid of beings arranged in perfect harmony and gradation with each creature occupying its proper place according to its degree of perfection. The word hierarchy was used by Pseudo-Dionysius to denote the grades of ruling powers in the Church, and in the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* where he hierarchizes the Christians and the sacraments according to their proximity to God, the word hierarchy becomes a totality of "order or disposition — in regular series of steps or stages — by which God communicates himself to man."<sup>22</sup> Creation being a self-diffusion of God's perfection and creativity is therefore manifested in a hierarchy.

This idea of a graded universe is present throughout the history of ideas as Lovejoy points out so well. For Thomas "the greatest good in things created is the perfection of the universe, consisting in the order of distinct things; for always the perfection of the whole has precedence over the perfection of the individual parts."<sup>23</sup> The model of physical organism operates here just as it does in St. Paul where he compares the Church to a body whose every part plays a

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>22</sup> Dom Denys Rutledge, *Cosmic Theology — The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of Pseudo-Denys: An Introduction*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, p. 49.

<sup>23</sup> Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Ch. 44, No. 2.

role for the whole. The good of the whole demands that there should be a variety of grades of being, for "the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things."<sup>24</sup> For Plotinus, even the lower grades are necessary for the perfection of the whole, for "to eliminate these low characters would be to spoil the beauty of the whole ; and it is by means of them that it becomes complete."<sup>25</sup>

"But as no one can appreciate the beauty of a poem unless his vision embraces it as a whole, so no one can see the beauty of the orderly governance of creation unless he has an integral view of it."<sup>25a</sup> And this integral view is brought about by the book of Scripture. For Bonaventure, Scripture has four dimensions : breadth, length, height and depth. "The breadth of the Scriptures refers to the number of their parts ; the length, to their account of the times and periods ; the height, to their description of the *orderly levels of hierarchies* ; and the depth, to their abundant allegorical senses and interpretations."<sup>26</sup>

Height, also, is found in the Scriptures as they unfold. It is seen in the description of the hierarchies and of their ordered ranks : the ecclesiastical, the angelical, and the divine ; or, in other terms, the subcelestial, the celestial, and the supercelestial. The first are described plainly, the second somewhat more indirectly, and the third in an even more mysterious way. So Scriptures are high, higher, or more high accordingly as they describe the ecclesiastical, the angelical, or the divine hierarchies.<sup>27</sup>

Thus Bonaventure lists three major hierarchies in the universe. The division is probably inspired by Pseudo-Dionysius' *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* and *Celestial Hierarchy*. In the *Hexaëmeron* he quotes Pseudo-Dionysius defining hierarchy as : "a divine order, a knowledge and action assimilated as much as possible to the deiform, and rising proportionately in the likeness of God toward the lights conferred upon it from on high."<sup>28</sup>

"It is clear that for the Pseudo-Dionysius there is an integral connection between the two hierarchies, the celestial and the ecclesiastical. It has been assumed that the one forms a continuation

<sup>24</sup> Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia, Q. 47, Art. 2.

<sup>25</sup> Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, 3, 7.

<sup>25a</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 12.

<sup>28</sup> Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, 21, § 17, translation from José de Vinck, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J. 1970.

of the other, the ecclesiastical hierarchy being attached, as it were, to the lower end of the celestial and forming a regular series of steps with it.”<sup>29</sup> The hierarchical arrangement of the universe is a presupposition in the theology of Bonaventure as it is throughout the history of ideas evidenced in Plotinus, Thomas, Dante, and Leibniz.

In point of fact, this concept plays a most important role in the writings of the Seraphic Doctor, even dominating his whole thought. We find traces of this doctrine in his teaching regarding the creation and the universal order, in which God is the centre and the various creatures gather around Him in gradated spheres. We encounter it again in the Blessed Trinity, in the hierarchy of the divine processions. Among the angels, too, there is a hierarchy of perfection — of knowledge, acts, and communications. We see it once more when our saintly author discusses the hierarchical ordering of the internal faculties of the human soul. Finally, we arrive at what the Seraphic Doctor terms the ecclesiastical hierarchy.<sup>30</sup>

This great chain of being is such that the top member of each hierarchy touches the lowest of the hierarchy above it. In this way there is an unbroken cosmic chain stretching from the creating divinity to the last of all creatures. Considering them as individuals of unequal perfections within the cosmos, it is a great chain ; whereas considering them as members of the same species in a general hierarchy, it is more a pyramid of species.<sup>31</sup>

Following Pseudo-Dionysius, both the ecclesiastical and celestial hierarchies can be subdivided into three divisions and each in turn can be subdivided into three. The supercelestial hierarchy consists in the trinity. Being the highest, the supercelestial hierarchy is therefore the archetype for the lower hierarchies.

And because of this, hierarchy is disposed on three levels, demonstrated, as it were, in a threefold manner. And it is necessary that any (hierarchy) have three orders, and that the first be appropriated to the Father, the second to the Son, and the third to the Holy Spirit ; and that the first hierarchy be appropriated to the Father in all three (persons), the second to the Son in all three (persons), and the third to the Holy Spirit in all three (persons).<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Dom Denys Rutledge, *Cosmic Theology*, p. 30.

<sup>30</sup> Matthew M. De Benedictis, *The Social Thought of Saint Bonaventure*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1946, p. 124.

<sup>31</sup> Arthur Lovejoy, *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>32</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, 21, 18.

In the celestial hierarchy, Bonaventure subdivides in each of the "three levels of the hierarchy : the higher, the intermediate, and the lower. The higher level comprises the Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim ; the intermediate, the Dominions, Virtues, and Powers ; the lower, the Principalities, Archangels and Angels."<sup>33</sup> The trinitarian archetype is represented thus in the angelic hierarchy : "The order corresponding to Father as he is in Himself is that of the Thrones ; the order corresponding to the Father as He is in the Son is that of the Cherubim ; the order corresponding to the Father as He is in the Holy Spirit is that of the Seraphim. . . ."<sup>34</sup> Accordingly we have the following scheme of the trinitarian archetype in the celestial hierarchy :

order of Father	Father – Thrones Son – Cherubim Holy Spirit – Seraphim
order of Son	Father – Dominions Son – Virtues Holy Spirit – Powers
order of Holy Spirit	Father – Principalities Son – Archangels Holy Spirit – Angels

Thrones are the proper expression of power in the Father ; Virtues are proper to the exemplarity of the Son ; and Angels are suitably the errand runners for the perfection and sanctification of the human race.

The ecclesiastical hierarchy is concerned with illumination and purification, and "all this is done through the one Hierarch, Jesus Christ, who is Hierarch not only in the hierarchy of the Church by reason of the human nature He assumed, but also in the angelical hierarchy, and again, as the Second Person sharing the supercelestial hierarchy of the most Blessed Trinity."<sup>35</sup> In this division of the third hierarchy, Bonaventure certainly owes his inspiration to the

<sup>33</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 90.

<sup>34</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, 21, 20. For detailed subdivision of the angelic hierarchy, see the whole Coll. 21.

<sup>35</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 13.

Pseudo-Dionysian idea of progressive illumination and initiation. The *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* is divided by Dionysius into three hierarchies :

the mysteries (sacraments)	initiation – Baptism synaxis – Communion unction – Confirmation
the ministers	bishops priests deacons
laity	the initiates – penitens the holy people of God the highest perfection – monks <sup>36</sup>

Parallel to this, Bonaventure divides the Church Militant into three orders after the Trinitarian patterns : "And so, there are three (sets of) orders : the fundamental, which correspond to the Father, the promoting, which correspond to the Son, the consummating, which correspond to the Holy Spirit." <sup>37</sup> In terms of dignity there are likewise three orders : cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting — each of which is subdivided into three offices in the Church. In terms of practice, there are three states of life : active, mixed, and contemplative — each of which is subdivided into three types. <sup>38</sup> In the three states of life are the *sacri principes*, *sacri consules*, and the *sacra plebs* <sup>39</sup> — each correspondingly responsible for the *bonum interius*, *bonum exterius* and the *bonum inferius*. <sup>40</sup> Accordingly three major functions are performed by three classes of people in the medieval society of the Church Militant : the monastic class responsible for spiritual goods ; clerics responsible for administrative and social goods ; and the laity responsible for material good, especially agriculture. <sup>41</sup>

<sup>36</sup> See Denys Rutledge, *Cosmic Theology*.

<sup>37</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, 22, 5.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* For detailed division, see the whole of *Coll. 22*.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, *Coll. 22*, § 18.

<sup>40</sup> Bonaventure, *De Perfectione Evangelica*, Q. 2, a. 3 (Quaracchi V, p. 161).

<sup>41</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, 22, § 16–23.

b. *The Order of Wisdom*

Bonaventure sees triplicity in the whole of creation; cosmic order is thus triple in every possible way.

To indicate the *order of wisdom* in disposing, Scripture shows that the threefold nature was not divided and furnished in a single operation. To correspond to the trineness of created nature, separation also took three days, and furnishing, another three. Thus, as God in the beginning, before the dawn of time, created a triple nature all at once, even so, when time began its course, he used a triple measure of duration, as it were a triple day, to make a triple division in the triple created nature; and He used another triple day to provide the triply distinct nature with a triple furnishing.<sup>42</sup>

In this passage our author has surrendered himself completely to his love for triplets! Starting from the trinity as an a priori model for creation, Bonaventure is determined in his search for triplicity in cosmic order.

The order of wisdom is the order of knowledge, of exemplarity, and of the Son par excellence. The order of wisdom is the middle point of the triple orders of existence — just as exemplarity is central to divine emanating; as Christ is central to knowledge; and the Son is centric to the trinity. In his Christocentric theology, Christ is the medium and center of all orders: metaphysical, physical, mathematical, logical, ethical, juridical and theological.<sup>43</sup> "Bonaventure grounds truth both metaphysically and epistemologically in exemplarism."<sup>44</sup> The true metaphysician is the one who understands exemplarism and traces the way to God. Aristotle is therefore considered to be a mere philosopher of nature and not a metaphysician for he cursed the ideas of Plato and did not understand exemplarism.<sup>45</sup>

Wisdom is to know the truth — and truth is threefold: subjective, objective and eternal: corresponding to the threefold existence of things in the soul, in themselves, and in the Eternal Art. Thomas maintains a parallel division of truth: ontological, logical and in God. But, though the divisions are similar, the way to obtain truth is radically different. For Thomas, the mind attains to true knowledge of things by understanding the ontological truth of things in them-

<sup>42</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 83.

<sup>43</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, I, § 12.

<sup>44</sup> Ewert Cousins, *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>45</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, Coll. 6, § 2-4.

selves, for the proper object of the human mind is the quiddity of sensible things and not their divine source. Whereas for Bonaventure, the mind grasps the rectitude of things first and foremost in their source — the divine Exemplar. In the exemplar are the Platonic forms by which things are what they are. "He links the intelligible world to the generation of the Son from the Father in the Christian Trinity and he associates the ratio aeterna, with the eternal Word of Christian revelation."<sup>46</sup> Thus the neo-platonism of Bonaventure is a combination of many elements.

In *Questiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi*, Bonaventure discusses the question of certainty of knowledge. Things are seen more clearly and with more certitude in the eternal reasons in the mind of God, for "the exemplary likeness expresses the thing more perfectly than the caused thing itself expresses itself."<sup>47</sup> But that is by no means the only way to know. Natural reason still functions with the concrete intelligible entity. "For knowledge with certitude, an eternal reason is necessarily required as regulative and motive principle — not, indeed, as the sole principle, or in its own complete clarity, but acting with the created reason, and seen by us 'in part', in accordance with our wayfaring condition."<sup>48</sup>

The existence of things in the soul by way of knowledge is obtained in two ways: by innate or acquired knowledge. Innate knowledge is by way of illumination. The mind perceives without labor the *rationes seminales* in things which correspond to the eternal reasons in the Divine Exemplar. Acquired knowledge is attained by the rational power of the mind and would seem to suggest some of the autonomy of Thomistic epistemology.

Although we abstract the forms of things from sense objects, these very objects are ultimately grounded in the divine mind so that in some degree we attain in a shadowy way the very archetypes of things in God. Thus our minds are bathed in the divine light and in touch with the eternal forms. God is in our mind and our mind is in God. All things are in God and God in all things. Thus the epistemology of illumination and the metaphysics of exemplarism establish profound intimacy between God and creatures.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Ewert Cousins, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>47</sup> Bonaventure, *Questiones Disputatae de Scientia Christi*, 9, 2, ad. 9 (Quaracchi, V. 10).

<sup>48</sup> Fairweather, Eugen. (ed.), *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham*, London, S.C.M., 1956, p. 393.

<sup>49</sup> Ewert Cousins, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

Thus there is a graded hierarchy in the order of wisdom. Knowledge comes down from the trinitarian source mediated by the eternal reasons in the divine logos and the seminal reasons innate in the mind. The human mind with its *ratio inferior* is the last in the rung of intelligibility.

All that enters into a hierarchical order — save the first term which gives all and receives nothing and the last term which receives all and gives nothing — is placed between the higher influence which it receives and the lower degrees on which its own influence is exercised. This influence of the superior upon the inferior is threefold, namely: purification, illumination, and perfection. Hierarchy, therefore, implies concurrence of entities, actions, and influences — entities placed one above the other, with each receiving influence from the one above it and imparting influence to the one below it.<sup>50</sup>

### c. *The Order of Goodness*

Thirdly there is the order of goodness which is an ethical or value hierarchy. According to the ontological hierarchy, there is a great chain of being according to the greater or lesser degree of perfection of the creature. But perfection in the order of being connotes the entitative state of the creature and does not necessarily consider cosmic order in terms of ethical goodness and value. The Pseudo-Dionysian principle of “*bonum est diffusivum sui*” applies to goodness both as entitative perfection as well as moral perfection of spiritual entities. Hence in this order of goodness, Bonaventure considers the hierarchical order of perfection especially under the aspect of moral perfection. In Thomistic terms it would be an accidental order since it deals with states of beings and not beings themselves. These states form an order of their own.

“Order, however, supposes a superior, an inferior, and a middle degree. The wisdom of the Divine, therefore, is manifested in the universe, for here we have a superior, an inferior, and a middle degree.”<sup>51</sup> God, being the “*summum bonum*”, is for Bonaventure our yardstick to measure good and evil and by which we can determine the superior from the inferior. All goodness is for him shadows and vestiges of the *summum bonum*.

Further, in regard to the requirement of faith that we have a concept of God of the loftiest order, this is proved not only by Holy Scripture,

<sup>50</sup> De Benedictis, *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

but also by the whole of creation. ...a Creator who granted us natural intelligence and reason, by which we are able to judge that living beings are superior to lifeless, sensitive to insensitive, rational to brute, immortal to mortal, potent to powerless ; just to unjust, beautiful to ugly, good to evil ; incorruptible to corruptible, changeless to mutable, invisible to visible, incorporeal to bodily, blessed to reprobate.<sup>52</sup>

In this enumeration of divine attributes we can see a whole value hierarchy set up according to the proximity or distance from the fullness of each of the attributes. Just as the hierarchical structure of this order of goodness resembles the ontological order of emanation studied before, so the exemplarism of goodness resembles the order of wisdom. The value of a creature is derived from exemplarity of the Word just as knowledge is so dependent. Insofar as a creature resembles the Word, it is to that degree of value and moral goodness. "Thus all the objects of the created world are related in an interlocked harmony like the music of the chords of a lyre or the colors of a stained glass window, representing the divine exemplar in various degrees : as shadows, vestiges, images, similitudes."<sup>53</sup> "Exemplarism, therefore, for the Seraphic Doctor, is the very heart of metaphysics. From it flows all light ; without it there is total darkness."<sup>54</sup> According to the degree of participation in the Exemplar, so is the grade of goodness and value. The varying degrees thus set up a hierarchy of values.

All of the above three orders of existence — nature, wisdom, and goodness — take their primordial archetype from the generation of the Son from the Father. Simultaneous with this generation is the generation of all orders of the cosmos. These are three names for the Son.

The Son is properly the Image, the Word, and the Son as such. Likewise, therefore, Image designates Him as the expressed likeness, Word as the expressing likeness, and Son as the personal likeness. Again, Image designated Him as the likeness in the order of form, Word as the likeness in the order of reason, and Son as the likeness in the order of nature.<sup>55</sup>

The cosmic order of nature corresponds to the expressed likeness of the Image as participated being ; the cosmic order of wisdom

<sup>52</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>53</sup> Cousins, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>54</sup> De Benedictis, *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>55</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, pp. 39-40.

corresponds to the expressing likeness in the order of reason or Word ; and the cosmic order of goodness corresponds to the personal likeness of the Son in the generation and diffusion of the good.

#### IV. THE TRIPLE ORDER OF CAUSALITY

This brings us to a consideration of the world from the point of view of causality. While the archetypal model for creation is the generation of the Son from the Father, nevertheless different modes of causality are appropriated to different persons of the trinity. After the appropriations of orders and attributes to the persons of the trinity, there is a

third series of appropriations : In the Father is the efficient principle, in the Son the exemplary principle, and in the Holy Spirit the final principle. And from this lastly, derives a fourth series : of omnipotence to the Father, of omniscience to the Son, and of supreme will or benevolence to the Holy Spirit. <sup>55a</sup>

Nine characteristics are found in creation corresponding to the threefold causality of the trinity. "We indicate that the creature is an effect of the creating Trinity in virtue of a triple causality : efficient, through which creatures are given unity, mode, and measure ; exemplary, through which they are given truth, species, and number ; final, through which they are given goodness, order, and weight." <sup>56</sup> Thus we have the following scheme : <sup>57</sup>

cosmic orders	characteristics	causality	appropriations
1 nature	unity, mode, measure	efficient	Father
2 wisdom	truth, species, number	exemplary	Son
3 goodness	goodness, order, weight	final	Holy Spirit

In the order of nature every creature has unity, mode and measure by efficient causality in increasing specification. Oneness

<sup>55a</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>57</sup> See Bonaventure, *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, Translation by José de Vinck, Vol. III, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J., p. 26 footnote.

is that by which a creature has separate existence — “a state of being subsequent upon a state of non-being”.<sup>58</sup> It is an emanation of the one from the One. One can be considered as a transcendental or as the most general status of being for a creature. “The word *modus* has the significance, not of manner, but of essence, that which constitutes a thing to be what it is.”<sup>59</sup> It is a specified existence of a created one. “*Mensura* corresponds to *modus*, and has the same signification” in an even more specified form.<sup>60</sup>

In the order of wisdom and intelligibility, the Logos is the exemplar of truth. With him as the archetype, substantial truth diffuses itself into species and numbers in increasing specification. Intelligible species are the eternal reasons in the Logos by which truth is dispensed to created intellects in distinct numbers or temporal ideas. The Logos is the exemplar of knowing just as the Son and Eternal Art is the Exemplar in the order of efficiency. Exemplarity is in the center of the triple cosmic orders and triple causality because it is central to Bonaventure’s philosophy just as the Son is middle point of the trinity. Hence exemplary causality is concurrent with all types of causality although it is most properly so in the order of wisdom.

In the order of goodness we find the process of diffusion of the good. Just as unity and truth can be substantially considered, so goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. The order in the self-diffusion of the good is both an orderly diffusion and an ordination towards an end. “Order can be considered in a twofold way : as the order of parts to a whole, and as the order of parts to an end.”<sup>61</sup> The former pertains to the exemplarity of design and pattern and the latter is in regard to a teleological orientation of the good — “for weight is defined as an orderly tendency.”<sup>62</sup> Hence weight is the most appropriate manifestation of final causality ; species the manifestation of exemplary causality ; and oneness of efficient causality.

<sup>58</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 71.

<sup>59</sup> Emma Jane Marie Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, Franciscan Institute, N.Y., 1953, p. 51.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>62</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 71.

## V. THE TRIPLE ORDER OF ESSENCE

Cosmic order can be considered in another way which for want of a better name we call the order of essence. Parallel to the order of existence, we have a different triple division: of being, beauty, and return. In different passages, the nine traits of cosmic order are arranged in a different way by Bonaventure indicating a different approach to considering the order of creation.

Every creature must bear the same threefold reference to the first Cause: for every one exists by virtue of the efficient cause, is patterned after the exemplary cause, and ordained toward the final cause. For this reason, every creature is one, true, and good; has mode, species, and order; and has measure, distinct existence (number), and weight.<sup>63</sup>

We can arrange the different orders discussed so far in the following scheme.

existence				
	nature	wisdom	goodness	
being	one	true	good	substantiality
beauty	mode	species	order	propriety
return	measure	number	weight	orientation
	efficiency	exemplarity	finality	

causality

essence

essential

trait

a. *The Order of Being*

The order of being is related to the order of nature; the order of beauty is related to the order of wisdom; and the order of return is related to the order of goodness. In virtue of this correspondence, there is likewise an analogous correspondence of causality and correspondence of trinitarian appropriations. Hence oneness, truth and goodness can be appropriated to the efficiency of the Father in virtue of its substantiality. Likewise, mode, species and order in the order

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

of beauty can be appropriated to the exemplary proportionality of the Son. While measure, number, and weight can be appropriated to the finality of the Holy Spirit.

The model of trinitarian emanation operates behind this triple division here insofar as both beauty and return emanates from the order of being as increasing specification and diversification of the substantial order of being; and likewise wisdom presupposes both wisdom and nature for its operation.

This should be understood as follows. Since the first Principle is utterly exalted and utterly perfect, it follows that in Him are found in utter perfection the highest and most universal properties of being. These properties are: oneness, truth, and goodness. They do not narrow down the concept of being in terms of distinct supposita, but determine it rationally. For 'one' describes being in that it is whole, by reason of inner indivision; 'true' in that it is intelligible, by reason of indivision between itself and its proper species; and 'good' in that it is communicable, by reason of indivision between itself and its proper operation. This triple indivision has an orderly reference to understanding, in the sense that true presupposes one, and good presupposes both one and true.<sup>64</sup>

Supreme substantiality of one, true, and good is appropriated to the Father insofar as He is the principle and origin of both trinitarian and cosmic emanations. Beauty is appropriated to the Son as the expression and Art of the Father. And the order of return is appropriated to the Holy Spirit as the summation of goodness in a trinitarian and cosmic return. This is so because "supreme oneness and priority imply the concepts of principle and origin; supreme beauty and resplendence, the concepts of expression and exemplarity; supreme beneficence and goodness, the concept of end — for 'the good and the end are the same'."<sup>65</sup>

### b. *The Order of Beauty*

Besides one, true, and good, every creature must possess a fourth transcendental: beauty. Beauty consists in mode, species, and order<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>66</sup> "Mode, species and order" is derived from Augustine as characterizing the universe. It is interesting to note that Thomas defines the essence of goodness as consisting in mode, species, and order: 'Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable.' (*Summa Theologica* Ia, Q. 5, Art. 5). But goodness here connotes more the perfection of form than goodness

which are specifications of the one, true, and good. "Mode (of being) refers to the creature's dependency upon the efficient cause (*a Deo* — by the power of God); species, to the creature's conformity with the exemplary cause (*secundum Deum* — according to God); order, to the creature's ordination toward the final cause (*propter Deum* — for God as an end)."<sup>67</sup> The proper expression of one, true, and good constitutes beauty. "Whatever has being has form, and whatever has form has beauty."<sup>68</sup> Mode, species and order are the proper forms for one, true and good.

The four transcendental attributes of being — unity, truth, goodness, and beauty — are founded on the nature of being. They add a certain richness to the concept, depending upon one's point of view. They all presuppose the intelligibility of being in which they share, and in this sharing, they also presuppose one another. Beauty presupposes the good, and the good presupposes the true; and the true, in turn, presupposes the one.<sup>69</sup>

When Bonaventure says "*Pulcritudo consistit in ordine*",<sup>70</sup> he understands it in the widest sense<sup>71</sup> and does not refer merely to the ordination of good to an end. "Bonaventure had a definite idea of what constituted the beautiful. Beauty can be found wherever reality is, because beauty belongs to the order of formal causality and where there is being, there must be form, and hence beauty."<sup>72</sup>

The Art of the Father, as the perfect form and expression of the Father, is therefore the most beautiful of all and is consequently the exemplar of beauty. In material things "beauty is nothing other than numerical equality or a certain relation of parts with agreeable color."<sup>73</sup> But the basic pattern of all beauty is in the trinity where there is perfect "numerical equality". In this supreme hierarchy,

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of being and so coincides with our concept of beauty here. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species, and order."<sup>74</sup> (S.T. *ut supra*).

<sup>67</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 71.

<sup>68</sup> Spargo, p. 34. *Op. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>70</sup> Bonaventure, *II Sent.* 9, unic. 6 (Quaracchi, II, p. 252).

<sup>71</sup> Spargo, *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>73</sup> Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*, Ch. II, § 5. This is taken from Augustine, *VI de Musica*, 13, 18.

because of its supreme perfection there is found both the beauty of the most perfect equality and the similitude of equals.<sup>74</sup>

The order of beauty is a hierarchy leading to its essence in the uncreated beauty of the trinity. Bonaventure sees a graded hierarchy of beauty reflecting the substantial beauty of the trinity. "There is indeed great beauty in the fabric of the world; but there is much greater beauty in the Church, for it is adorned with the splendor of the holy charismatic gifts; and greater beauty still in the heavenly Jerusalem; and the greatest beauty of all in the supreme and most blessed Trinity."<sup>75</sup>

Anything whatsoever can be considered in three ways: in itself, in comparison with other things of the universe, and in comparison to its end. What one considers when one considers a thing in itself is called modus; for anything whatsoever in itself is its own limitation and modification; when it is compared to other things, it is species that is considered, by which is understood the beauty of parts according to the position that they have in the whole; when a thing is compared in respect to its relation to the end, it is ordo that is understood. For a thing is ordered when it directly tends to its end.<sup>76</sup>

Bonaventure sees the whole created universe as a grand harmony representing the divine exemplar as shadows, vestiges, images and similitudes in increasing density of reality.<sup>77</sup>

When one looks upon the things of the world as created things, which consequently bear the mark of their Creator, they are considered as vestiges, having modus, species and ordo. The word modus has the significance, not of manner, but of essence, that which constitutes a thing to be what it is. Then he points out how great a harmony there is between the two sets of characteristics in the creature's relation to God, even in respect to a common causality. Thus unity corresponds to modus in so far as it looks to God as efficient Cause; truth corresponds to species in so far as it looks to Him as exemplary Cause; and goodness corresponds to ordo which looks to God as final Cause.<sup>78</sup>

Thus mode, species and order are the beautiful expressions of the one, true and good. Ontological beauty consists primarily in

<sup>74</sup> Bonaventure, *II Sent.* 9, 1, 8. (Quaracchi II, p. 256): "In suprema hierarchia propter summam perfectionem reperitur et pulchritudo ex perfectissima aequalitate et similitudine parium."

<sup>75</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 13.

<sup>76</sup> Spargo, *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>77</sup> See *Itinerarium*. Cf. Cousins, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>78</sup> Spargo, *Op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

this conformity — especially to the true which is the exemplar of beauty. Bonaventure

says that everything is beautiful according to its own genus, that is, in so far as it corresponds to ontological truth. It must be, as an *exemplatum*, what it is supposed to be according to the exemplary idea in the Divine Mind, and thus, by a conformity between what represents and what is represented, beauty will result.<sup>79</sup>

Hence the bride in the Canticle of Canticles is black but beautiful because it is her nature to be black;<sup>80</sup> and the ugly Franciscan superior mentioned by the Chronicler Salimbene de Adam is beautiful despite his misshapen head since such is the exemplar in the divine mind!<sup>81</sup> Only sin is ugly for Bonaventure, because it is a privation of mode, species and order.<sup>82</sup>

### c. *The Order of Return*

There are two ways to consider the exemplification of the transcendentals of the order of being: statically the order of parts to a whole in the order of beauty, and dynamically the order of parts to an end in the order of return. These are two distinct ways of considering cosmic order, "yet these two orders are conformed to each other in such a way that the order of parts in the universe is on account of the order to an end."<sup>83</sup> A certain priority is evidenced here. "To elucidate still further, Saint Bonaventure compares the order of the world to a most beautiful song: the things of the world are ordered best to an end without violence to the order of the universe, as a song flows on according to the best harmonies, some parts succeeding others, until the thing is perfectly ordered to an end..."<sup>84</sup>

Even though considered in itself the pattern and design of the world might not be the best of all possible worlds in the Leibnizian sense, nevertheless in virtue of an end, it is the best. The dialectic of the two orders: static beauty and dynamic return produces, in

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>80</sup> Bonaventure, *Coll. in Hexaëmeron*, Coll. 14, § 4 (Quaracchi V, pp. 393).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Cousins, *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>82</sup> Bonaventure, *II Sent.* 32, 3, 1. (Quaracchi II, p. 770): "Et quoniam omne peccatum, sive sit actuale, sive contractum, est 'privatio modi, speciei et ordinis' (secundum Augustinum, *de Natura Boni*, c. 4)."

<sup>83</sup> Spargo, *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

the course of history, a superior order that comprises and immunizes the ugliness and evil en route. "Although contingent things have contingent essences, they have, nevertheless, a necessary order, so that, although a thing may not be best in itself, yet it is ordered best."<sup>85</sup> In this sense each particular moment in history finds its full significance in the eschaton. The order of return is the order of grace and providence dynamically geared towards the heavenly Jerusalem.<sup>86</sup>

In the order of return we witness divine providence. "Since all things flow from the first and utterly perfect Principle, who is omnipotent, all-wise, and all-beneficent, their production must reflect the same three attributes or perfections."<sup>87</sup> The "all-beneficent" principle is the perfective principle of creation, and this is "by virtue of His operations."<sup>88</sup> This principle "has disposed all things by measure, and number and weight,"<sup>89</sup> towards a final goal. The creature who is well ordered in goodness after the exemplar is thus ordained in virtue of it towards an end by means of measure, number and weight.<sup>90</sup> The more established the goodness, the heavier the weight to return. In the angelic hierarchy, "they become so perfectly ordered that they could no longer lose this ordination either in ascending to see God, or in descending to serve men."<sup>91</sup>

Measure, number and weight are further specifications and concretizations of the one, true and good. It is that by which a being is dynamically orientated towards an end in virtue of its goodness. According to Bonaventure, these are the "*habitudines*" mentioned in the Book of Wisdom by which a being is in relation to others (one), to the principle (true), and to the end (good).<sup>92</sup>

*Mensura* corresponds to *modus*, and has the same signification. *Numerus* corresponds to *species*. Thus the meaning of the statement, All things are full of numbers, becomes clear, for one already understands

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>86</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 11. Cf. *Itinerarium*.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>90</sup> Wisdom 11: 21.

<sup>91</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 91.

<sup>92</sup> Bonaventure, *I Sent.* 3, 1 dubium 3 (Quaracchi I, 79): "Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura dispositi. In numero enim intelligitur principiorum distinctio, in pondere propria ipsorum inclinatio, in mensura eorum ad invicem propotione."

that everything has a certain species, by which it is known and according to which it is beautiful. *Pondus* signifies the natural inclination of a thing, and is clearly related to *ordo*, the direction of a thing to an end.<sup>93</sup>

For Thomas too, measure, number and weight are concrete exemplifications of mode, species and order. "For it is written: Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number and weight. And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order."<sup>94</sup>

"Reduction" here has the inverse meaning from that of Bonaventurean reduction which is a retracing to the source.<sup>95</sup> For Thomas however, reducing is to trace downward in exemplification or upward in the Porphyrean tree. It is a further specification rather than a return to the source.

Augustine is quoted by Thomas as holding to the same position, for he says: Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability."<sup>96</sup> The only difference here is that for Bonaventure, weight does not give rest and stability but rather a dynamic forward return completing the cosmic cycle — "for weight is defined as an orderly tendency" by Bonaventure.<sup>97</sup> Employing the logic of coincidence of opposites, he sees in the furtherest point of emanation a built-in movement of return to the source. The most specified concrete being is likewise endowed with a weight to return. Thus from one comes the many cosmic orders, and from weight the universe returns to its source. It will be re-united to God as the fourth division of nature — the order of the neither created nor creates.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Thus the various orders are intertwined cohesively to form one grand pattern of emanation and return. It is typical of Bonaventure's theology and philosophy that there be no stray element. Every thought is intimately woven into the whole system so much so that it is impossible to present one aspect of his thought without

<sup>93</sup> Spargo, *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>94</sup> Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia, Q. 5, Art. 5, Obj. 1.

<sup>95</sup> See Bougerol, Guy. *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure*, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J. 1964.

<sup>96</sup> Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia, Q. 5, Art. 5.

<sup>97</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 71.

bringing in the whole vision. To present one segment of the system is to do so at the risk of being unsystematic. Any extraction is bound to be incoherent in a system that is so coherent. His statements are not linear and clear-cut syllogisms that one can take out of context and still retain their intelligibility. Rather they are comprehensive and involved just as his cosmic order is. Ontology and methodology betray the same sort of cohesive integration in Bonaventure. From an examination of cosmic order, one is led by a spiral ascent to its exemplar in the trinity. In the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* he captures the quintessence of all cosmic ascent. Looking at the world from

the aspect of one contemplating, considering things in themselves, one sees in them weight, number, and measure — weight, which directs things to a certain location : number, by which they are distinguished from one another : and measure, by which they are limited. And so one sees in them mode, species, and order ; and also substance, power, and operation. From these one can rise as from the traces to understanding the power, wisdom, and immense goodness of the Creator.<sup>98</sup>

Thus because of trinitarian exemplarism, each division of cosmic order is intimately woven into the whole by virtue of the mutual communicability within the trinity.

Humanly speaking, the act of exemplating in God may be understood to consist in four elements : *Ideation*, or rational planning ; *Expression*, or setting forth the pattern in an intelligible form ; *Execution*, or bringing about the realization of the pattern as planned ; while, overshadowing these three is the *Intention*, or purpose, by which the exemplated object obtains its final perfection, ordination toward its proper end.<sup>99</sup>

*Ideation* corresponds to the cosmic order of wisdom ; *expression* corresponds to the order of beauty ; *execution* corresponds to the orders of nature and being ; and *intention* corresponds to the orders of goodness and return.<sup>100</sup>

It is in such a cohesive cosmic order that we can visualize Dante's rungs and rungs of sainted creatures chanting : holy, holy, holy. It is in such magnificence that we can hear Handel's choir sing in unison : Alleluia ! Alleluia ! Alleluia !

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<sup>98</sup> Bonaventure, *Itinerarium*, Ch. I, § 11.

<sup>99</sup> Bonaventure, *Breviloquium*, p. 59 footnote.

<sup>100</sup> See scheme on p. 323.

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